地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响【外文翻译】.doc

1、本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目THEEFFECTOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTONECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTEVIDENCEFROMTRANSITIONALCHINA出处ECOLOGICECONOMY作者ZHANGWEIGUO,HOUYONGJIANTHEEFFECTSOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTONECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENEVIDENCEFROMTRANSITIONALCHINABASEDONTHEPANELDATAOF28PROVINCESINTHEYEAROF19872001,THIS

2、PAPEREXAMINESTHEEFFECTSOFTHELOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTONECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTTHEEMPLIRICALRESULTSHOWATHATTHELOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTPLAYSASIGNIFICANTPOSITIVEROLEINECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTHOWEVER,WHILETHEPROPTIONOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTTOGDPHADAREMARRKABLERISEAFTER1998,THEELASTICITYOFLOCA

3、LGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTONECONOMICGROWTHDECLINED,WHICHSHOWSTHATTHEREISABIGROOMFORRAISINGTHEEFFICIENCYOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTMOREOVER,THEEMPIRICALEXAMINATIONSHOWSTHATALTHOUGHLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTHADPOSITIVEEFFECTONEMPLOYMENT,THEELASTICITYHADADECREASEAFTER1994WHENTHETAXSHARINGSYSTEMREFORMWASPUTIN

4、TOPRACTICETHISSHOWSTHATTHEPOSITIVEROLEOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTONEMPLOYMENTISALSOLIMITEDTHISPAPERARGUESTHATTHEROLEOFLOCALGOVERNMENTIASINVESTORSMUSTBEWEAKEDANDLOCALGOVERNMENTSOFDIFFERENTLEVELSSHOULDLESSENDIRECTECONOMICINTERVENTIONANDCONCERNTRATEONPUBLICREGULATIONTHETRANSITINGPROCESSOFCHINAFROMTRADI

5、TIONALPLANNINGECONOMYTOMARKETINGECONOMYISALSOAPROCESSFORGOVERNMENTSTOCHANGETHEIRROLESINTHISTRANSITIONPROCESSCHINATAKESAPATHOFGRADUALREFORMATION，ANDTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTGRADUALLYLOOSESITSDIRECTCONTROLONECONOMYANDLESSENSITSADMINISTRATIVEPOWERONSTATEOWNEDECONOMYHOWEVERTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTDIDNOTGIVEENTER

6、PRISESTHECOMPLETEADMINISTRATIVEPOWER；INSTEADITPASSEDTHEADMINISTRATIVEPOWERTOLOCALGOVERNMENTSTHUS，THELOCALGOVERNMENTSGAINEDMOREPOWERINECONOMIEDECISION，INEXAMININGLARGEINVESTMENTPROJECTS，ANDINISSUINGLICENSEANDINCONTROLLINGLANDRESOURCESTHISMADETHELOCALGOVERNMENTSHAVEGREATPOWERONINTERVENINGIOCALECONOMIC

7、DEVELOPMENTONTHEOTHERHAND，THEESTABLISHMENTOFFISCALDECENTRALIZATIONSYSTEMINAGREATDEGREEINTENSIFLEDTHEECONOMICINTERESTOFLOCALGOVERNMENTSWHICHURGEDTHELOCALGOVERNMENTSTOHAVEMOREINCENTIVETODEVELOPIOCALECONOMYUNDERTHEFISCALDECENTRALIZATIONSYSTEMTHEREVENUEOFLOCALGOVERNMENTSHIGHLYDEPENDSONTHELOCALECONOMICDE

8、VELOPMENTONIYWHENTHELOCALECONOMYHASAGOODPERFORMANCE，COULDTHETAXBASEBEEXPANDED，ANDREVENUEBEINCREASEDSOTHATTHELOCALGOVERNMENTSHAVEGREATINCENTIVETODEVELOPTHELOCALECONOMYINADDITIONTHEGROWTHRATEOFGDPANDTHEEMPLOYMENTSITUATIONAREVERYIMPORTANTINDEXESFOREXAMININGOFFICIALSACHIEVEMENTS；THISFURTHERSTRENGTHENSTH

