测量与盈余管理动机：一个批判的视角【外文翻译】.doc

1、1外文文献翻译原文MEASUREMENTANDMOTIVATIONSOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTACRITICALPERSPECTIVEIIIMOTIVATIONFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTHEWAKEOFENRONANDOTHERSIMILARCASES,RESEARCHERSHAVEBECOMEMOREINTERESTEDINSTUDYINGTHEMOTIVATIONSTHATDRIVEFIRMSTOMANAGETHEIRREPORTEDEARNINGSMANAGERSHAVEDIFFERENTINCENTIVESTOMANIPULATEREPORTEDEA

2、RNINGSTHEYMAYSMOOTHEARNINGSTOSIGNALINFORMATIONABOUTFUTUREPROSPECTSTOOUTSIDERSORTHEYMAYUSEACCOUNTINGITEMSTHATARESUBJECTTOTHEIRDISCRETIONOPPORTUNISTICALLYOREFFICIENTLYABROADDISCUSSIONABOUTALLSITUATIONSTHATMIGHTDRIVEMANAGERSTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSISPRESENTEDNEXTBASEDONTHAT,AJUDGEMENTCANBEDEDUCEDASTOWHETHE

3、REARNINGSMANIPULATIONSCOULDINCREASETHEQUALITYOFEARNINGSINTHISPAPER,THEDIFFERENTMOTIVATIONSFORMANAGERIALACCOUNTINGCHOICESAREGROUPEDINTOFIVECATEGORIES1MOTIVATIONSTOSMOOTHEARNINGS,2MOTIVATIONSTOREDUCETAXEXPENSES,3MOTIVATIONSFROMCONTRACTUALPERSPECTIVES,4MOTIVATIONSTOREDUCEPOLITICALCOSTS,AND5MOTIVATIONSC

4、OMINGFROMMANAGEMENTCHANGESMOTIVATIONSTOSMOOTHEARNINGSALARGENUMBEROFSTUDIESHAVECONSIDEREDINCOMESMOOTHINGASANEFFICIENTWAYTOREFLECTAGOODPICTUREABOUTTHEFIRMSFUTUREINCOMEFLOWSTOINVESTORSHEPWORTH1953,ANEARLIERCONTRIBUTOR,EXPLAINSTHATMANAGERSMAYSMOOTHEARNINGSTOREDUCETHEFIRMSEARNINGSFLUCTUATIONOVERTIMERATHE

5、RTHANTOINCREASEREPORTEDINCOMEFOLLOWINGTHESAMEARGUMENT,GORDON1964ESTABLISHESTHEINCOMESMOOTHINGHYPOTHESISANDCONSIDERSITASAGOODTOOLTOESTIMATEFUTUREINCOMEFLOWSTHROUGHENHANCINGTHEUSEFULNESSOFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONHISSTUDYISCONSIDEREDTOBETHEFIRSTSTEPTOWARDSFORMALINCOMESMOOTHINGRESEARCHWHICHHASSOUGHTTOFOCUS

6、ONTHEREALMOTIVATIONSTHATLEADMANAGERSTOSELECTSMOOTHINGACTIONSSUBRAMANYAM1996ANDCHANEYETAL1996ARGUETHATSMOOTHEARNINGSWOULDLEADTOANIMPROVEMENTIN2THEQUALITYOFEARNINGSONTHEOTHERHAND,LEV1989ARGUESTHATSMOOTHEARNINGSWOULDDECREASETHEQUALITYOFEARNINGSHELOOKSATTHEQUALITYOFEARNINGSFROMTHEVIEWPOINTOFAFFECTINGTHE

7、SEEARNINGSONINVESTORSINPREDICTINGTHESECURITYRETURNSDEFONDANDPARK1997PROVIDEEVIDENCETHATJOBSECURITYCREATESMOTIVESFORMANAGERSTOSMOOTHEARNINGSTHEYFINDTHATMANAGERSAPPEARTOSHIFTEARNINGSFROMGOODYEARSTOBADYEARSFOREXAMPLE,IFCURRENTEARNINGSARE“GOOD“ANDEXPECTEDEARNINGSARE“POOR“,MANAGERSWOULDSHIFTSOMEEARNINGSF

