Ominous Saudi-Iran Tensions.doc

1、Ominous Saudi-Iran TensionsIt was through a strange twist of fate that Adel Al-Jubeir， Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs， declared the severing of his countrys diplomatic ties wiIran on January 3. This is the same man who， being the Saudi ambassador to the United States some years ago， had been subj

2、ect to a failed murder attempt， allegedly by Iranian conspirators in 2011. That anecdote helps illustrate the distrust between Riyadh and Tehran that has spanned for at least four decades. The conflictsuch is the most appropriate term to describe the relationshiphas degenerated through a variety of

3、aspects and dimensions throughout generations. When Saudi authorities executed the Shiite cleric and activist， Sheikh Nimr AlNimr， along with three other Shiites and 43 Al-Qaeda figures on January 2， protests and condemnations erupted violently. Sheikh Nimr was considered a leader of the Saudi Shiit

4、e minority and a serious critic of the Saudi royal family. In 2012， he was injured in a clash with security forces while trying to escape and was subsequently arrested and jailed. Sentenced to death in 2014， his supporters had hoped that a deal could be reached that would secure his release. So， whe

5、n his execution was announced， Shiite Muslims in the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia as well as in Iran， Iraq， Lebanon， Yemen， Pakistan and other places expressed intense indignation. Such a response was likely expected. However， the storming of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran by angry

6、 protestors who set fire to the building was unacceptable in the eyes of the Saudi authorities. As a result， diplomatic relations were cut off immediately， and all economic activities with Iran were ceased. The beheading of the Shiite leader， along with 43 Sunni jihadists accused of terrorism， conve

7、yed two main messages： First， whether Shiite or Sunni， any Saudi citizen who chooses to rebel against the government will face the same fate. This was addressed mainly to the local population. It also implies that Shiite dissension will be treated similarly to Sunni terrorism. The second message was

8、 addressed to Iran， which is accused of fomenting trouble， pushing the Shiite minority inside the Saudi kingdom to rebellion， and opposing Saudi projects in the region. The opposition is comprised of Irans alleged arming of Shiite militias to fight against the Saudi-backed Sunni order in Yemen， and

9、Sunni Jihadists in Syria， Iraq， Afghanistan， Pakistan， and other Asian and African countries. The message implies that Saudi Arabia is not impressed by Irans aggression and is in a position to retaliate. These are the policies that embody Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Sauds Saudi Arabian kingdom， which so

10、me observers have called everything from ultra-conservative to hawkish， authoritarian to brutal. Riyadh had paved the way to the mass execution， the largest since 1980， through two crucial actions： First， adopting a new defense policy； second， announcing the Islamic anti-terrorist alliance. The new

11、defense policy was outlined in October 2015 by Prince Sultan bin Khaled Al- Faisal while addressing the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations in Washington， D.C. The policy emphasized that Saudi Arabias primary goals were to “defend the homeland， protect Saudi citizens， secure national interests，

12、bolster defense of partner states and strengthen inter-agency partnerships.”The prince said that “the doctrines evolution will depend on the conventional capabilities of potential non-friendly countries， the spread of unconventional threats （Daesh， AlQaeda and Hezbollah） and proliferation of nuclear

13、 weapons in the region.” The formation of the Islamic anti-terrorist military alliance was also a major event in its own right. When he announced it on December 15， 2015， Saudi Deputy Crown Prince， Mohammed bin Salman， said that it was directed not only against the so-called“Islamic State” group， bu

14、t also against any other terrorist organization. According to the Saudi Press Agency， 34 states have decided to form the alliance， with a joint operations center based in Riyadh. The 34 countries include most Arab League states， a number of Muslim states in Africa， and Asian countries including Paki

15、stan， Bangladesh and Malaysia. More than 10 other Islamic countries， including Indonesia， are said to have expressed their support for the coalition. Iran， Iraq， Syria， Afghanistan， Algeria， Oman and Eritrea were not among the members of the alliance. Whatever the credibility and internal cohesion of such an alliance， it is clear that neither Iran nor Iraq or Syria would join in any time soon. Yemen， Syria， and Iraq have joined Lebanon as a proxy battlefield between Iran and Saudi Arabia， representing Shiite and Sunni communities， respectively.