9、EINCENTIVESOFIOCALOFFICIALSTODEVELOPLOCALECONOMYTHUSLOCALGOVERNMENTSOFDIFIERENTLEVELSUSUALLYPLAYAROLEOFENTREPRENEURSINPROROOTINGLOCALECONOMICDEVELOPMENTTHEMOSTDIRECTEFFECTIVEMEASUREFORIOCALGOVERNMENTSTODEVELOPLOCALECONOMYISTORAISELOCALINVESTMENTLEVELTHROUGHVARIOUSWAYSINTHISWAYTHEPROPORTIONOFTHEINVES

10、TMENTPROJECTSOFLOCALGOVERNMENTSTONATIONALFIXEDINVESTMENTGROWSCONTINUOUSLY；THEINVESTMCNTEXPENDITUREFROMLOCALGOVERNMENTSTHEMSELVESKEEPSAHIGHLEVELWITHTHEESTABLISHMENTOFFISCALDECENTRALIZATION,THECAPABILITYOFLOCALGOVERNMENTSINCONTROLLINGTHEREVENUESWITHINBUDGETINCREASESREMARKABLYINADDITION，LOCALGOVERNMENT

11、SHAVEALARGEPERTIONOFRIGHTSINDISPOSINGTHEREVENUESBOTHOUTSIDETHEBUDGETANDOUTSIDETHESYSTEM；THISMAKESLOCALGOVERNMENTSHAVEFINANCERESOURCESTOINVESTININFRASTRUCTURECONSTRUCTIONINFACTINTHETOTALGOVERNMENTALINVESTMENT，THEPROPORTIONOFINVESTMENTWITHINBUDGETDECREASESINCREASINGLY,ANDTHATOUTSIDETHEBUDGETINCREASESI

12、NCREASINGLY,ANDTHEMOSTOFINVESTMENTOUTSIDETHEBUDGETISRAISEDANDUSEDBYLOCALGOVERNMENTSMOREOVER，INORDERTOATTRACTMOREINVESTMENTFROMOUTSIDESOASTOPROMOTETHELOCALECONOMICDEVELOPMENTWHILETHEREVENUESBOTHWITHINANDOUTSIDETHEBUDGETAREINSUFFICENTFORTHEDEMANDOFINVESTMENTEXPENDITURESSOMELOCALGOVERNMENTSTAKEAPATHOFR

13、AISINGALOANFROMOUTSIDETOSPEEDUPTHEURBANDEVELOPMENTINTHEPASTYEARS，MANYLOCALGOVERNMENTSWEREENGAGEDINTHESOCALLED“CITYMANAGEMENT”,SPEEDEDUPTHECITYDEVELOPMENT，RENEWEDTHEINFRASTRUCTUREINCITIESINLARGESCALEANDESTABLISHEDECONOMICDEVELOPINGAREASTHESENVESTMENTSTAKEALARGEPORTIONINNATIONALTOTALINVESTMENTFROMABOV

14、EANALYSISWECANSEETHATLOCALGOVERNMENTSHAVEBEENONEOFTHEMAININVESTORSINCHINASECONOMICLIFEATPRESENTCHINASFIXEDINVESTMENTHASCHANGEDFROMTHATTHECENTRALGOVERNMENTPLAYSADOMINANTROLETOTHATLOCALGOVERNMENTSPLAYADOMINANTROLELOCALGOVERNMENTSOFDIFFERENTLEVELSHAVEBECOMEANIMPORTANTPARTICIPANTINCHINASECONOMICLIFEWEMU

15、STCONSIDERTHEEFFECTSOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTONECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTWHENSTUDYINGTHELATTERTWOBASEDONTHEPANELDATAOF28PROVINCESINTHYEAROF19872001THISPAPEREXAMINESANDANALYSESTHEEFFECTSOFTHELOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTONECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTTHESTRUCTUREOFTHEPAPERISASFOLLOWINGTHESECONDPARTISLIT

16、ERATUREREVIEWTHETHIRDPARTISANALYSISANDDESIGNTHEFORTHPARTISTHEDATAANDRESULT；THEFIFTHPARTISTHECONCLUSIONANDREVELATIONWEEXPECTTOEXAMINEIFTHELOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTHAVEREMARKABLEEFFECTSONEMPLOYMENT，SOWETAKETHELOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTASTHEMAINEXPLANATORYVARIABLEINMAKINGTHERELEVANTMODELINADDITIONINLINE

