内部资金分配和股权结构以韩国企业集团为例【外文翻译】.doc

1、外文翻译原文INTERNALFUNDSALLOCATIONANDTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREEVIDENCEFROMKOREANBUSINESSGROUPSMATERIALSOURCEREVIEWOFQUANTITATIVEFINANCEANDACCOUNTINGAUTHORBYUNGMOKIM,KOOYULJUNGABSTRACTWEEXAMINETHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSCASHFLOWRIGHTSANDTHEFUNDSTRANSFERINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETWITHINKORE

2、ANBUSINESSGROUPSCHAEBOLSDURINGTHEPERIODFROM1998TO2001WEFINDTHATTHEFUNDSALLOCATIONINTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSISBETTERALIGNEDWITHTHEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESANDTHEREFORE,MOREEFFICIENTTHANINTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVELOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSTHISEFFECTISSTRONGERWHENTHEYHAVECONTROLLINGP

3、OWERSLARGEENOUGHTOEXPROPRIATEMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSHOWEVER,DURINGTHEFINANCIALCRISISPERIOD,FUNDSSIMPLYMOVETOWARDTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSTHERESULTSEVIDENCETHETUNNELINGBEHAVIORINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETWITHINACHAEBOLTHATTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREDISTORTSTHEALLOCATIONOFINTERNA

4、LFUNDSINSUCHAWAYASTOBENEFITTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSINTRODUCTIONRECENTLY,MANYSTUDIESEXAMINEDFUNDSALLOCATIONINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETINTHEDIVERSIFIEDCOMPANIESINRELATIONTOTHEDIVERSIFICATIONDISCOUNTHOWEVER,FEWSTUDIESEXAMINETHECAPITALALLOCATIONBEHAVIORWITHINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETASEVIDENCEOFTHEINEFF

5、ICIENTALLOCATIONBEHAVIORINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKET,RAJAN,SERVAESANDZINGALESHEREAFTERRSZ2000SUGGESTTHATINTERNALPOWERSTRUGGLESBETWEENSEGMENTMANAGERSDISTORTTHEALLOCATIONOFRESOURCESWHENDIVERSITYINRESOURCESANDOPPORTUNITIESAREHIGHSCHARFSTEINANDSTEIN2000ARGUETHATDIVISIONALRENTSEEKINGBEHAVIORBYSEGMENTMANAGE

6、RSCAUSESINEFFICIENTFUNDSALLOCATIONINDIVERSIFIEDFIRMSTHEYCALLTHEFACTTHATWEAKERDIVISIONSGETSUBSIDIZEDBYSTRONGERONESASCAPITALALLOCATIONSOCIALISMINCONTRASTTOTHEINEFFICIENTASPECTOFTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKET,STEIN1997ARGUESTHATWINNERPICKINGBEHAVIORIMPROVESTHEEFFICIENCYOFCAPITALALLOCATIONANDCONTRIBUTESTOVALU

7、ECREATIONINDIVERSIFIEDFIRMSTHISSTUDYEXAMINESWHETHERTHETUNNELINGBEHAVIOREXISTSINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETWITHINABUSINESSGROUPCHAEBOLINKOREATHECONTROLLINGOWNEROFABUSINESSGROUPHASINCENTIVESTOEXPROPRIATEMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSBYTUNNELINGRESOURCESFROMTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVELOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSTOTHOSEWHERETHEYHAVE

8、HIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSJOHNSONETAL,2000WEARGUETHATTHEDISCREPANCYINCASHFLOWRIGHTSAMONGFIRMSTHATTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERCONTROLSCREATESTHETUNNELINGINCENTIVESINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETTUNNELINGOCCURSINMANYWAYSOUTRIGHTTHEFTORFRAUDOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERWHICHISILLEGAL,ANDASSETSALESATBELOWORABOVEMARKETVAL

