公司治理、经济壕沟与经济增长【外文翻译】.doc

1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译外文文献译文标题公司治理、经济壕沟与经济增长资料来源美国经济文献杂志20059作者兰德尔莫可丹尼尔沃尔芬森伯纳德杨在全世界，大公司常有实际控制者，他们是非常富有的家族。在美国和英国之外，金字塔形控制结构、交叉持股、超级投票权都很常见。利用这些方式，一个家族能控制公司，且无需要相对应的资本投资。在许多国家，这最终导致这些家族控制着国家不少的一部分经济。这里需要指出三点。首先，从公司层面来说，这种所有制结构将绝对控制权授予这些家庭，而他们只有很少的实际投资这又同时带来两个问题代理人问题、壁垒问题。此外，为了私利，拥有控制权的持股人借助金字塔形集团内部交易来分散公司资源。这导致

2、资源的无效利用。而在经济层面上，公司资产过度被少数家族控制会扭曲资本分配、降低创新速度。结果带来这个经济体内资源的错误分配、经济增长放缓。第二，人的政治影响力与受其控制的东西息息相关，而与其所拥有的无关。因此，金字塔的实际控制者极大地放大了他们的政治影响，远超他们实际财富对应的影响力。他们影响公共政策的发展（例如私有财产权的保护与加强），同时也在影响如资本市场这样的机构。我们把这种现象称为“经济壁垒”。第三，我们考虑一种关联，它涉及公司控制权的配与机构发展两方面，并且产生、巩固了经济壁垒，而且我们把这种关联视为一种均衡虽然不是经济体中唯一的均衡。基于现有文献，我们去识别经济壁垒的关键决定因素。

3、同时，我们识别了诸多不足，而这些是进一步探索公司控制权分配的政治经济重要性所需要的。越来越多的文献指出，经济增长依赖于资本资产控制权的分配。在经济文献杂志中，有两类文献从出发点来说与此相关。被AGHION,CAROLI,与GARCIAPENALOSA1999审阅的第一类讨论为何经济失衡阻碍增长。由LEVINE1997调研的第二类文献讨论资本市场刺激增长的功能性作用。通过回顾最近的研究，我们进一步发展以上见解深入的理论最近的研究显示出公司控制权分配与资本市场作用的关联，并且它们的相互作用影响经济增长。为此，AGHION等1999,P1621的关键观点是，通过将资本分配到每一个投资机会直到边际收益

4、等于市场结算均衡利率，完备资本市场使得财富分配不相关。然而，资本市场是不完备的，其中的不均衡减少了投资机会、削弱了贷款者的动机、且产生宏观经济的波动。简单的资本市场摩擦会导致富有者投2资量多于最优值，而贫困者投资得比最优量少。在投资回报率减弱时，将财富从富人转移到穷人的再分配能增加产出。通过促进增长，这样的再分配也同时为富人和穷人创造投资机会。与贷款有关的道德风险问题也是不完备资本市场的一个特征。如果从富人给穷人的财富再分配能减少整个经济体内借贷总量，相关的道德风险也就减弱，致使提高总体产出、减少了遍及贷款融资成本。经济增长与经济体中公司资产控制权的分配有关。现有文献显示，在美国和英国以外，大

5、多数大型公司的控制者常是非常富有的家族。通过金字塔形的管理结构、相互持股、绝对投票权，这样的家庭通常控制着上市公司。管理的金字塔结构，使得这些家庭的绝对控制权力与他们实际对公司的小额投资相违背。这样的不一致，常会导致两个著名的公司治理问题同时出现对公司实际控制的持股人利益与公众持股人利益的分歧、对公司实际控制的持股人的墨守成规。公司实际控制者，可以利用并不属于他们的公司资源来满足私利，且不用担心其他持股人的反对，也不用担心恶意收购。通过在人为价格促成公司间的交易，公司控制者在金字塔型公司间转移财富，以获得更大私利。这么做的结果，是公司层面上的资源无效分配。在很多国家，大型金字塔结构的集团公司，

