成本效益模式下企业环境信息披露的决定因素【外文翻译】.doc

1、外文文献翻译原文CORPORATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGIESDETERMINANTS,COSTSANDBENEFITSINRESPONSETOINVESTORSANDOTHERSTAKEHOLDERSCONCERNSABOUTCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALPOLICIES,MANYFIRMSAREVOLUNTARILYINCREASINGTHEIRLEVELOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESINCETHEREISASCARCITYOFALTERNATIVEINFORMATIONSOURCESUSINGACOSTBENEFI

2、TFRAMEWORK,THISSTUDYINTENDSTOIDENTIFYDETERMINANTSOFCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGBYCANADIANFIRMSSUBJECTTOWATERPOLLUTIONCOMPLIANCEREGULATIONSDURINGTHE19861993PERIODRESULTSSUGGESTTHATINFORMATIONCOSTSANDAFIRMSFINANCIALCONDITIONAREKEYDETERMINANTSOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREFIRMSIZE,THEREGULATORYREGIMEGOVE

3、RNINGCORPORATEDISCLOSURE,ANDINDUSTRY,ALSOCONTRIBUTETOEXPLAININGENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURE1INTRODUCTIONWHILEREGULATORSEG,SECURITIESCOMMISSIONSSETGUIDELINESFORFINANCIALANDNONFINANCIALINFORMATIONDISCLOSURE,FINNSOFTENREVEALMOREABOUTTHEIRACTIVITIESTHANREQUIREDMANYEXECUTIVESRECOGNIZETHATAFIRMSDISCLOSUREPOLIC

4、YISASTRATEGICTOOLTHATPROVIDESECONOMICBENEFITSIFMANAGEDPROPERLYINFACT,THEREISEVIDENCETHATANOPENDISCLOSUREPOLICYHASAPOSITIVEIMPACTONFIRMVALUELEV1992SKINNER1994BLACCONIEREANDPATTEN1994BOTOSAN1997HOWEVER,THEPOTENTIALCOSTSFROMINCREASEDLEGALORPOLITICALEXPOSURECANLEADTOLESSDISCLOSURETHUS,THEIDENTIFICATIONO

5、FCIRCUMSTANCESOREVENTSTHATPROMPTFIIRMSTODISCLOSEMORETHANWHATISREQUIREDBECOMESARELEVANTISSUEMANAGERIALDECISIONSAREESPECIALLYSENSITIVEINTHECASEOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURE,SINCEAFIRMCANINCURCOSTSOFSOMEMAGNITUDEIFITISPERCEIVEDTOBENEGLIGENTORIRRESPONSIBLEINITSINTERACTIONSWITHTHEENVIRONMENTSUCHCOSTSMAYRESUL

6、TFROMLOBBYINGCAMPAIGNSBYVARIOUSENVIRONMENTALPRESSUREGROUPSORFROMTHEFIRMSLOSINGITSREPUTATIONAMONGCUSTOMERS,EMPLOYEES,LENDERS,ANDSUPPLIERSTHISPAPERCONJECTURESTHATMANAGERSWEIGHSHAREHOLDERSINFORMATIONCOSTSASWELLASCOSTSANDBENEFITSARISINGFROMAFIRMSFINANCIALCONDITIONINDECIDINGITSENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRA

7、TEGYFORINSTANCE,ACOSTBENEFITANALYSISOFSHAREHOLDERSINFORMATIONNEEDSMAYSUGGESTTHATITISMOREEFFICIENTFORMANAGEMENTOFWIDELYHELDFIRMSTODISCLOSEENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONDIRECTLYTHANFORINDIVIDUALINVESTORSTOCOLLECTITTHEMSELVESHOWEVER,FORFIRMSINPOORFINANCIALCONDITION,THEDISCLOSUREOFADDITIONALINFORMATIONABOUTTH

