公司治理与会计信息失真【外文翻译】.doc

1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译题目浙江中小企业会计信息质量研究专业会计学外文题目THECORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATION外文出处ASIANSOCIALSCIENCEJULY2008,VOL4,NO7外文作者QIUFEIWANG1原文THECORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONABSTRACTDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONOFTHEPUBLICCOMPANYBECOMESTHEMAINELEMENTRESTRICTINGO

2、URCOUNTRYSECONOMICDEVELOPMENTHENCE,HOWTOIMPROVEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONQUALITYBECOMESAHOTTOPICTHISSTUDYINBRIEFANALYZESSOMEFACTORS,WHICHAFFECTACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONQUALITYFROMTHEDIRECTIONOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMOREOVERITGIVESOUTSEVERALDIFFERENTMATHEMATICALMODELSANDPROPOSESABASETRAINOFADMINISTERINGTHOUGHT,I

3、NORDERTOESTABLISHAFEWFOUNDATIONSFORRESEARCHONTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONPROBLEMKEYWORDSCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,THEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATION1INTRODUCTIONTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISTHE“CHRONICILLNESS”OFSECURITIESMARKETSBECAUSEITENDANGERSGOVERNMENTMARCOCONTROL,DISTURBSTAXREVENUEANDDOESHA

4、RMTOFUNCTIONINGOFOPTIMIZINGCAPITALRESOURCEDISPOSAL,MANYGOVERNMENTSATTEMPTTORESOLETHISPROBLEMYETEVENTOTHISDAY,VARIETIESOFEVENTSABOUTDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONSTILLDISTURBTHEWHOLEWORLDFOREXAMPLE“ENRON”INUNITEDSTATES,AND“YINGGUANGXIA”AND“LANTIAN”INCHINATHISSTUDYCONCLUDESTHATTHEREASONTHATRESEARCHAND

5、GOVERNANCEONDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONCANNOTACQUIREBREAKTHROUGHISTHATITNEGLECTSTHEROOTOFTHISQUESTIONPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPLEADTODISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATION,SOMETHODOFONLYDEPENDINGONACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSANDACCOUNTINGINSTITUTIONISNOTTHEMOSTEFFECTIVEWAYTOSETTLEPROBLEMSCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISANAR

6、RANGEMENTOFLAW,CULTURE,USUALPRACTICEANDSYSTEMS,WHICHAREUSEFORHARMONIZINGANDCONTROLLINGTHERELATIONSHIPANDACTIONBETWEENEVERYPARTICIPANTSOTHEMOSTFUNDAMENTALPROBLEM,WHICHWILLBERESOLVED,ISTHEACTIONOFTHEAGENTPROBLEMFORTHISREASON,ITISEMERGENCETOBENEFITCONFLICTBETWEEN“PRINCIPAL”AND“AGENT”ANDASYMMETRICINFORM

7、ATIONALLOFTHOSEEVOKE2DISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONREPORTSPUBLISHEDBYCOSO,ONTHEBASISOFTHERESEARCH,WHICHINVOLVE200PUBLICCOMPANIESWITHFINANCIALREPORTMALPRACTICEFROM2003TO1007,DEMONSTRATESTHAT72OFTHECASESARERELATEDTOCEO,43ARERELATEDTOCFO25OFCORPORATIONSDIDNOTSETUPTHEAUDITCOMMISSIONTHESTUDYRESEARCHSPECI

8、MENINCLUDED50PUBLICCOMPANIESWITHFINANCIALMALPRACTICESFROM1994TO2000,ACCORDINGTOPUNISHMENTSOFCSRC,ANDDEMONSTRATESTHATTHEREARE79CASERELATEDTODISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONANDAMONGTHOSEIS79CASESRELATEDTODIRECTORSANDMANAGERSFIGURE1FIGUE1FINANCIALAFFAIRSMALPRACTICESCORPORATIONINVIEWOFTHEABOVE,WETHINKTHER

