The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt【外文翻译】.doc

1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译外文文献译文标题公司债务期限结构资料来源金融期刊1995（2）作者迈克尔巴克莱，克利福德史密斯摘要我们提出了一个有关企业到期债务影响因素的实证研究。经验证据支持契约成本假说。具有更少成长机会、资产期限长或规模大的公司在其资本结构中拥有更多的长期债务。我们有限地发现公司使用债务期限结构向市场传递信号的证据。然而，证据却一致证明了一种假设，即拥有更深程度信息不对称的企业会产生更多的短期债务。我们没有发现证据表明税收影响到期债务。在解释指导大型上市公司来选择特定的融资政策的动机方面，金融经济学取得了重大进展。这个专业正在越来越多地超越基本标准选择的考查界限，进而涉及到了更为详细

2、的融资决策方面。在本文中，我们通过大量采用公司数据样本来考查这个专业领域的文献，来验证有关企业债务期限结构的影响因素的假说。我们小组把解释公司债务期限结构选择的现有理论归类为以下三种契约成本假说，信号假说和税收假说。我们的证据支持契约成本假说。与MYERS（1977）的观点相一致，拥有更多成长机会的公司具有更少的长期债务，规模大的公司和管制公司具有更多的长期债务。证据是混合信号假说。我们有限地发现公司使用债务期限结构向市场传递信号的证据。然而，我们的证据与信息不对称相一致，即信息不对称性严重的公司（通过衡量投机机会集合中的增长期权）更可能发行短期债务。与DIAMOND的预测相一致，他们发现公司

3、债务期限结构和信用等级呈非单调关系。但他们的经验证据较少支持公司债务期限结构的税收假说我们在第一节中提出假设，第二节中描述数据。在第三节中，我们测试有关债务的期限结构变化的假设，并在第四节中，考察我们的研究结果的可靠性。最后在第五节中提出我们的结论。一到期债务的理论三种不排斥的假说已经用来解释公司的到期债务契约成本假说，信号假2说和税收假说。在本节中，我们总结了这些基本的假设，来指导我们实证检验的结构和解释我们的结论。A契约成本假说A1投资机会集合MYERS（1977）认为公司未来的投资机会类似选择权。这些选择权的价值取决于公司对其进行最优选择的可能性。公司资本结构中具有风险性的固定索取权，使

4、承担盈利性投资项目实现的利益在股东和债权人之间进行分割。在某些情况下，债权人获得足够多的利益以至使一个盈利性项目不能给股东提供正常回报。在这种情况下，股东具有拒绝正的净现值项目的激励，即产生投资不足问题。公司投资机会集（IOS）中具有更多成长机会时，股东和债权人对这些选择权执行的冲突更大。MYERS认为公司可以通过以下方法控制这个激励问题在资本结构中包括更少的债务；在契约条款中包括严格的条款；或缩短债务的有效期限。MYERS注意到如果在执行真实投资选择权前债务到期，这种妨碍投资的活动将被消除。因此，在投资机会集中具有更多成长选择权的公司应该使用更多的短期债务。如果企业可以毫无成本地进行自己的资

5、本重组，那么这种对投资的阻碍因素就可以得以消除FAMA1978。例如，考虑一个拥有增长潜力但需要在本年度有一笔投资的企业。那么，这个企业不论它是有一年未偿还的债务还是有下一年就要偿还的十年债务，它都有有同样的动机来引入投资。但是资本重组战略需要企业再背负它的长期债务，而这种债务却是按一个未能反应出这个新项目的价值的价格来进行的。如果有关项目的信息造成长期债务的价格上涨，那么源自于这个项目的收益就又会在股东和债券持有者间得到分配不论债券是否是再度购买的并且认为投资不足的动机仍会存在。而发行短期债务就可以避免这个问题。发行短期债务按企业再一次背负它的债务来定价，并允许股东可以从企业新的投资中获得更

6、多的（如果不是全部的话）收益。因此，MYERS的分析提供了一个企业价值最大化的理论框架用来匹配他们的资产和负债的有效期限。到了资产运转过程的结尾时，企业会面对再投资决策这件事。而那时到期而发行的债务有助于在需要新投资时再次确定合适的投资动机。然而，更为重要的是，这种分析暗示出一个企业的有形资产的期限不3是它的债务期限的单一决定因素。企业的无形资产（它的增长期权）也扮演了重要的角色。无疑地是，MYERS也必须假设短期债务运转的成本比发布长期债务的成本要大。如果短期债务成本不具有这种独特性，那么所有企业都会在契约成本的假说下而倾向于短期债务。潜在更高的短期债务成本包括（1）更高的赔钱上市成本，（2