6、常将公司重要部门的治理工作托付给少数极其富有家族。这潜在地将家族长的不佳治理，放大为整个经济体资本的无效分配、创新产业投资减少、以及迟钝的经济增长。不仅如此，为了维持“现状”，这些精英家庭会影响公共政策来限制私人财产所有权的发展、资本市场发展以及经济开放。我们将这个情形称为“经济壁垒”。我们认为大多数已有的工作（论文），都指出经济壁垒在许多国家构成严重问题。我们随后展示了概念上的政治经济结构，它既定义了经济壁垒，又说明经济壁垒形成的条件。尽管我们的讨论针对拥有控制金字塔的富有家族，需要强调的是，“壁垒”作为一个基本概念，有更广泛的内涵。在日本运营集团公司的少数管理精英，或者在法国运营国有金字塔

7、的官僚，也都可能受“壁垒”影响。本质的问题是将经济体的资本分配托付给少数不需承担责任的精英这种趋势在增长，而且会带来负面的结果。我们研究的文献也提出了几个关键点第一，在当代美国经济中的原型公司治理问题持股人与专业公司经理的冲突，不能一般化到其他大多数国家。事实上，在大多数国家的大型公司通常被组织为金字塔形式，且被少数富有家族控制。相应的公司治理问题成为拥有控制权的持股人与公众持股人的冲突。第二，公司各部门控制权力的分配会影响经济增长。对公司资产过于集中的控制权力，会导致一系列市场力量的扭曲在资本市场中尤其如此。它也3会削弱对创新产业的投资、放大贷款需求量。所有这些都会使经济发展放缓。第三对于财

8、产权、资本市场及金融机构的发展、经济开放等重要问题，与之相关的公共政策常被视为政治经济带来的结果。从这一点来说，许多国家的“公共政策”不能被当成是被任意决定的，不能够被“调整”以治愈经济疾病。事实上，重要的是去识别一些因素，这些因素能够被“调整”并且也许能把次优的政治经济体带入更优的均衡。尤为重要的是澄清这些关键点的经验和理论证据。4外文文献原文TITLECORPORATEGOVERNANCE,ECONOMICENTRENCHMENTANDGROWTHMATERIALSOURCEJOURNALOFECONOMICLITERATUREAUTHORRANDALLMORCKSEP,2005DANIE

9、LWOLFENZONBERNARDYEUNGAROUNDTHEWORLD,LARGECORPORATIONSUSUALLYHAVECONTROLLINGOWNERS,WHOAREUSUALLYVERYWEALTHYFAMILIESOUTSIDETHEUSANDTHEUK,PYRAMIDALCONTROLSTRUCTURES,CROSSSHAREHOLDINGANDSUPERVOTINGRIGHTSARECOMMONUSINGTHESEDEVICES,AFAMILYCANCONTROLCORPORATIONSWITHOUTMAKINGACOMMENSURATECAPITALINVESTMENTI

10、NMANYCOUNTRIES,SUCHFAMILIESENDUPCONTROLLINGCONSIDERABLEPROPORTIONSOFTHEIRCOUNTRIESECONOMIESTHREEPOINTSEMERGEFIRST,ATTHEFIRMLEVEL,THESEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURESVESTDOMINANTCONTROLRIGHTSWITHFAMILIESWHOOFTENHAVELITTLEREALCAPITALINVESTEDCREATINGAGENCYANDENTRENCHMENTPROBLEMSIMULTANEOUSLYINADDITION,CONTROLLINGS

11、HAREHOLDERSCANDIVERTCORPORATERESOURCESFORPRIVATEBENEFITSUSINGTRANSACTIONSWITHINTHEPYRAMIDALGROUPTHERESULTISAPOORUTILIZATIONOFRESOURCESATTHEECONOMYLEVEL,EXTENSIVECONTROLOFCORPORATEASSETSBYAFEWFAMILIESDISTORTSCAPITALALLOCATIONANDREDUCESTHERATEOFINNOVATIONTHERESULTISANECONOMYWIDEMISALLOCATIONOFRESOURCE

12、S,ANDSLOWERECONOMICGROWTHSECOND,POLITICALINFLUENCEISPLAUSIBLYRELATEDTOWHATONECONTROLS,RATHERTHANWHATONEOWNSTHECONTROLLINGOWNERSOFPYRAMIDSTHUSHAVEGREATLYAMPLIFIEDPOLITICALINFLUENCERELATIVETOTHEIRACTUALWEALTHTHEYAPPEARTOINFLUENCETHEDEVELOPMENTOFBOTHPUBLICPOLICY,SUCHASPROPERTYRIGHTSPROTECTIONANDENFORCE