9、EASONTHATINDUCESTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISDEFECTSINCORPORATEGOVERNANCEPATTERNSBECAUSEOFTHOSEDEFECTS,SOMEMECHANISMSCANNOTSUPERVISEANDPENALIZETHEACTIONSOACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONCANNOTBECREDITABLETHISSTUDYINBRIEFANALYZESSOMEFACTORS,WHICHAFFECTACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONQUALITYFROMTHEDIRECTIONOFCORPORAT

10、EGOVERNANCEMOREOVERITGIVESOUTSEVERALDIFFERENTINSTANCESTHATDIRECTLYCAUSEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONDISTORTONTHISBASIS,THISSTUDYDESIGNSAMATHEMATICALMODELANDPROPOSESABASETRAINOFADMINISTERINGTHOUGHT,INORDERTOESTABLISHAFEWFOUNDATIONSFORRESEARCHONTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONPROBLEM2OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDDIS

11、TORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONGENERALLYSPEAKING,OWNERSHIPSTRUCTURECONTAINSTWOIMPLICATIONSFIRSTLY,VARIEDPERCENTPOSSESSEDBYDIFFERENTSTOCKHOLDERSSECONDLY,OWNERSHIPSTRUCTURECONCENTRATIONDEGREEITISTHESIGNIFICANTCOMPONENTANDTHEOWNERSHIPBASEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCERATIONALOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREDECIDESIFTHEBASISFUNCT

12、IONBY3WHICHCORPORATEGOVERNANCEENSURESTHECREDIBLEFINANCIALREPORTCANWORKWELLSTOCKHOLDERSASOWNERSOFCAPITALHAVETOMAKECONTACTSWITHMANAGERSACCORDINGTOTHEACCOUNTINGINFORMATION,ANDACHIEVEMAXIMUMTHECAPITALPROFITHENCETHESTOCKHOLDERISTHEDEMANDEROFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONYETSTOCKHOLDERS,WITHDISTINCTPROPORTION,HAVE

13、DIFFERENTDEMANDSWECONSIDERTHATLARGESTOCKHOLDERSAREINDEEDTHEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONDEMANDERSINTHISGROUP,THERELATIONSHIPBETWEENECONOMICBENEFITANDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISMOREIMPORTANTTHANOTHERS,SOTHEYPOSSESSMOREPOWERTOGOVERNANDCONTROLQUALITYOFTHEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONFOREXAMPLE,THEPERSONWHOFIRSTDISCOVERED“

14、ENRON”CASEWASTHEFINANCIALANALYSTINTHEINVESTMENTORGANIZATIONRATIONALOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREPRODUCESACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONDEMANDERSANDDECREASESINSTANCESOFDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTHROUGHTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURERESEARCHONTHEPUBLICCOMPANYWITHFINANCIALREPORTMALPRACTICEACTIONS,WEDISCOVERTHATTHEREARETWODISTING

15、UISHINGFEATUREINTHOSECOMPANIESFIRSTTHEPROPORTIONOFCIRCULATIVESTOCKISTOLOW,ANDSECONDTHEFIRSTSTOCKHOLDERARENATIONAND“LEGALPERSON”,WITHTHEHIGHESTPROPORTIONBEING51FIGURE2INJAPANBANKSARETHEMOSTIMPORTANTSTOCKHOLDERS,WITHCENTRALIZEDOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREBEINGONLYPOSSESS15FIGURE3GOVERNMENTANDMANAGERDEPARTMENTAS

16、STOCKHOLDERSOFNATIONALSTOCKANDOWNERSOFPROPERTYRIGHTSARENOTABLETOASKFORTHEREMAINDER,SOITISNORTENOUGHIMPETUSFORTHEMTOSUPERVISEANDEVALUATETHEMANAGERSO“INSIDERCONTROL”BECOMESANIMPORTANTPROBLEMINCHINAINORDERTOATTAINTOCONTROL,ANINSIDERMUSTUSETHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONSOTHISKINDOFUNRIGHTFULLYOWNERSH

17、IPBECOMESTHESOURCEOFDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONFIGURE2CORPORATEIDENTITY4FIGURE3OWNERSHIPSTRUCTURESINJAPAN3IMPROPERINCENTIVEMECHANISMSISTHEDIRECTCAUSETHATCREATESTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTHEPROBLEMOFINCENTIVEMECHANISMISVERYSIGNIFICANTINCORPORATEGOVERNANCEBECAUSEOWNERSHIPANDMANAGERIALAUTHORI

18、TYARESEPARATEINMODERNCOMPANYTHEINTERESTOFTHESTOCKHOLDERANDTHEMANAGERIALAUTHORITYHASDIVERGEDFORTHISREASON,OWNERSDESIGNINCENTIVEMECHANISMTOMAKETHEACTIONOFMANAGERIALAUTHORITYAGREEWITHSTOCKHOLDERSBENEFITINTHEUSTHEINCENTIVEMECHANISMOFTHEPUBLICCOMPANYWASMOSTOBVIOUSBYTHEENDOF2001,90OFTHEGREATBUSINESSOFTHEU

19、SSENTNONQUALIFIEDSTOCKOPTIONSTOMANAGERS,60OFTHEREVENUEOFMANAGERSCAMEFROMSTOCKYETINCENTIVEMECHANISMIS“TWOBLADESWORDS”ONONEHANGITMAKESMANAGERSWORKEFFICIENTLY,BUTONTHEOTHERHANDITMOTIVATESMANAGERSTOSUPPLYTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONSWINDLESWHICHHAPPENEDINTHEUSCONFIRMTHATTHEACTIONOFGIVINGEXCESSIVEMO

20、TIVATIONTOINSPIREMANAGERSJUSTLIKE“DRINKINGPOISONTOQUENCHTHIRST”THEBENEFITSOFMANAGERSSHOULDNOTBECOMBINEDTOGETHERWITHCOMPANYBENEFITTHISISTHECAUSEOFTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTOSOMEDEGREE,NONQUALIFIEDSTOCKOPTIONSARETHEMAINREASONOFTHEAMERICANACCOUNTINGSWINDLESLAWCASESWECONSIDERTHATIMPROPERINCENTIV

21、EMECHANISMISTHEDIRECTCAUSETHATCREATESTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTHEAMERICANACCOUNTINGSWINDLELAWCASEORIGINATEDFROMOVERCOMPENSATION,BUTTHEREASONFORDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONOFTHEPUBLICCOMPANYINCHINAISJUSTSHORTOFESSENTIALINCENTIVE5MECHANISMNOWADAYS,THEREVENUEFORMINCHINAISCOMPARATIVELYSIMPLETA

22、B1MONTHLYPAYANDBONUSARETHEMOSTCOMMONFORMTHATTHECOMPANIESADOPTTHEREISANINTIMATERELATIONSHIPBETWEENBONUSANDACCOUNTINGBENEFIT,SOINTHECASEOFINSIDERCONTROL,USEBONUSASINCENTIVEMEANSUSUALLYLEADSTHEPUBLISHDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTOCONTROLBENEFITONTHEOTHERHAND,THETRADITIONALVIEWPOINTOFCHINESEIS“THEGOVE

23、RNMENTOFFICIALISMOSTIMPORTANT”SOMEMANAGERSGOALISTOBECOMEANOFFICIALORPOLITICIAN,SOFORTHOSEPEOPLEACCOUNTINGBECOMESACHESSPIECEITISNOTSTRANGEFORACOMPANYTOAPPEARTO“TURNHOSTILESUDDENLY”THOUGHANALYSISOFTHOSEFINANCIALMALPRACTICECASES,WEMAYDISCOVERTHATTHEIMPROPERINCENTIVEMECHANISMIMPELSMANAGERSTOCONTROLTHEPR

