在公司治理中的关联方交易【外文翻译】.doc

1、1本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译题目上市公司关联方交易相关问题的探讨专业会计学外文题目RELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSINCORPORATEGOVERNANCE外文出处SECONDUNIVERSITYOFNAPLESTTALY外文作者MICHELEPIZZO原文RELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSINCORPORATEGOVERNANCEINTRUDUCTIONUNTILRECENTSCANDALSRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSDIDNOTDESERVEINDEPTHANALYSESACADEMICRESEARCHMAINLYFOCUSEDONDIF

2、FERENTISSUESANDLIMITEDATTENTIONWASPAIDBYREGULATORSANDOVERSEERSTOOACCOUNTINGWASMAINLYCONCERNEDWITHPOTENTIALLYBIASEDFINANCIALFIGURESNOTBEINGCARRIEDOUTATARMSLENGTH,THEYMIGHTDIVERGEFROMMARKETPRICESMEANWHILE,INGOVERNANCESTUDIESANDCODESTOPICSSUCHASBOARDCOMPOSITIONANDINDEPENDENCE,AUDITCOMMITTEE,DIRECTORSRE

3、MUNERATION,ETC,LARGELYPREVAILEDASAMATTEROFFACT,FINANCIALDISCLOSURESUITEDBOTHACCOUNTINGANDGOVERNANCESTUDIESBECAUSETHEINFORMATIONREQUIREDWASBOTHAPROXYOFPOTENTIALACCOUNTINGBIASANDATOOLFORMONITORINGPURPOSESHOWEVER,ENRONS,ADELPHIASANDPARMALATS2CRISESSHEDLIGHTONTHEINHERENTRISKS,ASRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSE

4、MERGEDASAPOWERFULINSTRUMENTOFFINANCIALFRAUDS,SHAREHOLDERSEXPROPRIATION,ETC,TURNINGTHEVEILFROMTHEMANYRELEVANTLOOPHOLESAFFECTINGEXISTINGREQUIREMENTSSUCHADISCOVERYHASOBLIGEDREGULATORSANDSTANDARDSETTERSTOSTRENGTHENCURRENTRULESANDPRINCIPLESAND/ORINTRODUCENEWBANSANDREQUIREMENTSACLEARSHIFTTOWARDSBETTERANDM

5、OREDETAILEDDISCLOSUREANDTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFMONITORINGPROCEDURESIEBOARDAPPROVAL,INDEPENDENTDIRECTORSINVOLVEMENT,EXTERNALQUALIFIEDOPINIONSCANBEEASILYOBSERVEDIEOECD2004AND2CONSIDEREDANEFFECTIVESTRATEGYDJANKOVETAL,2005SUCHAPROCESSISSTILLONGOINGANDITSIMPACTCANNOTYETBEPROPERLYEXAMINEDCONTEMPORARILY,THANKS

6、TOTHESUBSTANTIALANECDOTALEVIDENCE,PROVIDEDALSOBYFORMERSCANDALS,THESUSPICIOUSATTITUDEANDTHENEGATIVECOMMONPERCEPTIONS,GENERALLYACCOMPANYINGTHESEOPERATIONS,BECAMEMOREWIDELYANDPROFOUNDLYACCEPTEDREVIEWOFTHELITERATUREANDTHEREGULATORYFRAMEWORKDOESNOTPROVIDEACLEARANDDEFINITEPICTURE,BUTITSUPPORTSMANYSHADESOF

7、OPINIONANDREVEALSBOTHTHEORETICALANDOPERATIONALOPENISSUES,DESERVINGFURTHERANDMOREDETAILEDANALYSISTHISPAPERCARRIESOUTACRITICALSURVEYOFTHELITERATUREONTHEISSUEANDATTEMPTSTOEXAMINETHEECONOMICRATIONALEBEHINDRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSINTHELASTPARTTHEEUROPEANSTATEOFTHEARTISREVIEWEDINORDERTOASSESSITSTHOROUGHNE

8、SSANDCONSISTENCYWITHTHEECONOMICNATUREOFRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSASCONFLICTOFINTERESTSTHETOPICHASALWAYSBEENSTUDIEDINTHELITERATUREACCORDINGTOTWODIFFERENTTHEORIESACONFLICTOFINTERESTSBEFFICIENTTRANSACTIONHYPOTHESISACCORDINGTOTHEFORMER,RELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSMAYIMPLYMORALHAZARDAND

9、MAYBECARRIEDOUTINTHEINTERESTOFDIRECTORSINORDERTOEXPROPRIATEWEALTHFROMSHAREHOLDERSBYCONTRAST,THELATTERCONSIDERSTHESEDEALINGSASSOUNDBUSINESSEXCHANGESFULFILLINGECONOMICNEEDSOFTHEFIRMACADEMICRESEARCHCONSISTENTWITHTHEFORMERAPPROACHHASTHROWNLIGHTONTHEDRAWBACKSASSOCIATEDWITHRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSAWEAKENI

10、NGCORPORATEGOVERNANCERELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSMAYUNDERMINENONEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSFUNCTIONS,TURNINGTHEMINTOAFFILIATEDOR“GREY”DIRECTORS,CLASSIFIEDASNONINDEPENDENTOUTSIDEDENISANDSARIN,1999KLEIN,2002VICKNAIRETAL,1993WEISBACH,1988,CLOSERTODEPENDENTDIRECTORSFURTHERMORE,WEAKERCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMAKESTHESETRAN

11、SACTIONSMORELIKELYTOOCCUR,WHILEBOARDINDEPENDENCEANDTHEIRLOWERPROBABILITYAREPOSITIVELYASSOCIATEDKOHLBECKANDMAYHEW,2004GORDONETAL,2004BEARNINGSMANAGEMENTIE“APURPOSEFULINTERVENTIONINTHEEXTERNALFINANCIAL3REPORTINGPROCESS,WITHTHEINTENTOFOBTAININGSOMEPRIVATEGAIN”SCHIPPER,1989DIRECTORSHAVEINCENTIVESTOMANAG

12、EEARNINGSTOINCREASEORLEGITIMATETHEIRPERQUISITESORTOHIDESUCHWEALTHEXPROPRIATIONRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSMAYTURNOUTTOBEAUSEFULTOOLFORMANAGINGEARNINGSJIANANDWONG,2008AHARONYETAL,2005,OPERATINGRESULTSANDACHIEVINGROEOROTHERTARGETSIEAVOIDINGDELISTING,NEWEQUITYISSUEPLACEMENTJIANANDWONG,2003MINGANDWONG,2003C

13、TUNNELING,IEWEALTHTRANSFERSOUTOFACOMPANYFORTHEBENEFITOFSHAREHOLDERSWITHACONTROLLINGINTERESTJOHNSONETAL,2000ACOMPANYMAYPAYARELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONABOVEMARKETPRICESORPAYMARKETPRICESFORGOODSORSERVICESOFINFERIORQUALITY3SUCHAPHENOMENONDOESNOTNECESSARILYIMPLYOPPORTUNISTICBEHAVIOUR,BUTMAYBEDUETOANOVERCONFI

14、DENTAPPROACHORBIASEDJUDGEMENTFORINSTANCE,OVERESTIMATINGONESRELATIVES,RYNGAERTANDTHOMAS,2007TRANSFEROFASSETSANDPROFITS,ALTHOUGHCOMMONINDEVELOPEDCOUNTRIES,BECOMESMORERELEVANTANDFREQUENTINEMERGINGECONOMIESWHEREEXTERNALMARKETSAREINADEQUATEORCORPORATEGOVERNANCERULESARELACKINGAND,PRESUMABLY,LESSEFFECTIVEJ

15、IANANDWONG,2004JIANGETAL,2005DEMPLOYMENTOFRELATIVESINFAMILYFIRMSADIRECTORCANBEAPPOINTEDORPROMOTEDOWINGTOHISFAMILYINFLUENCEOVERTHECOMPANYEMISLEADINGSTATEMENTMANYSTUDIESPROVIDEEVIDENCEOFTHEIRROLEINMANYFINANCIALCRISESSWARTZANDWATKINS,2003MCTAGUE,2004ANDINTHEACHIEVEMENTOFSPECIFICAIMSERICKSON,2000MOREOVE

16、R,APARTFROMTHESECASES,THESETRANSACTIONSAREGENERALLYREGARDEDASLESSRELIABLETHANARMSLENGTHONESBECAUSEOFTHESEFACTORS,RELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSMAYBEASSOCIATEDWITHABNORMALSTOCKRETURNSCHEUNGETAL,2006,FIRMSPOORPERFORMANCESCHENANDCHIEN,2004ORLOWERVALUEGORDONETAL,2004JIANANDWONG,2004THEPREVIOUSCIRCUMSTANCESSUP

