环境信息披露的规范：理论分析【外文翻译】.doc

1、外文文献翻译原文INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREASENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONATHEORETICALANALYSISABSTRACTGOVERNMENTSAROUNDTHEWORLDAREBEGINNINGTOEMBRACEANEWFORMOFENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONMANDATORYDISCLOSUREOFINFORMATIONWHILEINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSAPPEARTOHAVEANIMPACTONSUBSEQUENTFIRMBEHAVIOROFTENRESULTINGINLOWERLEVELSOF

2、POLLUTIONLITTLEISKNOWNABOUTTHECOSTSANDBENEFITSOFTHESEPROGRAMSANDWHETHERORNOTTHEYENHANCESOCIALWELFARETHISPAPERPRESENTSASIMPLEBARGAININGMODELWHEREMANDATORYINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISUSEDTOOVERCOMEALACKOFINFORMATIONONTHEPARTOFTHEPUBLICWECHARACTERIZETHECONDITIONSUNDERWHICHINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREWILLLEADTOARED

3、UCTIONINEMISSIONS,ANDULTIMATELY,THECONDITIONSUNDERWHICHITWILLENHANCESOCIALWELFARESEVERALEXTENSIONSOFTHEMODELAREBRIEFLYEXPLORED,INCLUDINGTHEEFFECTOFTWOSOURCESOFPOLLUTIONONLYONEOFWHICHISSUBJECTTOINFORMATIONDISCLOSURE1INTRODUCTIONGOVERNMENTSAROUNDTHEWORLDAREBEGINNINGTOEMBRACEANEWFORMOFENVIRONMENTALREGU

4、LATIONMANDATORYDISCLOSUREOFINFORMATIONPERHAPSTHEBESTKNOWNEXAMPLEISTHETOXICRELEASEINVENTORYTRIPROGRAMINTHEUS,WHEREBYFIRMSAREREQUIREDTODISCLOSELEGALLYEMITTEDCHEMICALRELEASESTRIHASBROUGHTABOUTSIGNIFICANTREDUCTIONSINCHEMICALEMISSIONSFOREXAMPLE,TOTALONSITEANDOFFSITERELEASESOFTOXICEMISSIONSAREREPORTEDLYDO

5、WNBY455BETWEEN1988AND1999EPA,2001TABLEE6OTHERDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSHAVEFOCUSEDONDRINKINGWATERSAFETYANDRISKMANAGEMENTPLANSFORCHEMICALRELEASES1SIMILARPROGRAMSHAVEBEENINSTITUTEDINOTHERCOUNTRIESANDCONTEXTS,INCLUDINGINDIA,INDONESIA,PHILIPPINES,COLOMBIA,MEXICOANDBRAZILAFSAH,LAPLANTEANDWHEELER,1996THEMECHANISM

6、SBYWHICHINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSLEADTOREDUCTIONSINPOLLUTIONAREVARIEDANDSTILLBEINGSTUDIEDSEEEG,MAXWELL,LYONANDHACKETT,2000ANDKONARANDCOHEN,2000DEPENDINGONTHECONTEXT,CONSUMERSMAYDECIDETOREDUCEORWITHDRAWFROMCONSUMINGTHEPRODUCTOFAFIRMTHATISAHIGHPOLLUTERINVESTORSMAYSHUNTHESTOCKOFFIRMSTHATAREFOUNDTOB

7、EHIGHPOLLUTERSEITHERTHROUGHSOCIALLYACTIVEINVESTMENTDECISIONSORBYANASSESSMENTTHATHIGHLYPOLLUTINGFIRMSWILLULTIMATELYBELESSPROFITABLEVICTIMS2MAYBRINGABOUTPRESSUREONPOLLUTINGFIRMSTOREDUCEEMISSIONSBYPICKETING,LOBBYINGLOCALZONINGBOARDSFORMORESTRINGENTRESTRICTIONS,PRESSURINGGOVERNMENTENFORCEMENTAGENCIESTOS