8、EIRENVIRONMENTALOBLIGATIONSORCOMMITMENTSISUNLIKELYTOENHANCETHEIRREPUTATIONAMONGCREDITORSANDSUPPLIERSTHEPAPERSCONTRIBUTIONTOTHEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURELITERATUREISTHREEFOLDFIRST,ACOSTBENEFITFRAMEWORKISPROPOSEDTHATIDENTIFIESPOTENTIALECONOMICBASEDDETERMINANTSOFCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESECOND,ENVI

9、RONMENTALDISCLOSUREISVIEWEDINACOMPREHENSIVEMANNERASCOMPRISINGBOTHFINANCIALANDNONFINANCIALINFORMATIONTHIRD,THEINCREMENTALRELEVANCEOFENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEANDOFOTHERFIRMSPECIFICATTRIBUTESINEXPLAININGCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISASSESSEDASAMPLEOFCANADIANFINNSISEXAMINEDDURINGTHEPERIOD1986TO1993CA

10、NADIANFIRMSFACEAREPORTINGENVIRONMENTTHATISLESSRULEORIENTEDPRESCRIPTIVETHANTHATINTHEUNITEDSTATESANDLESSSUBJECTTOLAWSUITSORLITIGATIONAPRIORI,SUCHANENVIRONMENTISMORECONDUCIVETOVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESINCERESOURCEBASEDFIRMSINCANADAARESUBJECTTOSPECIFICPOLLUTIONSTANDARDS,ENVIRONMENTALMATTERSAREEXPECTEDTOBEANI

11、MPORTANTPARTOFTHESEFIRMSOVERALLDISCLOSURESTRATEGYWISEMANS1982INSTRUMENTISUSEDTODEVELOPAMEASUREOFAFIRMSENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREAFIRMSINFORMATIONALANDENVIRONMENTALPOSITIONSAREINFERREDFROMMEASURESSUGGESTEDINTHEDISCLOSUREEG,SCOTT1994ANDENVIRONMENTALACCOUNTINGBARTHANDMCNICHOLS1994LITERATURESRESULTSSUGGEST

12、THATBOTHINFORMATIONCOSTSANDFINANCIALCONDITIONINFLUENCECORPORATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGIESTHESERESULTSARERELATIVELYSTABLEOVERTIME2ACOSTBENEFITFRAMEWORKFORENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURE21OVERVIEWSURVEYSCONDUCTEDBYKPMG1997ANDDELOITTETOUCHETOMATSU1994,ASWELLASDESCRIPTIVESTUDIESGAMHLEETAL1995,SUGGESTTHAT

13、FIRMSHAVEINCREASEDTHELEVELOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREOVERTHEPASTDECADEHOWEVER,SINCECORPORATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISONLYPARTIALLYREGULATED,ITTENDSTOVARYWIDELYACROSSFIRMSITEMSTHATOFTENAREMENTIONEDBYFIRMSBUTNEEDNOTBEDISCLOSEDSPECIFICALLYINCLUDECAPITALEXPENDITURESFORANTIPOLLUTIONEQUIPMENT,RECYCLINGANDCO

14、NSERVATIONPOLICIES,ENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENTANDAUDITPRACTICES,ANDCONFORMITYTOGOVERNMENTALEMISSIONSTANDARDSALTHOUGHENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURELEVELSHAVEINCREASED,ITISNOTCLEARWHYFIRMSCHOOSETODISCLOSEMOREABOUTTHEIRENVIRONMENTALACTIVITIESINFACT,AFIRMMAYHAVESTRONGDISINCENTIVESTODISCLOSEINFORMATIONABOUTITSENVIR

15、ONMENTALACTIVITIESFOREXAMPLE,CORPORATEPOLLUTIONOFTENMAKESFORNEGATIVEHEADLINES,WITHLEAKAGESOFCONTAMINATEDWATERSATMINESITESOWNEDBYCAMBIORINC,PLACERDOME,ANDBOLIDENBEINGWIDELYREPORTEDINTHECANADIANPRESSEVENTHOUGHTHEPROPERTIESWEREINGUYANA,THEPHILIPPINES,ANDSPAIN,RESPECTIVELYINADDITION,BEINGSINGLEDOUTASENV