13、MENT,ANDINSTITUTIONSLIKECAPITALMARKETSWEDENOTETHISPHENOMENONECONOMICENTRENCHMENTTHIRD,WECONCEIVEOFARELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFCORPORATECONTROLANDINSTITUTIONALDEVELOPMENTTHATGENERATESANDPRESERVESECONOMICENTRENCHMENTASONEEQUILIBRIUMBUTNOTTHEONLYONEBASEDONTHELITERATURE,WEIDENTIFYKEYDETERMINANT

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15、TURE,ARERELEVANTASPOINTSOFDEPARTURETHEFIRST,REVIEWEDBYAGHION,CAROLI,ANDGARCIAPENALOSA1999,DISCUSSESREASONSWHYECONOMICINEQUALITYMIGHTIMPEDEGROWTHTHESECOND,SURVEYEDBYLEVINE1997,DISCUSSESTHEFUNCTIONALROLEOFCAPITALMARKETSINSTIMULATINGGROWTHWEBUILDONTHESEINSIGHTFULCONTRIBUTIONSBYREVIEWINGRECENTRESEARCHTH

16、ATSHOWSHOWTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFCORPORATECONTROLANDTHEWORKINGSOFCAPITALMARKETSARERELATED,ANDHOWTHEIRINTERACTIONSAFFECTECONOMICGROWTHFORTHISPURPOSE,THEKEYINSIGHTINAGHIONETAL1999,P1621ISTHATPERFECTCAPITALMARKETSMAKEWEALTHDISTRIBUTIONIRRELEVANTBYALLOCATINGCAPITALTOEACHINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYUNTILITSMARGINALRE

17、TURNEQUALSTHEMARKETCLEARINGEQUILIBRIUMINTERESTRATEHOWEVER,WHENCAPITALMARKETSAREIMPERFECT,INEQUALITYREDUCESINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIES,WORSENSBORROWERSINCENTIVES,ANDGENERATESMACROECONOMICVOLATILITYSIMPLECAPITALMARKETFRICTIONSCANLEADTHEWEALTHYTOINVESTMORETHANISTHEFIRSTBESTOPTIMAL,WHILETHEIMPECUNIOUSINVEST

18、LESSASSUMINGDIMINISHINGRATESOFRETURN,REDISTRIBUTINGWEALTHFROMTHERICHTOTHEPOORRAISESTOTALOUTPUTSUCHAREDISTRIBUTION,BYFOSTERINGGROWTH,ALSOCREATESFURTHERINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESFORRICHANDPOORALIKEMORALHAZARDPROBLEMSASSOCIATEDWITHBORROWINGAREALSOAFEATUREOFIMPERFECTCAPITALMARKETSIFWEALTHREDISTRIBUTIONFROM

19、RICHTOPOORLESSENSTHEOVERALLUSEOFBORROWINGINTHEECONOMY,THESEMORALHAZARDPROBLEMSEASE,RAISINGOVERALLPRODUCTIONANDREDUCINGTHECOSTOFDEBTFINANCINGONTHEMARGINAGHIONETALP1626LEVINE1997SURVEYSTHESECONDLITERATURE,ONTHEFUNCTIONSOFCAPITALMARKETSINECONOMICGROWTHTHEORGANIZATIONOFINFORMATIONACQUISITION,ALLOCATIONO

20、FRESOURCES,MONITORINGOFMANAGERS,ANDEXERCISEOFCORPORATECONTROLTOECONOMIZEONINFORMATIONACQUISITIONCOSTS,FINANCIALINTERMEDIARIESEMERGETHATSPECIALIZEININFORMATIONACQUISITION,ASINDIAMOND1984ANDBOYDANDPRESECOTT1986IFFINANCIALMARKETSARELARGEANDLIQUIDENOUGH,ANDIFINVESTORSPROPERTYRIGHTSARESUFFICIENTLYWELLPRO