8、CRUTINIZELARGEPOLLUTERSMORECAREFULLY,ORCALLINGFORNEWREGULATIONSTHEYMIGHTALSOSUEFORDAMAGESUNDERVARIOUSTHEORIESOFTORTLAWREGARDLESSOFTHEMECHANISM,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSAPPEARTOHAVEANIMPACTONSUBSEQUENTFIRMBEHAVIORTIETENBERG1998HASCHARACTERIZEDINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREASBEINGTHETHIRDWAVEOFENVIRONMENTA

9、LREGULATIONFOLLOWINGTHEORIGINALCOMMANDANDCONTROLAPPROACHANDTHESUBSEQUENTINTRODUCTIONOFMARKETBASEDINCENTIVESSUCHASEMISSIONFEESANDMARKETABLEPERMITSINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSHAVEBEENWIDELYTOUTEDBYPOLICYMAKERSFORNUMEROUSREASONSONEOBVIOUSBENEFITISTHEFACTTHATINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREHASBEENFOUNDTORESULTINS

10、IGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTSINENVIRONMENTALQUALITYINADDITION,HOWEVER,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSSATISFYTHEDEMOCRATICBELIEFTHATTHEPUBLICHASARIGHTTOKNOWTHATTHEYMIGHTBEAFFECTEDBYTHIRDPARTYPOLLUTIONONAMOREPRACTICALLEVEL,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSAREGENERALLYTHOUGHTTOCOSTTHEGOVERNMENTFARLESSTHANDRAFTINGAN

11、DIMPLEMENTINGINDUSTRYWIDEREGULATIONSASARESULTOFTHESEPRESUMEDBENEFITS,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSMIGHTALSOBEPOLITICALLYMOREFEASIBLETHANNEWCOERCIVEREGULATIONSDESPITETHESEPRESUMEDBENEFITS,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSARENOTFREEASWITHANYGOVERNMENTPOLICY,THEYSHOULDBESUBJECTTOTHESCRUTINYOFACOSTBENEFITAN

12、ALYSISTHEBENEFITSAREOBVIOUSIMPROVEMENTSINTHEENVIRONMENTTHATAREPRESUMABLYVALUEDBYSOMEMEMBERSOFSOCIETYONTHECOSTSIDE,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREREQUIRESSOMEAMOUNTOFGOVERNMENTRULEMAKINGALONGWITHDATACOLLECTION,VERIFICATION,ANDDISSEMINATIONFIRMSALSOINCURTHECOSTSOFCOLLECTINGANDDISSEMINATINGDATAANDPRESUMABLYINCUR

13、THECOSTSOFANYVOLUNTARYPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONCONSUMERGROUPSANDOTHERNONGOVERNMENTALGROUPSTHATEXERTPRESSUREONPOLLUTINGFIRMSTOREDUCETHEIREMISSIONSALSOINCURCOSTSTHECOSTOFCOLLECTIVEACTION,LOBBYING,LITIGATION,ETCTHESECOSTSSUBSTITUTETOSOMEEXTENTFORTHESAVINGSFROMREDUCEDGOVERNMENTMONITORINGANDENFORCEMENTFINALLY,T

14、HEREISANOTHERPOTENTIALCOSTASSOCIATEDWITHINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFFOREGONEPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONBENEFITSOUTSIDETHEINDUSTRY/POLLUTANTSUBJECTTOINFORMATIONDISCLOSURETHATIS,BYPLACINGATTENTIONONONEFORMOFPOLLUTION,AMANDATORYDISCLOSUREPROGRAMMIGHTDIVERTTHEATTENTIONANDLIMITEDRESOURCESOFCO

15、NSUMER,COMMUNITY,ANDENVIRONMENTALGROUPSAWAYFROMOTHERFORMSOFPOLLUTIONTHATMIGHTBEWORSETHANAND/ORLESSEXPENSIVETOCONTROLTHANTHEPOLLUTANTSUBJECTTOINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREREGULATIONWORSEYET,ITISPOSSIBLETHATINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSMAYRESULTINNONETBENEFITINENVIRONMENTALQUALITYANDEVENAWORSENINGTOTHEEXTENTT