17、WITHOTHERVARIABLESAFFECTINGEMPLOYMENT，WEADDEDSOMECONTROLVARIABLESACCORDINGTO“PHILIPSCARVE”THEREISASUBSTITUTIONRELATIONSHIPBETWEENINFLATIONRATESANDUNEMPLOYMENTRATESTHISPAPERINTRODUCESCPIINTOTHEEMPIRICALTESTOFEMPLOYMENT，SOASTOTESTIFTHEINFLATIONLEVELHASREMARKABLEEFFECTSONEMPLOYMENTINCHINAMOREOVER,THENU

18、MBEROFEMOLOYMENTINSTATEOWNEDENTERPRISESTAKESAGREATRATIOOFTOTALEMPLOYMENTITSHOWSTHATTHEESTIMATIONVALUEISEVIDENTLYNOT0，WHICHPROVESTHATTHEPROPORTIONOFEMPLOYMENTINSTATEOWNEDSECTORSHASASTRONGEXPLANATORYCAPABILITYTOTHEGROWTHRATEOFEMPLOYMENTTHEREAREVERYFEWLITERATURESWHICHDIRECTLYSTUDYTHEEFFECTSOFLOCAIGOVER

19、NMENTINVESTMENTONECONOMICGROWTHANDEMPLOYMENTMOSTOFLITERATURESSTARTFROMFISCALDECENTRAIIZATIONAWORIDBANKREPORTPOINTSOUTTHATTHOUGHCHINAHASASINGLEGOVERNMENTALSYSTEM,CHINASSYSTEMHASASTRONGCHARACTEROFFEDERALISMBECAUSECHINASFINANCESYSTEMISHIGHIYDECENTRALIZEDONSOMANYDIFFERENTLEVELSASCENTRAIGOVERNMENT31PROVI

20、NCES,331CITIES,2,109COUNTIESAND44,741TOWNS，THEREFOREQIANYINGYIANDWEINGASTREGARDTHISFEDERALISMOFCHINA，WHICHFORMEDFROMFISCALDECENTRAIJZATION,ASMARKETPRESERVINGFEDERALISMWITHCHINESECHARACTER,QIANYINGYIANDROLANDPOINTOUTTHATTHEINCENTIVEOFGOVERNMENTTOSUBSIDEINEFFICIENTPROJECTSISDETERMINEDBYTHETRADEOFBETWE

21、ENPOLITICALINTERESTSANDECONOMICCOSTS,ANDTHEECONOMICCOSTSDEPENDUPONTHEDEGREEOFGOVERNMENTALDECENTRAIIZATIONTHEYINSISTTHAT,WITHTHEFREEMOVEMENTOFNONSTATEOWNEDCAPITALS,FISCALDECENTRALIZATIONHASTHEEFFECTOFHARDENINGTHEBUDGETRESTRICTIONOFTHESTATEOWNEDENTERPRISESCONTROLLEDBYLOCALGOVERNMENTSTHISISBECAUSETHATT

22、HECOMPETITIONOFATTRACTINGINVESTMENTOFLOCALGOVERNMENTSMAYGENERATEEXTERNALITIESTHISMAKESTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTOFSUBSIDINGTHEINEFFICIENTSTATE,OWNEDENTERPRISESTOBEHIGH,THEREFOREWEAKENSTHEINCENTIVEOFLOCALGOVERNMENTTOSAVEIOSINGENTERPRISESTHEYALSOBELIEVETHATSUCHGOVERNMENTORGANIZATIONALREFORMATIONASFISCALDECENT

23、RALIZATIONISANIMPORTANTASPECTFORTHETRANSITIONFROMPLANNINGECONOMYTOMARKETINGECONOMYLINYIFUANDLIUZHIQIANG,EMPLOYINGPROVINCIALDATAASSESSEDTHEEFFECTSOFCHINASFISCALDECENTRALIZATIONSTARTEDFROML980SONTHEECONOMICGROWTHTHEYFOUNDTHAT,AFTERCONTROLLINGTHEEFFECTSOFOTHERREFORMATIONSOCCURREDATTHESAMETIME,FISCALDEC