8、ROMTHEGOODYEARTOTHEPOORYEARINASIMILARPAPER,BAUWHEDEETAL2003DOCUMENTTHATPRIVATEANDPUBLICBELGIUMCOMPANIESAREMORELIKELYTOSMOOTHTHEIREARNINGSOPPORTUNISTICALLYWHENTHEIREARNINGSAREABOVETARGETANDMAYNOTABLETOREPORT“GOODEARNINGS“INTHENEXTYEARTHEIRSTUDYREPORTSTHATMANAGERSOFTHESECOMPANIESAREINVOLVEDINSMOOTHING

9、THEIREARNINGSTOMEETTHEBENCHMARKTARGETOFTHEPRIORYEARSEARNINGSASUMMARYOFSEVERALMOTIVATIONSFORMANAGERSTOSMOOTHEARNINGSISSTUDIEDBYRONENANDSADAN1981THEFIRSTMOTIVEISTOINCREASEINVESTORCONFIDENCEINTHEFIRMSFUTURESITUATIONTHEYEXPLAINTHATSMOOTHINGEARNINGSLEADSTOASTABLEFLOWOFEARNINGSTOSUPPORTAHIGHDIVIDENDPAYOUT

10、WHICHWILLAFFECTANDRAISETHECOMPANYSSHAREPRICESINCEDIVIDENDSAREAPPROPRIATEDFROMCURRENTINCOME,MANYINVESTORSBASETHEIRBUYINGANDSELLINGDECISIONSONTHEDIVIDENDYIELDIE,DIVIDINGTHEPRICEOFSTOCKINTOTHECURRENTANNUALDIVIDENDDIVIDENDSAREPAIDNOTONLYTOMEETSHAREHOLDERSEXPECTATIONBUTALSOTOENTICEPOTENTIALINVESTORSWHOAR

11、ELOOKINGFORARETURNONTHEIRCAPITALDIVIDENDSARETHEKEYTOSATISFYTHEPOTENTIALINVESTORSREQUIREMENTSCONSEQUENTLY,MANAGERSMAYSMOOTHEARNINGSTOPAYDIVIDENDSTOINCREASETHECOMPANYSSTOCKPRICESTHEREISACONNECTIONBETWEENDIVIDENDSANDSTOCKPRICES,SINCEDIVIDENDSARETHEMOSTRELIABLETOOLBYWHICHVALUEISMEASUREDFOREXAMPLE,WHENAD

12、IVIDENDISINCREASED,THEVALUEOFASTOCKMAYRISEONTHEOTHERHAND,IFADIVIDENDISCUT,THEPRICEOFTHESTOCKMAYGENERALLYFALLTHESECONDMOTIVEISTOENHANCEINVESTORABILITYTOPREDICTFUTURECASHFLOWSBARNEA,RONAN,ANDSADAN1975MENTIONTHATTHISMOTIVEISCONSISTENTWITHTHEOBJECTIVESOFFINANCIALSTATEMENTS,ASINCLUDEDINTHE1973REPORTPRESE

13、NTEDBYTHE3AMERICANINSTITUTEOFCERTIFIEDPUBLICACCOUNTSWHICHSTATESTHAT,“ANOBJECTIVEOFFINANCIALSTATEMENTSISTOPROVIDEUSEFULINFORMATIONTOINVESTORSANDCREDITORSINPREDICTING,COMPARING,ANDEVALUATINGPOTENTIALCASHFLOWS”ONEOFTHEOBJECTIVESOFFINANCIALSTATEMENTSISTOHELPINVESTORSINMAKINGTHEIRPREDICTIONSTHESEASSESSME

14、NTSRELYMOSTLYONNETINCOMETHISWOULDHELPMANAGERSTOSENDPOSITIVEINFORMATIONABOUTFUTUREEARNINGSTOOUTSIDERSSUBRAMANYAMSSTUDY1996FOCUSESONTHEAUTOCORRELATIONSANDCROSSCORRELATIONBETWEENTHELEVELSOFCURRENTANDFUTURENETINCOME,OPERATINGCASHFLOWS,ANDNONDISCRETIONARYINCOMETHERESULTSPROVIDEEVIDENCETHATTHEOPERATINGCAS