24、OFIT,THEREBYCAUSETHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTABLE1CORPORATIONADMINISTRATIONPERSONYEARREVENUETOGETHERREVENUESHAPEITEMUNDER1000010000200002000050000OVER50000MONTHLYPAY906852765647YEARLYPAY56122204262MORTGAGED67448844DIVIDEND6793132242OTHERS292221604THEUNQUALIFIEDSUPERVISORYMECHANISMISTHEEXTERNAL

25、CAUSETHATCREATESTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTHESUPERVISORYMECHANISMOFPUBLICCOMPANYCONSISTSOFEXTERIORSUPERVISIONANDINTERIORSUPERVISIONEXTERIORSUPERVISIONMEANSTHECOMPANYRESTRICTSTHEMANAGERSACTIONTHROUGHOUTSIDEMARKETPLACETHESEMARKETPLACESCHIEFLYARETHEPRODUCTMARKETPLACE,THEMANAGERMARKETPLACE,ANDTHE

26、CAPITALMARKETPLACEINTERIORSUPERVISIONMEANSTHATCOMPANIESRESTRICTTHEMANAGERSACTIONTHROUGHSPECIFICSYSTEMDESIGNEXTERIORSUPERVISIONWILLTAKEALONGTIMETOBEESTABLISHED,AND6TRADITION,CULTURE,POLITICALOFENVIRONMENTWILLHAVEAGREATAFFECTONITHENCEITISALONGPERIODOFTIMEFOREXTERIORSUPERVISIONTORESOLVETHEDISTORTEDACCO

27、UNTINGINFORMATION,ANDITCANNOTACCOMPLISHITINONEMOVEUNDERTHISSITUATION,RESOLVINGTHEPROBLEMASQUICKLYASPOSSIBLEWILLDEPENDONINTERIORSUPERVISIONTHEWAYOFTHEUSISWORTHSTUDYINGAFTEREXPERIENCINGASERIESOFACCOUNTANCYSCANDALCASES,THEUSGOVERNMENTPASSEDSARBANESOXLEYACTIONOF2002TORESOLVEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONQUALITYT

28、HELAWHADSEVERALASPECTS,WHILEAREASFOLLOW1THEACTALSOHASSTIFFENEDPENALTIESFORCORPORATEANDCRIMINALFRAUDBYCOMPANYINSIDERSTHELAWMAKESITACRIMETODESTROY,ALTERORFALSIFYRECORDSINAFEDERALINVESTIGATIONORIFACOMPANYDECLARESBANKRUPTCYTHEPENALTYFORTHOSEFOUNDGUILTYINCLUDESFINES,ORUPTO20YEARSIMPRISONMENT,ORBOTH2NOPER

29、SONALLOANSOREXTENSIONSOFCREDITTOCOMPANYEXECUTIVESEITHERDIRECTLYORTHOUGHASUBSIDIARY,EXCEPTFORCERTAINEXTENSIONOFCREDITUNDERANOPENENDEDCREDITPLANORCHARGECARD,HOMEIMPROVEMENTANDMANUFACTUREDHOMELOANS,OREXTENSIONSOFCREDITPLANBYABROKERORDEALERTOITSEMPLOYEETOBUY,TRADEORCARRYSECURITIES3ANYCEOORCFOWHO“RECKLES

30、SLY”VIOLATESHISORHERCERTIFICATIONOFTHECOMPANYFINANCIALSTATEMENTIF“WILLFULLY”VIOLATES,FINEOFUPTO1,000,000AND/ORUPTO10YEARSIMPRISONMENTFINEOFUPTO5MILLIONAND/UPTO20YEARSIMPRISONMENT4THEACTVESTSTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEOFAPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANYWITHRESPONSIBILITYFORTHEAPPOINTMENT,COMPENSATIONANDOVERSIGHTOFANYREGI

31、STEREDPUBLICACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTOPERFORMAUDITSERVICESTHESUPERVISORYMECHANISMOFTHEPUBLICCOMPANYINCHINACONSISTSOFSTOCKHOLDERBOARD,CORPORATEBOARDANDSUPERVISORBOARDBUTTHOSEBOARDSCANNOTSUPERVISETHEMANAGEREFFICIENTLYWHENTHEOUTSTANDINGACHIEVEMENTISNOTVERYGOOD,CERTAINLYTHEMANAGERWILLUTILIZEDIFFERENTMEASUR

