资本成本,公司财务和投资理论【外文翻译】.doc

1、外文翻译原文THECOSTOFCAPITAL,CORPORATIONFINANCEANDTHEORYOFINVESTMENTMATERIALSOURCEHTTP/WWJSTORORAUTHORFRANCOMODIGLIANIMERTONHMILLERACAPITALSTRUCTUREANDINVESTMENTPOLICYONTHEBASISOFOURPROPOSITIONSWITHRESPECTTOCOSTOFCAPITALANDFINANCIALSTRUCTUREANDFORTHEMOMENTNEGLECTINGTANS,WECANCOERCIVETHEFOLLOWINGSIMPLERULE

2、FOROPTIMALINVESTMENTPOLICYBYTHEFIRMPROPOSITIONIIIIFAFIRMINCLASSISACTINGINTHEBESTINTERESTOFTHESTOCKHOLDERSATTHETIMEOFTHEDECISION,ITWILLEXPLOITANINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYIFANDONLYIFTHERATEOFRETURNONTHEINVESTMENT,SAY,ISASLARGEASORLARGERTHANTHATIS,THECUTOFFPOINTFORINVESTMENTINTHEFIRMWILLINALLCASESBEANDWILLB

3、ECOMPLETELYUNAFFECTEDBYTHETYPEOFSECURITYUSEDTOFINANCETHEINVESTMENTEQUIVALENTLY,WEMAYSAYTHATREGARDLESSOFTHEFINANCINGUSED,THEMARGINALCOSTOFCAPITALTOAFIRMISEQUALTOTHEAVERAGECOSTOFCAPITAL,WHICHISINTURNEQUALTOTHECAPITALIZATIONRATEFORANUNLEVEREDSTREAMINTHECLASSTOWHICHTHEFIRMBELONGSTOESTABLISHTHISRESULTWEW

4、ILLCONSIDERTHETHREEMAJORFINANCINGALTERNATIVESOPENTOTHEFIRMBONDS,RETAINEDEARNINGS,ANDCOMMONSTOCKISSUESANDSHOWTHATINEACHCASEANINVESTMENTISWORTHUNDERTAKINGIF,ANDONLYIF,CONSIDERFIRSTTHECASEOFANINVESTMENTFINANCEDBYTHESALEOFBONDSWEKNOWFROMPROPOSITIONITHATTHEMARKETVALUEOFTHEFIRMBEFORETHEINVESTMENTWASUNDERT

5、AKENWAS20ANDTHATTHEVALUEOFTHECOMMONSTOCKWAS（21）IFNOWTHEFIRMBORROWSIDOLLARSTOFINANCEANINVESTMENTYIELDINGITSMARKETVALUEWILLBECOME（22）ANDTHEVALUEOFITSCOMMONSTOCKWILLBE（23）ORUSINGEQUATION21,（24）HENCETOILLUSTRATE,SUPPOSETHECAPITALIZATIONRATEFORUNCERTAINSTREAMSINTHECLASSIS10PERCENTANDTHERATEOFINTERESTIS4P

6、ERCENTTHENIFAGIVENCOMPANYHADANEXPECTEDINCOMEOF1,000ANDIFITWEREFINANCEDENTIRELYBYCOMMONSTOCKWEKNOWFROMPROPOSITIONITHATTHEMARKETVALUEOFITSSTOCKWOULDBE10,000ASSUMENOWTHATTHEMANAGERSOFTHEFIRMDISCOVERANINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYWHICHWILLREQUIREANOUTLAYOF100ANDWHICHISEXPECTEDTOYIELD8PERCENTATFIRSTSIGHTTHISMIGH