15、HFLOWSANDNONDISCRETIONARYINCOMEARELESSCORRELATEDWITHFUTURENETINCOMETHANCURRENTNETINCOMEHOWEVER,INGENERAL,AHIGHCORRELATIONISEVIDENTBETWEENFUTURELEVELSOFNETINCOMEANDCURRENTLEVELSOFNETINCOME,CASHFLOWSANDNONDISCRETIONARYINCOMEMOTIVATIONFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDTAXATIONONEOFTHEMOSTINFLUENTIALMOTIVATIONSFO

16、RMANAGERSTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSISINCOMETAXATIONTHEGAMEBETWEENTHETAXAUTHORITYANDFIRMSISANANCIENTONEASTHETAXAUTHORITYSETSUPANEWDEFENCETOPLUGTHEGAPS,FIRMSADJUSTTHEIRSTRATEGYANDTRYTOOPENUPANEWHOLEORTAKEADVANTAGESOFEXISTINGONESTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSTHESEADVANTAGESARETAKENBYMANAGERSWHOSIMPLYSELECTACCOUNTINGME

17、THODCHOICESTHATDECREASETHEEXPECTEDPRESENTVALUEOFTAXPAYMENTSONEOFTHEACCOUNTINGMETHODCHOICESTHATHASBEENMOSTUSEDFORSUCHPURPOSESISTHEINVENTORYCOSTINGMETHODESPECIALLYFIFOANDLIFOFOREXAMPLE,WHENMANAGERSSELECTLIFOORFIFO,THISMAYRESULTINCHANGESINAFIRMSCASHFLOWASARESULTOFTHEEFFECTOFSUCHINVENTORYCOSTMETHODSONTA

18、XABLEEARNINGSFIRMSUSUALLYUSEFIFOWHENPRICESGOUPTOINCREASEINCOMEREPORTINGWHICHWILLLEADTOINCREASETAXESANDDECREASECASHFLOWSHOWEVERINTHISCASE,LIFOMIGHTBEUSEDTODECREASEREPORTEDINCOME,WHICHRESULTSINADECREASEINTAXESANDANINCREASEINCASHFLOWSO,THETAXINCENTIVETOMAXIMISETHEFIRMSVALUEISAPRIMARYMOTIVETHATAFFECTSMA

19、NAGERSDECISIONSINADOPTINGTHEIRINVENTORYACCOUNTINGPOLICIESDOPUCHANDPINCUS1988INVESTIGATETHEEFFECTOFUSINGFIFOORLIFOONFIRMSACCOUNTINGNUMBERSTHEIRRESULTSREVEALTHATLIFOFIRMSHAVEAHIGHTAXSAVINGCOMPAREDTOTHOSEFIFOFIRMS4BUTTAXSAVINGISNOTTHEISSUEALLTHETIMEINSHORT,INCENTIVESHYPOTHESISINDICATETHATMANAGERSSELECT

20、THEINVENTORYMETHODTHATWILLMINIMISETHETAXCOSTSANDMAXIMISETHEFIRMSVALUECOPPENSAANDPEEK2005REPORTWHETHERTAXINCENTIVESHAVEANEFFECTONEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHEYEXAMINEPRIVATEFIRMSINEIGHTEUROPEANCOUNTRIESANDFINDTHATTHESEFIRMSAVOIDREPORTINGSMALLLOSSESWHENTHEREARENOCAPITALMARKETPRESSURESHOWEVER,INCOUNTRIESWHERET

21、HEREISTAXREGULATION,FIRMSDONOTAVOIDREPORTINGSMALLLOSSESSIMILARLY,ADHIKARIETAL2005TESTTHECONNECTIONBETWEENTHEEFFECTIVETAXRATEANDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINANONWESTERNCONTEXTTHEYINVESTIGATETHEEFFECTOFANANTICIPATEDTAXPOLICYINMALAYSIAONFIRMSINMANAGINGTHEIRINCOMETHEIRFINDINGSSHOWTHATPRIORTOAREDUCTIONINCORPORATE

22、TAX,BIGMALAYSIANFIRMSWITHLOWEFFECTIVETAXRATESSEEMTOREDUCETHEIRREPORTEDEARNINGSWHICHAFFECTTHETAXPOLICYMOTIVATIONSFROMCONTRACTUALPERSPECTIVESMOSTSTUDIESUNDERPATVIEWACCOUNTINGMETHODCHOICESASAFUNCTIONOFPOLITICALANDCONTRACTUALCOSTSANDINVESTIGATETHEDETERMINANTSOFMANAGEMENTSACCOUNTINGMETHODCHOICESBYFOCUSIN

23、GONINCENTIVESDERIVEDFROMEXPLICITCLAIMSEG,DEBTCONTRACTS,BONUSPLANS,ANDPOLITICALCOSTSZMIJEWSKIANDHAGERMAN1981STUDYFIRMSPORTFOLIOSOFFOURACCOUNTINGPROCEDURESDEPRECIATIONPROCEDURES,INVENTORYPROCEDURES,INVESTMENTTAXCREDITPROCEDURES,ANDTHEAMORTISATIONPERIODFORPASTSERVICEPENSIONCOSTSTHEIRRESULTSPROVIDESTRON

24、GEVIDENCETHATMANAGERSCHOICESOFAPORTFOLIOOFACCOUNTINGPROCEDURESVARYWITHTHEPRESENCEOFDEBTCONTRACTS,BONUSPLANS,ANDPOLITICALCOSTSPATASSUMESTHATTHEPRIMARYREASONSFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTARETOREDUCECONTRACTINGANDPOLITICALCOSTSANDINFORMATIONASYMMETRYCOMPENSATIONPLANSANDMOTIVATIONFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTACCOUNTING

25、NUMBERSAREUSEDEXTENSIVELYINCONTRACTSFOREXAMPLE,THECOMPENSATIONCONTRACTBETWEENAPRINCIPALANDANAGENTMAYBEDRAWNUPINSUCHAWAYASTORELY,INPART,ONINCOMENUMBERSDYE1988BELIEVESTHATUSINGACCOUNTINGNUMBERSINCOMPENSATIONCONTRACTSWOULDMOTIVATEMANAGERSTOMANAGETHESEACCOUNTINGNUMBERSHECONSIDERSSUCHMOTIVATIONASANINTERN

26、ALMOTIVATIONFOR5EARNINGSMANAGEMENTHEALY1985INHISSTUDYMENTIONSTHATTHEINCENTIVEFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTHECASEOFEXISTINGBONUSPLANSISANEXAMPLEOFCONTRACTUALMOTIVATIONTHISMOTIVATIONWOULDTRANSFERWEALTHFROMPRINCIPALSTOAGENTSTHROUGHTHEABILITYOFMANAGERSTOINCREASETHEIRCOMPENSATIONHEWASTHEFIRSTTOCREATEANAVEMODE

27、LTODETECTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTHEUSEDHISMODELTOPROVIDEEVIDENCETHATMANAGEMENTBONUSPLANSLINKEDTOACCOUNTINGNUMBERSWOULDGIVEMANAGERSAMOTIVATIONTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSUSINGACCRUALSTOMAXIMISETHEIRBONUSAWARDSDISCRETIONARYACCRUALS,WHICHARETHEDIFFERENCEBETWEENEARNINGSASDEFINEDINBONUSPLANANDOPERATINGCASHFLOW,AREUSED

28、TOCAPTUREMANAGEMENTMANIPULATIONSHEALYASSUMESTHATTHEREARETWOSITUATIONSWHEREMANAGERSWOULDHAVEANINCENTIVETOSELECTINCOMEDECREASINGACCOUNTINGCHOICESTHEFIRSTSITUATIONISWHENCURRENTEARNINGSAREBELOWTHETARGETMENTIONEDINTHEPLANLOWERBOUNDINTHISCASE,MANAGERSWOULDHAVEAMOTIVATIONTOTRANSFEREARNINGSTOFUTUREPERIODSTH

29、ESECONDSITUATIONOCCURSWHENACTUALEARNINGSEXCEEDANUPPERBOUNDSETBYTHEPLANINTHISSITUATION,MANAGERSWOULDPREFERTOTRANSFEREARNINGSTOFUTUREYEARSHOWEVER,HEALYMENTIONSTHATMANAGERSWOULDADOPTINCOMEINCREASINGACCOUNTINGCHOICESIFACTUALEARNINGSAREBETWEENTHETARGETLOWERBOUNDANDTHEUPPERBOUND,BECAUSETHATWILLINCREASETHE

30、IRBONUSESHISEMPIRICALRESULTSSHOWASTRONGRELATIONSHIPBETWEENDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSPOSITIVEORNEGATIVEANDTHEMOTIVATIONSRESULTEDFROMBONUSPLANSINSHORT,MANAGERSOFFIRMSWITHEARNINGSBASEDBONUSPLANSMAYBEMORELIKELYTOSELECTACCOUNTINGMETHODSCHOICESTHATINCREASECURRENTPERIODREPORTEDINCOMEBECAUSESUCHSELECTIONSINCREAS

31、ETHEPRESENTVALUEOFTHEIRBONUSESTHISRESULTSUPPORTSTHEARGUMENTTHATTHEEFFECTOFACCOUNTINGBASEDBONUSPLANSONACCOUNTINGPROCEDURECHOICESISCONSISTENTWITHTHEPATSHYPOTHESISTHATMEANSMANAGERSWILLHAVEMOTIVATIONSTOMANAGETHEIRREPORTEDINCOMETOGETSOMEBENEFITSREITENGAETAL,2002HOWEVER,RESEARCHERSINACCOUNTINGANDFINANCEWH

32、OHAVEINVESTIGATEDPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSHAVETENDEDTOEMPHASISETHEOWNER/CEORELATIONSHIPBERHOLD1971MENTIONSTHATTHEPRINCIPALSTENDTOMOTIVATETHEAGENTSTOPERFORMANAPPROPRIATEACTIONBYCONNECTINGACHARACTERISTICOFTHEAGENTSPERFORMANCETO6MONETARYPAYMENTREWARDORPUNISHMENTPOSITIVISTRESEARCHINACCOUNTINGANDFINANC

33、EMAYEMPHASISETHEOWNER/CEOCONTRACTBUTPRINCIPALAGENTRESEARCHISCONCERNEDWITHAGENERALTHEORYOFPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSTHECOMMONTHEMEBETWEENTHETWOSTREAMSOFRESEARCHINVOLVESTHEDETERMINATIONOFTHEMOSTEFFICIENTCONTRACTTOALIGNTHEINTERESTSOFTHEPRINCIPALANDTHEAGENTPOSITIVISTACCOUNTINGRESEARCHERSARGUETHATANOUTC

34、OMEBASEDCONTRACTISTHEMOSTEFFICIENTMECHANISMTOACHIEVETHECONGRUENCYOFEXPECTATIONSTHELITERATURESUGGESTSCONTRACTSBETWEENMANAGERSANDSHAREHOLDERSMUSTINCLUDEBONDINGANDMONITORINGPROVISIONSTHATCOULDBEHELPFULTOREDUCEAGENCYPROBLEMSHODGSONETAL,1992BONUSSCHEMESAREANEXAMPLEOFSUCHCONTRACTPROVISIONSFROMWHICHTHEMANA

35、GERSCOMPENSATIONISDEPENDENTONTHEFIRMSPERFORMANCEJENSENANDZIMMERMAN1985INDICATETHATTHEEXISTENCEOFMANAGEMENTCOMPENSATIONPLANSINCREASESSHAREPRICESWHICHGIVESASIGNALTHATSUCHPLANSCANBEUSEDASAGOODTOOLTOALIGNMANAGERIALINTERESTWITHTHOSEOFSHAREHOLDERSCOMPENSATIONVIASTOCKOPTIONSISRELATEDTOTHEMARKETVALUEOFTHEFI

36、RMSSHARES,WHILETHECOMPENSATIONVIABONUSESISCONNECTEDTOTHEFIRMSPERFORMANCETHATISDEPENDENTONACCOUNTINGMEASURESEGREPORTEDEARNINGSWATTSANDZIMMERMAN1986SUGGESTSTHATBONUSPLANS,UNLIKESHAREOPTIONSTHATAREDIRECTLYHELPTOALIGNMANAGERIALINTERESTWITHTHOSEOFSHAREHOLDERS,MAYHELPTOREDUCETHECONFLICTOFINTERESTBETWEENMA