7、）在处理更频繁的债务问题需要的管理时间的机会成本和（3）再投资风险和潜在的流动性不足的成本（再投资风险和流动性的更详细地讨论在IB节）。STULZ和JOHNSON1985论述说企业能通过维持优先处理确定项目的能力（例如安全债务）来控制投资不足的问题。由于优先处理确定项目，资助新投资项目限制了财产从股东转移到现存的债券持有者，并且因此减少了股东放弃这些项目的因素。HO和SINGER1982争论到即使短期和长期债务在破产方面拥有相同的优先性，但短期债务在破产外也还有更高的有效的优先性，因为它是最先偿还的。因此发布短期债务来资助新投资项目可以产生潜在的收益，这种收益与用来控制投资不足的问题而发布安全

8、债务所产生的收益是相似的。4外文文献原文TITLETHEMATURITYSTRUCTUREOFCORPORATEDEBTMATERIALSOURCETHEJOURNALOFFINANCEVOLLNO2JUNE1995AUTHORMICHAELJBARCLAYANDCLIFFORDWSMITHABSTRACTWEPROVIDEANEMPIRICALEXAMINATIONOFTHEDETERMINANTSOFCORPORATEDEBTMATURITYOUREVIDENCEOFFERSSTRONGSUPPORTFORTHECONTRACTINGCOSTHYPOTHESISFIRMSTHATHAVEF

9、EWGROWTHOPTIONS,ARELARGE,ORAREREGULATEDHAVEMORELONGTERMDEBTINTHEIRCAPITALSTRUCTUREWEFINDLITTLEEVIDENCETHATFIRMSUSETHEMATURITYSTRUCTUREOFTHEIRDEBTTOSIGNALINFORMATIONTOTHEMARKETTHEEVIDENCEISCONSISTENT,HOWEVER,WITHTHEHYPOTHESISTHATFIRMSWITHLARGERINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESISSUEMORESHORTTERMDEBTWEFINDNOEVIDE

10、NCETHATTAXESAFFECTDEBTMATURITYFINANCIALECONOMICSHASMADESIGNIFICANTPROGRESSINEXPLAININGTHEINCENTIVESTHATLEADLARGEPUBLICCORPORATIONSTOCHOOSEPARTICULARFINANCINGPOLICIESINCREASINGLY,THEPROFESSIONISMOVINGBEYONDANEXAMINATIONOFTHEBASICLEVERAGECHOICETOMOREDETAILEDASPECTSOFTHEFINANCINGDECISIONINTHISARTICLE,W

11、EEXTENDTHISLITERATUREBYEMPLOYINGDATAFROMALARGESAMPLEOFFIRMSTOEXAMINEHYPOTHESESABOUTTHEDETERMINANTSOFTHEMATURITYSTRUCTUREOFTHEFIRMSDEBTWEGROUPTHEHYPOTHESESTHATHAVEBEENOFFEREDTOEXPLAINCORPORATEDEBTMATURITYINTOTHREECATEGORIESCONTRACTINGCOSTHYPOTHESES,SIGNALINGHYPOTHESES,ANDTAXHYPOTHESESOUREVIDENCESUPPO

12、RTSTHECONTRACTINGCOSTHYPOTHESESCONSISTENTWITHMYERS1977,FIRMSWITHMOREGROWTHOPTIONINTHEIRINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYSETSHAVELESSLONGTERMDEBTINTHEIRCAPITALSTRUCTURELARGEFIRMSANDREGULATEDFIRMSHAVEMORELONGTERMDEBTTHEEVIDENCEONSIGNALINGHYPOTHESESISMIXEDWEFINDLIMITEDEVIDENCETHATFIRMSUSEDEBTMATURITYTOSIGNALINFORM

13、ATIONTOTHEMARKETHOWEVER,OUREVIDENCEISCONSISTENTWITHAPOOLINGEQUILIBRIUMINWHICHFIRMSWITHLARGERPOTENTIALINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESMEASUREDBYTHEAMOUNTOFGROWTHOPTIONSINTHEIRINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYSETSISSUEMORESHORTTERMDEBTOUR5EVIDENCEALSOSUGGESTSANONMONOTONICRELATIONBETWEENCREDITSTANDINGANDDEBTMATURITYASPREDIC

