审计委员会和内部审计：来自西班牙的公司的经验证据【外文翻译】.doc

1、外文翻译原文AUDITCOMMITTEEANDINTERNALAUDITANDTHEQUALITYOFEARNINGSEMPIRICALEVIDENCEFROMSPANISHCOMPANIESMATERIALSOURCESPRINGERLINKDATABASEAUTHORLAURASIERRAGARCIACORPORATESCANDALSANDFAILURESSUCHASENRON,WORLDCOM,ETCWEREHIGHLYCATASTROPHICANDHADATERRIBLEEFFECTONSTAKEHOLDERSTHEPRESSUREOFGLOBALISATIONANDTHEINTENS

2、ECOMPETITIONHAVELEADTOORGANISATIONSENCOURAGINGGOODCORPORATEGOVERNANCEORGANISATIONSHAVETOPROMOTETRANSPARENCYANDACCOUNTABILITYOFNANCIALINFORMATIONASGRAMLINGETALJACCOUNTLIT23194244,2004ARGUEDTHEREAREFOURIMPORTANTMECHANISMSOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEINCLUDEBOARDSOFDIRECTORS,AUDITCOMMITTEESAMONGOTHERSANDINTERN

3、ALANDEXTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONSHOWEVER,THISPAPERWILLFOCUSONTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTWOCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSAUDITCOMMITTEEANDINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONTHUS,OURPURPOSEISTOANALYSETHERELATIONBETWEENCHARACTERISTICSOFTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONANDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTMEASUREDASABNORMALACCRUALSTOTE

4、STTHEQUALITYOFNANCIALSTATEMENTSWEHYPOTHESISETHATTHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDTHEPRESENCEOFANINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONANDITSRELATIONSHIPWITHTHISCOMMITTEEWOULDINDICATELESSOPPORTUNITYFORMANAGEMENTTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSUSINGASAMPLEOF108NONNANCIALSPANISHCOMPANIESTHATTRADEDONTHEMAD

5、RIDSTOCKEXCHANGEBETWEEN2003AND2006432OBSERVATIONS,WEHAVEFOUNDTHATTHESIZEANDNUMBEROFMEETINGSOFTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEHADASIGNINCENTNEGATIVEASSOCIATIONWITHEARNINGSMANIPULATIONSALSO,OURRESULTSSUGGESTTHATANEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENHAVINGANINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONANDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTSINCETHEENDOFTHEEIGHTIESANDEARLY

6、NINETIES,THETOPICOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEBEGANTOATTRACTMUCHATTENTIONINTHEACADEMICWORLDWETHINKTHATTHISINTERESTWASPRIMARILYDUETOTWOREASONSCHANGESINTHEWAYOFGOVERNINGCOMPANIESBECAUSEOFGLOBALISATION,COMPETITION,NEWTECHNOLOGIESANDSOCIALANDENVIRONMENTALCONCERNAND,SECONDLY,ASARESULTOFNANCIALSCANDALSINSEVERALCO

7、MPANIESTHESESCANDALSWEREUSUALLYCAUSED,INGENERALTERMS,BYTHECONICTOFINTERESTINHERENTINTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEOWNERANDMANAGERSINTHISCONICT,ITWASNECESSARYTOESTABLISHFORMULASFORGOVERNMENTTOREGULATETHEACTIONSOFALLACTORSINVOLVEDINCOMPANIESFURTHERMORE,TOENHANCETHECREDIBILITYANDTRANSPARENCYOFNANCIALINFORMA

8、TION,ASWELLASCONTRIBUTINGTOGREATERCONTROLOFMANAGERS,DIFFERENTCODESOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEWEREISSUEDINEUROPEINTHENINETIESSUCHASTHECADBURYREPORTINTHEUK,1992THEVIENOTIREPORTINFRANCE,1995THEOLIVENCIAREPORTINSPAIN1998DIFFERENTCODESPROPOSEDASERIESOFRECOMMENDATIONSTOIMPROVETHEQUALITYOFTHENANCIALINFORMATIONTH