24、ENTRALIZATIONRAISESTHEPROVINCIALGDPGROWTHRATEINPERCAPITAASPECT,THISSHOWSTHATFISCALDECENTRALIZATIONPROMOTESECONOMICGROWTHTHROUGHRAISINGTHEEFFICIENCYOFRESOURCEDISTRIBUTIONTHEYBELIEVETHATTHEPOSITIVEEFFECTSOFFICALDECENTRALIZATIONONECONOMICDEVELOPMENTAREDUETOTHAT,RELATIVETOCENTRALGOVERNMENT，THEPROVINCIAL

25、GOVERNMENTSHAVEINFORMATIONADVANTAGEINSATISFYINGLOCALDEMAND；THUS，THEYCOULDPROVIDEBETTERPUBLICGOODSANDSERVICESWHICHHAVELARGEEFFECTSONLOCALECONOMICENVIRONMENTZHANGWEIYINGANDSUSHUHEARGUETHATTHEDECENTRALIZATIONHAPPENINGINTHEEARLYOF1980SLEDTOREGIONALCOMPETITIONWHICHLEDTOPRIVATIZATIONTHEESTABLISHMENTOFDECE

26、NTRALIZEDSYSTEMACCELERATESTHEINCENTIVEOFLOCALGOVERNMENTSTOPURSUEPROFIT，WHICHCAUSESTHEHIGHCOMPETITIONBETWEENLOCALGOVERNMENTS,WHICHFACILITATESTHEMARKETORIENTEDMOVEMENTOFTHEWHOLEECONOMYDUETOTHEINTENSEREGIONALCOMPETITIONINTHEPRODUCTMARKET，EACHREGIONHASTOMAKEEFFORTSTODECREASEITSPRODUCTIONCOSTSOASTOOCCUPY

27、ASPACEINTHEMARKETCOMPETITIONINORDERTOEFFECTIVELYCUTTHECOST,LOCALGOVERNMENTSMAKESUCHCHOICEASGIVINGTHEWHOLEORPARTOFSHARETOMANAGERSTOGIVETHEMINCENTIVES,WHICHACCELERATESTHEGROWTHOFMARKETANDECONOMICDEVELOPMENTTHEREAREALSOSOMEWRITERSWHOHAVENOTEDTHENEGATIVEEFFECTSOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTINGBEHAVIORASTOTHEAS

28、PECTOFREDUCINGTHEEFFICIENCYOFSOCIALRESOURCESDISTRIBUTION,LUMING,CHENZHAOANDYANJIWHOTAKETHEANGLEOFTHEISOLATIONOFREGIONALECONOMY，XUYINGWHOTAKETHEANGLEOFCONFLICTOFREGIONALECONOMY,HURONGTAO，ZHANGXUYINGANDSUMINGBINGWHOTAKETHEANGLEOFTHESIMILARIZATIONOFINDUSTRIALSTRUCTURE，WITHGAMETHEORY，HAVERESPECTIVELYANA

29、LYZEDTHESTRATEGICBEHAVIOROFLOCALGOVERNMENTSPURSUINGSELFPROFITWHICHLEDTOTHELOSSOFSOCIALRESOURCESDISTRIBUTIONEFFICIENCYTHERESEARCHGROUPOF“THECOMPETITIONOFCHINESELOCALGOVERNMENTS”ANALYZEDTHENEGATIVEPERFORMANCEOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINCOMPETITIONTHERESULTSHOWSTHAT，AFTERCHINAPRACTICEDANEWPOSITIVEFISCALPOLICY,T

30、HOUGHLOCALGOVERNMENTSHADGREATINCENTIVETOINVESTINCITYINFRASTRUCTURECONSTRUCTIONWITHTHEIMPETUSOFCENTRALGOVERNMENTLOAN，WHICHMADETHEINVESTMENTEXPENDITUREOFLOCALGOVERNMENTANDITSPROPORTIONTOGDPAREINCREASING,THEEFIICIENCYOFTHESEINVESTMENTDECLINEDTHEEMPIRICALRESULTOFTHISPAPERSHOWSTHATTHELOCALGOVERNMENTINVES

31、TMENTHASAVERYEVIDENTPOSITIVEEFFECTONECONOMICGROWTHTHEEMPIRICALRESULTALSOPROVESTHATAFTERTHEESTABLISHMENTOFTHETAXSHARINGSYSTEMIN1994,THEELASTICITYOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTTOECONOMICGROWTHWENTUPBUTTHISELASTICITYWENTDOWNWHENLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTINCREASEDGREATLYAFTER1998THEEMPIRICALTESTRESULTALSOSH

32、OWSTHATTHEELASTICITYOFLOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTTOEMPLOYMENTDECREASEDWHENTHETAXSHARINGSYSTEMREFORINWASPUTINTOPRACTICEAFTER1994ITSHOWSTHATTHOUGHTHELOCALGOVERNMENTINVESTMENTINCREASEDRAPIDLYINTHEPASTYEARSANDPLAYEDANIMPORTANTROLEINECONOMICDEVELOPMENT，ITSPOSITIVEEFFECTONEMPLOYMENTWASLIMITEDTHISEXPLAINSWHY

33、THEELASTICITYOFGDPTOEMPLOYMENTTENDSTODECREASEANDTHEEMPLOYMENTPRESSUREKEEPSHIGHWHILECHINASECONOMYKEEPSRAPIDGROWTHTHEEMPIRICALTESTRESULTSHOWSTHATINTHEPROCESSOFTRANSITION，CENTRAIGOVERNMENTGRADUALLYDECENTRALIZEDMOSTOFTHECONTROLPOWERANDPASSEDITTOLOCALGOVERNMENTSTHELOCALGOVERNMENTS,ASANINDEPENDENTECONOMIC

34、ACTOR,PARTICIPATEDINTHEECONOMICLIFEACTIVELY,EXPANDEDTHEINVESTMENTWITHGREATEFFECTSSOASTODEVELOPTHELOCAIECONOMYTHISISANIMPORTANTSTEPINCHINASGRADUALREFORMATION,WHICHPROMOTEDTHEECONOMICDEVELOPMENTANDTHEGROWTHOFEMPLOYMENTBUTONTHEOTHERHAND,LOCALGOVERNMENTSARENOTREALENTREPRENEURSANDTHEYWIILNOTBEARTHERISKSO

35、FINVESTMENTFAILURELIKEREALENTREPRENEURSTHEIRINVESTMENTCRITERIAAREALSODIFFERENTFROMENTREPRENEURS，ANDTHEYWOULDNOTMAKETHEINVESTMENTDECISIONACCORDINGTOTHEPROFITOFINVESTMENTINFACT,THEINVESTMENTANDCONSTRUCTIONSSPONSOREDBYLOCALGOVERNMENTSUSUALLYHAVESUCHCHARACTERASSOFTBUDGETRESTRIETIONANDSOFTRESOURCERESTRIC

36、TIONWHICHCAUSETHELOCALGOVERNMENTSTOHAVESTRONGINCENTIVETOINVESTTHEINVESTMENTWITHOUTSTRICTBUDGETRESTRICTIONISGENERALLYINETIICIENTASARESULTTHEINVESTMENTSPONSOREDBYLOCALGOVERNMENTISNOTPARETOEFFICIENTANDTHERESOURCESARESOMEWHATWASTEDWHICHHINDEREDTHEOPTIMALDISTRIBUTIONOFRESOURCESASARESULT,ABUNDANTLOCALGOVE

37、RNMENTINVESTMENTCOULDHARDLYDRAWMOREPRIVATEINVESTMENTANDTHEMULTIPLIEREFFECTOFINVESTMENTISLOWMOREOVER,THEINVESTMENTSPONSOREDBYLOCALGOVERNMENTSSUCHASJNVESTMENTINCITYINFRASTRUCTUREINHIGHTECHGARDENETC,ISMOSTLYCAPITALINTENSIVETHOUGHTHISKINDOFINVESTMENTISHUGEANDHASAREMARKABLEPOSITIVEEFFECTONSHORTTERMECONOM

38、ICGROWTH,SUCHCAPITALINTENSIVEINVESTMENTCOULDHARDLYINCREASEEMPLOYMENTTHISRESULTEDINTHATTHEEMPLOYMENTELASTICITYWENTDOWNSHARPLY,ANDTHATTHEEMPLOYMENTGROWTHWASDISCREPANTWITHECONOMICGROWTH，WHICHHASBROUGHTSOMENEGATIVEEFFECTSONCHINASECONOMICDEVELOPMENTTHELOCALGOVERNMENTSBECOMETHEMAINACTOROFINVESTMENTANDIMPE