16、HATFIRMSSUBSTITUTEONEFORMOFPOLLUTIONFORANOTHERTODATE,VIRTUALLYALLOFTHELITERATUREONINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREHASBEENEMPIRICALEITHERDEMONSTRATINGTHEAGGREGATEEFFECTOFANINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMONEMISSIONSORATTEMPTINGTOCHARACTERIZETHEMECHANISMSBYWHICHINFORMATIONDISCLOSURELEADSTOTHESEEMISSIONREDUCTIONSEXAM

17、PLESINCLUDEHAMILTON1995,KONARANDCOHEN1997AND2000,KHANNA,QUIMIOANDBOJILOVA1998,ANDMAXWELL,LYONANDHACKETT2000INSPITEOFTHISGROWINGLITERATUREONINFORMATIONDISCLOSURE,NOATTEMPTHASBEENMADETOTHEORETICALLYANALYZE2BARGAININGBETWEENPOLLUTERANDVICTIMTHEIMPACTOFVICTIMSIGNORANCEOFHISDAMAGETHEPROBLEMWEARECONSIDERI

18、NGISSIMILARTOBUTNOTTYPICALOFACOASEANBARGAININGMODELWITHASYMMETRICINFORMATIONSEECOASE,1960ANDHUBERANDWIRL,1998INASTANDARDASYMMETRICINFORMATIONPROBLEM,THEVICTIMKNOWSTHEDAMAGECAUSEDBYPOLLUTION,BUTDOESNOTKNOWTHECOSTOFPOLLUTIONCONTROLHOWEVER,INTHISMODEL,THEVICTIMDOESNOTKNOWTHEDAMAGESHEMAYORMAYNOTKNOWTHEC

19、OSTOFPOLLUTIONCONTROLCONSIDERTHEPROBLEMOFASINGLEPOLLUTERWHOSEPOLLUTIONCAUSESDAMAGETOASINGLEVICTIMLETDBETHEDAMAGEANDCBETHECOSTOFCONTROLLINGPOLLUTIONTHUS,ONECANCHARACTERIZETHESTATEOFKNOWLEDGEBASEDONACOMBINATIONOFFOURPARAMETERS,D,CD,CWHERETHEFIRSTPAIRISTHESTATEOFKNOWLEDGEOFTHEPOLLUTERANDTHESECONDCHARAC

20、TERIZESTHEKNOWLEDGEOFTHEVICTIMTHUS,FOREXAMPLE,0,11,0INDICATESTHATTHEPOLLUTERKNOWSHISCOSTSBUTNOTTHEDAMAGETOVICTIMANDTHEVICTIMKNOWSHERDAMAGEBUTNOTTHECOSTWEEXPLOREVARIOUSPOSSIBLESTATESOFKNOWLEDGE,WHEREBYTHEVICTIMMIGHTORMIGHTNOTKNOWEITHERDORCTHEPOLLUTERALWAYSKNOWSTHECOSTOFABATEMENT,CALTHOUGHWEALSOASSUME

21、THATTHEPOLLUTERALWAYSKNOWSHOWMUCHPOLLUTIONISBEINGGENERATED,WEDONOTASSUMETHATTHEPOLLUTERALWAYSKNOWSTHEFUNCTIONALRELATIONSHIPBETWEENPOLLUTIONANDDAMAGESINOTHERWORDS,ITISPOSSIBLETHATTHEPOLLUTERDOESNOTKNOWTHEDAMAGECAUSEDBYHISPOLLUTIONEVENIFTHEVICTIMDOES3、EXTENSIONSOFTHEMODELOURRESULTSTHUSFARASSUMENOTRANS

22、ACTIONSCOSTS,ONLYONEPOLLUTERANDONEVICTIMWHILEWELEAVEEXTENSIVEMODELINGTOFUTURERESEARCH,INTHISSECTION,WEBRIEFLYEXPLORESOMEOFTHEOBVIOUSEXTENSIONSOFTHEMODELANDPROVIDECONJECTURESABOUTTHEIRIMPLICATIONS31INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREWITHTRANSACTIONSCOSTSOURMODELASSUMEDZEROTRANSACTIONSCOSTSANDEFFICIENCYHASBEENDEFIN