9、ROUGHMECHANISMSTOCONTROLTHEACCOUNTABILITYOFORGANISATIONSGOODMECHANISMSSUCHASANINDEPENDENTBOARDOFDIRECTORS,EFFECTIVEAUDITCOMMITTEES,ETCARENEEDED,BOTHINTERNALLYANDEXTERNALLY,TOHELPMANAGEMENTTOCONTROLTHEIRCOMPANIESCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSAREDENEDBYATLEASTFOURMECHANISMS,AMONGOTHERS1BOARDOFDIRECTORS

10、ANDMANAGEMENT,2AUDITCOMMITTEES,3THEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONAND4THEEXTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONGRAMLINGETAL2004INSPAIN,THEISSUEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCESTARTEDIN1998THATYEAR,ADOCUMENTENTITLEDTHEGOVERNMENTOFSOCIETIESKNOWNASTHEOLIVENCIAREPORTWASPUBLISHEDSPAIN,ASWITHOTHEREUROPEANCOUNTRIES,TOOKFROMTHECADBURYREPORTUK19

11、92SIMILARRECOMMENDATIONSABOUTTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORS,AUDITCOMMITTEES,ETCFIVEYEARSAFTERTHEPUBLICATIONOFTHERSTCODE,THESECONDPHASEOFDEVELOPMENTSSTARTEDINSPAINTHEREPORTBYTHESPECIALCOMMISSIONFORTHEFURTHERANCEOFTRANSPARENCYANDSECURITYINLISTEDMARKETSANDCOMPANIESREFERREDTOASTHEALDAMAREPORTWASPUBLISHEDTHISREPORT

12、GOESONESTEPFURTHERINTHEPRINCIPLESOFTRANSPARENCYANDSECURITY,ASWELLASTHEDEGREEOFINFORMATIONANDLOYALTYREQUIREDIN2006ANDFOLLOWINGANGLOSAXONCOUNTRIES,THEUNIEDCODEKNOWNASTHECONTHEREPORTWASPUBLISHEDON25JULY2005,THEGOVERNMENTAGREEDTOSETUPASPECIALWORKINGGROUPTOADVISETHESPANISHSECURITIESMARKETSCOMMISSIONCOMIS

13、IONNACIONALDELMERCADODEVALORES,CNMVWITHREGARDTOTHEHARMONISATIONANDUPDATINGOFTHEOLIVENCIAANDTHEALDAMAREPORTRECOMMENDATIONSFORGOODGOVERNANCEINLISTEDCOMPANIESINTHETABLEBELOW,WEOUTLINETHESPANISHCORPORATEGOVERNANCESYSTEMREGARDINGBOARDOFDIRECTORS,AUDITCOMMITTEEANDINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONIN2002,BETWEENTHERSTA

14、NDTHESECONDREPORT,ANEWLAWWASPASSEDINSPAINTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMREFORMACTLAW44/22NOVEMBER2002SEEKSTOACHIEVEGREATERTRANSPARENCYANDIMPROVETHECREDIBILITYOFNANCIALINFORMATIONBYREGULATINGAUDITORSINDEPENDENCEANDPROVIDINGFORTHEMANDATORYCREATIONOFAUDITCOMMITTEESINLISTEDCOMPANIESTHISLAWFORCEDALLSPANISHRMSTHATTRAD

15、EDONTHESTOCKEXCHANGETOHAVEANAUDITCOMMITTEEANDIMPOSEDTHATTHECOMMITTEEPRESIDENTANDAMAJORITYOFITSMEMBERSWEREINDEPENDENTBUTTHISLAWDIDNOTREGULATETHECHARACTERISTICSOFTHEAUDITCOMMITTEETHECOMPANIESTHEMSELVESHAVETOREGULATETHISINTHEIRSTATUTESALSO,AFTERTHEALDAMAREPORT,THE26/2003LAWWASPASSEDINSPAINTHISLAWADDRES

16、SESTHEFOLLOWINGGOVERNANCEMATTERSSHAREHOLDERAGREEMENTS,SUBSTANTIVEANDDISCLOSURERULESOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,SHAREHOLDERSMEETINGSANDDUTIESOFDIRECTORSTHELAWFORCEDLISTEDCOMPANIESTOPUBLISHANANNUALREPORTONCORPORATEGOVERNANCEFORTHE2004NANCIALYEARBASEDONTHEAFOREMENTIONEDANDINORDERTOENSURECLARITY,THEMAINOBJECT