17、PORTTHEIDEATHATTHESETRANSACTIONSREPRESENTACONFLICTOFINTERESTCONFLICTOFINTERESTHYPOTHESISANDTHATTHEYAREINCONSISTENTWITHSHAREHOLDERWEALTHMAXIMIZATIONEMSHWILLER,2003TOTHISEXTENT,SUCHAVIEWENCOMPASSESAGENCYISSUESANDISCONSISTENTWITHANAGENCYPROSPECTIVEBERLEANDMEANS,1932JENSENANDMECKLING,1976WHEREOWNERSFACE

18、MORALHAZARDLACKOF4EFFORTORMISUSEOFCOMPANYRESOURCESANDADVERSESELECTIONBYTHECEOMISREPRESENTATIONOFABILITYTHUS,RISKSHARINGPOLICIES,MONITORING,INFORMATIONSYSTEMSAREADOPTEDAND,INPARTICULAR,MECHANISMSLIKECEOCOMPENSATIONANDBOARDSTRUCTUREARESUGGESTEDONCEFRAMEDINSUCHACONTEXT,RELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSMAYIMPLYT

19、HEMISUSEOFFIRMRESOURCESMORALHAZARDANDTHEMISREPRESENTATIONOFPRIVATEINFORMATIONADVERSESELECTIONTOOTHEIRPOTENTIALHARMINELUDINGALIGNMENTMECHANISMS,LIKECEOCOMPENSATIONANDBOARDCOMPOSITION,ISINCREASINGLYPERCEIVEDMOREOVER,THEPOTENTIALBIASINFINANCIALSTATEMENTS,WITHANEGATIVEIMPACTONTHEIRRELIABILITYANDRELEVANC

20、E,INTRODUCESFURTHERUNCERTAINTYANDWEAKENSTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFCONTRACTSAIMINGATREDUCINGAGENCYCONFLICTSINPARTICULAR,ACCORDINGTOAGENCYTHEORYFAMA,1980FAMAANDJENSEN,1983ANOPTIMALBOARDCOMPOSITIONREQUIRESBOTHEXECUTIVEMEMBERSASWELLASEXTERNALNONEXECUTIVEDIRECTORS,THUSMONITORINGBECOMESEVENMORECRUCIALWHENNONEXECU

21、TIVEDIRECTORSAREINVOLVEDGORDONETAL,2004NOTSURPRISINGLY,THESEFINDINGSCONTRIBUTEDINDEFINITELYSHIFTINGOPINIONINFAVOUROFTHEVIEWTHATRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSREPRESENTCONFLICTOFINTERESTS,COMPROMISINGDIRECTORSINDEPENDENCEANDMONITORINGFUNCTIONS,POTENTIALLYSERVINGDECEPTIVEANDFRAUDULENTPURPOSESINDEEDTHISIDEA,H

22、ASALWAYSLARGELYPREVAILED,BUTCORPORATECOLLAPSESAND,TOSOMEEXTENT,LITERATUREPROVIDEDULTIMATEEVIDENCEOFPOSSIBLEABUSESAND,MOREOVER,ADIFFICULTPOINTTOCHALLENGETHERISKSOFHARMTOCOMPANYSHAREHOLDERSTHROUGHSELFINTERESTEDDECISIONSBYDIRECTORS,SPOILINGCORPORATEWEALTH,AREOFTENSTRESSEDINBUSINESSPRESSANDINREGULATORSP

23、OSITIONS,THEREBYFAVOURINGWIDESPREADACCEPTANCEOFTHEPREVAILINGLYNEGATIVEMEANINGOFTHETERMTHEABILITYTOINFLUENCETHECOUNTERPARTEVENINCONTRASTWITHITSOWNINTERESTS,THEDEPARTUREFROMTERMSAPPLIEDINRELATIONSHIPSWITHTHIRDPARTIESAND,LASTBUTNOTLEAST,THEPOTENTIALWEALTHTRANSFERSAREOFTENRECALLEDBYSECANDFASBFAS57THEFOL