9、UE,SELFDEALINGTRANSACTIONSSUCHASTRANSFERPRICINGADVANTAGEOUSTOTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDER,LOANGUARANTEESTOTHEAFFILIATEDMEMBERFIRMSANDEXPLOITINGINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESFROMTHEAFFILIATEDFIRMSWHICHARENOTNECESSARILYILLEGALJOHNSONETAL,2000BERTRAND,MEHTAANDMULLAINATHAN,2002NEVERTHELESS,THEREAREFEWSTUDIESTOEXA

10、MINETHETUNNELINGEVIDENCESGENERALLYOCCURRINGINTHEMULTIDIVISIONALFIRMSBEYONDLISTINGSOMEANECDOTALCASESEG,BERTRANDETAL2002FORINCOMESHIFTINGININDIANBUSINESSGROUPSANDBAE,KANGANDKIM2002FORMADECISIONSINKOREANCHAEBOLSITREFLECTSTHEFACTTHATFERRETINGOUTGENERALTUNNELINGEVIDENCEISDIFFICULTBECAUSESOMEPARTOFTUNNELI

11、NGISILLEGALLYPERFORMEDANDTHEOTHERPARTISDISGUISEDANDHARDTODETECTEVENIFITISBARELYINTHELEGALBOUNDARIESBECAUSEITMIGHTCREATECONFLICTWITHTHEMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSOFTHEINVOLVEDAFFILIATEDFIRMSTHISPAPERATTEMPTSTOFINDTUNNELINGEVIDENCEGENERALLYOCCURRINGINKOREANBUSINESSGROUPS,ESPECIALLYTHROUGHINTERNALCAPITALMARKE

12、TWEDONOTARGUETHATTHETUNNELINGSHOULDAPPEARINTHEFORMOFINTERNALFUNDSTRANSFERONLYHOWEVER,INTERNALCAPITALMARKETISUNIQUETOTHEBUSINESSGROUPSANDPROVIDESANENVIRONMENTINWHICHTUNNELINGCANBEEASILYPERFORMEDFOREXAMPLE,THEFREQUENTASSETSALESBETWEENAFFILIATEDMEMBERFIRMSATUNDEROROVERMARKETPRICECANBECONSIDEREDASSUBSID

13、YORTRANSFERINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETANOTHEREXAMPLEISINTERCOMPANYLOANFORTHEFINANCIALLYDISTRESSEDMEMBERFIRMSTHESEPROVIDEEXAMPLESINWHICHTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETSERVESASTUNNELINGDEVICESTHROUGHWHICHTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSFULFILLTHEIRSPRIVATEINCENTIVESATTHEEXPENSEOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSKOREANBUSINESSGR

14、OUP,CHAEBOLPROVIDESANAPPROPRIATEEXPERIMENTALSETTINGTOEXAMINETHETUNNELINGHYPOTHESISACCORDINGTOBAE,KANGANDKIM2002,THECHAEBOLSOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREISCHARACTERIZEDASAPYRAMIDALANDCROSSOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINWHICHACONTROLOFAFIRMSPOSSIBLEWITHMUCHLESSTHANTHEMAJORITYHOLDINGSTHEUNIQUEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREALLOWSTHECONT

15、ROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSTOEFFECTIVELYCONTROLTHEWHOLEMEMBERFIRMSINACHAEBOLWITHVERYSMALLOWNERSHIPHOLDINGSINADDITION,MARKETMONITORINGMECHANISMSHAVENOTBEENEFFECTIVEINREDUCINGTHEAGENCYPROBLEMSBETWEENOWNERMANAGERSANDMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSINKOREAHENCE,MINORITYSHAREHOLDERSARENOTABLETOPROTECTTHEIRBENEFITSAGAINSTTHE

16、HUGECOMBINEDCONTROLPOWERSOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERANDOTHERMEMBERFIRMSKOREADEVELOPMENTINSTITUTEKDI,2003REPORTSTHATTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVEANEXTENSIVEINFLUENCEEVENONTHEINDIVIDUALMEMBERFIRMSINVESTMENTSTRATEGIESANDPERSONNELMANAGEMENTASWELLASONTHEGROUPLEVELADJUSTMENTFORTHEBUSINESSSTRATEGIESAMONGM