17、IVEOFTHISPAPERISTOSTUDYTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENANEFFECTIVEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDTHEPRESENCEOFANINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONONTHEQUALITYOFNANCIALINFORMATIONWEWILLFOCUSONTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEBECAUSEITISONEOFTHEELEMENTSRESPONSIBLEFOROVERSEEINGTHEINTERESTSOFSHAREHOLDERSANDSUPERVISINGNANCIALSTATEMENTSTHEAUDITCOMMITTEESHOU

18、LDBEEFCIENTANDPROVIDEMAXIMUMTRANSPARENCYTHISORGANOFACOMPANYNEEDSOTHERGROUPS,SUCHASTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTION,TOCOMPLETETHEIREFFECTIVENESSDAVIDSONETAL2005WEWILLCARRYTHISOUTBYEXAMININGTHEROLETHATEFFECTIVEAUDITCOMMITTEES,ANDTHEPRESENCEOFTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTION,PLAYINMITIGATINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTFROMASAMP

19、LEOF432NONNANCIALSPANISHCOMPANIESTHATTRADEDONTHEMADRIDSTOCKEXCHANGEBETWEEN2003AND2006ALSO,WEWANTTOPOINTOUTTHATOURRESEARCHISIMPORTANTANDUNIQUEBECAUSE,TODATE,THEREHASNOTBEENASTUDYCARRIEDOUTONTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONANDAUDITCOMMITTEESINSPAININADDITION,OURCOUNTRYHASTWOLAWSONCORPORA

20、TEGOVERNANCETHATMAKEITDIFFERENTFROMOTHEREUROPEANCOUNTRIESTHEREMAINDEROFTHISPAPERISORGANISEDASFOLLOWSSECT2BRIEYREVIEWPREVIOUSLITERATUREONTHELINKSBETWEENCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSANDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTFURTHERMORE,WEPROVIDEOURHYPOTHESESSECTION3DESCRIBETHERESEARCHDESIGNTHESAMPLE,MODELANDMAINRESULTSFIN

21、ALLY,SECT4SETSOUTOUCONCLUSIONSAGREATNUMBEROFSTUDIESAREFOCUSEDONTHEINDEPENDENCEOFDIRECTORSBEASLEYANDSALTERIO2001VAFEAS2001KLEIN1998MENONANDWILLIAMS1994VICKNAIRETAL1993VERSCHOOR1993MANYOFTHESEAUTHORSCONCLUDEDTHATANAUDITCOMMITTEEFORMEDEXCLUSIVELYOFEXTERNALANDINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSWOULDRESULTINBETTERACCOU

22、NTABILITYANDTRANSPARENCYFORORGANISATIONSWEFOUNDSTUDIESRELATEDTOTHEINDEPENDENCEOFTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDEARNINGSMANIPULATIONKLEIN2002BCARRIEDOUTASTUDYOF692COMPANIESINTHEUSANDTHERESULTSSHOWEDTHATAUDITCOMMITTEEINDEPENDENCEWASNEGATIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHABNORMALACCRUALS,ANDREDUCTIONSINAUDITCOMMITTEEINDEPENDENC

23、EWASASSOCIATEDWITHLARGEINCREASESINABNORMALACCRUALSYANGANDKRISHNAN2005FOUNDASIGNICANTCONNECTIONBETWEENAUDITCOMMITTEEINDEPENDENCEANDQUARTERLYDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSBRADBURYETAL2004FOUNDAUDITCOMMITTEEINDEPENDENCEWASRELATEDTOHIGHERQUALITYACCOUNTINGTHUS,THERESULTSINDICATETHATAUDITCOMMITTEESAREMOREEFFECTIVE

24、WHENTHEYARECOMPRISEDOFINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSALSO,INTHESPANISHCONTEXT,WEFOUNDTHATSTUDIESSUCHASPUCHETAMARTINEZETAL2005PROVIDEEVIDENCE,INASAMPLEOF86SPANISHRMSBETWEEN1996AND2001,THATTHEEXISTENCEOFANAUDITCOMMITTEEANDITSCOMPOSITIONDIDNOTAFFECTTHEQUALITYOFNANCIALREPORTINGFURTHERMORE,PUCHETAMARTINEZANDDEFUENT