14、TEDBYDIAMOND（1993）WEFINDNOEVIDENCETHATTAXESAFFECTDEBTMATURITYWEDEVELOPTHEHYPOTHESESINSECTIONIANDDESCRIBEOURDATAINSECTIONIIINSECTIONIII,WETESTHYPOTHESESABOUTVARIATIONINDEBTMATURITYSTRUCTURE,ANDINSECTIONIV,WEEXAMINETHEROBUSTNESSOFOURRESULTSWEPRESENTOURCONCLUSIONSINSECTIONVITHETHEORYOFDEBTMATURITYTHREE

15、NONMUTUALLYEXCLUSIVESETSOFHYPOTHESESHAVEBEENPROPOSEDTOEXPLAINCORPORATEDEBTMATURITYCONTRACTINGCOSTHYPOTHESES,SIGNALINGHYPOTHESES,ANDTAXHYPOTHESESINTHISSECTION,WESUMMARIZETHESEBASICHYPOTHESESTOGUIDETHESTRUCTUREOFOUREMPIRICALTESTSANDTHEINTERPRETATIONOFOURRESULTSACONTRACTINGCOSTHYPOTHESESA1INVESTMENTOPP

16、ORTUNITYSETMYERS1977ARGUESTHATACORPORATIONSFUTUREINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESARELIKEOPTIONSTHEVALUEOFTHESEOPTIONSDEPENDSONTHELIKELIHOODTHATTHEFIRMWILLEXERCISETHEMOPTIMALLYWITHRISKYFIXEDCLAIMSINTHEFIRMSCAPITALSTRUCTURE,THEBENEFITSFROMUNDERTAKINGPROFITABLEINVESTMENTPROJECTSARESPLITBETWEENSTOCKHOLDERSANDBON

17、DHOLDERSINSOMECASES,BONDHOLDERSCAPTUREENOUGHOFTHEBENEFITSSOTHATAPROFITABLEPROJECTDOESNOTOFFERSTOCKHOLDERSANORMALRETURNINTHESECASES,STOCKHOLDERSHAVEINCENTIVESTOREJECTPOSITIVENETPRESENTVALUEPROJECTSMYERSCALLSTHISTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMWITHMOREGROWTHOPTIONSINTHEFIRMSINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYSET,THECONFLI

18、CTBETWEENSTOCKHOLDERSANDBONDHOLDERSOVERTHEEXERCISEOFTHESEOPTIONSISGREATERMYERSARGUESTHATAFIRMCANCONTROLTHISINCENTIVEPROBLEMISSEVERALWAYSBYINCLUDINGLESSDEBTINITSCAPITALSTRUCTURE,BYINCLUDINGRESTRICTIVECOVENANTSINITSINDENTUREAGREEMENTS,ORBYSHORTENINGTHEEFFECTIVEMATURITYOFITSDEBTSPECIFICALLY,MYERSNOTEST

19、HATIFTHEDEBTMATURESBEFOREANYOPPORTUNITYTOEXERCISETHEREALINVESTMENTOPTIONS,THISDISINCENTIVETOINVESTISELIMINATEDHENCE,FIRMSWITHMOREGROWTHOPTIONSINTHEIRINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYSETSSHOULDEMPLOYSHORTERMATURITY6DEBTIFTHEFIRMCOULDCOSTLESSLYRECAPITALIZEITSELF,THISDISINCENTIVETOINVESTWOULDBEELIMINATEDFAMA1978FO

20、REXAMPLE,CONSIDERAFIRMWITHAGROWTHOPPORTUNITYTHATREQUIRESANINVESTMENTINONEYEARTHISFIRMHASTHESAMEINVENTIVETOINVESTWHETHERITHASONEYEARDEBTOUTSTANDINGORTENYEARDEBTTHATITREPAYSAFTERONEYEARBUTTHERECAPITALIZATIONSTRATEGYREQUIRESTHATTHEFIRMREPURCHASEITSOUTSTANDINGLONGTERMDEBTATPRICESTHATDONOTREFLECTTHEVALUE