7、TAPPEARTOBEAPROFITABLEOPPORTUNITYSINCETHEEXPECTEDRETURNISDOUBLETHEINTERESTCOSTIF,HOWEVER,THEMANAGEMENTBORROWSTHENECESSARY100AT4PERCENT,THETOTALEXPECTEDINCOMEOFTHECOMPANYRISESTO1,008ANDTHEMARKETVALUEOFTHEFIRMTO10,080BUTTHEFIRMNOWWILLHAVE100OFBONDSINITSCAPITALSTRUCTURESOTHAT,PARADOXICALLY,THEMARKETVAL

8、UEOFTHESTOCKMUSTACTUALLYBEREDUCEDFROM10,000TO9,980ASACONSEQUENCEOFTHISAPPARENTLYPROFITABLEINVESTMENTOR,TOPUTITANOTHERWAY,THEGAINSFROMBEINGABLETOTAPCHEAP,BORROWEDFUNDSAREMORETHANOFFSETFORTHESTOCKHOLDERSBYTHEMARKETSDISCOUNTINGOFTHESTOCKFORTHEADDEDLEVERAGEASSUMEDCONSIDERNEXTTHECASEOFRETAINEDEARNINGSSUP

9、POSETHATINTHECOURSEOFITSOPERATIONSTHEFIRMACQUIREDIDOLLARSOFCASHWITHOUTIMPAIRINGTHEEARNINGPOWEROFITSASSETSIFTHECASHISDISTRIBUTEDASADIVIDENDTOTHESTOCKHOLDERSTHEIRWEALTH,AFTERTHEDISTRIBUTIONWILLBE25WHEREREPRESENTSTHEEXPECTEDRETURNFROMTHEASSETSEXCLUSIVEOFIINQUESTIONIFHOWEVERTHEFUNDSARERETAINEDBYTHECOMPA

10、NYANDUSEDTOFINANCENEWASSETSWHOSEEXPECTEDRATEOFRETURNIS,THENTHESTOCKHOLDERSWEALTHWOULDBECOME26CLEARLYASSOTHATANINVESTMENTFINANCEDBYRETAINEDEARNINGSRAISESTHENETWORTHOFTHEOWNERSIFANDONLYIFCONSIDERFINALLY,THECASEOFCOMMONSTOCKFINANCINGLETPODENOTETHECURRENTMARKETPRICEPERSHAREOFSTOCKANDASSUME,FORSIMPLICITY

11、,THATTHISPRICEREFLECTSCURRENTLYEXPECTEDEARNINGSONLY,THATIS,ITDOESNOTREFLECTANYFUTUREINCREASEINEARNINGSASARESULTOFTHEINVESTMENTUNDERCONSIDERATIONTHENIFNISTHEORIGINALNUMBEROFSHARES,THEPRICEPERSHAREIS27ANDTHENUMBEROFNEWSHARES,M,NEEDEDTOFINANCEANINVESTMENTOFIDOLLARSISGIVENBY28ASARESULTOFTHEINVESTMENTTHE

12、MARKETVALUEOFTHESTOCKBECOMESANDTHEPRICEPERSHARE29SINCEBYEQUATION28,IMPO,WECANADDMPOANDSUBTRACTFROMTHEQUANTITYINBRACKET,OBTAINING30ANDONLYIFTHUSANINVESTMENTFINANCEDBYCOMMONSTOCKISADVANTAGEOUSTOTHECURRENTSTOCKHOLDERSIFANDONLYIFITSYIELDEXCEEDSTHECAPITALIZATIONRATEONCEAGAINANUMERICALEXAMPLEMAYHELPTOILLU

13、STRATETHERESULTANDMAKEITCLEARWHYTHERELEVANTCUTOFFRATEISANDNOTTHECURRENTYIELDONCOMMONSTOCK,IESUPPOSETHATIS10PERCENT,RIS4PERCENT,THATTHEORIGINALEXPECTEDINCOMEOFOURCOMPANYIS1,000ANDTHATMANAGEMENTHASTHEOPPORTUNITYOFINVESTING100HAVINGANEXPECTEDYIELDOF12PERCENTIFTHEORIGINALCAPITALSTRUCTUREIS50PERCENTDEBTA

14、ND50PERCENTEQUITY,AND1,000SHARESOFSTOCKAREINITIALLYOUTSTANDING,THEN,BYPROPOSITIONI,THEMARKETVALUEOFTHECOMMONSTOCKMUSTBE5,000OR5PERSHAREFURTHERMORE,SINCETHEINTERESTBILLIS045,000200,THEYIELDONCOMMONSTOCKIS800/5,00016PERCENTITMAYTHENAPPEARTHATFINANCINGTHEADDITIONALINVESTMENTOF100BYISSUING20SHARESTOOUTS

15、IDERSAT5PERSHAREWOULDDILUTETHEEQUITYOFTHEORIGINALOWNERSSINCETHE100PROMISESTOYIELD12PERCENTWHEREASTHECOMMONSTOCKISCURRENTLYYIELDING16PERCENTACTUALLY,HOWEVER,THEINCOMEOFTHECOMPANYWOULDRISETO1,012THEVALUEOFTHEFIRMTO10,120ANDTHEVALUEOFTHECOMMONSTOCKTO5,120SINCETHEREARENOW1,020SHARES,EACHWOULDBEWORTH502A

16、NDTHEWEALTHOFTHEORIGINALSTOCKHOLDERSWOULDTHUSHAVEBEENINCREASEDWHATHASHAPPENEDISTHATTHEDILUTIONINEXPECTEDEARNINGSPERSHAREFROM80TO796HASBEENMORETHANOFFSET,INITSEFFECTUPONTHEMARKETPRICEOFTHESHARES,BYTHEDECREASEINLEVERAGEOURCONCLUSIONIS,ONCEAGAIN,ATVARIANCEWITHCONVENTIONALVIEWS,SOMUCHSOASTOBEEASILYMISIN

17、TERPRETEDREADHASTILY,PROPOSITIONIIISEEMSTOIMPLY,THATTHECAPITALSTRUCTUREOFAFIRMISAMATTEROFINDIFFERENCEANDTHAT,CONSEQUENTLY,ONEOFTHECOREPROBLEMSOFCORPORATEFINANCETHEPROBLEMOFTHEOPTIMALCAPITALSTRUCTUREFORAFIRMISNOPROBLEMATALLITMAYBEHELPFUL,THEREFORE,TOCLEARUPSUCHPOSSIBLEMISUNDERSTANDINGSBPROPOSITIONIII

18、ANDFINANCIALPLANNINGBYFIRMSMISINTERPRETATIONOFTHESCOPEOFPROPOSITIONIIICANBEAVOIDEDBYREMEMBERINGTHATTHISPROPOSITIONTELLSUSONLYTHATTHETYPEOFINSTRUMENTUSEDTOFINANCEANINVESTMENTISIRRELEVANTTOTHEQUESTIONOFWHETHERORNOTTHEINVESTMENTISWORTHWHILETHISDOESNOTMEANTHATTHEOWNERSORTHEMANAGERSHAVENOGROUNDSWHATEVERF

19、ORPREFERRINGONEFINANCINGPLANTOANOTHERORTHATTHEREARENOOTHERPOLICYORTECHNICALISSUESINFINANCEATTHELEVELOFTHEFIRMTHATGROUNDSFORPREFERRINGONETYPEOFFINANCIALSTRUCTURETOANOTHERWILLSTILLEXISTWITHINTHEFRAMEWORKOFOURMODELCANREADILYBESEENFORTHECASEOFCOMMONSTOCKFINANCINGINGENERAL,EXCEPTFORSOMETHINGLIKEAWIDELYPU

20、BLICIZEDOILSTRIKE,WEWOULDEXPECTTHEMARKETTOPLACEVERYHEAVYWEIGHTONCURRENTANDRECENTPASTEARNINGSINFORMINGEXPECTATIONSASTOFUTURERETURNSHENCE,IFTHEOWNERSOFAFIRMDISCOVEREDAMAJORINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYWHICHTHEYFELTWOULDYIELDMUCHMORETHAN,THEYMIGHTWELLPREFERNOTTOFINANCEITVIACOMMONSTOCKATTHETHENRULINGPRICE,BECAU

21、SETHISPRICEMAYFAILTOCAPITALIZETHENEWVENTUREABETTERCOURSEWOULDBEAPREEMPTIVEISSUEOFSTOCKANDINTHISCONNECTIONITSHOULDBEREMEMBEREDTHATSTOCKHOLDERSAREFREETOBORROWANDBUYANOTHERPOSSIBILITYWOULDBETOFINANCETHEPROJECTINITIALLYWITHDEBTONCETHEPROJECTHADREFLECTEDITSELFININCREASEDACTUALEARNINGS,THEDEBTCOULDBERETIR

22、EDEITHERWITHA11EQUITYISSUEATMUCHBETTERPRICESORTHROUGHRETAINEDEARNINGSSTILLANOTHERPOSSIBILITYALONGTHESAMELINESMIGHTBETOCOMBINETHETWOSTEPSBYMEANSOFACONVERTIBLEDEBENTUREORPREFERREDSTOCK,PERHAPSWITHAPROGRESSIVELYDECLININGCONVERSIONRATEEVENSUCHADOUBLESTAGEFINANCINGPLANMAYPOSSIBLYBEREGARDEDASYIELDINGTOOLA

23、RGEASHARETOOUTSIDERSSINCETHENEWSTOCKHOLDERSARE,INEFFECT,BEINGGIVENANCRESTINANYSIMILAROPPORTUNITIESTHEFIRMMAYDISCOVERINTHEFUTUREIFTHEREISAREASONABLEPROSPECTTHATEVENLARGEROPPORTUNITIESMAYARISEINTHENEARFUTUREANDIFTHEREISSOMEDANGERTHATBORROWINGNOWWOULDPRECLUDEMOREBORROWINGLATER,THEOWNERSMIGHTFINDTHEIRIN

24、TERESTSBESTPROTECTEDBYSPLITTINGOFFTHECURRENTOPPORTUNITYINTOASEPARATESUBSIDIARYWITHINDEPENDENTFINANCINGCLEARLYTHEPROBLEMSINVOLVEDINMAKINGTHECRUCIALESTIMATESANDINPLANNINGTHEOPTIMALFINANCIALSTRATEGYAREBYNOMEANSTRIVIAL,EVENTHOUGHTHEYSHOULDHAVENOBEARINGONTHEBASICDECISIONTOINVESTASLONGASANOTHERREASONWHYTH

25、EALTERNATIVESINFINANCIALPLANSMAYNOTBEMATTEROFINDIFFERENCEARISESFROMTHEFACTTHATMANAGERSARECONCERNEDWITHMORETHANSIMPLYFURTHERINGTHEINTERESTOFTHEOWNERSSUCHOTHEROBJECTIVESOFTHEMANAGEMENTWHICHNEEDNOTBENECESSARILYINCONFLICTWITHTHOSEOFTHEOWNERSAREMUCHMORELIKELYTOBESERVEDBYSOMETYPESOFFINANCINGARRANGEMENTSTH

26、ANOTHERSINMANYFORMSOFBORROWINGAGREEMENTS,FOREXAMPLE,CREDITORSAREABLETOSTIPULATETERMSWHICHTHECURRENTMANAGEMENTMAYREGARDASINFRINGINGONITSPREROGATIVESORRESTRICTINGITSFREEDOMTOMANEUVERTHECREDITORSMIGHTEVENBEABLETOINSISTONHAVINGADIRECTVOICEINTHEFORMATIONOFPOLICYTOTHEEXTENT,THEREFORE,THATFINANCIALPOLICIES

27、HAVETHESEIMPLICATIONSFORTHEMANAGEMENTOFTHEFIRM,SOMETHINGLIKETHEUTILITYAPPROACHDESCRIBEDINTHEINTRODUCTORYSECTIONBECOMESRELEVANTTOFINANCIALASOPPOSEDTOINVESTMENTDECISIONMAKINGITIS,HOWEVER,THEUTILITYFUNCTIONSOFTHEMANAGERSPERSEANDNOTOFTHEOWNERSTHATARENOWINVOLVEDINSUMMARY,MANYOFTHESPECIFICCONSIDERATIONSWH

28、ICHBULKSOLARGEINTRADITIONALDISCUSSIONSOFCORPORATEFINANCECANREADILYBESUPERIMPOSEDONOURSIMPLEFRAMEWORKWITHOUTFORCINGANYDRASTICANDCERTAINLYNOSYSTEMATICALTERATIONOFTHECONCLUSIONWHICHISOURPRINCIPALCONCERN,NAMELYTHATFORINVESTMENTDECISIONS,THEMARGINALCOSTOFCAPITALISCTHEEFFECTOFTHECORPORATEINCOMETAXONINVEST

29、MENTDECISIONSINSECTIONIITWASSHOWNTHATWHENANDISINTEGRATEDCORPORATEINCOMETAXISINTRODUCED,THEORIGINALVERSIONOFOURPROPOSITIONI,MUSTBEREWRITTENAS11THROUGHOUTSECTIONIWEFOUNDITCONVENIENTTOREFERTOASTHECOSTOFCAPITALTHEAPPROPRIATEMEASUREOFTHECOSTOFCAPITALRELEVANTTOINVESTMENTDECISIONS,HOWEVER,ISTHERATIOOFTHEEX

30、PECTEDRETURNBEFORETAXESTOTHEMARKETVALUE,IE,FROM11ABOVEWEFIND（31）WHICHSHOWSTHATTHECOSTOFCAPITALNOWDEPENDSONTHEDEBTRATIO,DECREASING,ASD/VRISES,ATTHECONSTANTRATETHUS,WITHACORPORATEINCOMETAXUNDERWHICHINTERESTISADEDUCTIBLEEXPENSE,GAINSCANACCRUETOSTOCKHOLDERSFROMHAVINGDEBTINTHECAPITALSTRUCTURE,EVENWHENCAP

31、ITALMARKETSAREPERFECTTHEGAINSHOWEVERARESMALL,ASCANBESEENFROM31,ANDASWILLBESHOWNMOREEXPLICITLYBELOWFROM31WECANDEVELOPTHETAXADJUSTEDCOUNTERPARTOFPROPOSITIONIIIBYINTERPRETINGTHETERMD/VINTHATEQUATIONASTHEPROPORTIONOFDEBTUSEDINANYADDITIONALFINANCINGOFVDOLLARSFOREXAMPLE,INTHECASEWHERETHEFINANCINGISENTIREL

32、YBYNEWCOMMONSTOCK,D0ANDTHEREQUIREDRATEOFRETURNSONAVENTURESOFINANCEDBECOMES（32）FORTHEOTHEREXTREMEOFPUREDEBTFINANCINGDVANDTHEREQUIREDRATEOFRETURN,D,BECOMES33FORINVESTMENTSFINANCEDOUTOFRETAINEDEARNINGS,THEPROBLEMOFDEFININGTHEREQUIREDRATEOFRETURNISMOREDIFFICULTSINCEITINVOLVESACOMPARISONOFTHETAXCONSEQUEN

33、CESTOTHEINDIVIDUALSTOCKHOLDEROFRECEIVINGADIVIDENDVERSUSHAVINGACAPITALGAINDEPENDINGONTHETIMEOFREALIZATION,ACAPITALGAINPRODUCEDBYRETAINEDEARNINGSMAYBETAXEDEITHERATORDINARYINCOMETAXRATES,50PERCENTOFTHESERATES,25PERCENT,ORZERO,IFHELDTILLDEATHTHERATEONANYDIVIDENDSRECEIVEDINTHEEVENTOFADISTRIBUTIONWILLALSO