24、LOWINGQUOTATIONFROMTHE2008CONSOBDRAFTONRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSENLIGHTENSASTOTHECAUTIONSANDADVERSEAPPROACHLYINGBEHINDTHE5SUGGESTEDCHANGES“INGENERAL,THEEXISTENCEOFCOMPANIESINTERESTINCARRYINGOUTRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONCANNOTBEAPRIORIEXCLUDEDINAFEWCASES,THEYMAYBESEENASEFFICIENTTRANSACTIONS”THEIRECONOMIC

25、SOUNDNESSISNOT,INPRINCIPLE,REJECTED,BUTISCLEARLYLIMITEDTOFEWCASES,ANDEVENTHENTHEASYMMETRICALINFORMATIONAMONGINSIDERSANDOUTSIDERSLEADSTOSTRICTERREGULATIONINDEED,DEFINITIONSLIKE“ACCOUNTINGMINEFIELDS”SHERMANANDYOUNG,2001CLEARLYEXPRESSTHEGENERALMOODNOTSURPRISINGLY,GROWINGCONCERNFORABUSES,LACKOFINFORMATI

26、ONSYMMETRY,NEGATIVEINFLUENCEONDIRECTORSINDEPENDENCEANDINTEGRITYANDWEAKENINGOFMONITORINGFUNCTIONSISWARRANTEDAMONGOVERSEERSANDSTANDARDSETTERSINACTUALFACT,NEWLYINTRODUCEDRULESORPRINCIPLES,AIMEDATIMPROVINGDISCLOSUREANDIMPLEMENTINGMOREEFFECTIVEMONITORINGPROCEDURES,REPRESENTACLEARATTEMPTTOBALANCETHEABOVEM

27、ENTIONEDRISKSANDPERCEPTIONSSPECIFICALLY,SOLUTIONSENHANCINGCONFLICTOFINTERESTPROVISIONS,SUCHASMONITORINGPROCEDURESLIKEBOARDAPPROVAL,INDEPENDENTDIRECTORSINVOLVEMENT,AUDITCOMMITTEEEVALUATION,EXTERNALINDEPENDENTOPINION,ASSEMBLYAPPROVALINCREASINGDISCLOSURECONCERNINGSUBJECTS,TYPEOFTRANSACTIONS,AMOUNT,TERM

28、SANDCONDITIONS,ALIGNMENTWITHMARKETCONDITIONS,ETCINFACT,INVESTORSCANANALYSETHEPOSSIBLEEXPROPRIATIONANDWEIGHTITINORDERTODISCOUNTEQUITYPRICESBARTH,1994WILKINSANDZIMMER,1983HARRISANDOHLSON,1987SAMIANDSCHWARTZ,1992BANONSOMEOPERATIONSIEEMPLOYMENTLOANS,PROHIBITEDBYSOXIN2002GAINWIDESUPPORTANDSEEMUNAVOIDABLE

29、MEASURESTOCOPEWITHTHEPERCEIVEDRISKSATTHESAMETIME,THECONSISTENCYOFTHEABOVEMENTIONEDMEASURESWITHAGENCYTHEORYPRINCIPLES,THATSUGGESTSMONITORING,INCENTIVEALIGNMENTANDCONTROLOFMANAGERSTOMINIMIZETHEAGENCYPROBLEMSTOSI,2008,CANBEEASILYPERCEIVEDHOWEVER,COSTSOFMONITORINGANDOFREPORTINGCOMPLEXITYINCREASESHARPLYB

30、ECAUSEOFTHEFORMERMEASURESANDTHEYADDONTHEPOTENTIALECONOMICCOSTSASSOCIATEDTORELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSDUETOWEALTHTRANSFERS,EARNINGSMANAGEMENT,ETCASWELLASTHEASSOCIATEDOPPORTUNITYCOSTSOFTENWIDELYNEGLECTEDTHEOVERALLRESULTINGNEGATIVEIMPACTONPERFORMANCECANBELEGITIMATELYPRESUMEDANDCOULD6IMPROPERLYREPRESENTACA

31、GEFORTHISSORTOFTRANSACTION,TOWHICHRECOURSEMAYBELIMITEDTHEEFFICIENTTRANSACTIONHYPOTHESISINCONTRASTWITHTHEPREVIOUSAPPROACH,THEEFFICIENTTRANSACTIONHYPOTHESISASSUMESTHATRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSREPRESENTSOUNDBUSINESSEXCHANGES,EFFICIENTLYFULFILLINGUNDERLYINGECONOMICNEEDSOFTHEFIRMTHEREFORE,THEYDONOTHARMTHE

32、INTERESTSOFSHAREHOLDERSANDEMERGEASANEFFICIENTCONTRACTINGARRANGEMENTWHEREINCOMPLETEINFORMATIONTHEREISMOREOVER,POSSIBLEBENEFITSMAYBECONTRACTINGPARTIESREPRESENTATIVESAPPOINTEDASBOARDMEMBERSFACILITATETHEACHIEVEMENTOFBETTERCOORDINATIONOFTHEDIFFERENTACTIVITIES,QUICKERFEEDBACKORMOREINSIGHTSDEEPERRECIPROCAL

33、KNOWLEDGEASWELLASGREATERFAMILIARITYCANJUSTIFYTRANSACTIONSTHATARENOTFEASIBLEATARMSLENGTHORCREATEMORECONVENIENTTERMSANDCONDITIONSFORBOTHPARTIESHOLDUPPROBLEMMAYBEMITIGATEDTHESETRANSACTIONSMAYALSOSUPPLEMENTCEOANDDIRECTORCASHREMUNERATIONORCOMPENSATETHEMFORINCREASEDRISKTHEVIEWOFRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSREP

34、RESENTINGINTERNALDEALINGS,ALTERNATIVETOCONTRACTUALORMARKETEXCHANGES,ABLETOREDUCETRANSACTIONSCOSTSANDOVERCOMEDIFFICULTIESIMPAIRINGPRODUCTIONISCONSISTENTWITHTHETRANSACTIONCOSTTHEORYCOASE,1937WILLIAMSON,1985ANDSUPPORTINGEVIDENCEHASBEENPROVIDEDBYMANYSTUDIESFANANDGOYAL,2006INPARTICULAR,ININSTITUTIONALCON

35、TEXTSWITHOUTEFFICIENTCAPITAL,LABOURANDPRODUCTMARKETS,LIKEMANYDEVELOPINGECONOMIES,INFORMATIONANDAGENCYPROBLEMS,ASWELLASMARKETIMPERFECTIONS,INCREASERISKSASSOCIATEDTOFIRMACTIVITY,WHILEGROUPSTRUCTURESANDINTERNALDEALINGSMAYPROVIDEABETTERALLOCATIONOFFINANCIALRESOURCES,ECONOMIESOFSCALE,EASIERACCESSTOFINANC

36、E,MOREOPPORTUNITIES,INCREASEDINFLUENCE,ETCTHEREFORE,INTERNALCAPITALMARKETSMAYBECREATEDWITHBENEFICIALEFFECTSFORTHE7ENTIREGROUPWHENEXTERNALFUNDSARESCARCEANDUNCERTAINKHANNAANDPALEPU,1997SCALEANDSCOPEOFTHEGROUPSPERMITDIFFICULTIESIMPAIRINGPRODUCTIONINEMERGINGCOUNTRIESTOBEOVERCOMEANDMAKEINVESTMENTINTHESER

37、EGIONSMORELIKELYANDPROFITABLEFISMANANDKHANNA,2004SHARINGTECHNOLOGICALSKILLSANDADVERTISING,ASSOCIATEDWITHAVAILABLEGROUPFINANCIALRESOURCES,CONTRIBUTESTOPROFITABILITY,SUPPLEMENTINGINEFFICIENTCAPITALMARKETSANDREDUCINGTRANSACTIONCOSTSCHANGANDHONG,2000MOSCARIELLO,2007NEVERTHELESS,EVIDENCEISNOTYETDECISIVEK

38、HANNAANDPALEPU,2000ANDTHEPOSSIBILITYOFWEALTHTRANSFERSTHROUGHINTERNALDEALINGSCHANGANDHONG,2000ISNOTEXCLUDEDMOREOVER,AGENCYISSUESSTILLPLAYAROLEINSHAPINGBENEFITSANDCOSTSOFGROUPAFFILIATIONANDRELATEDPROBLEMSREDUCETHEBENEFICIALEFFECTSDERIVINGINTERNALMARKETSCLAEESSENSANDFAN,2002CLAESSENS,ETAL,2006ADIFFEREN

39、TCONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKSOMEGUIDELINESBOTHTHEABOVEMENTIONEDTHEORIESAREAFFECTEDBYINCONSISTENCIESORDEFICIENCIESAND,INPROVIDINGALMOSTDIAMETRICALLYOPPOSITEINTERPRETATIONS,THEYAREUNABLETOCOPEWITHDIFFERENTKINDSOFPOSSIBLECASESTHECONFLICTOFINTERESTSTHEORYSEEMSPROBABLYMORESENSITIVETOSOCIALNEEDS,SUCHASMINORITYPRO

40、TECTIONANDCAPITALMARKETFAIRNESSANDEFFICIENCYNOTSURPRISINGLY,ITSSOLUTIONSARECOHERENTWITHTHEGROWINGCONCERNFORTHESEDEALINGSANDTHEPOLITICALCLIMATEAROUNDTHEISSUEITCOULDBEARGUEDTHAT,TOSOMEEXTENT,THISPERSPECTIVEOFFERSA“POLITICALEXCUSE”TOLEGITIMATEMOREBINDING,DISCLOSUREANDMONITORINGREQUIREMENTSHOWEVER,THISA

41、PPROACHISWEAKENEDBYSIGNIFICANTDRAWBACKSORLOOPHOLES,SOMEOFWHICHAREHEREINAFTERBRIEFLYEXAMINEDEMPIRICALEVIDENCENEITHERALWAYSNORCONSISTENTLYACCOMPLISHESTHEEXPECTEDOUTCOMESASPREVIOUSLYSEEN,THELITERATURESUPPORTSCONTRADICTORYCONCLUSIONSTOOANDGRADUALLYREVEALS,INSTEADOFABLACKANDWHITEPICTURE,AMULTICOLOUREDPOR

42、TRAIT,INTRODUCINGDISTINCTIONSANDWARNINGSWHICHCALLFORSPECIFICTREATMENTSOURCEUNIVERSITYOFNAPLESITALY8译文在公司治理中的关联方交易介绍直到最近，关联方交易的丑闻还没有值得深入分析，学术研究主要侧重于不同问题的局限性引起了规管机构及监督员很大的注意力。会计是最受关注的可能有误差的财务数字，我们尽自己最大的努力不让这种误差存在，他们可能会偏离市场价格。然而审计委员会、董事的报酬等在很大程度上占了上风。事实上，财务信息的披露适合会计和管理研究，因为这两个研究方向的潜在会计偏见和监控目的。然而安然、阿德菲亚

43、的骗局和帕玛拉特等危机揭示了固有的风险，由于关联方交易的出现作为一个强有力的金融欺诈工具被股东利用等，至于从影响现有要求来看，如发现不得不规管机构及标准的制订，加强目前的规则和原则或介绍的很多有关漏洞表面的工具，其实适合会计和治理研究新禁令和要求。明确转向更好和更详细的披露监测程序（即委员会批准、独立董事参与、外部合格的意见）的实现可以被方便地观察到（即OECD2004年和被视为有效的战略（2005DJANKOV等人）。这一进程仍在进行中，其影响还不能恰当地测算。可观的是，多亏了之前提出的丑闻、质疑的态度和负面的共同看法，通常伴随这些操作的逸闻实证更广泛以及更深入地被接受。回顾文献和规管架构的

44、检讨并没有提供一个明确的画面，但它支持很多细微的意见，并显示理论和业务值得进一步打开的问题和关键问题，这份文件尝试对检查关联方交易的经济理据文献的调查进行更详细的分析。最后部分，欧洲国家的文献被审查，以评估其与关联方交易的完整性和一致性。相关方交易的利益冲突主题总是围绕研究两个不同文献的理论利益的冲突；有效事务的假设；根据之前所述，关联方交易可能意味着道德风险，并可能在侵占股东财富方面侵犯董事会的利益。与此相反，后者认为这些交易是满足经济需求的公司的良好交易。符合前述办法的学术研究与关联方交易相关联的缺点已明朗化。A削弱公司治理。关联方交易可能会破坏与外界（丹尼斯和沙林，1999年；使9用非独