37、NAGERSANDSHAREHOLDERSTHISCOULDHAPPENDEBTCOVENANTCONTRACTSANDMOTIVATIONFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTANOTHERCONTRACTUALMOTIVATIONFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTISTOAVOIDBREACHINGCOVENANTINDEBTCONTRACTSTHISKINDOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTWOULDHELPMANAGERSTOTRANSFERWEALTHFROMDEBTHOLDERSTOSHAREHOLDERSTHROUGH,FORINSTANCE,PAYINGEXC

38、ESSIVEDIVIDENDS,MAKINGADDITIONALBORROWING,ANDLETTINGNETWORTHFALLBELOWTHEMINIMUMLEVELREQUIREDFROMTHELENDERSUNDERPAT,AVOIDINGBREACHINGDEBTCOVENANTSISAVERYSTRONGMOTIVETOMANAGEEARNINGSBECAUSESUCHABREACHMIGHTAFFECTTHEFIRMSVALUEDUETOPOSITIVECONTRACTINGCOSTSTHEWIDELYACCEPTEDDEBTEQUITYHYPOTHESISSTATESTHATRE

39、LIANCEINDEBTCOVENANTSONACCOUNTINGNUMBERSCANINFLUENCEACCOUNTINGMETHODCHOICESAPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENAFIRMSDEBTEQUITYRATIOANDTHEUSEOFINCOMEINCREASINGACCOUNTING7PROCEDURESISUSUALLYINTERPRETEDASEVIDENCETHATMANAGERSCHOOSEINCOMEINCREASINGACCOUNTINGPROCEDURESTOLOOSENDEBTCOVENANTCONSTRAINTSDHALIWAL1980REVEA

40、LSTHATHIGHLYLEVERAGEDHIGHDEBTEQUITYFIRMSSELECTTHEACCOUNTINGMETHODCHOICEFULLCOSTACCOUNTINGINHISSTUDYTHATINCREASESREPORTEDINCOMEHEMENTIONSTHATHIGHLYLEVERAGEDFIRMSWOULDAVOIDUSINGINCOMEDECREASINGACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSBECAUSESUCHSTANDARDSMAYREQUIRETHEMTORENEGOTIATETHEIRCREDITAGREEMENTSTHISRESULTISCONSISTENT

41、WITHTHEPREDICTIONOFPATSDEBTEQUITYHYPOTHESISINARELATEDSTUDYOFDEBTCOVENANTS,DEFONDANDJIAMBALVO1994TESTTHEBEHAVIOUROFABNORMALTOTALANDWORKINGCAPITALACCRUALSINFIRMSTHATAREINTECHNICALDEFAULTOFTHEIRDEBTCOVENANTSTHESEABNORMALACCRUALSMEASURETHEDISCRETIONARYACCRUALS,WHICHINTURNMEASUREEARNINGSMANIPULATIONTHEIR

42、RESULTSSHOWTHATINTHEPREVIOLATIONYEAR,FIRMSTENDTOHAVESIGNIFICANTLYPOSITIVETOTALANDWORKINGCAPITALACCRUALSTHEYALSONOTETHATGOINGCONCERNQUALIFICATIONSAND/ORMANAGEMENTCHANGESARELIKELYTOLEADTONEGATIVEVIOLATIONYEARACCRUALSWHENFIRMSTHATMATCHTHESECONDITIONSAREREMOVEDFROMTHESAMPLE,THEABNORMALTOTALACCRUALSAREPO

43、SITIVE,BUTNOTSIGNIFICANTLYDIFFERENTFROMZEROHOWEVER,THEWORKINGCAPITALACCRUALSFORTHESEFIRMSARESIGNIFICANTLYPOSITIVETHEREFORE,THEREISEVIDENCEOFPOSITIVEACCRUALMANIPULATIONEVENDURINGTHEYEAROFCOVENANTVIOLATIONUSINGTHESAMEDEBTCONTRACTSHYPOTHESIS,DEANGELOANDSKINNER1994STUDYTHEEFFECTOFDEBTCOVENANTRESTRICTION

