强制性会计信息披露[外文翻译].doc

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44、HEAPLYANDPROMPTLY译文强制性会计信息披露资料来源小型私人公司强制性会计信息披露作者贝尼托不同国家在金融监管私营公司和披露，特别是关于他们的帐户披露，有重大差异。在美国，日本和其他一些国家，大多数私营公司，无论其大小，没有义务披露财务信息。与此相反，在欧洲联盟的所有公司必须要向公众披露。大多数其他国家的帐户也需要他们的私人公司的许多公开文件的帐户。这些披露通过讨论和发表给出不同的建议，导致轻微扩大披露的需求，并且去维护他们，减少他们。最近，为主动简化营商环境，减轻行政负担的一部分，欧洲委员会（2007）亦建议豁免小公司，让他们不需要遵循国家法律来披露他们的账户。委员会给出的建议，

45、即这些公司帐目产生的原因，没有明显的好处却花了相当大的成本。一方面，根据委员会的要求是一项重大的行政负担。另一方面，当给定的自由，让企业选择不透露他们的帐户，因为他们的帐户只是“被少量的股东使用，如信用机构和供应商有可能会要求直接从财务信息使用”。强制性的披露公司帐户涉及到的经济，会计及财务文献业务手续，强制性的财务信息披露，投资者的保护和在所有这些领域的信用信息，从而发现放松管制下提供的补充讨论的问题的见解。20世纪60年代，出现了对成本和效益以及财务披露的强制性内容最佳平衡的争论。但是，美国目前的监管机构大部分集中在上市公司的强制信息披露，也就是说，企业在证券交易所出售股票或债券给个人投资

46、者。这些上市公司被法律规定，不仅财务信息要定期公开披露，而且还要披露公司的其他信息，提出对证券新问题的详细数据，报告所有内部贸易。欧盟委员会的建议，上市公司的强制信息披露的讨论部分，适用年度帐目小型私人公司的强制性披露。但其他部分明显不同，在治理结构，规模和两种类型的公司信息的差异，以及在该资料的内容差异，被强制性披露。特别是，以往的研究集中于如何为上市公司强制性信息披露影响了他们的权益提供便利或不公平交易的价值等。但对私营公司的主要兴趣在于知道如何披露自己的帐户可以帮助他们的交易各方（主要是银行和供应商）估算其信用风险，从而扩大其获得信贷和降低其成本。其主要作用应该是减少信贷（包括贸易信贷）

47、的信息不对称，而不是在股权交易。此外，鉴于上市公司的股票在股市交易，有可能是强制披露对上市公司价值产生了影响。然而，即使在信用账户造成的强制交易成本也增加公司价值，我们不能衡量这个效果，因为我们缺乏私人公司股权的市场价格。因此，如果没有一个强制性披露帐目的信息，我们只能渴望建立一个综合指标，以成本和效益开明的定性库存。最后，强制性的财务披露在经济增长中发挥关键作用，因为它是为了“保护”与投资者和债权人的交易的公司法律制度的重要组成部分。强制性的财务披露起着经济增长的关键作用，金融发展是经济增长的重要因素。大多数研究集中于上市公司在股票市场的交易上，但类似的索赔，有关私营公司，主要考虑到对信贷成

48、本的证据。在经济上，信用额度取决于两个因素对债务人的质量提供信息，并在违约的情况下权利的法律制度补助给债权人。我们在意信息因素的可用性，经验证据显示，信贷供应量增长时，当银行对债务人分享更多的信息和信贷登记时，质量提高。看来，更好的质量和债权人知道债务人的潜在纪录，降低信贷交易成本，可能是因为既提高了债务人激励和逆向选择更容易避免。正如我们将看到的，披露的帐户最主要的原因是它允许信用风险改进评估为个人交易，银行和宏观调控。竞争扭曲帐户信息披露会导致私人成本的披露，使事务所通知其竞争对手，这可能扭曲竞争。然而，似乎不太可能大多小公司都参与。至少，这些成本显然比现在普遍要求对从上市公司披露的小。公

49、开申报的与该年度账户披露相比较将是一个有用的影响。例如，一个研究项目被取消。然而，并非由欧洲委员会审议的微型和小型公司在这一点上都有疑问。由于其规模和市场集中和有区别的存在，中型甚至大型私营公司对此披露到是相当敏感。投资者可占有优势公司账户披露还使贸易伙伴和第三方公司受益。本节探讨哪些是可受益的披露公司。披露者和他的合作伙伴账户信息披露给公司贸易伙伴带来好处，减少它们之间的信息不对称账户信息披露使公司的投资者了解公司的财政状况和企业盈利能力。这种信息不对称的减少，尤其体现在公司未来债务的价值客户购买耐用消费品，各方在公司特定资产，少数股东，特别是贸易和金融债权人的投资。可以理解的，更透明的公司已经发现要支付债务和股权资本成本较低。此外，与合同当事人移交给他们的个人通信相比，披露的账户可能更可靠，只有那些谁要求他们明确各方成本更低。信用是因为申请获得与独立第三方（登记）的帐目提交公司，如已经提出帐户不能被修改和今后的帐户将要与过去提出的一致。成本的降低，因为它不再需要他们提供大量的贸易债权人，债权人和潜在的第三方将不再有要求的帐目交付给他们。个人披露作为替代公开披露另一种方案，由欧盟委员会提出的对债权人要求借款人的财务报表。这个解决方案是有问题的，这是因为往往有两个以上当事方的交易。提供的信息在一对一的互动，以较少的一方往往比提供可信在市场上提交给所有潜在的各方。这是在银行给