23、EDSOLELYINTERMSOFCOSTLESSBARGAININGINREALITY,THERECANBENUMEROUSFORMSOFTRANSACTIONSCOSTSINCLUDINGTHECOSTOFNEGOTIATION,MONITORINGTOENSURETHATTHEPROVISIONSOFANYCONTRACTAREADHEREDTO,ANDENFORCEMENT/PUNISHMENTCOSTSTOTHEGOVERNMENTTOENSURETHATINFORMATIONISHONESTLYDISCLOSEDINTRODUCINGTRANSACTIONSCOSTSINTOTHE

24、BARGAININGPROCESSREDUCESTHELIKELIHOODTHATINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSWILLRESULTINPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONSOFCOURSE,THEHIGHEREXPECTEDPOLLUTIONIS,THEMORETHEVICTIMISWILLINGTODEVOTERESOURCESTOBARGAININGFORREDUCEDPOLLUTIONONEOFTHEOBVIOUSIMPLICATIONSOFTHISEXTENSIONISTHATCETERISPARIBUS,WEWOULDEXPECTINFORMATIOND

25、ISCLOSUREPROGRAMSTOWORKBESTINCOMMUNITIESTHATAREBETTEROFFFINANCIALLYORAREENDOWEDWITHARELATIVEABUNDANCEOFTIMEIEHAVEALOWOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFTIMETHESECOMMUNITIESWILLHAVETHERESOURCESTOBARGAINAND/ORPRESSUREFIRMSTOREDUCEPOLLUTION32MULTIPLEPOLLUTERSORTYPESOFPOLLUTIONWEALSOASSUMEDONLYONEPOLLUTERANDONETYPEOFPOLL

26、UTIONIFTHEREARETWOPOLLUTERSWITHDIFFERENTCOSTSTRUCTURES,ORTWOTYPESOFPOLLUTIONWITHDIFFERENTDAMAGES,THEGOVERNMENTMUSTDECIDEWHETHERTOREQUIREDISCLOSUREOFALLPOLLUTIONTYPESAND/ORALLSOURCESIFTHEGOVERNMENTARBITRARILYDECIDESTOIMPOSEANINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMONONEPOLLUTERBUTNOTTHEOTHER,ITISPOSSIBLETHATTHIS

27、WILLDISTORTTHEEXPECTEDBENEFITSOFPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONINSUCHAMANNERTHATTHEVICTIMWILLNOWBARGAINWITHTHEWRONGFIRMFORPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONSTHISCOULDWORKINEITHERDIRECTIONFOREXAMPLE,SUPPOSETHEREARETWOTYPESOFPOLLUTION,P1ANDP2IFINFORMATIONDISCLOSURESUGGESTSTHATDAMAGESFROMP1AREWORSETHANTHEVICTIMTHOUGHT,SHEMIGHTSHIF

28、TRESOURCESTOTHATPOLLUTIONSOURCEEVENTHOUGHATTHEMARGINSHEWOULDPREFERTOREDUCEP2IFSHEHADBETTERINFORMATIONSIMILARLY,IFTHEINFORMATIONDISCLOSURESUGGESTSTHATDAMAGESFROMP1ARELESSTHANTHEVICTIMTHOUGHT,SHEMIGHTSHIFTRESOURCESAWAYFROMTHATPOLLUTIONSOURCEEVENTHOUGHATTHEMARGINSHEWOULDPREFERTOREDUCEP1IFSHEHADBETTERIN

29、FORMATIONABOUTP2THEPOLICYIMPLICATIONSOFTHISEXTENSIONAPPEARTOBEEITHERTHATTHEGOVERNMENTSHOULDREQUIREDISCLOSUREOFALLPOLLUTIONBYALLSOURCES,ORFOCUSITSINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSONTHOSESOURCESTHATVICTIMSAREMOSTLIKELYTOUNDERESTIMATEWEAREUNAWAREOFANYATTEMPTTOCONSIDERTHESECONCERNSINDESIGNINGINFORMATIONDISC

30、LOSUREPROGRAMSTHUS,THISISANIMPORTANTAREAFORFUTURERESEARCH33MULTIPLEVICTIMSANDTHECOLLECTIVEACTIONPROBLEMFINALLY,WEASSUMEDONLYONEVICTIMONCEMULTIPLEVICTIMSAREALLOWED,THECOLLECTIVECHOICEPROBLEMBRINGSWITHITTHEWELLKNOWNFREERIDERPROBLEMASSOCIATEDWITHPROVISIONOFAPUBLICGOODGENERALLY,SINCEITISBENEFICIALFORONE