39、TUSOFECONOMICGROWTH,WHICHISONLYONESTEPINTHEPROCESSOFCHINASGRADUAIREFORMATIONRATHERTHANTHEWHOLEINTHEFUTURE，WITHTHEFURTHERDEVELOPMENTANDPERFECTIONOFCHINASMARKETINGECONOMY，THEROLEOFLOCALGOVERNMENTSININVESTMENTSHOULDBEWEAKENEDTHELOCALGOVERNMENTSOFDIFFERENTLEVELSMUSTLESSENTHEIRDIRECTINTERVENTIONINECONOMY

40、ANDGIVETHECONTROLLINGANDDECISIONPOWERTOENTERPRISESTHUS，ENTERPRISESBECOMETHEREALACTOROFSOCIALINVESTMENT，ANDTHELOCALGOVERNMENTSOFDIFFERENTLEVELSCONCENTRATETHEMSELVESONPUBLICADMINISTRATION译文地方政府对投资经济增长和就业的影响中国经济转型期研究基于19872001年28个省的面板数据，本文讨论了政府投资对经济发展和就业的影响，实验结果表明，当地政府在促进经济增长和就业上扮演着重要的积极作用，然而当地政府在1998年

41、后投资比例在GDP中显著上升，地方政府投资增长下降，结果表明，提高当地政府投资有很大空间，而且实证检查显示，尽管当地政府投资对就业有正面影响，但这降低了1994年以后分税制改革的实现概率，这就表明，地方政府作用于就业的手段是投资有限公司，本文认为，地方政府作为投资者的角色被削弱了，各地方政府应当按着经济学的规律减少干预，集中精力。中国的传统计划经济向市场经济转变的过程，同样也是政府改变自身角色的过程。在这一过程中，中国采取逐渐改革的路径，减少政府集中及直接对经济的控制以及减少对私人经济的行政权。然而，中央政府并没有给企业公司完整的管理权；取代的是对地方经济的管理权。因此，地方政府获得了更多的权

42、利对经济做决定，如重大投资方案，发行执照以及对土地资源的控制。这使得地方政府有地方经济的发展保持着重大的权力。弹性下降以及当中国经济高速增长时就业压力仍然居高不下的原因。从另外一面来讲，财政分权制度的建立从很大程度上加强了地方政府的经济利益。在财政分权制度下，地方政府的收入主要取决于地方经济的发展。只有在地方经济有了好的表现，税收基础可以增加，收入得到增长。所以地方政府对经济发展采取很高的经济鼓励。此外，GDP的增长以及就业情况也是主要官方财政收入的指针；这也扩大了地方办公室的经济鼓励来发展地方经济。所以，不同级别上的地方政府通常扮演企业家在地方经济发展的角色。最直接有效的衡量地方政府对地方经

43、济的发展就是通过多种方式增加地方投资项目及级别。通过这种方法，地方投资项目的比例对国家固定投资是逐渐增长的；地方政府的投资支出自身保持在一个较高的水平。随着财政分权的建立，地方政府对控制收入增加及预算方面能力显著。此外，地方政府的大部分权利在处理体系外收入及预算的系统上；这使得地方政府有经济资源去投资在基础设施建设上面。实际上，政府的总投资在预算之内的投资比重日益下降，预算之外日益上涨。大多预算外的投资增长着被地方政府所用。而且，为了吸引更多的外来投资从而促进当地经济增长。而内外预算的收入对于投资的支出需求不足。一些地方政府通过增加外部贷款而促进城市化发展。在过去的几年中，一些地方官员从事所谓

44、的“城市管理”，大范围的加速城市的发展以及基础建设的改建。这些投资占了总投资的很大部分。通过以上的分析，我们可以看到地方政府是中国经济的主要投资者。现今，中国财政投资从中央控制为主转变为地方政府控制。不同级别的地方政府变成中国经济种重要的参与者。我们必须考虑到地方政府在经济方面的投资增长，就业情况。基于1987到2001的28个省所获得的数据。本文分析了当地政府的投资对于经济增长以及就业所带来的影响。本文的结构如下。第二部分是文献回顾，第三部分是分析以及设计，第四部分是数据和结果，第五部分是相关结论。很少有文献是直接对当地政府的经济增长和就业的投资效应的研究。大部分的文献从财政分权开始。一个世

45、界银行报告指出尽管中国有一个单一的政府体制，因此中国的系统有一个很明显的联邦制特征，因为中国的金融体系是高度分散到不同程度的中央政府31个省，331个城市，2109个县，44741城镇。QIANYINGYI和WEINGAST把这种从财政分权形成的联邦制中国，与汉字作为维护市场的联邦制。QIANYINGYI和ROLAND指出减弱低效项目的政府动机是由政治利益之间的贸易和经济成本决定，经济成本取决于政府权力下放的程度。他们坚持认为,非国有的自由流动资金、财政分权的效果是硬化预算软约束国有企业被地方政府控制。这是因为地方政府吸引投资的竞争可能产生的外部性。这使得下降的低效率国有企业的机会成本变高。因

46、此削弱了当地政府挽救亏损企业的动机。他们也认为,这样的政府组织改革,正如财政分权是一个很重要的方面过渡从计划经济向市场经济。林毅夫、刘志强以省级数据的影响评估中国财政分权始于我80年代对经济增长。他们发现,在控制了改革的影响的同时,财政分权提高省的GDP增长率的人均方面,这说明,财政分权促进经济增长通过提高资源分布的效率。他们相信在经济发展方面积极的影响政府分权,是因为相对于中央，地方政府信息的优势满足当地需求因此,他们可以提供更好的公共产品和服务,其中有很大效应在当地经济环境。ZHANGWEIYING和SUSHUHE认为分权发生在80年代，导致了区域竞争力,从而导致了私有化。加快建立分散式系

47、统的积极性地方政府追求高利润,导致了地方政府之间的竞争,有利于市场为导向的整体经济的运作发展。由于激烈的区域竞争的产品市场,每个地区都努力减少生产成本,以尽可能快的速度在市场上竞争。为了有效地把削减成本，政府作出这样的选择，赋予的全部或部分股份给经理作为对他们奖励,加速了市场发育状况和经济的发展。我们希望了解当地政府投资是否对当地就业显著的效应影响,因此,我们采取当地政府投资为主要表达变量作了相应的模型。另外，与就业相关的其他变量,我们又增添了一些控制变量。按照“菲利普斯曲线”替代关系说明通货膨胀率和失业率。本文介绍了居民消费价格指数CPI进入实证检验工作,以检测这个通货膨胀水平对中国就业是否

48、有显著影响。此外,国有企业的人数占总就业人数的比重也很高。结果证明估计值显著不为0,这证明了国有企业就业的比例,对于增加就业机会，拥有强大的解释能力。这里有一些学者们会注意到地方政府投资行为的负面影响。对于降低社会资源分布的效率这方面，LUMING,CHENZHAO和YANJI用了隔离地区经济的视角，XUYING选择了区域经济发展不平衡的视角，HURONGTAO，ZHANGXUYING和SUMINGBING利用了产业结构的相似性这一视角，用博弈论的方法,分析了它们各自的地方政府追求自我利益最大化策略行为,导致了社会资源配置效率的损失。“中国地方政府的竞争”的这一研究小组还分析了地方政府竞争的性

49、能的负面影响。结果表明,中国实行了新的积极的财政政策以后,尽管地方政府有很大的动力在城市基础设施建设去投资，推动中央政府贷款,使当地政府的投资支出和其占GDP的比率越来越多,这些投资的效率却在下降。由分析结果得出，地方政府投资对经济增长起积极作用，并且在1994年颁布实施分税制度以后，地方政府投资对于经济增长的弹性进一步扩大而对于就业的弹性缩小，但是，前者在1998年经济飞速增长之后也有所下降。相应地，地方政府投资在过去几年中，虽然对经济增长起到了重要的推动作用，但是对于就业的影响却很有限，这也刚好解释了GDP对就业。从分析中我们还可以知道，在过渡阶段，中央政府下放了大部分的权利给地方政府，这使得地方政府可以自主参与到日常经济活动中扩大投资以便发展地方经济。这在中国逐步发展经济增加就业的改革中，迈出了重要的一步。但是从另一方面来看，地方政府并不是企业家，他们会尽力避开投资风险，保障政府投资的成功，而且他们的投资决策标准也不是投资的收益大小。事实上，地方政府投资具有相对较小的经费和资源约束，这使得地方政府有很强的投资动机。一般情况下，没有严格经费约束的投资是低效的，这就导致地方政府投资，不会达