25、ES2007,INASAMPLEOF142SPANISHCOMPANIESOBSERVEDIN1999,ARGUEDTHATTHEVOLUNTARYFORMATIONOFAUDITCOMMITTEESWASPOSITIVERELATEDTOINDEPENDENTMEMBERSOFTHEBOARDHOWEVER,THESESTUDIESWERECONDUCTEDBEFORETHENEWLAWIN2002WHENCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREQUIREMENTSWERELESSSEVEREANDLESSRELATEDTOTHEQUALITYOFNANCIALSTATEMENTSNOWA

26、DAYS,THISHASCOMPLETELYCHANGEDINSUMMARY,THEMAJORITYOFSTUDIESARGUETHATTHEPRESENCEOFEXTERNALANDINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSINTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEINCREASESTHEQUALITYANDCREDIBILITYONANCIALSTATEMENTSFURTHERMORE,CORPORATEGOVERNANCECODES,SUCHASTHESMITHREPORT2003INENGLANDORTHEUNIEDREPORT2006INSPAIN,RECOMMENDEDTHEPRESEN

27、CEOFINDEPENDENTMEMBERSONTHEAUDITCOMMITTEETHESIZEANDTHENUMBEROFMEETINGSOFAUDITCOMMITTEESAREMENTIONEDINNUMEROUSCODESORRECOMMENDATIONSONCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,SUCHASTHECADBURYREPORT1992ANDTHESMITHREPORT2003THESEREPORTSRECOMMENDEDAMINIMUMOFTHREEMEMBERSONTHEAUDITCOMMITTEETHEBLUERIBBONCOMMITTEEREPORT1999RECO

28、MMENDEDAMINIMUMOFTHREEMEMBERSANDFOURMEETINGSAYEARFOREFFECTIVENESSOFAUDITCOMMITTEESTHESARBANESOXLEYACT2002STIPULATESAMINIMUMOFTHREEMEMBERSTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONHASBECOMEANIMPORTANTMECHANISMFORCORPORATEGOVERNANCEINTHELASTFEWYEARSIIA2005FIRSTOFALL,WEINVESTIGATEWHETHERRMSHAVEANINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONAND

29、IMPROVEDCORPORATEGOVERNANCESCARBROUGHETAL1998RAGHUNANDANETAL2001GOODWIN2003JAMES2003SECONDLY,WELOOKATWHETHERTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONHAVEAGOODRELATIONSHIPTHEYCOULDENHANCEGOODCORPORATEGOVERNANCEASGRAMLINGETAL2004ARGUE,THEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONISONEOFTHEFOURCORNERSTONESOFCORPORATEGOV

30、ERNANCETHEHEADOFTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONSHOULDINFORMABOUTTHEIRPROGRESSTOTHEAUDITCOMMITTEESEVERALAUTHORSCLAIMTHATAGOODRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDINTERNALAUDITORSISNECESSARYFORTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFGOODINTERNALCONTROLMECHANISMSANDTOIMPROVETHEQUALITYOFNANCIALSTATEMENTSCOOPERANDCRAIG1984COOPERET

31、AL1989REZAEEANDLANDER1993LIGHTLEANDBUSHONG2000NAGYANDCENKER2002ANDERSON2004HARRINGTON2004KALBERS1992,INASURVEY,CONCLUDEDTHAT31OFTHERESPONDENTSSTATEDTHATINTERNALAUDITORSDIDNOTHAVEMEETINGSINPRIVATEWITHTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEINAWHOLEYEARLIKEWISE,SCARBROUGHETAL1998INFORMEDTHAT24OFTHEINTERVIEWEDCOMPANIESWITHAN

32、INTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONDIDNOTHAVEACCESSTOTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEHOWEVER,MCHUGHANDRAGHUNANDAN1994RELATEDTHAT65OFTHEINTERVIEWEDCOMPANIESHADMEETINGSWITHTHEAUDITCOMMITTEESTRAWSERETAL1995ANDTHETREADWAYCOMMISSION1987ARGUEDTHATTHEQUALITYOFTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONASACOMPONENTOFTHESTRUCTUREOFINTERNALCONTROLOFTHECOMP

33、ANYWASENHANCEDWHENTHEINTERNALAUDITDEPARTMENTREPORTEDDIRECTLYTOTHEAUDITCOMMITTEETHATISTOSAY,IFTHEREISAROBUSTWORKINGRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDINTERNALAUDITORSTHENTHEYCOULDFULLTHEIRDUTIESSOMEAUTHORSHAVETRIEDTORELATEAUDITCOMMITTEEMEMBERSWITHTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONFOREXAMPLE,RAGHUNANDANETAL

34、2001,INASURVEYCARRIEDOUTOF114CHIEFINTERNALAUDITORS,SHOWEDTHATAUDITCOMMITTEESWITHONLYINDEPENDENTDIRECTORS,ANDATLEASTONEDIRECTORWITHACCOUNTINGKNOWLEDGE,WEREMORELIKELYTOHAVEMOREMEETINGSWITHTHEHEADOFTHEINTERNALAUDITDEPARTMENTSCARBROUGHETAL1998,INASTUDYCARRIEDOUTINCANADAOF72HEADSOFINTERNALAUDITORS,SHOWED

35、THATAUDITCOMMITTEESEXCLUSIVELYCOMPRISEDOFINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSWEREMORELIKELYTOMEETWITHINTERNALAUDITORSANDREVIEWTHEIRWORKINACCORDANCEWITHCOOPER1993,THEHEADOFINTERNALAUDITDEPARTMENTSSHOULDREPORTDIRECTLYTOTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDHAVEFREQUENTMEETINGSWITHTHISCOMMITTEETHUS,DEZOORTANDSALTERIO2001SHOWED,INASAMPL

36、EOF18HEADSOFINTERNALAUDITDEPARTMENTS,THATGOODCOMMUNICATIONBETWEENINTERNALAUDITORSANDAUDITCOMMITTEESCOULDIMPROVECORPORATEGOVERNANCEQUALITYINCONCLUSION,THESTUDIESREVIEWEDSHOWEDTHATFORINTERNALAUDITINGTOBEEFFECTIVEITSHOULDHAVEARELATIONSHIPWITHTHEAUDITCOMMITTEE,WHICHTOGETHERCOULDIMPROVECORPORATEGOVERNANC

37、EISSUESTHESELEADTOTHEFOLLOWINGHYPOTHESESH21THEEXISTENCEOFANINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONISNEGATIVELYRELATEDTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTH22MEETINGSBETWEENTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONANDTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEISNEGATIVELYRELATEDTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTFINALLY,WEHAVESTUDIEDTHEINTERACTIONBETWEENANEFFECTIVEAUDITCOMMITTEEANDTHEPRESENC

38、EOFTHEINTERNALAUDITFUNCTIONANEFFECTIVEAUDITCOMMITTEE,FOLLOWINGTHEBLUERIBBONCOMMITTEEREPORT1999,ISONEWHICHHASANINDEPENDENTAUDITCOMMITTEE,ATLEASTFOURMEETINGSPERYEARANDHASAMINIMUMOFTHREEMEMBERS译文审计委员会和内部审计来自西班牙的公司的经验证据资料来源斯普林格数据库作者劳拉塞拉利昂安然、世通公司发生灾难性的丑闻，产生了可怕的影响。随着经济全球化,企业之间竞争越来越激烈，促使企业要有良好的管理，企业财务信息的透明

39、度要加强。格拉姆林认为企业有四个重要机制，包括董事会，审计委员会和内部审计职能和外部审计职能。本文将集中讨论审计委员会和内部审计功能，我们要分析审计委员会和内部审计功能之间的关系。我们假设审计委员会及内部审计职能的存在，这对企业管理层来说，很重要。自从二十世纪八十年代以来，公司治理这个话题越来越受到学术界的关注。我们认为，这主要有两个原因第一，企业管理方式的变化。随着经济全球化，新技术不断更新，产生了社会问题和环境问题。第二，一些公司出现财务丑闻。财务丑闻的出现,更有必要建立规范性的企业。此外，企业要提高财务信息的可靠性和透明度，内部控制需要加强。法规提出了一系列建议，通过金融机制改革来提高内