34、BEAVARIABLEDEPENDINGONTHEAMOUNTOFOTHERINCOMERECEIVEDBYTHESTOCKHOLDER,ANDWITHTHEADDEDCOMPLICATIONSINTRODUCEDBYTHECURRENTDIVIDENDCREDITPROVISIONSIFWEASSUMETHATTHEMANAGERSPROCEEDONTHEBASISOFREASONABLEESTIMATESASTOTHEAVERAGEVALUESOFTHERELEVANTTAXRATESFORTHEOWNERS,THENTHEREQUIREDRETURNFORRETAINEDEARNINGS

35、RCANBESHOWNTOBE（34）WHERETHEASSUMEDRATEOFPERSONALINCOMETAXONDIVIDENDSANDISTHEASSUMEDRATEOFTAXONCAPITALGAINSANUMERICALILLUSTRATIONMAYPERHAPSBEHELPFULINCLARIFYINGTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHESEREQUIREDRATESOFRETURNIFWETAKETHEFOLLOWINGROUNDNUMBERSASREPRESENTATIVEORDEROFMAGNITUDEVALUESUNDERPRESENTCONDITIONSA

36、NAFTERTAXCAPITALIZATIONRATEOF10PERCENT,ARATEOFINTERESTONBONDSOF4PERCENT,ACORPORATETAXRATEOF50PERCENT,AMARGINALPERSONALINCOMETAXRATEONDIVIDENDSOF40PERCENTCORRESPONDINGTOANINCOMEOFABOUT25,000ONAJOINTRETURN,ANDACAPITALGAINSRATEOF20PERCENTONEHALFTHEMARGINALRATEONDIVIDENDS,THENTHEREQUIREDRATESOFRETURNWOU

37、LDBE120PERCENTFORINVESTMENTSFINANCEDENTIRELYBYISSUANCEOFNEWCOMMONSHARES216PERCENTFORINVESTMENTSFINANCEDENTIRELYBYNEWDEBTAND315PERCENTFORINVESTMENTSFINANCEDWHOLLYFROMINTERNALFUNDSTHESERESULTSWOULDSEEMTOHAVECONSIDERABLESIGNIFICANCEFORCURRENTDISCUSSIONSOFTHEEFFECTOFTHECORPORATEINCOMETAXONFINANCIALPOLIC

38、YANDONINVESTMENTALTHOUGHWECANNOTEXPLORETHEIMPLICATIONSOFTHERESULTSINANYDETAILHERE,WESHOULDATLEASTLIKETOCALLATTENTIONTOTHEREMARKABLYSMALLDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHE“COST“OFEQUITYFUNDSANDDEBTFUNDSWITHTHENUMERICALVALUESASSUMED,EQUITYMONEYTURNEDOUTTOBEONLY25PERCENTMOREEXPENSIVETHANDEBTMONEY,RATHERTHANSOMETHING

39、ONTHEORDEROF5TIMESASEXPENSIVEASISCOMMONLYSUPPOSEDTOBETHECASETHEREASONFORTHEWIDEDIFFERENCEISTHATTHETRADITIONALVIEWSTARTSFROMTHEPOSITIONTHATDEBTFUNDSARESEVERALTIMESCHEAPERTHANEQUITYFUNDSEVENINTHEABSENCEOFTAXES,WITHTAXESSERVINGSIMPLYTOMAGNIFYTHECOSTRATIOINPROPORTIONTOTHECORPORATERATEBYCONTRAST,INOURMOD

40、ELINWHICHTHEREPERCUSSIONSOFDEBTFINANCINGONTHEVALUEOFSHARESARETAKENINTOACCOUNT,THEONLYDIFFERENCEINCOSTISTHATDUETOTHETAXEFFECT,ANDITSMAGNITUDEISSIMPLYTHETAXONTHE“GROSSEDUP“INTERESTPAYMENTNOTONLYISTHISMAGNITUDELIKELYTOBESMALLBUTOURANALYSISYIELDSTHEFURTHERPARADOXICALIMPLICATIONTHATTHESTOCKHOLDERSGAINFRO

41、M,ANDHENCEINCENTIVETOUSE,DEBTFINANCINGISACTUALLYSMALLERTHELOWERTHERATEOFINTERESTINTHEEXTREMECASEWHERETHEFIRMCOULDBORROWFORPRACTICALLYNOTHING,THEADVANTAGEOFDEBTFINANCINGWOULDALSOBEPRACTICALLYNOTHING译文资本成本,公司财务和投资理论资料来源HTTP/WWJSTORORG/作者莫迪格利尼和米勒A资本结构和投资政策在我们假设的基础上关于资本成本和财务结构，我们可以得出以下简单的关于企业最优投资政策的规律命题

42、如果一个属于K层级的企业在做决策的时候总是在股票持有者认为的最佳利率的行动，那么他将开发一个投资机会仅且仅当投资的期望回收利率大于或者等于K时。那就是说，企业在K断点处的情况下投资，将完全不受有价证券为投资提供资金的影响。相同的，我们可以说不管是否使用融资，企业的资本边际成本和平均成本是一致的，依次等同于属于企业的没有杠杆收入资本化利率。建立这个结果我们将考虑三个主要的可供选择的财务工具债券、留存收益、发行普通股展示在只有在的情况下投资是值得的。首先考虑投资情况下卖出债券融资。我们从命题中知道企业的市场价值是在投资之前的价值。（20）普通股票的价值为21000DVS如果企业借入I美元去为投资收

43、益筹集资金，那么他的市场价值变为22KKIVIXV001股票的价值将会变为（23）或者利用等式（21），（24）IISSK01说明假设在K层级中不确定性收入下的资本化利率是10，利息率是4，如果一个企业的期望总收益是1000，如果他只能通过普通股筹资，通过命题我们知道股票的价值也是1000。假设现在企业的管理者发现一个投资机会，这个投资机会的费用是100，期望收益是8。第一眼看上去这可能是一个有利润的投资机会，因为期望收益是以前的两倍。但是，管理者以4的利息借入100，总的期望收益变成了1008，企业的是市场价值变成了10080但是企业在资本结构中将会有100的债券，但是事与愿违，企业股票的市

44、场价值将由1000减到9980，获得的将会更加便宜，股票所有者借入的资金将由假设增加的股票杠杆收益的市场折扣来补偿。下一个我们考虑留存收益。假设在企业的运行中获得I的现金。如果这些现金是由股票所有者的红利为0W分配的，经过分配（25）IDXISWK00000X代表数量为I的专用资产的期望收益。但是如果由企业留存的资金和用于筹资的期望收益为资产，这样股票所有者的收益变为（26）明显的，只要那么，如果留存收益筹资提高所有者的净收益只有在K的情况下才能实现。最后考虑普通股票筹资。0P代表当前市场上每股普通股票的价格，简单的假设这个价格仅仅只反应了当前期望收益，并不反映未来深思熟虑条件下投资收益的增加

45、。如果N代表股票的最初数量，每股的价格为（27）NSP00新股的数量M，由以下公式给出（28）0PIM结果股票的市场投资价值变为每股的价格变为（29）从等式（28）以后，0MPI，我们0MP代入等式中得到30000111PINMPIPNMNMPKKKK仅且仅当K的时候才成立。这样，一个投资者发行普通股股票筹资对于当前股票持有者有优势只有在他的收益率超过资本化利率的时候才成立。重新考虑一个数值的例子可以帮助我们表明结果和表明相关分离点利率K更清晰，不是当前普通股的收益。假设K是10，R是4，公司的最初期望收入是1000，管理者有机会投资100获取12的期望收益。如果公司的做出资本结构是50的债权