17、EMBERFIRMSTHISINDICATESTHATTHEINVESTMENTDECISIONOFACHAEBOLFIRMISDETERMINEDATTHEGROUPLEVEL,NOTINDIVIDUALFIRMLEVELANDTHATITISCONTROLLEDBYTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERTHATIS,THEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETISEXPOSEDTOTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSTUNNELINGINCENTIVESCREATEDBYTHEUNIQUEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREOFACHAEBOLTHECONT

18、ROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSWOULDLIKETOALLOCATEINTERNALFUNDSTOMAXIMIZETHEIRTOTALPROFITSFROMINVESTMENTSINTHEGROUPMEMBERFIRMSFORPROFITMAXIMIZATION,THEYSEETOITTHATFUNDSALLOCATIONTOTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSISEFFICIENTSOTHATALLGOODINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESAREFULLYFINANCEDWITHOUTFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSTHI

19、SWILLRESULTINTHEINVESTMENTSBEINGBETTERALIGNEDWITHTHEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESINTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSTHANTHOSEINTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVELOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSTHEN,THEYWILLHAVEMOREBENEFITSFORTHEINVESTMENTSINTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSATTHEEXPENSEOFEFFICIENTALLOCATIONINTHEFIRMSWHERE

20、THEYHAVELOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSOTHERWISE,IFTHEYFOCUSONTHEEFFICIENTFUNDSALLOCATIONONTHEWHOLEMEMBERFIRMS,THEIRTOTALBENEFITSCOULDDECREASEEVENTHOUGHTHETOTALPROFITSOFTHEGROUPMAYINCREASEASACONSEQUENCEOFSUCHALLOCATIONBEHAVIOR,FUNDSALLOCATIONINTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVELOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSTENDSTOBEINEFFICIENTANDREDUCESTH

21、EPOTENTIALWEALTHOFTHEMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSOFTHEFIRM,RESULTINGINTHETUNNELINGBEHAVIORINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETTHEN,WEEXAMINETHETUNNELINGBEHAVIORDURINGTHEFINANCIALCRISISPERIODDURINGTHEFINANCIALCRISIS,ITISPOSSIBLETHATTHEINTERNALFUNDSARETRANSFERREDSIMPLYFROMTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVELOWCASH

22、FLOWRIGHTSTOTHOSEWHERETHEYHAVEHIGHCASHOWRIGHTSJOHNSONETAL2000HEREAFTERJBBFTHEORETICALLYSUGGESTTHAT,DURINGTHECRISIS,THECOSTOFFRAUDANDSELFDEALINGDECREASES,ANDTHEEXPECTEDRETURNSONALMOSTALLINVESTMENTALTERNATIVESFALLMITTON2002,BAEK,KANGANDPARK2004ANDKIMANDLEE2003ALSOARGUETHATAGENCYPROBLEMBECOMESMORECRITI

23、CALDURINGTHEASIANCRISISEXPROPRIATIONOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSCOULDINCREASEDURINGTHECRISISSINCETHEINCENTIVEFORCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERTODOSOTENDSTOINCREASEASTHEEXPECTEDRETURNONINVESTMENTFALLSWHENEXPECTEDRETURNSONALMOSTALLINVESTMENTPROJECTSPLUMMETNEARTOZEROINTHECRISISPERIODANDTHEREFORE,THEREISNODIFFERENCEI

24、NTHEPROFITABILITYACROSSTHEAFFILIATEDMEMBERFIRMS,THEPRIORITYINTHEPROFITABILITYOFAFFILIATEDFIRMSWOULDNOTBEAMAINDETERMINANTALLOCATINGTHEINTERNALFUNDSTHATIS,ALIGNINGTHESUBSIDYANDTRANSFERWITHAFFILIATEDFIRMSINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESDOESNOTNECESSARILYMAXIMIZETHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSWEALTHDURINGTHECRISIS,WH