21、OFTHENEWPROJECTIFINFORMATIONABOUTTHEPROJECTCAUSESTHEPRICESOFITSLONGTERMDEBTTORISE,THENTHEBENEFITSFROMTHEPROJECTAREAGAINSHAREDBETWEENTHESTOCKHOLDERANDBONDHOLDERSWHETHERTHEBONDSAREREPURCHASEDORNOTANDTHEUNDERINVESTMENTINCENTIVEREMAINSISSUINGSHORTTERMDEBTAVOIDSTHISPROBLEMITFIXESTHEPRICEATWHICHTHEFORMREP

22、URCHASESITSDEBTANDALLOWSSTOCKHOLDERSTOCAPTUREMOREIFNOTALLOFTHEBENEFITSFROMITSNEWINVESTMENTSMYERSANALYSISTHUSPROVIDESARATIONALEFORVALUEMAXIMIZINGFIRMSTOMATCHTHEEFFECTIVEMATURITIESOFTHEIRASSETSANDLIABILITIESATTHEENDOFANASSETSLIFE,THEFIRMFACESAREINVESTMENTDECISIONISSUINGDEBTTHATMATURESATTHISTIMEHELPSTO

23、REESTABLISHTHEAPPROPRIATEINVESTMENTINCENTIVEWHENNEWINVESTMENTISREQUIRESMOREIMPORTANTLY,HOWEVER,THISANALYSISINDICATESTHATTHEMATURITYOFAFIRMSTANGIBLEASSETSISNOTTHESOLEDETERMINANTOFITSDEBTMATURITYTHEFIRMSINTANGIBLEASSETITSGROWTHOPTIONSPLAYACRITICALROLEASWELLIMPLICITLY,MYERSMUSTALSOASSUMETHATTHECOSTOFRO

24、LLINGSHORTTERMDEBTISGREATERTHANTHECOSTOFISSUINGLONGTERMDEBTIFTHEREWERENODIFFERENTIALCOSTSOFSHORTTERMDEBT,THENALLFIRMSWOULDPREFERSHORTTERMDEBTUNDERTHECONTRACTINGCOSTHYPOTHESISTHEHIGHERCOSTSOFSHORTTERMDEBTPOTENTIALLYINCLUDE1HIGHEROUTOFPOCKETFLOTATIONCOSTS,2GREATEROPPORTUNITYCOSTSOFMANAGEMENTTIMEINDEAL

25、INGWITHMOREFREQUENTDEBTISSUES,AND3REINVESTMENTRISKANDPOTENTIALCOSTSOFILLIQUIDITYREINVESTMENTRISKSANDLIQUIDITYAREDISCUSSEDINMOREDETAILINSECTIONIBSTULZANDJOHNSON1985SUGGESTTHATTHEFIRMCANCONTROLTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMBYRETAININGTHEABILITYTOISSUEFIXEDCLAIMSWITHHIGHPRIORITYSUCHAS7SECUREDDEBTFINANCINGNE

26、WINVESTMENTPROJECTSWITHHIGHPRIORITYCLAIMSLIMITSWEALTHTRANSFERSFROMSTOCKHOLDERSTOEXISTINGBONDHOLDERSANDTHUSREDUCEDTHEINCENTIVEFORSTOCKHOLDERSTOFOREGOTHESEPROJECTSHOANDSINGER1982ARGUETHATEVENIFSHORTTERMANDLONGTERMDEBTHASTHESAMEPRIORITYINBANKRUPTCY,SHORTTERMDEBTHASAHIGHEREFFECTIVEPRIORITYOUTSIDEBANKRUP

27、TCYBECAUSEITISPAIDFIRSTTHUSISSUINGSHORTTERMDEBTTOFINANCENEWINVESTMENTPROJECTSOFFERSPOTENTIALBENEFITSTHATARESIMILARTOTHOSEFROMISSUINGSECUREDDEBTFORCONTROLLINGTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMFINALLY,SMITHANDWARNER1979HYPOTHESIZETHATRISKYFIRMSBENEFITFROMPLACINGMORERESTRICTIVECOVENANTSINTHEIRDEBTCOVENANTSREDUC