40、部控制质量。如建立良好的独立董事机制以及有效的审计委员会。通过内部审计和外部审计，管理好企业。公司治理的机制定义至少四种机制，其中包括（1）董事会管理。（2）审计委员会。（3）内部审计职能。（4）外部审计职能（格拉姆林等人，2004年）。在西班牙，公司治理问题开始于1998年。这一年，刊登了一份题为“社会”的政府报告。西班牙与其他欧洲国家不同的是，建立了董事会、审计委员会等。第一个法规发布，使西班牙公司治理制度开始发展。这份报告在透明度和安全性原则方面，都有了进一步要求。2002年，西班牙通过了一项新的法律，金融体制的改革法。上市公司委员会提供审计创作，旨在实现更大的透明度和增加金融信息的可信

41、度。该委员会规定总统和其成员大多数是独立的。但是，这项法律并没有明确提出审计委员会的特点，这些法律法规规范企业的行为。此外，在阿尔达马的报告中，该法解决了以下管理问题股东协议的实质性，披露了公司治理的规则，股东会议及董事会职务。本文其主要目标是研究审计委员会和财务信息方面的联系。我们将重点提到审计委员会，因为它是一个负责监督股东利益的部门，检查并监督财务报表。该审计委员会应提供财务性息最大限度的透明度和提高效率。一家企业需要这个机构，如内部审计职能，以完成其有效性。我们将继承这一点，通过审计委员会检查，使内部审计职能得到充分发挥。此外，我们要指出的是，我们的研究是很重要的、独特的。目前大量的研

42、究都集中在董事会的独立性。许多人认为，审计委员会成立了专门的外部独立董事，将更好地提供组织的透明度和问责性。我们进行了有关审计委员会的独立性方面的研究。2002年，克莱因通过研究表明，内部审计委员会在企业结构当中，很重要。此外，在西班牙方面的研究，例如2005年，马蒂内斯珀提供了86家西班牙公司样本证据，1996年至2001年，即在审计委员会的存在情况下，没有影响财务报告的质量。此外，1999年，马蒂内斯珀和德富恩特斯观察了西班牙142公司样本，他们认为应当成立相应的审计委员会。然而，在2002年新法律中，对公司治理的要求不太严格，对财务报表的质量要求不高。如今，这已经完全改变了。总之，大多数

43、研究认为，设立审计委员会，提高了财务报表质量和信誉。许多法规都提到了审计委员会的会议次数以及公司治理问题，如1992年的吉百利报告和2003年的史密斯的报告。这些报告建议审计委员会至少有3名组成人员。1999年，蓝带委员会由三名成员组成，审计委员会每年至少开四次会议。2002年，萨班斯法案规定了审计委员会至少三由名成员组成。2005年国际内部审计师协会提出，在过去的企业管理中，内部审计已成为企业的重要机制。首先，我们调查某公司是否有一个内部审计部门和良好的公司治理。其次，我们研究审计委员会及内部审计职能是否有良好的关系，它们可以提高企业的管理水平。格拉姆林认为，内部审计职能是企业管理的基石。相

44、关负责人应了解内部审计职能的进展情况。审计委员会和内部审计之间的良好关系，有利于企业内部控制，提高财务报表的质量。1992年一项调查得出的结论31的受访者表示，内部审计人员没有参加审计委员会会议，整整已经有一年了，24的受访公司的内部审计职能的作用没有得到充分的发挥。然而，65的受访公司开展了审计委员会的会议。1987年，特雷德韦委员会认为，内部审计部门，作为本公司内部控制的组成结构，应直接向审计报告委员会报告。这就是说，审计关系委员会与内部审计人员，如果有一个良好的工作关系，他们能够履行自己的职责。有些企业没有涉及内部审计委员会的审计职能。内部审计法规定，独立的审计委员会，至少有一名会计知识人员，参加内部审计部门负责人以上的会议。斯卡伯勒在加拿大时，进行了一项关于内部审计的研究，结果表明，审计委员会更适应内部审计工作和审查工作。内部审计部门负责人应直接向审计报告委员会报告，并经常参加会议。内部审计人员和审计委员会的良好沟通可以提高企业的管理水平。总之，这些研究调查表明，企业要设立一个独立的审计委员会，解决企业的治理问题。