25、ILE,DURINGTHENONCRISISPERIOD,MEMBERFIRMSDIFFERININVESTMENTPROFITABILITY,ANDTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERNEEDTOCONSIDERTHERELATIVEPROFITABILITYINDISTRIBUTINGTHEINTERNALCAPITALAMONGTHEAFFILIATEDMEMBERFIRMSINTHISCASE,THECASHFLOWRIGHTSOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERAMONGAFFILIATEDFIRMSBECOMEAMAINFACTORINDETERMI

26、NINGTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFINTERNALFUNDSCONSEQUENTLY,WEEXPECTTHATTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSGENERALLYCONSIDERTHERELATIVEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESOFTHEFIRMSINSUCHAWAYTHATTHETUNNELINGSATISFIESTHEFINANCINGNEEDSOFTHEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSMEANWHILE,DURINGTHECRISISPERIOD,THEYTRANSFERINTERNALCAPITALTO

27、THEFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSWITHOUTCONSIDERINGTHERELATIVEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYTHISWAY,CONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSPRIVATEBENEFITSWILLINCREASEMOREBECAUSEITISNOTMEANINGFULTODETERMINETHEINVESTMENTPRIORITYOFUNPROFITABLEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESANDCOSTSOFOUTRIGHTTRANSFERBECOMETRIVIALFURTHER,WEEXAMINE

28、WHETHERTUNNELINGEVIDENCEININTERNALCAPITALMARKETWOULDBEMOREPREVALENTFORTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVESIGNIFICANTCONTROLLINGPOWERSTHANOTHERFIRMSLEMMONANDLINS2003FINDTHATHAVINGASIGNIFICANTDEGREEOFCONTROLOVERAFIRMSASSETSISANECESSARYCONDITIONFOREXPROPRIATIONOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSWEAPPROXIMATETH

29、EDEGREEOFCONTROLPOWERSWITHINSIDEOWNERSHIPHOLDINGSTHEINSIDEOWNERSHIPISTHEOWNERSHIPHELDBYALLTHERELATEDPARTIESTOTHELARGESTSHAREHOLDERINCLUDINGOTHERAFFILIATESINAGROUPINADDITIONTOTHELARGESTSHAREHOLDERTHERESULTSINDICATETHATINGENERALINTERNALFUNDSALLOCATIONACROSSMEMBERFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVEHI

30、GHLEVELSOFCASHFLOWRIGHTSISBETTERALIGNEDWITHTHERELATIVEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESANDTHEREFORE,MOREEFFICIENTTHANTHEFUNDSALLOCATIONINOTHERMEMBERFIRMS,SUPPORTINGTHETUNNELINGBEHAVIORWHENWETESTEDFORTHEFINANCIALCRISISPERIODONLY,INTERNALFUNDSTENDTOFLOWTOTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHT

31、SRATHERTHANTOTHOSEWHERETHEYHAVELOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSITINDICATESTHAT,DURINGTHECRISISPERIOD,THEINCREASEINTHESIZEOFFIRMSWHERETHEYHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSISABETTERALTERNATIVEINMAXIMIZINGTHEIRPRIVATEBENEFITSTHANINVESTINGINTHEPROJECTSWITHPOOREXPECTEDRETURNSFURTHER,WEFINDTHATTHEDIFFERENCEINTHEEFFICIENCYOFFUNDSAL

32、LOCATIONBETWEENTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSANDTHOSEWITHLOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSISGREATERFORTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVESUFFICIENTCONTROLPOWERS,ASEVIDENCEDINLEMMONANDLINS2003THEFINDINGSOFTHETUNNELINGBEHAVIORINTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETWITHINACHAEBOLINKOREAPROVIDENEWEV

33、IDENCEONTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDINTERNALFUNDSALLOCATIONTHISIDENTIFIESANUNDERLYINGSOURCEOFPOTENTIALINCENTIVETHATDERIVESDISTORTEDINTERNALCAPITALALLOCATIONWITHINABUSINESSGROUPCONCLUSIONPREVIOUSSTUDIESHAVEDOCUMENTEDTHATDIVERSIFIEDBUSINESSGROUPSHAVEOWNINTERNALCAPITALMARKETSANDEXAMINEWH

34、ETHERTHEINTERNALCAPITALMARKETISEFFICIENTANDITSEFFICIENCYCANEXPLAINTHEEXCESSVALUEOFTHEDIVERSIFIEDFIRMSHOWEVER,FEWSTUDIESEXAMINEWHATDETERMINESTHEDIRECTIONOFINTERNALFUNDSINABUSINESSGROUPTHISPAPERFOCUSESONTHETUNNELINGINCENTIVESCAUSEDBYTHECASHFLOWRIGHTSOFACONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERINCHAEBOLMEMBERFIRMSANDEXAM

35、INESWHETHERTHETUNNELINGINCENTIVESCANEXPLAINTHEINTERNALFUNDSALLOCATIONWITHINKOREANBUSINESSGROUPS,CHAEBOLSUSINGTHETRANSFERMEASURESOFRSZ2000ANDBM2003,WEFINDTHATFUNDSALLOCATIONWITHINTHEAFFILIATEDFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVEHIGHCASHFLOWRIGHTSISMOREEFFICIENTCOMPAREDWITHTHOSEWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREH

36、OLDERSHAVELOWCASHFLOWRIGHTSTHATIS,THEADJUSTEDINVESTMENTRATIO,OURTRANSFERMEASURE,ISBETTERALIGNEDWITHTHERELATIVEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESINTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSCASHFLOWRIGHTSAREHIGHTHISBEHAVIORMAXIMIZESCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSTOTALWEALTHFROMTHERETURNONINVESTMENTSINMEMBERFIRMSINADDITION,THE

37、TUNNELINGBEHAVIORISMOREAPPARENTFORTHEFIRMSWHERECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVESUFFICIENTLYLARGECONTROLLINGPOWERSITINDICATESTHATITISEASIERTODIVERTTHEFUNDSFORTHEIROWNBENEFITSWHENCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSHAVESUFFICIENTLYLARGECONTROLPOWERSTHESEFINDINGSARECONSISTENTWITHTHEARGUMENTTHATSUFFICIENTLEVELOFCONTROLRI

38、GHTSISNECESSARYINEXPROPRIATINGMINORITYSHAREHOLDERSLEMMONANDLINS,2003OURRESULTSSUGGESTTHATTHEDISPERSEDCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREACROSSMEMBERFIRMWITHINAGROUPPLAYSANIMPORTANTROLEINEXPLAININGTHEBEHAVIOROFFUNDSALLOCATIONTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREDISTORTSTHEALLOCATIONOFINTERNALFUNDSWITHINACHAEBO

39、LINSUCHAWAYASTOMAKETHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSMOREBENEFICIAL译文内部资金分配和股权结构以韩国企业集团为例资料来源回顾定量财务和会计作者BYUNGMOKIM,KOOYULJUNG摘要我们检查从1998年到2001年在韩国企业集团（财阀）期间，现金流控股股东权利和资金内部资本市场转让的关系，发现资金分配公司控股股东具有较高的现金权与取得更好的投资机会是相一致的，这比他们在公司的掌握低资金控制权的情况下更有效率。这种有控制能力的影响大到足以废除中小股东享有的平等地位。然而，在金融危机期间，资金只是走向具有较高资金控制权的控股股东。结果证据表明

40、，内部资本市场的隧道行为，在一个财阀股权结构下扭曲了内部资金的分配，以这样的方式来造福控股股东。引言近年来，许多研究都关于资金分配和检查内部资本市场的公司多元化与折扣多样化。然而，却很少有研究考核了内部资本市场内的资本配置行为。作为内部资本市场有效的配置行为的证据，RAJAN,SERVAES和ZINGALES以下简称RSZ2000认为内部权力斗争的管理者之间的分配段，扭曲多样性资源资源和机会是很高的。SCHARFSTEIN和STEIN2000认为基金经理区分寻租行为造成了多元化企业的资金配置效率低下。他们称这事实上就像社会主义的资源配置一样，强的部门资助弱的部门。与此相对照内部资本市场低效率的

41、方面,STEIN1997认为，胜利者挑选行为提高了地区资本配置的效率，有助于多元化企业价值的创造。本文主要研究隧道行为是否存在于韩国的一个商业组织称作“财阀”的内部资本市场。业务集团的控制者鼓励废除少数股股东在公司的隧道资源，无论他们有低现金流量的现金权还是有高现金流量的现金权约翰逊、苏达权等，2000年。我们认为在公司控股股东控制现金权的差异激励创造了内部资本市场的隧道行为。隧道行为以许多方式发生彻底盗窃或欺诈控股股东是违法的，资产销售价格低于或者高于市场价值，定价有利于控制者股东的谋私交易，贷款担保附属会员公司投资的机遇和开发附属公司，不一定是违法约翰逊、苏达权等，2000；伯特蓝德，梅塔

42、博士和MULLAINATHAN，2002。然而，很少有研究了解隧道证据通常发生在多数分部的公司。例如，BERTRAND等2002收入转向印度商业团体和BAE，KANG和KIM2002在韩国财阀并购决策。它反映出一个事实，找出证据很困难，因为一般隧道行为部分进行非法，另一部分隐蔽起来了，难以被发现，即使是仅仅在合法的界限，因为它涉及与少数股东关联的公司，可能会造成冲突。本文试图找到通过韩国企业集团内部资本市场发生在隧道行为的证据。我们不认为隧道行为应该出现在的内部资金转帐的形式。然而，独特的内部资本市场的企业集团提供了一个让穿隧可以很容易进行的环境。例如，在市场价格可以被认为是补贴或转让的内部资

43、本市场下，频繁的资产附属会员公司之间的销售。另一个例子是公司的贷款在财政上拖累成员公司。这些范例提供内部资本市场的作为隧道行为的设备，通过控股股东履行他们的私人权利，牺牲中小股东的权益。韩国企业集团，财阀提供了一个合适的实验环境，研究隧道假说。根据BAE，KANG和KING2002，财阀的所有权结构特征是一个金字塔，交叉的股权结构控制公司，不太可能以多数控股。独特的股权结构允许控股股东拥有很少的股权有效地控制整个成员公司。此外，韩国的市场监测机制还没有能有效降低企业所有者之间的少数股东代理问题的方法。因此，少数股东无法抵御庞大的控股股东及其他成员企业合并控制权力及其利益。韩国开发研究院KDI，

44、2003报告说，控股股东，甚至个别会员公司的投资策略和人事管理，以及对成员企业间的商业战略组级别调整有着广泛的影响。这表明，一个财阀企业的投资决策是确定在集团层面，而不是单个企业层次，它是由控股股东控制的。也就是说，内部资本市场是不暴露于控股股东的隧道，激励创造了独特的股权结构。控股股东想通过分配内部资金，来使投资集团成员公司的利润总额达到最大化。为了利润最大化，他们看到资金分配给企业，他们具有较高的现金流权是有效的，良好的投资机会得到充分资助，没有融资约束。这将会导致该投资成为一个更好的投资机会,与具有较高的现金权的公司有相一致的投资机会。然后，他们将会有更多的福利企业的投资，他们有较高的现

45、金流的有效分配，比低资金的控制权有更多的好处。另外，如果他们将对整个会员公司进行有效的基金分置，他们将会减少总效益，尽管集团的总利润可能增加。由于这样的分配行为，基金公司在低现金权下的配置往往是效率低下的，降低了该公司的少数股东的潜在财富，在内部资本市场的行为造成隧道。然后，我们研究在金融危机期间的隧道行为。在金融危机期间，内部资金转移有可能仅仅是简单地从公司控制股股东从低现金流量权相高现金流量权的转让。约翰逊等人2000以下简称JBBF从理论上表明，在危机期间，欺诈和自我交易成本下降，以及几乎所有的投资选择的预期回报下降。MITTON2002，BAEK，KANG和PARK2004和KIM和L