46、和50的普通股，公司最初还有1000尚未支付的股票，由命题，股票的市场价值是5000，或者是每股5。更进一步，只要利息是0045000200，股票的收益是800/500016。这可以说是通过投资额外的100需要以每股5元的价格发行20股股票，这将稀释最初所有者的资产，100预期收益12，反之普通股票现在的收益率为16。但是实际上，企业的收入增加到1012，企业的价值现在是10120，普通股股票的价值是5120只要公司有1020股票，每一股票可以获得502，最初股票所有者的价值将会增加。这是因为稀释了每股的期望收益从08到0796，提供了更多的补偿，因为杠杆作用的减小使得对市场每股股票价格产生了

47、影响。重复一下我们的结论传统观点很大程度上没有很好的解释。草率的看，命题好像显示企业的资本结构是无关紧要的，接下来公司财务的一个核心的问题企业最佳资本结构完全没有问题了因此他可能有用，清除可能的误解。B命题和企业的财务计划没有很好的解释命题可以由记住这个命题仅仅告诉我们这个工具用来为企业投资筹集资本，和是否值得投资是不相关的。这并不是意味着所有者没有理由不管是否偏好一个财务计划还是另外一个；或者没有另外的政策和在企业水平上财务的发行问题。偏好一个财务结构而不是另外一种的理由仍然存在于我们的普通股股票的财务框架之中。大体上说，除了一些像广泛宣传石油罢工，我们期待在当前的情况下市场在近期盈利以形成

48、对未来的回报上起较大的作用。既然这样，如果企业的所有者发现一个重要的投资机会认为收益可能会超过K，这时候他们并不倾向于在常规价格下通过发行普通股来筹资，因为这个价格可能形成新的风险。一个好的进程就是发行股票的优先购买权。另外一种可能性就是最初通过债券筹资。只要这个项目考虑了它本身最初增加的收益，债券可以退出，通过在更好的价格上发行普通股或者是通过留存收益。另一种可能性就是可转化公司债券或者偏好股票两个进行合并，可能转换率会逐步下降。甚至这样一个双级的筹资计划可能被看做是外部收益者收入过大，新的股票持有者实际上在给定的利息率上企业任何相似的机会都可以在未来被发现。如果有一个合理的前景，即使再大的

49、投资机会在不久的将来可能呈现出来，如果借入资金是危险的，那么在稍后可能会阻止借入更多，所有者可能发现他们的利益通过分离当前的机会进入一个分开的财务独立的附属机构而得到很好的保护。清晰地是，这个问题包括做出关键的估计还有规划绝不是小事的最佳资本战略，即使没有任何影响的基本的投资决定。另一个原因是替代品的财政计划，可能不是一个问题无关源于一个事实，即管理者所关注的不仅仅是促进所有者的利益。另外一个管理的目标和这些所有者斗争是没有必要的更可能是由某些类型的融资安排比其他更好。例如，在许多的借款合同中，债权人能够约定合同中的条款，当前管理形式可以看作是侵害了它的权利，或者说是限制了它自由的动作。债权人可能坚持在政策的形成过程中有主导的声音。因此，在一定程度上，财务政策涉及到企业管理，就像在导论那一章节中描述的效用靠近决策制定。但是本质上管理者的效用函数也包括在里面了总的来说，在传统的讨论中有许多特别的深思熟虑之处，企业财务能够添加到我们的简单的框架而没有任何严重的结论改变，这是我们主要考虑的，也就是投资决定，资产的边际成本KC企业所得税对投资决策的影响在第一部分中当没有整合成一个企业的所得税被引入的时候，这是命题最初的看法。AVXK一定