16、IRONMENTALLYIRRESPONSIBLEMAYENTAILPOTENTIALPOLITICALANDECONOMICCOSTSLANOIEANDLAPLANTE1994CONVERSELY,SOMEFIRMSHAVECOMPETITIVEADVANTAGESINCOMPLYINGWITHENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONSOREVENGOINGFURTHERTHANREGULATIONSORINRECYCLINGHAZARDOUSWASTESINTOPROFITABLEPRODUCTSFORINSTANCE,MANAGEMENTMAYWANTTOPROVIDEADDITI

17、ONALENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONTOBUILDUPCOMMUNITYSUPPORTFORITSRELATIONSWITHREGULATORS,TOOBTAINCHEAPERCAPITAL,ORTOENHANCETHEFIRMSREPUTATIONASACREDIBLEANDRELIABLECOMMERCIALORFINANCIALPARTNER22TOWARDAFRAMEWORKOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETWODISTINCTPERSPECTIVESUNDERLIERECENTATTEMPTSTOEXPLAINCORPORATEENVIRONME

18、NTALDISCLOSUREFIRST,ENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGHASBEENPOSITEDTOBEARESPONSETOPRESSURESEXERTEDBYVARIOUSSTAKEHOLDERSORCONSTITUENCIES,WITHCORPORATEMANAGEMENTATTEMPTINGTOMANAGETHEPUBLICSIMPRESSIONOFITSENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCENEUETAL1998MOSTCONCEPTUALWORKUNDERTHISPERSPECTIVEASWELLASSOMEEMPIRICALSTUDIESRELYONST

19、AKEHOLDERTHEORYEG,ROBERTS1992,LEGITIMACYTHEORYEG,PATTEN1991,ORPOLITICALECONOMYTHEORYEG,TINKERETAI1991ONTHEWHOLE,ALLTHESETHEORIESCONVERGEINVIEWINGCORPORATESOCIALANDENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGTHROUGHTHEORGANIZATIONALENVIRONMENTALNEXUS,WITHPUBLICPRESSUREPLAYINGADOMINANTROLESCOTT1991NEUETAL1998WALDENANDSCHWA

20、RTZ1997SEEGRAYETAL1995FORACOMPREHENSIVEREVIEWOFTHECORPORATESOCIALANDENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGLITERATURESECOND,CORPORATEENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGHASBEENVIEWEDSTRICTLYASANECONOMICDECISION,WITHMANAGEMENTASSESSINGTHEVARIOUSCOSTSANDBENEFITSTOBEDERIVEDFROMADDITIONALDISCLOSURETHESECOSTSANDBENEFITSAREDETERMINEDBY

21、EXPLICITANDIMPLICITCONTRACTUALRELATIONSHIPSBETWEENTHEFIRMSVARIOUSSTAKEHOLDERSFORINSTANCE,THEREMAYBEACOSTFROMDISCLOSUREIFTHEINFORMATIONISUSEDBYOUTSIDEPARTIESAGAINSTTHEFIRMSINTERESTSEG,COMPETITORS,PRESSUREGROUPSTHEREMAYBEBENEFITSFROMADDITIONALDISCLOSUREIFTHEFIRM,BYREASSURINGINVESTORSABOUTVARIOUSASPECT

22、SOFITSOPERATIONSORPERFORMANCE,ISABLETOREDUCEITSCOSTOFCAPITALSUCHANAPPROACHHASBEENUSEDTOEXPLAINSPECIFICFINANCIALREPORTINGCHOICESEGSCOTT1994WITHRESPECTTOENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURE,LIETAL1997ANDBARTHETAL1997ADOPTASIMILARFOCUSANDINVESTIGATETHEDETERMINANTSOFENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESDISCLOSUREBYFIRMSBOTHPAPER