31、VICTIMTOFREERIDEIFTHEOTHERVICTIMCONTRIBUTES,THEREISNODOMINANTSTRATEGYFOREITHERVICTIMINSTEAD,AVICTIMSDECISIONTOCONTRIBUTEDEPENDSONHEREXPECTATIONOFTHEBEHAVIOROFTHEOTHERVICTIMWHILEINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISNOTASOLUTIONTOTHECOLLECTIVECHOICEPROBLEM,ITDOESHAVETHEPOTENTIALTOOVERCOMETHEPROBLEMINCERTAININSTANCE

32、SINPARTICULAR,TOTHEEXTENTTHATNEWINFORMATIONABOUTDAMAGESINCREASESONEORBOTHVICTIMSPERCEIVEDDAMAGEFROMPOLLUTIONORREDUCESTHECOSTOFBARGAININGBYREDUCINGTHEDISPARITYOFINFORMATIONBETWEENVICTIMS,ANINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMWILLMAKEITMORELIKELYTHATCOLLECTIVEACTIONWILLTAKEPLACE4、SUMMARYOFFINDINGSANDCONCLUDIN

33、GREMARKSINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSHAVEBEENTOUTEDASTHENEXTWAVEOFREGULATIONANDTHEYHAVEBEENSHOWNTORESULTINLOWERLEVELSOFPOLLUTIONASFIRMSVOLUNTARILYREDUCEPOLLUTIONBELOWTHEIRLEGALLYREQUIREDAMOUNTSYET,NOTALLPROGRAMSHAVERESULTEDINSIGNIFICANTREDUCTIONSINPOLLUTION,ANDTHEREISOFTENADIFFERENTIALEFFECTONFIRMRE

34、SPONSIVENESSTOTHESENEWMANDATESULTIMATELY,WEKNOWLITTLEABOUTTHECOSTSANDBENEFITSOFINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSTHISPAPERTAKESANINITIALSTEPINTHEDIRECTIONOFUNDERSTANDINGTHETHEORYBEHINDINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSWEPRESENTASIMPLEMODELOFINFORMATIONDISCLOSURETHATTAKESINTOACCOUNTTHEKEYFEATUREOFTHEINFORMATIO

35、NALASYMMETRIESTHATLEDTOTHECALLFORDISCLOSUREPROGRAMS,NAMELY,THATTHEVICTIMDOESNOTKNOWTHEDAMAGECAUSEDBYINDIVIDUALPOLLUTERSWEEXAMINESEVERALINFORMATIONALSCENARIOSEGWHETHERTHEPOLLUTERANDVICTIMKNOWEACHOTHERSCOSTSANDBENEFITS,COSTSCENARIOSEGWHETHERTHEMARGINALCOSTOFABATEMENTEXCEEDSTHEMARGINALDAMAGESOFPOLLUTIO

36、N,ANDLEGALINSTITUTIONSEGPOLLUTERPAYSVERSUSPOLLUTEEPAYSOURKEYFINDINGRELATESTOIDENTIFYINGINSTANCESWHEREMANDATORYINFORMATIONDISCLOSURECANFACILITATETHEINTERNALIZINGOFAPOLLUTIONEXTERNALITYINTHECASEOFTHEPOLLUTERPAYSPRINCIPLE,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISMOSTAPPROPRIATEWHENTHEVICTIMUNDERESTIMATESTHEDAMAGESCAUSED

37、BYTHEPOLLUTIONANDTHEACTUALLEVELOFDAMAGESEXCEEDTHECOSTOFABATEMENTINTHECASEOFTHEPOLLUTEEPAYSPRINCIPLE,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISMOSTAPPROPRIATEWHENTHEPOLLUTEEOVERESTIMATESTHEDAMAGESANDTHECOSTOFCONTROLISGREATERTHANDAMAGESINTHEPROCESSOFELIMINATINGTHEVARIOUSPOTENTIALCIRCUMSTANCESINWHICHMANDATORYDISCLOSUREIS

