SeeingDoubleatCentralBanks一个央行两个大头.doc

1、Seeing Double at Central Banks 一个央行 两个大头Oxford Central banks are now targeting liquidity, not just inflation. The credit boom of the past decade highlighted the inadequacy of focusing only on prices, and underscored the need for the monetary authority of a country to monitor the financial sector. Ma

2、croprudential regulation is the new term of art among central bankers, supplementing their well-established inflation-targeting regimes. 牛津如今，央行的目标不仅包括通胀，也包括流动性。过去十年的信贷繁荣清楚地表明仅仅关注价格水平是不够的，货币当局还需要密切监控金融部门。宏观审慎监管已成为央行所要掌握的新技能，以补充已经成型的通胀目标机制。This shift in focus could radically change monetary policy, b

3、ut for better or worse? The Bank of England may be blazing the way in this transition, but the ECB and the United States Federal Reserve Board are taking on more financial regulation as well. Indeed, the ECBs European Systemic Risk Board serves a function that is similar to the United Kingdoms new F

4、inancial Policy Committee (FPC). 这一政策焦点的转变将彻底改变货币政策，但会变好还是变坏？英格兰银行正在迈出转变的步伐，但欧洲央行和美联储董事会也在采取更多的金融管制手段。事实上，欧洲央行的欧洲系统风险委员会和英国的新金融政策委员会（FPC）具有相同的职能。 At the end of a recent discussion with Andy Haldane, the Bank of Englands Executive Director for Financial Stability and a member of the FPC, I asked: Wha

5、t happens if inflation is high and lending is low? Under this scenario, the Bank of Englands Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) would favoran increase in interest rates, while the FPC would want to loosen monetary conditions. 最近，我和英格兰银行负责金融稳定性的执行董事兼FPC成员霍尔丹（AndyHaldane ）进行了探讨，讨论结束时，我问：如果通胀高企而贷款量很低怎么办？在

6、这一情形下，英格兰银行货币政策委员会（MPC）将倾向于提高利率，而 FPC则更愿意放松银根。I am still pondering the question that I posed to Haldane, because the potential for such contradictory policy imperatives appears unavoidable never more so than now. 对于这个问题，我自己仍在思考，因为从目前的情况来看，这种政策上的相互冲突已经是不可避免的了。 The last decade until the collapse of Le

7、hman Brothers in September 2008 was known as the Great Moderation, a period of low inflation and strong growth that reflected major new developments, such as global integration of emerging markets and major central banks adoption of inflation-targeting regimes during the 1990s. In the United Kingdom

8、, the Bank of England was made independent in 1997, and given a target of 2% annual inflation. 过去十年（直到2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭之前）被称为“ 大稳健”时代，这段低通胀、高增长的时期反映了多项重大新发展，比如新兴市场融入了全球经济、主要央行在20世纪90年代均采取了以通胀为目标的机制等等。在英国，英格兰银行于1997年获得独立地位，并以设定了每年通胀2%的政策目标。Price stability during the 2000s explained the low interest rates

9、 that supported strong growth. But, it also meant that a credit boom with international dimensions was not monitored, resulting in the most spectacular bust of modern times, including the near collapse of the banking system. 21世纪第一个十年物价一直十分稳定，这使得利率维持在低水平，从而支持了高增长。但是，这也带来了不受监控的国际层面上的信贷繁荣，结果造成了现代社会最壮观

10、的泡沫破裂，整个银行体系几乎崩溃。 Amid the UKs institutional changes in 1997, financial regulation was put in the hands of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). But the FSA is soon to be replaced by the FPC, resulting in a system that aims to avoid an “underlap” of authority that leaves no one in charge. The FPC

11、is now part of the Bank of England, which is meant somehow to ensure that monetary policy takes into account thefinancial sector. 在1997年英国制度变革中，金融监管权被交到了金融服务局（FSA）手中。但FSA很快被FPC所取代，这是因为监管体系需要避免“叠床架屋” ，最后造成谁也不管的局面。FPC 目前是英格兰银行的一部分，这多少确保了货币政策会考虑金融部门的利益。The change reflects central bankers argument that