23、SPROVIDERESULTSSUGGESTINGTHATFIRMSADOPTASTRATEGICPOSTUREWHENDISCLOSINGORNOTDISCLOSINGENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIES,WITHTHEIRACTUALENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEPLAYINGASIGNIFICANTROLEHOWEVER,ITCANBEARGUEDTHATAFIRMSDISCLOSUREOFENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESISPARTOFANOVERALLENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGYTHATISDETERMI

24、NEDBYANOBJECTIVECOSTBENEFITASSESSMENTACCORDINGLY,THEPRESENTPAPERINVESTIGATESTHEDETERMINANTSOFCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREUSINGACOSTBENEFITFRAMEWORK23DETERMINANTSOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGYBASEDONTHELITERATURE,ITISCONJECTUREDTHATAFIRMSENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGYDEPENDSUPON1THEBENEFITFRO

25、MAREDUCTIONININFORMATIONASYMMETRYBETWEENMANAGERSANDSHAREHOLDERSANDININFORMATIONGATHERINGCOSTSBYSHAREHOLDERSINFORMATIONCOSTAND2THECOSTSFROMTHEUSEOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREBYSTAKEHOLDERSOTHERTHANSHAREHOLDERSINLIGHTOFAFIRMSFINANCIALCONDITIONFINANCIALCONDITIONINADDITION,BYCHOOSINGANENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUR

26、ESTRATEGY,AFIRMESSENTIALLYSELECTSWHICHFACETOFITSENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENTPERFORMANCEISTOBEREVEALEDTOTHEPUBLICITCANBEASSUMEDTHATAFIRMSPROPENSITYTOENHANCEITSENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTANCEMAYBEFACILITATEDORHINDEREDBYITSENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEIEISTHEINFORMATIONTOBEREVEALEDFAVORABLE,NEUTRAL,ORUNFAVORABLETH

27、US,ENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEISCONSIDEREDADETERMINANTOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGYINFORMATIONCOSTSPRIORRESEARCHSUGGESTSTHATINFORMATIONCOSTSPOTENTIALLYINFLUENCECORPORATEDISCLOSUREFORINSTANCE,GROSSMAN1981ANDMILGROM1981ARGUETHATTHEREISEXTENSIVEINFORMATIONASYMMETRYBETWEENINVESTORSANDMANAGERSINTHEABSEN

28、CEOFCREDIBLEINFORMATION,INVESTORSTENDTOASSUMETHEWORSTANDBIDDOWNSTOCKPRICESINTHEABSENCEOFMAXIMUMDISCLOSUREBYMANAGERSHOWEVER,INSTEADOFREACTINGPASSIVELYTOTHELACKOFINFORMATION,INVESTORSCANCHOOSETOPRIVATELYCOLLECTANDANALYZEDATASINCETHEPRIVATEGATHERINGOFADDITIONALINFORMATIONISCOSTLY,ITISUNDERTAKENONLYBYIN

29、VESTORSTHATHAVETHEREQUIREDRESOURCESTIMEANDMONEYANDEXPECTAPOSITIVEPAYOFFBENEFITSCOSTS,WITHUNINFORMEDINVESTORSBEINGDRIVENOUTOFTHEMARKET,WHICHISLIKELYTOBECOMELESSEFFICIENTDIAMOND1985WITHINVESTORSFACINGHIGHERTRANSACTIONCOSTS,LOWERTRADINGVOLUMEANDILLIQUIDITYSTOCKPRICESARELIKELYTOBEBIDDOWNLEV1988KARPOFF19

30、86UNDERCERTAINCONDITIONS,ITISTHUSEFFICIENTFORAFIRMTOVOLUNTARILYDISCLOSEINFORMATIONIFTHECOSTTOTHEFIRMISLOWERTHANTHECOSTTOMARKETPARTICIPANTSATIASE1985LANGANDLUNDHOLM1993MILGROMANDROBENS1992FORINSTANCE,FIRMSTHATEXTENSIVELYRELYONCAPITALMARKETSTOFINANCETHEIREXPANSIONORAREWIDELYFOLLOWEDBYINVESTORSHAVEINCE