38、NEEDEDFOREFFICIENCYPURPOSES,WEIDENTIFIEDSEVERALINSTANCESWHERETHEROLEOFGOVERNMENTISESSENTIALLYONEOFCERTIFICATIONINTHESECASESDISCUSSEDINPROPOSITION2,THEREISANINCENTIVEFORTHEFIRMTODISCLOSEACTUALPOLLUTIONLEVELS,BUTFORSOMEREASONTHEYMIGHTNOTBEABLETODOSOCREDIBLYOFCOURSE,THEPOLICYPRESCRIPTIONINTHOSECASESDOE

39、SNOTNECESSARILYNEEDTOBEAGOVERNMENTPROGRAMITISPOSSIBLETHATINTERMEDIATESTEPSSUCHASVOLUNTARILYDISCLOSEDINFORMATIONWITHTHIRDPARTYAUDITINGANDCERTIFICATIONWOULDSUFFICEWEALSOSHOWTHATITDOESNOTMATTERFOREFFICIENCYPURPOSESWHETHERORNOTTHEVICTIMKNOWSTHEACTUALCOSTOFPOLLUTIONCONTROLINADDITION,ITDOESNOTGENERALLYMAT

40、TERWHETHERORNOTTHEPOLLUTERKNOWSTHEACTUALDAMAGESCAUSEDBYHISPOLLUTIONWEEXTENDOURMODELBRIEFLYTOEXAMINETHEEFFECTOFTWOSOURCESOFPOLLUTION,ONLYONEOFWHICHISSUBJECTTOINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREONCETRANSACTIONSCOSTSAREENTEREDINTOTHEMODEL,WESHOWTHATONEMIGHTNOTENDUPWITHANIMPROVEMENTINSOCIALWELFAREITISPOSSIBLE,FOREXAM

41、PLE,THATAMANDATORYDISCLOSUREPROGRAMWILLFOCUSONTHEPOLLUTINGINDUSTRYWHOSEDAMAGESARELOWERAND/ORTHECOSTOFPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONISHIGHERTHEPOLICYIMPLICATIONISTHATINTHEABSENCEOFREQUIRINGMANDATORYANDUNIFORMDISCLOSUREONALLSOURCESOFPOLLUTION,INFORMATIONDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTSSHOULDFALLONTHOSEINDUSTRIESTHATCREATET

42、HEMOSTDAMAGESANDWHEREPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONSARECHEAPESTOURTHEORETICALRESULTSAREDIFFICULTTOTESTEMPIRICALLYWITHOUTGOODDATAONTHEINFORMATIONSETSOFTHEVICTIMSANDTHECOSTSANDBENEFITSOFPOLLUTIONABATEMENTNEVERTHELESS,FOCUSINGONTHEPOLLUTERPAYSPRINCIPLEWHICHMORECLOSELYAPPROXIMATESREALWORLDPOLICY,WENOTETHATOURMAINRE

43、SULTISCONSISTENTWITHTHEEXPERIENCEOFINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREPROGRAMSFOREXAMPLE,AFSAH,LAPLANTE,ANDWHEELER1997STUDYAGOVERNMENTDISCLOSUREPROGRAMININDONESIATHATIDENTIFIEDTHERELATIVEPOLLUTIONRECORDOFLOCALMANUFACTURERSWHILETHEPROGRAMRESULTEDINSIGNIFICANTPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONS,THEAUTHORSFOUNDTHATTHEDISCLOSUREPROG

44、RAMWASMOSTEFFECTIVEINREDUCINGPOLLUTIONFROMFACILITIESTHATHADDONENOORMINIMALPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONTHOSEWHEREDAMAGESWEREVERYHIGHANDTHECOSTOFABATEMENTVERYLOWHOWEVER,THEPROGRAMHADLITTLEEFFECTONMOVINGTHERELATIVELYGOODACTORSTOACHIEVINGANYSIGNIFICANTIMPROVEMENTSASAFSAH,LAPLANTEANDWHEELERNOTED,THESEFIRMSWHICHALR