44、SONMANAGERSINTHEWAYTHEYEXERCISEACCOUNTINGDISCRETIONUSINGDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSTHEIRRESULTSDIFFERFROMDEFONDANDJAIMBALVO1994,INTHATTHEMOSTIMPORTANTTHINGFORMANAGERSISTOUSEACCOUNTINGCHOICESTHATREFLECTTHEIRFIRMSFINANCIALDIFFICULTIES,RATHERTHANTOMITIGATECOVENANTVIOLATIONORTOINFLATEINCOMEINOTHERWORDS,THEYFA

45、ILTOPROVIDEEVIDENCETHATINYEARSPRIORTOCUTSINDIVIDENDS,MANAGERSUSEDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSINSTEAD,ACCRUALSINTHESEYEARSARENEGATIVE,WHICHPROVIDESEVIDENCEOFINCOMEDECREASINGACCOUNTINGCHOICESSWEENEY1994PROVIDESEVIDENCETHATMANAGERSOFFIRMSAPPROACHINGDEFAULTUSEINCOMEINCREASINGACCOUNTINGCHANGE

46、SANDUNDERTAKEEARLYADOPTIONOFNEWACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSTHATINCREASEREPORTEDEARNINGSWHENCOMPAREDTOACONTROLSAMPLEJAGGIANDPICHENG2002USEDISTRESSEDFIRMSTHATVIOLATEDTHEIR8DEBTCOVENANTSDURINGTHEPERIODOF19891996TOEXAMINETHEEFFECTOFSUCHVIOLATIONSANDTHELENDERSWAIVERONACCRUALBASEDACCOUNTINGCHOICESTHERESULTSOFTHEIR

47、STUDYREVEALTHATMANAGERSOFTHESEFIRMSSELECTINCOMEINCREASINGDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSIFTHELENDERSAGREETOGIVETHEMWAIVERSHOWEVER,THEMANAGERSWOULDSELECTINCOMEDECREASINGDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSIFWAIVERSAREDENIEDSALEHANDAHMED2005STUDYDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSINFIRMSTHATVIOLATEDTHEIRDEBTCONTRACTSAFTERWHICHTHEYHAVEUNDER

48、TAKENRENEGOTIATIONWITHTHEIRLENDERSTHEYFINDTHATTHESEFIRMSAREMORELIKELYTOADOPTINCOMEDECREASINGACCRUALSCHOICESDURINGTHEYEARSURROUNDINGRENEGOTIATIONSWITHLENDERSINSUMMARY,MANAGERSOFFIRMSAPPROACHINGDEFAULTWOULDHAVEMOTIVATIONSTHATMAYINFLUENCETHEIRACCOUNTINGCHOICESEG,INCOMEINCREASINGACCOUNTINGCHOICESKHALEDA

49、LJIFRIMEASUREMENTANDMOTIVATIONSOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTACRITICALPERSPECTIVEJJOURNALOFACCOUNTINGBUSINESSMANAGEMENT,2007,1475959译文测量与盈余管理动机一个批判的视角在安然公司和其他类似的案件发生后，研究人员开始对驱使企业管理自己的报告收益的动机感兴趣。经理有不同的诱因去操纵报告收益。他们可能会平滑收益而向外界告知关于未来盈利前景的信息或者他们可能会使用会计科目，并且是那些可供投机使用或效率很高的。关于驱使管理者操纵报告收益的所有情况，以下将给出广泛的讨论。在此基础上，可以得出一个结论，关于管理者操纵报告收益是否可以增加收益质量。在本文中，影响管理会计的选择的动机可分为不同的五个类别（1）平滑盈余的动机，（2）减少所得税费的动机，（3）从合同的角度来看动机，（4）减少政治成本的动机，（5）管理变革的动机。（一）平滑盈余的动机大量的研究表明平滑盈余是一个向投资者反映公司的未来收入循环的有效途径。赫普沃思（1953），一个早期的研究者，解释说，管理者可能平滑收入来以减少公司一段时间内的盈利波动，而不是去增加报告收益。同理，戈登（1964）建立了平滑收入的假设，通过提高会计信息的有效性来估计未来收益的变动，并认为它