31、NTIVESTOREDUCEINFORMATIONASYMMETRYBETWEENMANAGERSANDINVESTORSSINCESUCHACTIONSLOWERFINANCINGCOSTSANDAREVALUEADDEDGIBBINSETAL1990FRANKELETAL1995CLARKSONETAL1994MOREOVER,ADDITIONALDISCLOSUREINFLUENCESTHEPERCEIVEDRISKINESSOFAFIRMANDHENCE,ITSCOSTOFCAPITALBOTOSAN1997SENGUPTA1998SUCHDISCLOSUREATTENUATESTHE

32、NEEDFORINVESTORSTOPRIVATELYCOLLECTINFORMATIONONTHEFIRMSRISKATTRIBUTESORCHARACTERISTICSINSUMMARY,ITISINTHEINTERESTOFFIRMSWITHAHIGHERLEVELOFPERCEIVEDRISKTOPROVIDEADDITIONALDISCLOSUREMOREOVER,ITISEXPECTEDTHATENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREBYAFIRMISRELATEDPOSITIVELYTOTHEOVERALLLEVELOFINFORMATIONCOSTSTOBEINCURRE

33、DBYITSSHAREHOLDERSFINANCIALCONDITION,DESPITEPRIOREVIDENCETHATMOREEXTENSIVEDISCLOSURECANBENEFITAFIRMANDITSSHAREHOLDERS,ITISUNLIKELYTHATMANAGERSWILLREVEALALLVALUERELEVANTINFORMATIONFORINSTANCE,ONEWOULDEXPECTSHAREHOLDERSTODEMANDENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONSUCHASENVIRONMENTALLYRELATEDCAPITALEXPENDITURESANDO

34、PERATINGCOSTS,ESTIMATESOFSITEREMEDIATIONANDRECLAMATIONCOSTS,BUDGETEDENVIRONMENTALINVESTMENTS,ENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENTSTRATEGIES,ANDENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESORCOMMITMENTSHOWEVER,MANAGEMENTISCONCERNEDABOUTTHEPOTENTIALCOSTSFROMSUCHDISCLOSURELIETAL1997THESECOSTSCANTAKEMANYFORMSEGREPUTATIONAL,POLITICAL,CON

35、TRACTINGORPROPRIETARYANDESSENTIALLYRESULTFROMNONSHAREHOLDERSTAKEHOLDERSTAKINGACTIONSTHATREDUCETHEFIRMSFUTURECASHFLOWSDYE1985KARPOFFANDLOTT1993THERELATIVEMAGNITUDEOFTHESECOSTSASWELLASTHEABILITYTOWITHSTANDTHEMAREINFLUENCEDBYAFIRMSFINANCIALCONDITIONFOREXAMPLE,FORAFIRMINPOORFINANCIALCONDITION,THEDISCLOS

36、UREOFIMPLICITENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESOROFNEWPOLLUTIONREGULATIONSMAYUNDERMINEITSREPUTATIONASARELIABLEANDTRUSTWORTHYSUPPLIERORDEBTORADDITIONALCAPITALEXPENDITURESINTHEFUTUREMAYCONCERNDEBTHOLDERS,SUPPLIERS,ANDCUSTOMERSOFAFIRMINPOORFINANCIALCONDITIONSUCHDISCLOSUREIMPLIESTHATNEWFINANCINGWILLBEREQUIRED,CAS

37、HFLOWSWILLBEDIVERTEDFROMOTHERINVESTMENTSORFROMDEBTREPAYMENT,ANDTHEFUTUREOFSOMEOFTHEFINNSOPERATIONSMAYBEJEOPARDIZEDALLTHESEIMPLICATIONSMAYLEADSTAKEHOLDERSTOREASSESSTHETERMSOFTHEIRBUSINESSRELATIONSWITHTHEFIRMFURTHERMORE,PRESSUREGROUPSANDCOMPETITORSMAYACTUPONTHEDISCLOSEDINFORMATION,WITHTHEFIRMBEINGILLE

38、QUIPPEDTOEFFECTIVELYRESPONDTOTHESEACTIONSOVERALL,THEFIRMSPOORFINANCIALCONDITIONWEAKENSITSABILITYTOWITHSTANDSTAKEHOLDERSPRESSURESORACTIONSINCONTRAST,AFIRMINGOODFINANCIALCONDITIONDISCLOSINGSIMILARINFORMATIONWILLHAVETHEMEANSTOBETTERRESISTSTAKEHOLDERSPRESSURESANDMOREQUICKLYRESOLVETHEENVIRONMENTALPROBLEM

39、THUS,AFIRMINGOODFINANCIALCONDITIONMAYVOLUNTARILYENGAGEIN“COSTLY“DISCLOSURE,SINCETHATWOULDINCREASEITSCREDIBILITYAMONGINVESTORSEGHUGHES1986SCOTT1994IFTHEINFORMATIONTOBEDISCLOSEDISOFAPOSITIVENATUREEG,ENVIRONMENTALAWARD,AFIRMINGOODFINANCIALCONDITIONALSOISEXPECTEDTOPROVIDEMOREEXTENSIVEENVIRONMENTALDISCLO

40、SURETHANAFIRMINPOORFINANCIALCONDITIONPRIORRESEARCHSHOWSTHATCREDIBLECORPORATEDISCLOSUREISVALUEENHANCING,SINCEITMAKESINVESTORSDECISIONMAKINGLESSRISKYANDMOREEFFICIENTBEAVER1989DATARETAL1991FELTHAMETAL1991CLARKSONANDSIMUNIC1994GOODFINANCIALCONDITIONINCREASESTHECREDIBILITY,ANDHENCETHEVALUE,OFINFORMATIONT

41、OBEDISCLOSEDSINCEMUCHMOREISATSTAKEFORTHEDISCLOSINGFIRMINCONTRAST,AFIRMINPOORFINANCIALCONDITIONHASLESSCREDIBILITYINTHEMARKETANDTHUSCANBEEXPECTEDTOBENEFITLESSFROMADDITIONALPOSITIVEDISCLOSUREINSUMMARY,ITISINTHEINTERESTOFFIRMSINGOODFINANCIALCONDITIONTOPROVIDEMOREENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETHANFIRMSINPOORFIN

42、ANCIALCONDITIONENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEPRIORRESEARCHHASINVESTIGATEDTHELINKBETWEENENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEEG,CONFORMITYORNOTTOCURRENTEMISSIONSTANDARDSABSENCEORNOTOFFINES,PENALTIES,ORDERSTOCONFORM,ORLEGALACTIONSANDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREINGRAMANDFRAZIER1980WISEMAN1982FREEDMANANDWASLEY1990ALTHOUGHRESUL

43、TSAREWEAK,THEEVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATBETTERPERFORMANCEISASSOCIATEDWITHMOREDISCLOSUREFURTHERMORE,THENATUREOFAFIRMSENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEUNDERLIESTHEINFORMATIONRELEVANCEOFITSENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETHUS,ENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEISINTRODUCEDASADETERMINANTOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGYCONSISTENTWITHPRIOR

44、RESULTS,APOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEANDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISPREDICTEDTHEREFORE,AFTERCONTROLLINGFORENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCE,ITISEXPECTEDTHATTHELEVELOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREBYFIRMSISDETERMINEDBYITSINFORMATIONCOSTSANDBYITSFINANCIALCONDITIONFIRMSWITHEXTENSIVELIMITEDOUTSIDESHAREH