32、ESANDANNOUNCETHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTOATTAININDIVIDUALANDPOLITICALAIMS5PATTERNOFTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONANDSOMEPROPOSALS7ACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISORIENTTOADVANCEEFFICIENCYANDIMPROVEPERFORMANCEOFCOMPANYTHOUGHUSINGTHEMECHANISMTOCONTROLTHE

33、ACCOUNTANTDATUMIFTHISCORPORATEMECHANISMBRINGSINTOPLAYEFFICIENTLY,THEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONMUSTCOMBINEWELLWITHCAPITALMARKETBECAUSETHEPRICEOFSTOCKCANIDENTIFYEFFORTOFMANAGERANDTHEPOSSIBILITYOFCONTROLLINGTHESURPLUS,THEACCOUNTINGINDEXMAYSIEVETHEUNCONVENTIONALINFLUENCEOFNONECONOMICFACTORSTHEOTHERWAYROUND,T

34、HECORPORATEGOVERNANCECANPROMOTETHEMANAGERTOREPORTTRUEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONTHERELATIONSHIPCANBEDESCRIBEDBYFIGURE4FIGUE4RELATIONSHIPOFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONANDTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEAFTERTHEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISANNOUNCEDBYTHEMANAGER,THROUGHTHESTOCKHOLDERBOARDTHECORPORATEBOARDANDTHESUPERVISORBOARD,ITFI

35、NALLYBECOMESTHEPUBLICRECORDBYMEANSOFTHEANALYSISOFTHEFOREGOINGPARAGRAPHS,WETHINKTHEMAINELEMENTSAFFECTINGQUALITYACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONARETHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,THESUPERVISORYMECHANISMANDTHEINCENTIVEMECHANISMACCORDINGTOTHEFORMULABELOW,THEREALACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISMEASUREDTOA,THEIMPROPERLYOWNERSHIPSTRUCT

36、URE,SUPERVISORYMECHANISMANDINCENTIVEMECHANISMWHICHAFFECTTHEDEGREEOFTHEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONQUALITYIS、,THECREDIBLEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONPERFORMANCECORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONPRICEOFSTOCKAUDITMECHANISMPROTECTDEGREEOFLAWINFLUENCEONPOLITICSFINANCINGSTRUCTURECONCENTRATIONOFINDUSTRY8I

37、SYYA111（1）（01,01,01,JUST,）TOBEFITFORCHINESETHECONDITIONSSOLVINGPROBLEMOFTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONINVOLVESCHANGINGOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,ANDESTABLISHINGINCENTIVEMECHANISMMOREOVERTHISPROCESSINVOLVESIMPROVINGTHESETUPOFINTERIORANDEXTERIORSUPERVISORYMECHANISMTHEFOLLOWINGSTEPSMAYBETAKENINTHEPROCESS1RE

38、DUCINGTHEPROPORTIONOFTHENATIONALSTOCKANDPERSONALSTOCKINTHESPECIFIEDSITUATION,ANDTHENADDINGTOTHEPROPORTIONOFCIRCULATIONSTOCK2IMPROVINGTHEESSENTIALSYSTEMMAKESTHEVALIDDEMANDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONAPRIORITY3IMPROVINGTHESTANDARDACHIEVEMENTEVALUATIONTARGETANDTHEPERSONALPAYMENTSYSTEM,RELIEVINGTHENEEDTOANNOUN

39、CETHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATION4ESTABLISHINGMOREKINDSOFINCENTIVEMECHANISM5SPEEDINGUPPRODUCTMARKET,DIRECTORMANANDCAPITALMARKETESTABLISHMENT6ESTABLISHINGIMPROVEDSTOCKHOLDERSTATUTEFORTHEIRPROTECTION7ESTABLISHINGTHEINDEPENDENTAUDITCOMMISSION,WITHSTRANGEBUILTINCONTROL8IMPROVINGTHESUPERVISORBOARDSYSTE

40、M6CONCLUSIONSTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONPOSSESSESTWOGENERALDIRECTIONFINANCIALREPORTMALPRACTICEANDPROFITCONTROLTHESCOPEOFTHESTUDYISRESTRICTEDTOTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEFINANCIALREPORTMALPRACTICEANDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEASTOTHECORPORATEGOVERNMENT,THESTUDYONLYCARRIESONPRELIMINARYRESEARCHTHROUGHTHREE

41、MAINRESPECTSTHESTUDYPROPOSESTHEEASYMATHEMATICALMODELOFTHEACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONQUALITYTHATTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHESUPERVISORYOFTHEEXTERIOR,STATUE,THEINTERMEDIARYORGANIZATIONANDTHEDISTORTEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONISSTILLAWAITINGFURTHERRESEARCHSOURCEASIANSOCIALSCIENCE2008,7469739译文公司治理与会计信息失真摘要制约我国经济的发展的

42、主要因素是上市公司会计信息失真。因此,如何提高会计信息质量成为热门话题。本研究简要分析了影响因素、会计信息质量公司治理的方向，而且提出了几种不同的数学模型，提出了一种基本思路,目的是建立一个研究一些基础会计信息失真问题。关键字公司治理会计信息失真1引言被扭曲的会计信息是“慢性疾病”的证券市场。因为它危及政府宏观调控，扰乱税收和有害于运转的优化资本资源处理,许多政府试图解决这个问题。然而，即使到今天，关于会计信息失真的事件仍扰乱了整个世界。例如美国的“安然”,而“银广夏”和“蓝天”在中国。该研究报告的结论是研究的是会计信息失真的治理不能获得突破是它忽视了这个问题的根源。委托代理关系导致会计信息失

43、真,所以只能在会计准则和会计制度而定的方法是不是最有效的方法来解决问题。公司治理是法律、文化、惯例和制度，这是协调和控制之间的关系和每一位参与者行动中使用的安排。所以最根本的问题将得到解决，是代理的问题采取行动。基于这个原因，它是有利于出现“主体”、“代理人”和信息之间不对称的冲突，这些都引起会计信息失真。COSO的出版研究涉及200个财务报告舞弊2003年至1007年上市公司的基础，报告显示72的案件涉及的CEO中，43都与财务总监，25的人对公司没有设立审计委员会。这项研究的研究样本包括50个1994至2000年上市公司财务舞弊，根据证监会的处罚，在那些关系到董事及经理79的案件，表明有7

44、9的案件涉及到会计信息失真。（图1）公司弊端案件相关的金融案例相关经理10图1财务公司营私舞弊的基于上述观点，我们认为引起会计信息失真的原因是公司治理模式的缺陷。由于这些缺陷，一些机制不能监督和惩罚的行动。因此，会计信息不能扣抵。本研究简要分析了影响因素，会计信息质量公司治理的方向。此外，它给出了几种不同的情况直接会导致会计信息失真。在此基础上,研究设计了一种数学模型的设计思路，提出一种基础管理思想,以建立研究会计信息失真问题的一些基础训练。2所有制结构和会计信息失真一般来说，所有制结构包含两种意义首先，由不同的股东拥有百分之多样；其次，业主船体结构集中程度，这是一个重要组成部分与公司治理股权

45、基地。在合理的所有制结构决定功能的基础上，其中的企业管治确保能提供可信的财务报告工作。股东作为主人资本与经理根据企业会计信息联系，实现最大的资本利润。因此股东是会计信息的检查，但是股东有明确的比例，有不同的要求。我们认为大股东是会计信息主体。在这一主体中，经济利益之间的关系和会计信息比别人更重要，所以他们拥有更多的权力来管理和控制会计信息质量。例如，首先发现“安然”案的是在投资机构的财务分析师。合理的所有制结构产生会计信息需求者与会计信息失真会减小。通过对与财务报告舞弊行为的上市公司股权结构的研究，我们发现有两个显著特征的公司首先，流通股比例低，其次是国家股东和“法人”，最高比例是51（图2）