45、EADYEMPLOYEDBASICPOLLUTIONCONTROLMETHODSWOULDREQUIREMORECOSTLYAPPROACHESTOMAKEFURTHERIMPROVEMENTSWEALSOFOUNDTHATINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISLIKELYTOBEMOREEFFECTIVEINREDUCINGPOLLUTIONWHENTHECOSTOFCOLLECTIVEACTIONISLOWANDRELATIVEINCOMEOFTHEPUBLICISHIGHTHISFINDINGISCONSISTENTWITHASTUDYOFWATERPOLLUTIONINCHIN

46、A,WHEREITWASFOUNDTHATDESPITETHEREBEINGAUNIFORMLAWONTHEBOOKS,POLLUTIONCHARGESANDQUALITYVARIEDSIGNIFICANTLYDEPENDINGONTHE“CAPACITY”OFTHECOMMUNITYINCLUDINGEDUCATION,INCOMEANDBARGAININGPOWERAFSAH,LAPLANTEANDWHEELER,1996ENVIRONMENTAL和KONARANDCOHEN,2000，同时在这种情况下，消费者会减少对一个高污染企业产品的消费。投资者可能会避开对那些高污染的上市公司的投资，

47、因此，无论是通过社会活动投资决定还是通过对高污染的上市公司的评估，高污染的上市公司利润最终还是会减少。受害者可能会通过罢工，向当地规划委员会提出对污染企业实施严格管制的要求，或让政府执法机关严格审查污染严重的企业，或提出一个新的法令来对污染企业进行施压，他们的行动迫使政府执行机构更加仔细的审议那些重污染企业，或者制定新的法规以制约污染企业，同时受害者可能还会要求根据侵权法来进行赔偿。不管是信息披露的方案还是机制都会对企业以后的行为产生影响。美国学者铁滕伯格1998形象化地说明了信息披露方案是第三次改革根据原始的制度与控制的方法作为随后引入市场的一种激励措施,例如排污费用和市场化许可。由于众多的

48、原因使信息披露方案被决策者广泛宣传，其中一个明显的好处就是信息披露使得环境质量得到了改善。此外，信息披露方案能够得到公众的信任，使他们有权利了解他们可能受到第三方污染的影响。在更实际的水平下，相对于起草和执行产业范围的规章制度，人们普遍认为信息披露项目能使政府的花费更少，而且这个假设的好处是，信息披露的计划可能比新的强制性法规更加有可行性。不管这些假设有什么好处，信息披露方案的使用并不是免费的。就像那些政府政策一样，我们应该对成本效益的分析进行监督，显而易见的好处是一些社会成员对环境的重视度有所提高。在成本方面，信息披露需要政府制定一些法律法规以及企业对成本数据的收集，核算和披露。企业也会因收

49、集和传播数据产生成本，据推测这可能是企业自愿减少污染所产生的成本。消费者和其他非政府团体，以集体行动、游说、诉讼等方式对污染企业施加压力，以减少其排放量。这些成本从某种程度上代替了来自于减少政府监控和干预的节余。最后，还有一个与潜在成本有关的信息披露方案即企业预知外部的信息披露受到因污染降低而获得机会成本的好处。也就是说，通过关注一个污染的形式，强制性信息披露方案可能会转移目标来限制消费者和社会所用的资源，从信息泄露管制的角度来说，环境团体在某种程度上甚至比其他形式的污染更糟，或者说更加难以控制。信息泄露活动很可能导致环境质量在根本上没有得到改善，甚至更糟的是这些机构用一种污染替代了另一种污染。迄今为止，几乎所有有关的信息披露的文献都已经被实证根据统计显示不管是信息披露对排放的影响还是试图运用该种机制的特性，都会使排放减少。例如HAMILTON1995,KONAR和COHEN（1997和2000），KHANNA,QUIMIO和BOJILOVA1998,和MAXWELL,LYON和HACKETT2000。虽然有关信息披露的文献还在不断增加，但是却没有从理论上对已经取得的潜在的成本进行分析并且从中获利。为了符合成本和利益原则，首先必须通过信息其本身特征的行为变化对其进行披露。那么在什么条件下可以通过信息披露使得企业的污染排放量能够减