46、EE2003也认为，在亚洲金融危机下，代理问题变得更加关键。少数股股东可能会增加为控股股东，这样做往往会使得增加投资的预期收益下降。当几乎所有投资项目预期收益率直线下降甚至接近零的危险时期时，没有对面的下属成员企业的盈利能力差，在分配内部资金时，附属公司的盈利能力不会作为主要因素被优先考虑的。也就是说，在危机期间，调整的补贴，以附属公司的投资机会，转让并不一定会使控股股东的财富最大化，同时，在非危机期间，会员企业的投资盈利能力不同，与控股股东需要考虑在成员之间分配附属公司的内部资本的相对盈利能力。在这种情况下，关联企业之间的控股股东现金流权成为确定内部资金分配的主要因素。因此，我们期望的控股股

47、东通常认为是相关投资机会的公司，在这种情况下穿隧满足企业的融资需求,他们有高的现金流的权利。同时,对企业来说，在经济危险期，他们具有较高的现金权，没有考虑到相关的投资机会。这种方式,会影响控股股东的私人利益，因为那不是增加更多有意义的投资项目确定投资机会，而是无用的成本转移，直接就变得琐碎。此外,我们在研究是否隧道内部资本市场的证据，使得负责公司控股股东比其他企业有更显著的控制权力。莱蒙和林氏2003发现，有超过一个公司的资产控制的重要程度是对少数股东征用的必要条件。近似内部持股与控制权的程度。与内部所有权有关的，集合了所有大股东包括集团的其他分支机构，除了第一大股东的所有权。结果表明，在会员

48、公司，普通内部资金分配，控股股东有着高水平的现金权是更好的获得相关的投资机会，因此，比其他成员公司的资金分配的隧道行为更有效率。当我们在金融危机期间进行的测试发现，内部资金往往只流向具有较高的现金权的控股股东手中，而不是那些只有低资金的控制权的人手中。这表明，在危险期，增加企业的规模，高现金权是一个更好的选择，可以使他们的个人利益最大化，而不会使投资项目的预期收益较差。另外，莱蒙和林斯2003也证明，在资金配置效率上，企业控股股东具有较高的现金流权与现金流权低的控股股东的公司之间，在控制力上有着较大的差异。隧道行为是内部资本市场的通道，为韩国财阀行为的结果，提供了有关产权结构和内部资本金分配关

49、系的新证据。这标识扭曲的潜在诱因源于，业务集团内部资本配置的基本来源。结论以往的研究已经证明，多元化的企业集团有自己的内部资本市场，研究是否内部资本市场是有效的，它的效率可以解释多元化公司的超额价值。然而，很少有研究探讨是什么决定了内部资金在企业集团的方向。本文着重论述了在财阀的成员公司，控股股东现金流权所造成的隧道奖励和激励机制，是否可以解释，隧道内的韩国企业集团内部资金的分配。利用RSZ2002和BM2003的转移措施,我们发现，在控股股东具有较高的现金流权的附属公司，比那些控股股东低现金流权的，更能有效地分配资金。也就是说，通过我们的转移措施调整后的投资比例，对准其中高现金流权的控股股东，能更好地与把握公司的投资机会。此行为能使成员公司在投资收益和控股股东的总财富上利益最大化。此外，隧道的行为明显地使更多公司的控股股东有足够大的控制权。它表明，在更容易为自己的利益转移资金时，控股股东有足够大的控制权。这些发现与论点一致证明，为了足够程度的控制权，没收少数股东的控制权是必要的（莱蒙和林氏，2003）。我们的结果表明，分散成员企业控制股东的股权结构，在群体中扮演着解释资金分配行为的重要作用。股权结构以这样扭曲的方式对内部资金进行分配，对控股股东在财阀中更为有利。