45、立把它们变为附属或“灰色“董事分类的非执行董事职能；克莱因2002年；VICKNAIR等人，1993年；WEISBACH，1988年）密切相关的董事之间的关系。此外，较弱的公司治理使这些交易更有可能发生，然而董事会的独立性和其较低的发生概率却是有效的关联（KOHLBECK和MAYHEW，2004年；松等人，2004年）；B）盈余管理（即“一个明确体现在外部的财务报告流程的管理目标，获得一些个人利益的意图“；SCHIPPER，1989年。董事有管理收入的增加在合法的前提条件或隐藏这种财富征用的奖励下。关联方交易可能是一个有用的工具，用于管理收入（建和黄，2008年；AHARONY等人，2005年

46、，经营成果和实现预期盈利或其他目标（即避免除名、新公平问题放置，建和黄，2003年；明、黄，2003年；C隧道效应，即财富转移出的一家公司控制权益（2000年约翰逊等人）与股东的利益。一家公司可能支付相关方交易价格以上的市场价格或以市场价格支付的劣质货物或服务，这种现象并不一定意味着投机行为的机会，但可能是由于一个自误的方法或判断高的见解（为例估之一的亲属，RYNGAERT和托马斯，2007年资产和利润的转化虽然在发达的国家中变得更切合实际和频繁，在外部的市场不充分和公司体制缺乏的新兴经济中大概很少有效（建和黄，2004年；江报，2005年）；D）家族企业的亲属就业问题。一名董事由于他家庭的影

47、响可以在该公司中被任命或晋升。E误导性的陈述。很多研究提供他们在金融危机（瓦金斯2003年，MCTAGUE，2004年和实现具体目标（埃里克森2000年）的角色的证明。此外,除了这些情况下,这些交易普遍被认为比正常交易要缺少可信度。因为这些因素,关联交易可能伴有异常股票的回报率张五常、苏达权等,2006年8月,企业的糟糕的表现陈和简,2004或更低的价值戈登、苏达权等,2004剑而吕志宗,2004。以前的情况下都支持这样一个观点,即这些交易代表利益冲突利益冲突的假设,他们不符合股东财富最大化EMSHWILLER,2003。从这个意义上来说,这样的一种观点包括代理问题,与一个机构未来的BERLE

48、和手段,1932年,延森和MECKLING,1976年业主面临道德危机缺乏努力或滥用公司资源和首席执行官10逆向选择误传的能力是一致的。因此,风险分担政策、监控、信息系统就被采纳了,特别是有些机制如首席执行官报酬和董事会结构被允许了。一旦框以这样一个背景,关联交易可能意味着滥用公司资源道德风险和过度歪曲私人信息逆向选择他们潜在的有害作用在规避对口机制,像经理人报酬和董事会组成,正变得越来越被感知到。此外,存在潜在偏见的财务报表,在可靠性和相关性方面有负面的影响，介绍了进一步的不确定性以及削弱了针对减少机构冲突的代理合同的效力。特别是，根据代理理论（法玛，1980法玛和詹森，1983）董事会的组

49、成，需要一个最佳的以及外部的（非执行）董事和执行成员，从而在非执行董事参与时监控就显得更加重要。（高登等人，2004）。毫不奇怪，这些研究结果有助于转移舆论从而以赞成关联方交易是代表利益冲突，损害董事的独立性和监测职能，可能提供以欺骗或欺诈目的服务的观点。事实上这种想法，在很大程度上一直盛行，但企业倒闭，并且文献提供了最终可能被滥用的证据从而使其成为一个挑战难点。对损害公司股东利益从而利己的决定，破坏企业的财富，站在商业媒体和监管者的立场上往往是被抨击的，从而有利于一般性的负面含义广泛被接受。影响同行的能力甚至和自身的利益能够形成对比,离开与第三方关系的条款,最后但并非最不重要的是潜在的财富转移往往被FASB和SEC召回到现实中来。FAS57从2008年CONSOB关联方交易的草案来看，以下注意事项的引文启示及不良做法说法背后所建议的修改是“一般情况下对公司进行关联方交易时会考虑利益存在的关系，不可能将其排除在外。在少数情况下，他们可能会被视为有效率的交易“。他们的经济是非常正确的，原则上不拒绝，但显然仅限于少数情况，正是这样的内部和外部之间的信息不对称关系从而导致了更严格的监管。的确，像“会计雷区”的定义谢尔曼，2001明显地表现出一般情绪，毫不奇怪，人们越来越关注侵权行为、信息缺乏对称，对董事的独立性和完整性以及监督职能的弱化的负面影响是监督员