28、EMORALHAZARDPROBLEMSINCLUDINGTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMTHATOCCURSAFTERTHEDEBTISISSUEDWHENARESTRICTIVEDEBTCOVENANTISVIOLATED,ITISOFTENOPTIMALTORENEGOTIATETHEDEBTAGREEMENTRATHERTHANFORCINGTHEBORROWERINTOBANKRUPTCYTHETRUSTINDENTUREARTOF1939,HOWEVER,LIMITSTHEDISCRETIONTHATMAYBEALLOCATEDTOTHETRUSTEEINAPUB

29、LICDEBTISSUEITTHUSISCOSTLYTORENEGOTIATECOVENANTSINPUBLICDEBTAGREEMENTSOUTSIDETHEBANKRUPTCYPROCESSPRIVATELENDERS,THEREFORE,HAVEACOMPARATIVEADVANTAGEINWRITINGDEBTCONTRACTSWITHRESTRICTIVECOVENANTSFAMA1985ARGUETHATBANKSHAVEACOMPARATIVEADVANTAGEOVEROTHERPRIVATELENDERSINMONITORINGSUCHLOANSCONSISTENTWITHTH

30、ISHYPOTHESIS,JAMES1987FINDSAPOSITIVEANDSTATISTICALLYSIGNIFICANTPRICEREACTIONASSOCIATEDWITHBANKLOANANNOUNCEMENTS,BUTINSIGNIFICANTPRICEREACTIONSFORPUBLICANDNONBANKPRIVATEDEBTANNOUNCEMENTSTOMAXIMIZETHEEFFECTIVENESSOFTHESEMONITORINGACTIVES,MOSTBANKLOANSARESHORTTERMBYREDUCINGTHETERMOFTHEDEBT,THEBANKMAINT

31、AINSASTRONGERBARGAININGPOSITION,ANDTHATCANAFFECTTHEFIRMSINVESTMENTPOLICYFOREXAMPLE,CONSIDERAFIRMWITHOUTSTANDINGPUBLICDEBTTHATWOULDFOREGOTHEEXERCISEOFAGROWTHOPTIONWITHSHORTTERMDEBT,THEBANKCANMAKEEXERCISEOFTHEOPTIONACONDITIONFORREFUNDINGTHISSUGGESTSTHATHIGHGROWTHFIRMSTHATCHOOSEBANKFINANCINGOVERPUBLICO

32、RNONBANKPRIVATEDEBTWILLHAVEMORESHORTTERMDEBTA2REGULATIONSMITH1986ARGUESTHATMANAGERSOFREGULATEDFIRMSHAVELESSDISCRETIONOVER8FUTUREINVESTMENTDECISIONTHANMANAGERSOFUNREGULATEDFIRMSTHISREDUCTIONINMANAGERIALDISCRETIONREDUCESTHEADVERSEINCENTIVEEFFECTSOFLONGTERMDEBTTHECONTRACTINGCOSTHYPOTHESISTHUSIMPLIESTHA

33、TREGULATEDFIRMSWILLHAVELONGERMATURITYDEBTTHANUNREGULATEDFIRMSA3FIRMSIZEFIRMSIZEISPOTENTIALLYCORRELATEDWITHDEBTMATURITYFORSEVERALREASONSISSUANCECOSTSFORPUBLICISSUESHAVEALARGEFIXEDCOMPONENTRESULTINGINSIGNIFICANTSCALEECONOMIESSMALLERFIRMSARELESSABLETOTAKEADVANTAGEOFTHESESCALEECONOMIESTHEYTYPICALLYOPTFO

34、RPRIVATEDEBTWITHITSLOWERFIXEDCOSTSANDCONSEQUENTLYLOWEROVERALLCOSTSSMALLFIRMSTHATCHOOSEBANKDEBTOVERPUBLICDEBTBECAUSEOFTHELOWERFLOTATIONCOSTSWILLHAVEMORESHORTTERMDEBTFIRMSWITHFOREIGNOPERATIONSAREMORELIKELYTOISSUEFOREIGNDEBTTOMANAGETHEIRCURRENCYEXPOSUREMANYFOREIGNDEBTMARKETSARELESSLIQUIDTHANUSDEBTMARKETS,ESPECIALLYFORLONGERMATURITIESTHUS,MULTINATIONALFIRMSARELIKELYTOHAVEMORESHORTTERMDEBTIFLARGERFIRMSAREMORELIKELYTOHAVEFOREIGNOPERATIONS,THISINDUCESANEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENSIZEANDDEBTMATURITY