The responsibility of China's emission reduction under CBDR.doc

1、The responsibility of Chinas emission reduction under CBDRFrom the very first meeting discussing human protection of the environment， held in Stockholm in 1972 and leading to the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment， up to the termination of the Copenhagen Summit of 2009， debates over how

2、countries should best approach specific responsibilities towards emission reductions have never been satisfactorily concluded. The sides in the dispute have evolved over time from being a clear-cut division between developed and developing countries， to being waged by some countries in particular， s

3、uch as the United States， China， India， and European countries. As specific responsibilities in these countries are able to swing the success or failure of execution of emission reductions， the stance and actions of these countries in terms of global environment issues are always closely scrutinised

4、. As Rosenthal （2008） states， China has overtaken the US as the worlds biggest CO2 emitter and is also the largest developing country in the world； as a consequence， there is much discussion as to whether China should take on the responsibility of emission reduction and if so， how best to do so. Thi

5、s also encroaches on the contentious issue of whether it is actually fair for other states to influence emission reduction decisions. There are differing opinions on whether China should take on responsibilities of emission reduction. Some believe that China should not take on such a responsibility

6、for two reasons： firstly， climate change influenced by CO2 levels may simply be an excuse created by developed countries such as the US in order to maintain their economy by imposition of a tax on CO2. As Chinese economist Lang Xianping （2009） notes， the United States uses CO2 emission tax to link e

7、mission reduction with the economy. For example， producing one tonne of cement produces one tonne of C02 or 10-70 USD of CO2 emission tax. If this theory is true， then China should reserve the right to refuse to join in. Secondly， it is believed that China should not undertake responsibilities becau

8、se 80% of CO2 emissions came from industrial revolutions in developed countries before 1950 so China should not have the obligation to pay now for historical reasons （Ding， 2009）. Others， however， believe that China should progressively accept more responsibility as the economy develops， but that th

9、is cannot be undertaken as yet （Zhou， 2006）. Thus， there are disputes over interpretations of Chinas specific responsibilities of emission reduction， and this essay will attempt to demonstrate whether the understanding of Chinas climate responsibilities has changed from UNFCCC to Copenhagen. Firstly

10、 it will focus on how Chinas responsibilities have been set out in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol， will then investigate whether Chinas responsibilities have changed in the time between the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Summit， and will finally discuss changes to Chinas specific responsibilit

11、ies outlined at the Copenhagen Summit. CBDR and Chinas responsibility towards emission reduction Firstly， the different responsibilities of different countries should be considered. The concept of differences in responsibility first arose from the Stockholm Declaration （Stone， 2004） ， and later， in

12、order to allocate specific different responsibilities to developing countries and developed countries， the concept Common But Different Responsibilities （CBDR） was formally put forward. The definition of CBDR includes two elements， one being that there exists a common responsibility of states to pro

13、tect the environment and climate， without distinction between national， regional and global levels， and the other being that， owing to different circumstances in different countries， the abilities of each state to deal with climate change is different （Sands， 1995）. The differences in situation incl

14、ude two aspects： firstly， historical responsibility for emissions， and secondly， the reduction abilities. That is to say， wealthy countries have the technological and financial abilities to accept reduction responsibilities， whereas some under-developed countries not only do not have such means， but

15、 are more importantly still in the vital process of development. Principle 7 in the Rio Declaration states that in view of global environmental degradation， different states have common but different responsibilities； developed countries ignore sustainable development in pursuit of economic developm

16、ent but the obligation of protecting the environment is a common duty which requires global cooperation （United Nations， 1992）. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change （UNFCCC） outlines the policy that developing countries may join the convention under favourable conditions which r

17、equire developed countries to assist with financial and technological support， maintenance of sustainable development， and training in use of endogenous capacities and technologies （United Nations， 1992）. In order to formulate specific reduction targets and responsibilities， the Chinese government l

18、aid out a timetable to show Chinas reduction plan， based on per-capita emissions. It can be seen in Figure 1 that China will not begin to carry out compulsory reduction until 2020. This graph shows Chinas strategic time plan via the three stages of participation in the UNFCCC， namely： voluntary redu

19、ction， independent reduction， and compulsory reduction. As explained by Zhou （2006） ， the developed countries in the world， such as the United States and Japan， are subject to compulsory emission reduction. Independent reduction， also known as self-imposed reduction， focuses on middle-income countri

20、es such as South Korea， and entails a self-imposed commitment to a reduction target value without obligation per se. Finally， voluntary reduction is aimed at developing countries which do not yet need to undertake reduction responsibilities， such as China and India. Chinas plans are guided by these

21、three stages. Figure 1： Chinas strategic timetable and three-stage theory for United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change （UNFCCC） participation （from Zhou， 2006） Some scholars contest the feasibility of the timescale due to the increase of CO2 emissions resulting from Chinas rapid economi

22、c development， and believe that China should take on total responsibilities outlined in the Kyoto Protocol. Chinas economy began a period of rapid development from around 1980， resulting in huge levels of emissions for which it is suggested China must pay. Zhang （2000） states that Chinas total CO2 e

23、missions rose from 358.60 2 MtC to 847.25 MtC from 1980 to 1997， at an average annual growth rate of 5.2%. The Polluter Pays Principle indicates that anyone who pollutes the environment has the responsibility to pay for it. However， in the case of China， this stance may be unfair on the poor. Econom

24、ic development has created many rich people who enjoy the benefits and who should pay for the emissions under the logic of this principle. But should the poor be expected to pay for emissions despite not necessarily yet enjoying any great benefits of economic development？ Nevertheless， China states

25、that it is still keeping in line with the basic and original principles of CBDR. Chinas premier Wen Jiabao stressed during the Copenhagen Summit that the reduction responsibilities in China have never been officially changed since the establishment of the principle CBDR， and China is currently and w

26、ill continue to follow the track assigned to it by CBDR （Wen， 2009）. In fact， upon analysis it is clear that Chinas responsibilities have changed， not only in terms of related direct action， but also in terms of global morals. For example， as an influential world power， China should consider climate

27、 change as a global issue， and for the global good， should place less emphasis on national interests. In terms of actions， owing to its huge economic development and high levels of greenhouse gas emissions， other countries have in recent years come to believe that China should take on more responsib

28、ilities towards climate change. Under this increasing pressure， China has moved from optional reduction to what could be considered compulsory reduction ahead of time. As for global morals， then， though China still does not believe it should accept any historical responsibility， if China wishes to b

29、ecome a responsible power in the future， it should now assume global moral responsibilities， as also required by international society （Chen， 2008）. As a result， on levels of action and morals， Chinas responsibilities have undeniably changed in practice， despite Wen Jiabaos official statements. This

30、 essay goes on to analyse how Chinas responsibilities have changed from the UNFCCC to Copenhagen. Voluntary emission reduction in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol According to a review of related documents， it can be found that not only in the UNFCCC， but also in the Kyoto Protocol， the requirements of

31、 China put forward by international society were the same， because in both cases， China was classified as a developing country， meaning that the most important issue for China is continued economic development. Thus， no requirements were made of China， and so， as still classed as a developing countr

32、y， China officially remains in the optional emission reduction stage for the time being. According to Article 3 in UNFCCC （1992） ， all parties should protect the climate in accordance with equality and their respective capabilities and thus developed countries should take the lead in combating clima

33、te change. In addition， as Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee （1992） notes， the largest emission of greenhouse gases came from the original developed countries and as a result， these countries have a duty to combat climate change and take on emission reduction responsibilities. Unfortunately， s

34、pecific reduction targets were not fixed in the UNFCCC， but were formulated later in the Kyoto Protocol. The world was divided into two groups： Annex-1 countries and non-Annex-1 countries. As Kholsa （2009） notes， Annex-1 countries refers to industrialised countries and members of the Organisation fo

35、r Economic Co-operation and Development （OECD） who have the abilities to combat climate change， such as the US and countries of the EEC. Non-Annex-1 countries， then， include developing countries such as China and India， who need not yet take on reduction responsibilities unless developed countries p

36、rovide sufficient financial and technological support. Despite its huge economic development， China is still categorised as a non-Annex-1 state； this fact leads to many developed countries refusing to accept that all reduction responsibilities should be wholly assigned to developed countries. As Ric

37、herzhagen and Scholz （2007） notes， that China remains a non-Annex-1 country means that the Kyoto Protocol may not be put into true practice for a long time. In other words， conflict over whether China should take on more responsibilities has been seen as an excuse for developed countries to avoid th

38、eir assigned responsibilities for the future.Or， from a different angle， a lack of binding commitments for developing countries has proved to be a stumbling block for securing commitment from some developed countries. According to Rajamani （2000：124） ， the US cited the failure of key developing coun

39、tries to take on commitments as a justification for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. In 2001， former US President George Bush pointed out the perceived limitations of the Kyoto Protocol； that it is not fair on developed countries because some key developing countries， such as China， have no officia

40、l requirement to carry out emission reductions （Office of Press Secretary， 2001）. It seems that US national interests are so important that despite the US being the largest emitter from 1997 （when the Kyoto Protocol was formulated） onwards， it still does not wish to implement its reduction responsib

41、ilities. In the Kyoto Protocol， the Clean Development Mechanism （CDM） was outlined which establishes links by allowing developed countries to invest in developing countries and supply technological and financial support. Joining the Kyoto Protocol provides China with excellent opportunities for deve

42、lopment and so signing up to optional reduction is a wise choice. Drawing from Heggelund （2007） ， the Kyoto Protocol can provide a good learning opportunity to teach China when and how to reduce emissions， because developed countries will be able to impart their knowledge from experience. So it is favourable for China