21、TECTED,INDIVIDUALSEXPENDRESOURCESTOACQUIREINFORMATIONANDCONDUCTPROFITABLEINFORMEDRISKARBITRAGE,ASMODELEDBYGROSSMANANDSTIGLITZ1980ANDSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1997,ANDTHISTRADINGCAPITALIZESINFORMATIONINTOSTOCKPRICESMORCK,YEUNG,ANDYU2000ROLL1988ARGUESTHATTHISMECHANISMISESPECIALLYIMPORTANTFORTHETIMELYUPDATINGOF

22、STOCKPRICESWITHNEWFIRMSPECIFICINFORMATIONSTOCKPRICESTHATCLOSELYTRACKFUNDAMENTALVALUESAIDEXTERNALFINANCIERSANDCORPORATEINSIDERSINCAPITALALLOCATIONDECISIONS,SIMPLIFYMONITORING,6ANDFACILITATETHEDESIGNOFCREDIBLEINCENTIVECONTRACTSTHATINDUCEMANAGERSTOKEEPFAITHWITHOUTSIDEINVESTORSANDMAXIMIZEFIRMVALUETHESET

23、WOLITERATURESCONVERGEONACENTRALTHEMEECONOMICGROWTHREQUIRESTHATSAVINGSBEDIRECTEDINTOVALUECREATINGINVESTMENTSRAJANANDZINGALES2003,DURNEV,MORCK,ANDYEUNG2000,2004,ANDOTHERSARGUETHATCAPITALMARKETSAREINIMITABLY,THOUGHCERTAINLYNOTPERFECTLY,EFFECTIVEINTHISREGARDTHISISBECAUSE,BYCREATINGINCENTIVESFORSELFINTER

24、ESTEDINVESTORSTOGATHERANDPROCESSINFORMATION,ASWELLASTOMONITORANDCONTROLCORPORATEMANAGERS,CAPITALMARKETSGENERATECONDITIONSAMENABLETOEFFICIENTCAPITALINVESTMENTDECISIONSDIRECTORSOFCORPORATIONSNEEDINGOUTSIDECAPITALMUSTSUBMITTOTHISANALYSIS,MONITORING,ANDCONTROLBYOUTSIDEINVESTORSWHENOFFICIALREGULATIONS,LA

25、WS,ANDENFORCEMENTMAKEOUTSIDEINVESTORSSUFFICIENTLYCONFIDENTOFTHEIRABILITYTOUNDERTAKETHESETASKS,OUTSIDEINVESTORSHOLDEQUITYPOOLINGTHEIRCAPITALUNDERTHEMANAGEMENTOFINSTITUTIONALINVESTORSALLOWSSMALLINVESTORSTOATTAINECONOMIESOFSCALEINACCOMPLISHINGTHESETASKSTHERESULTINGEFFICIENTFINANCIALMARKETDIRECTSCAPITAL

26、TOITSHIGHESTVALUEUSESASITUATIONTOBIN1982DEFINESASFUNCTIONALFORMSTOCKMARKETEFFICIENCYNOTETHATFUNCTIONALFORMEFFICIENCYDIFFERSFROMTHESTANDARDUSAGEOFTHETERMMARKETEFFICIENCYINTHEFINANCELITERATURE,WHICHDESCRIBESASITUATIONWHEREINVESTORSCANNOTOBTAINABNORMALRETURNSAFTERTRANSACTIONSCOSTSTHETWOCONCEPTSARERELAT

27、ED,BUTNOTIDENTICALECONOMISTSHAVELITTLEDIFFICULTYLISTINGFRACTUREPOINTSWHEREACTUALCAPITALMARKETSFAILTOSATISFYFUNCTIONALFORMEFFICIENCYTHELITERATUREWESURVEYBELOWARGUESTHATTHEFUNCTIONALEFFICIENCYOFCAPITALMARKETSDEPENDSONTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFCORPORATECONTROLINANECONOMYINPARTICULAR,THISLITERATUREVIEWSECONOMICG

28、ROWTHASCRITICALLYDEPENDENTONINSTITUTIONSTHATRESTRAINENTRENCHEDELITES,WHOCOULDOTHERWISECOMETODOMINATETHECAPITALINVESTMENTDECISIONSOFANECONOMYTHISLITERATUREHASITSRECENTROOTSINCORPORATEFINANCE,PERHAPSBECAUSETHEEXTREMECONCENTRATIONOFCORPORATECONTROLRIGHTSINTHEHANDSOFTINYELITESOBSERVEDINMANYCOUNTRIESRAIS

29、ESCONCERNSABOUTCORPORATEGOVERNANCEINTHOSEECONOMIESTHECORPORATEFINANCELITERATUREALSOCONSIDERSENTRENCHEDMANAGEMENTTOBEACORPORATEGOVERNANCEISSUEATTHEFIRMLEVELINWAYSTHATAREHELPFULINUNDERSTANDINGENTRENCHEDCONTROLINGENERALOURSTARTINGPOINTISACURIOUSEMPIRICALOBSERVATIONREPORTEDBYMORCK,STANGELANDANDYEUNG2000

30、THESEAUTHORSDIVIDEUPTHEWORLDSUSDOLLARBILLIONAIRESINTOTWOCATEGORIESANDSUMUPTHEWEALTHOWNEDBYEACHCATEGORYOF7BILLIONAIRESINEACHCOUNTRYUNSURPRISINGLY,THEYFINDTHATACOUNTRYSPERCAPITAGDPGROWSFASTERIFITSSELFMADEBILLIONAIREWEALTHISLARGERASAFRACTIONOFGDPWHATISSURPRISINGISTHEIRRESULTTHATPERCAPITAGDPGROWTHISSLOW

31、ERINCOUNTRIESWHEREINHERITEDBILLIONAIREWEALTHISLARGERASAFRACTIONOFGDPECONOMICGROWTHAPPEARSTOBERELATEDTOTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFCONTROLOVERANECONOMYSCORPORATEASSETSTHELITERATUREREVEALSTHATOUTSIDEOFTHEUNITEDSTATESANDUNITEDKINGDOM,MOSTLARGECORPORATIONSHAVECONTROLLINGOWNERSWHOAREOFTENVERYWEALTHYFAMILIESUSINGPYR

32、AMIDALSTRUCTURES,CROSSSHAREHOLDING,SUPERVOTINGRIGHTS,SUCHAFAMILYTYPICALLYCONTROLSMANYLISTEDCOMPANIESVIAACONTROLPYRAMIDCONTROLPYRAMIDSDRIVEAWEDGEBETWEENSUCHFAMILIESDOMINANTCONTROLRIGHTSANDTHEIROFTENMINISCULEACTUALINVESTMENTSINCOMPANIESTHEYCONTROLTHISSEPARATIONAPPARENTLYOFTENLEADSTOTHESIMULTANEOUSPRES

33、ENCEOFTWOWELLKNOWNCORPORATEGOVERNANCEPROBLEMSADIVERGENCEOFTHEINTERESTSOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERFROMTHATOFPUBLICSHAREHOLDERSANDTHEENTRENCHMENTOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERTHECONTROLLINGOWNERCANLIBERALLYUTILIZECORPORATERESOURCESTHEYDONOTOWNTOFUNDPRIVATEBENEFITSWITHNOFEAROFASHAREHOLDERREVOLTORHOSTILETA

34、KEOVERBYORCHESTRATINGINTERCORPORATETRANSACTIONSATARTIFICIAL56PRICES,THECONTROLLINGOWNERCANTUNNELWEALTHBETWEENPYRAMIDFIRMSTOGENERATEGREATERPRIVATEBENEFITSTHECONSEQUENCEISINEFFICIENTRESOURCEALLOCATIONATTHEFIRMLEVELINMANYCOUNTRIES,LARGEPYRAMIDALGROUPSEFFECTIVELYENTRUSTTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEOFSUBSTANTIA

35、LPARTSOFTHEIRCORPORATESECTORSTOAFEWEXTREMELYWEALTHYFAMILIESTHISCANPOTENTIALLYMAGNIFYTHEPOORGOVERNANCEOFAFEWFAMILYPATRIARCHSINTOINEFFICIENTECONOMYWIDECAPITALALLOCATION,REDUCEDINVESTMENTININNOVATION,ANDRETARDEDECONOMICGROWTHMOREOVER,TOPRESERVETHESTATUSQUO,THESEELITEFAMILIESSOMETIMESAPPEARABLETOINFLUEN

36、CEPUBLICPOLICIESSOASTOCURTAILPRIVATEPROPERTYRIGHTSDEVELOPMENT,CAPITALMARKETDEVELOPMENTANDECONOMICOPENNESSWEDUBTHISSITUATIONECONOMICENTRENCHMENTWEARGUETHATMUCHEXISTINGWORKPOINTSTOECONOMICENTRENCHMENTASASIGNIFICANTISSUEINMANYCOUNTRIESWETHENPRESENTACONCEPTUALPOLITICALECONOMYFRAMEWORKTHATBOTHDEFINESECON

37、OMICENTRENCHMENTANDCONDITIONSUNDERWHICHITCANTAKEHOLDWHILEWEDEVELOPOURARGUMENTSINTHECONTEXTOFWEALTHYFAMILIESWITHEXTENSIVECONTROLPYRAMIDS,ITISIMPORTANTTOSTRESSTHATTHEFUNDAMENTALCONCEPTOFENTRENCHMENTISMOREGENERALTINYELITESOFPROFESSIONALSMANAGERSRUNNINGKEIRETSUCORPORATEGROUPSINJAPAN,OROFBUREAUCRATSRUNNI

38、NGSTATECONTROLLEDPYRAMIDSIN8FRANCE,MIGHTALSOBEENTRENCHEDTHEESSENTIALISSUEISTHENEGATIVECONSEQUENCESFORGROWTHOFENTRUSTINGANECONOMYSCAPITALALLOCATIONTOATINYELITETHATCANNOTBESACKEDOURLITERATURESURVEYALSOSUGGESTSSEVERALKEYISSUESFIRST,THEARCHETYPALCORPORATEGOVERNANCEPROBLEMINTHEMODERNUNITEDSTATESECONOMY,A

39、CONFLICTBETWEENATOMISTICSHAREHOLDERSANDPROFESSIONALMANAGERSDOESNOTGENERALIZETOMOSTOTHERCOUNTRIESRATHER,LARGEFIRMSINMOSTCOUNTRIESARETYPICALLYORGANIZEDINTOPYRAMIDALGROUPSCONTROLLEDBYAFEWWEALTHYFAMILIESTHEENSUINGCORPORATEGOVERNANCEPROBLEMISCONFLICTBETWEENTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDEROFTHEPYRAMIDALGROUPANDP

40、UBLICSHAREHOLDERSSECOND,THEDISTRIBUTIONOFCONTROLOVERTHECORPORATESECTORAFFECTSECONOMICDEVELOPMENTSUCHHIGHLYCONCENTRATEDCONTROLOVERCORPORATEASSETSPLAUSIBLYLEADSTOARANGEOFMARKETPOWERDISTORTIONS,ESPECIALLYINCAPITALMARKETSITALSOMAYCURTAILINVESTMENTININNOVATIONANDAUGMENTRENTSEEKINGALLOFTHESEEFFECTSLIKELYR

41、ETARDECONOMICGROWTHTHIRD,PUBLICPOLICYREGARDINGIMPORTANTISSUESLIKEPROPERTYRIGHTS,THEDEVELOPMENTOFFINANCIALMARKETSANDINSTITUTIONS,ANDECONOMICOPENNESS,ISUSEFULLYTHOUGHTOFASAPOLITICALECONOMYOUTCOMEFROMTHISPERSPECTIVE,“PUBLICPOLICY”INMANYCOUNTRIESCANNOTBECONSIDEREDADISCRETIONARYVARIABLETHATCANBE“ADJUSTED”TOCUREECONOMICILLSRATHER,ITSEEMSIMPORTANTTOTRYTOIDENTIFYTHOSEFACTORSTHATARE“ADJUSTABLE”ANDTHATMIGHTLEADTOATRANSITIONOFTHEPOLITICALECONOMYFROMASUBOPTIMALTOABETTEREQUILIBRIUMFURTHEREMPIRICALANDTHEORETICALTHATCLARIFIESTHESEISSUESISLIKELYTOBEOFFIRSTORDERIMPORTANCE