46、。在日本银行最重要的股东与股权集中仅拥有15（图3）结构。政府和经理部门,作为国家股票的股东及业主，产权不能够提出剩余时间,所以它是没有足够的动力监督和评价他们。所以在中国“内部人控制”已成为一个重要的问题。因此，“内部人控制”成为中国的一个重要问题。为了实现控制，内幕必须使用会计信息失真。因此，这成为不正当所有制的会计信息失真的来源。第一大股东第二大股东其他11图2公司特征图3在日本的股权结构3不适当的激励机制是创建的直接原因是会计信息失真激励机制的问题是很重要的意义,在公司治理结构。因为所有权和经营权分离是现代公司。股东的利益和管理当局已经偏离。因此,管理机关同意股东的利益，业主设计激励机

47、制来完成动作。在美国，公众公司的激励机制最为明显。到2001年底，90美国伟大的企业派出非限定股票期权的经理，管理人员60的收入来自于股票。然而激励机制是“两刃刀”，在一个方面它促使管理人员的工作效率，但另一方面，它促使管理人员提供会计信息失真。骗取这在美国发生的事情证实，确认给予过多的动机采取行动，激励经理人就像“喝毒药解渴”。管理者的利益不应该与公司利益相结合，这是会计信息失真的原因。在某种程度上，非合格股票期权是美国会计欺诈违法案件的主要原因。我们认为，不适当的激励机制创建的直接原因是会计信息失真。美国会计欺诈的法律案例起源来自赔偿，但对在中国上市公司会计信息失真仅仅是至关重要的短期的激

48、励机制。如今，中国的收入形式是比较简单的（表1）。该公司采用的每月工资和奖金是最常见的形式。奖金和会计之间的亲密关系，使受益的内部人控制的情况下，国家股法人股流通股银行公共部门基金外国个人12用红利作为奖励手段通常会导致会计信息失真的发布控制受益。另一方面，中国传统的观点是“政府官员是最重要的”。一些管理者的目标是成为一个官方或政客，所以对于这些人会计成为棋子。公司出现的“翻脸”是不奇怪的。通过这些财务舞弊案件的分析，我们可以发现，不当的激励机制促使管理人员来控制利润，从而导致会计信息失真。表1公司管理人员年收入（收入形式）项目10000以下1000020000200005000050000以

49、上月薪906852765647年薪56122204262抵押67448844股息6793132242其它292221604外因是不合格的监督机制，创造了会计信息失真上市公司监督机制包括外部监督和内部监督。外部监督是指公司限制了经理人通过外部市场的行动。这些市场主要是产品市场、经理市场、资本市场。内部监督的手段，通过具体制度设计，制约企业管理者的行动。外部监督需要很长的时间才能建立，传统、文化、政治环境将有很大的影响。因此，它是为外部监督，解决会计信息失真需要很长一段时间，不能快速完成它。在这种情况下，尽快解决问题将取决于内部监督。美国的办法是值得研究的。在经历了一系列会计丑闻的情况下，美国政府通过萨班斯奥克斯利2002年行动，解决会计信息质量。该法有几个方面，如下（1）该企业行为也有助于对公司内部欺诈的刑事处罚。该法使犯罪毁灭，篡改或伪造在联邦调查记录，或者如果一个公司宣布破产。对于那些被判有罪的刑罚包括罚款，最多20年监禁，或两者兼而有之。（2）任何个人贷款或直接授信公司高管或子公司，除了一定的信用扩展下一个不限成员名额信贷计划或签账卡，家居装修及住房贷款，由经纪人或经销商的雇员购买，进行证券交易或信贷计划的扩展。13（3）任何行政总裁或首席财务官“鲁莽”违反其对公司财务报表的证明。如果“蓄意”违反，罚款高