研发费用和盈余管理的资本化：来自意大利上市公司的证据【外文翻译】.doc

1、外文文献翻译译文原文CAPITALIZATIONOFRTHISTYPEOFR2“APPLIEDRESEARCH,”WHICHCONSISTSOFSTUDIES,SURVEYS,ANDEXPERIMENTSTHATREFERTOSPECIFICPROJECTSAND3“DEVELOPMENT,”WHICHCONSISTSOFTHEAPPLICATIONOFRESEARCHRESULTSTOSPECIFICMATERIALS,TOOLS,PRODUCTS,ANDPROCESSESPRECEDINGPRODUCTIONTHECOSTSFORBASICRESEARCHARETOBEEXPENSEDIN

2、THEINCOMESTATEMENTHOWEVER,COSTSRELATEDTOAPPLIEDRBTHECOSTSAREIDENTIFIABLEANDMEASURABLECTHEPROJECTTOWHICHTHECOSTSREFERISTECHNICALLYFEASIBLEDTHECOMPANYOWNSTHENECESSARYRESOURCESTOCOMPLETEANDEXPLOITTHEPROJECTANDETHECOSTSARERECOVERABLETHROUGHTHEREVENUESGENERATEDBYEXPLOITINGTHEPROJECTITISEVIDENTTHATTHECOND

3、ITIONSSTATEDBYTHEITALIANACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSARESIMILARTOTHOSESTATEDBYIASFORDEVELOPMENTCOSTSINFACT,THEDEFINITIONOFAPPLIEDRESEARCHUNDERITALIANSTANDARDSALSOFITSINTOTHEDEFINITIONOFDEVELOPMENTCOSTSPROVIDEDBYIAS38THEITALIANSTANDARDSDIFFERFROMIASINTHATTHEYDONOTREQUIRERHOWEVER,THEREISNOCLEARREQUIREMENTASTOWH

4、ATQUANTITATIVEORQUALITATIVEDISCLOSURESSHOULDBERELAYEDWITHREGARDTOTHECAPITALIZATIONOFRDEANGELO,1986JONES,1991DECHOW,SLOAN,SCHRANDBEIDLEMAN,1973RONENTUCKERIMHOFF,1977KAMINCHANEYHUNT,MOYER,BARTH,LANDSMAN,GEBHARDT,LEE,WONG,1988CAHAN,1992GODFREYHOLTHAUSEN,LARCKER,DOWDELLMOSES,1987YOUNG,1998CHANEY,JETER,B

5、UCKMASTER,2001FOREMPIRICALPURPOSES,THEINCOMESMOOTHINGHYPOTHESISHASUSUALLYBEENCHARACTERIZEDASTHEPROPENSITYOFMANAGERSTOCHOOSEACCOUNTINGPOLICIESTHATINCREASEDECREASEREPORTEDEARNINGSWHENCURRENTPERIODPREMANAGEDEARNINGSAREBELOWABOVETHEPROFITABILITYMEASUREOFPRIORYEARSCONSISTENTWITHEARLIERSTUDIESBARNEA,RONEN

6、,MOSES,1987GODFREYSWEENEY,1994DEFONDELGAZZAR,LILIEN,WATTSRUSBARSKY,1988ANUMBEROFSTUDIESARESPECIFICALLYDEDICATEDTOTESTWHETHERTHELEVERAGERATIOISABLETORELIABLYPROXYFORDEBTCOVENANTSTIGHTNESSDUKEPRESSDEANGELO,1986JONES,1992DECHOW,SLOAN,和SWEENEY,1995）。作为一个替代方法，其他研究集中在单个项目，建议从具体收益中去的所得，涉及到鼓励盈余管理的一个系统的方法。在后

7、者的研究中，MCNICHOLS和WILSON1988认为公司通过奖金计划假说管理她们的坏账规定HEALY,1985。ZUCCA和CAMPBELL1992检查投资减计的任意资产，表明公司利用这些收益为了“巨额冲销”战略或为了盈余平稳。FRANCIS,HANNA和VINCENT1996证实盈余管理的诱因扮演一个重要的角色，在解释商誉销帐和重组费用时。其他研究的重点是递延税款津贴（例如，MILLERSCHRANDBEIDLEMAN,1973RONENTUCKERIMHOFF,1977KAMINCHANEYHUNT,MOYER,BARTH,LANDSMAN,GEBHARDT,LEE,WONG,1988

8、CAHAN,1992GODFREYHOLTHAUSEN,LARCKER,DOWDELLMOSES,1987YOUNG,1998CHANEY,JETER,BUCKMASTER,2001）。对于经验的目的，收入平滑假设经常被定性为管理者倾向去选择会计政策增加（减少）报告的收入，当本期管理前的收入低（高）于往年测量的收益率。与早期研究一致（BARNEA,RONEN,MOSES,1978GODFREYSWEENEY,1994DEFONDE1GAZZAR,LILIEN,WATTSRUSBARSKY,1988）。许多研究是特别的用于去测试杠杆比率是否能够可靠为债务契约紧密的代理（DUKEPRESSWEIN

9、TROP,1990）。这些研究多数支持杠杆比率的使用。债务契约假设更多杠杆公司的管理者有较强的动机去做收入增加的会计决策，例如在我们的实例中去利更多的研发费用。这种资本化“放松”债务契约的限制有两种方法。首先，如果债务契约是根据盈利情况，那么，资本化会增加盈余。其次，如果债务契约是基于总资产负债率，那么资本化会降低这个比率。当然，这是在真正的假设下，贷款人没有调整一个公司的收益和总资产通过排除资本化影响（DUKEHUNT,1990）。那么，我们第二个假设制定如下H2在公司的财务杠杆和它的研发资本化上有一个积极的关系。资源来源HTTP/IDEASREPECORG/A/EEE/ACCOUN/V43Y2008I3P246267HTML