45、OLDERSINFORMATIONNEEDSSHOULDDISCLOSEMORELESSENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONWHILEFIRMSINPOORGOODFINANCIALCONDITIONSHOULDDISCLOSELESSMOREENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONITISEXPECTEDTHATMOST“GOODNEWS“AND“BADNEWS“INENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREARECAPTUREDINENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCE,THATIS,CONFORMITYORNOTTOCURRENTEMISSIONSTAN

46、DARDSANDTHEABSENCEORNOTOFFINES,PENALTIES,ORDERSTOCONFORM,ORLEGALACTIONSSOURCEDENISCORMIER,MICHELMAGNANCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTRATEGIESDETERMINANTS,COSTSANDBENEFITSJOURNALOFACCOUNTING,AUDITINGANDFINANCE,VOL14,FALL1999P429451译文成本效益模式下企业环境信息披露的决定因素由于投资者和其他利益相关者缺乏可选择的信息来源，为了引起他们对有关环境政策的关注，许多公司

47、自愿披露环境信息。本研究采用成本效益模式，拟在通过加拿大公司19861993年水污染环境报告的法规遵循状况来确定企业环境报告的决定因素。结果表明，信息成本和企业财务状况是环境信息披露的决定因素。企业规模、企业监管制度和行业状况也是企业披露环境信息的重要原因。1介绍虽然监管机构对财务和非财务信息披露设定了相关标准，但芬兰企业往往披露更多的是有关企业的活动，而这不一定是符合要求的披露。许多管理者认识到，一个公司被妥善管理的信息披露政策是一个提供经济利益的战略工具。事实上，有证据表明，一个开放的信息披露政策对公司价值有积极的影响LEV1992SKINNER1994BLACCONIEREANDPATT

48、EN1994BOTOSAN1997然而，法律或政治上的潜在成本，可能会导致企业披露的减少。因此，要在查明事件的情况下提示公司披露，而不是使“什么是必须的”成为一个相关问题。管理决策是敏感的，尤其是环境信息披露事件。因为如果它是由于对环境的疏忽或不负责任造成的，公司将承担一部分费用。这些费用是对在公众或客户、员工、债权人以及供应商中所造成的声誉损失的赔偿。文章猜测，经营者权衡股东信息及其成本和效益源于公司财务状况所决定的环境信息披露策略。例如，对股东的信息需求进行成本效益分析表明，通过对公司的管理来直接披露环境信息比个人投资者自行收集信息更为有效。然而，对于财政状况不佳的公司，披露关于环境义务和

49、责任的其他信息，是不可能提高他们在供应商和债权人之中的声誉的。本文对环境信息披露研究的贡献有三个方面。第一，成本效益模式下，确定以潜在经济为基础的企业环境信息披露的决定因素。第二，环境信息披露的完整形式，包括金融和非金融信息。第三，对环保性能增量相关性和其他企业特有的企业环境信息披露属性进行评估。19831993年，某芬兰人对加拿大的一个样本进行审查。相比于美国，加拿大公司面临的报告环境是不太规范和缺乏法律约束的。自然，对于这样的环境，自愿披露是更有利的。由于加拿大资源型企业受制于特定的污染标准，环境问题预计将成为这些公司总体披露战略的重要组成部分。怀斯曼（1982）的方法被用来研究企业的环境披露措施。一个企业的信息化和环保立场是从环境会计披露措施中推断而来的（例如，斯科特1994；巴特和麦克尼科尔斯1994）。结果表明，信息成本和财务状况决定企业的环境信息披露策略。2环境信息披露的成本效益模式21概述毕马威会计师事务所（1997）和德勤会计师事务所1994）的调查和描述性研究（GAMHLE等，1995）表明，在过去的十年，许多公司提高了环境信息披露水平。然而，由于环境信息披露仅仅使部分企业得以规范，更广泛的企业披露是趋势。一些项目经常被企业提到（但不能透露具体需要），包括防污设备的资本支出，回收和保护政策，环境管