12、to target credit or liquidity requires another tool. Interest rates are too blunt an instrument, and risk damaging the wider economy when used to prick a housing bubble, as recent research by BOE Deputy Governor Charlie Bean has shown. So the FPC would wield instruments such as capital ratios or loa

13、n-to-value ratios to manage liquidity, and placing two instruments for two targets liquidity and inflation within the BOE would ensure coordination. 这一变革体现了央行的观点：需要用新的工具达到信贷或流动性为目标。英格兰银行副行长贝恩的最新研究表明，利率工具过于迟钝，如果将其用于刺破房地产泡沫将损害整体经济。因此FPC更愿意使用资本比率和贷款-估值比率来管理流动性，而让英格兰银行一家机构使用两种工具来达到两种目标（流动性和通胀）可以确保政策的协调性

14、。But what if the two targets are in conflict? During the pre-crisis Great Moderation, restraining lending through regulatory tools probably would have worked, because it was unlikely to push the economy into deflation, as hiking interest rates would have done. But that is not the problem now. 但如果两大目

15、标相互冲突怎么办？在危机前的大稳健时期，用监管工具来抑制贷款可能会有效果，因为这样做不会如同升息那样使经济陷入通缩。但现在的问题并非如此。The current issue is that the monetary aggregate (M4) measure of lending to the private sector is at its lowest level in a decade, while inflation is more than double the BOEs target. If the FPC lowers capital requirements to encou

16、rage lending, but the MPC raises rates to cope with inflation, banks would face competing pressures. Looser lending rules would conflict with the higher cost of money. Because both the FPC and the MPC rely on a monetary-transmission mechanism that operates through banks, it isnt clear that inflation

17、-targeting and liquidity maintenance can be so neatly separated. 现在的问题是，衡量流向私人部门的贷款的指标货币总量（M4）正处于十年来的最低点，而通胀率则是英格兰银行目标率的两倍。如果 FPC放松资本要求以刺激贷款，而MPC 提升利率以抑制通胀，那么银行将会面临竞争压力。放松贷款规则与提高资金成本是相互冲突的。由于FPC和MPC 均须依赖银行实现货币传递机制，因此要把通胀目标和保证流动性目标相分离并不容易。 There is also the added complexity of global regulation. The

18、idea is that countries would coordinate counter-cyclical regulatory measures, thereby preventing capital from skirting them by moving across borders. But, what if and this is very likely business cycles are not coordinated? After all, China is tightening credit while the UK is encouraging more of it

19、. 全球监管的复杂性也在增加。人们的如意算盘是各国能在实施反周期监管措施方面合作无间，从而防止资本通过跨国流动规避监管。但是，如果商业周期并不协调怎么办而这样的可能性非常大？如今英国正在刺激信贷，而中国却在收紧信贷。Closer to Britain, the ECB is potentially embarking on a tightening cycle and withdrawing hundredsof billions of euros in liquidity provided during the crisis, owing to concerns about “addicte

20、d” banks. Will it really loosen capital requirements in order to align itself with the BOE? 与英国更接近的欧洲央行由于担心银行“ 产生依赖心理 ”，也进入了紧缩周期，正在着手收回危机期间放出了数千亿欧元。欧洲央行真的会为了和英格兰银行保持一致而放松资本要求吗？Again, such policies would have worked a decade ago, in an environment of low inflation and rapidlending growth. But times h

21、ave changed, and monetary policy will, of course, shift accordingly. The problem is that if bodies like the FPC become as important to central banks as monetary policy committees, we may be left wondering which target takes precedence when they clash. 这些政策在十年前的低通胀、高贷款增速的环境下能起效。但时代已经起了变化，货币政策也必然需要随之改变。问题是，如果FPC在央行中变得如货币委员会一样重要，这将给我们带来一个新问题：当两者产生冲突的时候，优先考虑哪个？