泰国上市公司的股权结构与经营业绩【外文翻译】.doc

1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译外文文献译文标题泰国上市公司的股权结构与经营业绩资料来源JOURNALOFECONOMICSANDFINANCE作者PIMANLIMPAPHAYOMANDANCHALEENGAMWUTIKUL摘要此文以19911994年在泰国证券交易所发行现金增资股票的上市公司为样本研究其发行股票后的公司业绩。根据统计，上市公司在发行股票后出现经营业绩下降的趋势。再者，内部人持股的集中度与发行后公司业绩呈负相关关系。数据显示，预发行股票的募集资金与上市后公司业绩同样呈负相关。进一步讲，内部所有权的集中度越高，那么，股票的发行额对公司业绩的负相关性表现的越显著。这一发现为委托代理论和两者信

2、息不对称提供了依据，并且建议企业能平衡两者关系。简介这项研究的目的主要是考察19911994年间在泰国发行现金增资股票上市的企业以及他们发行股票后的公司业绩。很多其他国家的学者也对其上市公司的业绩影响进行了研究。美国，有HANSENANDCRUTCHLEYI990,MCLAUGHIN,SAFIEDDINE,ANDVASUDEVAN1996,ANDLOUGHRANANDRITTER1997。日本，CAIANDLOUGHRAN1998。然而，泰国的企业与这些发达国家企业的机构设置存在很多不同。例如，泰国是缺乏信息披露标准的国家之一，信息的低透明度反过来又可能导致泰国的信息高度不对称。（见LIMPA

3、PHAYOM2000）此外，在泰国证券交易所上市的公司的股权结构也相当集中。作为典型的发展中国家，泰国企业大多由个人，家庭或合伙人所拥有、控制和管理。见CLAESSENS,DJANKOV,ANDLANG2000股权的高度集中可能加剧委托人和代理人之间的矛盾，同时也拉大公司内部人和外部人之间的信息不对称。再者，并不是泰国所有股权集中度高的上市公司愿意去关注和调查股权集中度与公司绩效之间的关系。这项研究的调查区间为1991至1994。这段时间也是近代泰国证券交易史上最活跃的时期，同时为我们的研究提供了理想的环境。本文的其余部分安排如下第二部分回顾了以往的研究成果和理论假设。第三部分介绍了研究的样本

4、和方法，第四部分分析实证研究结果。第五部分总结全文。2理论的发展史LAPORTA,LOPEZDESILANES,ANDSHLEIFER1999认为，所有制结构是企业融资市场兴起的主导因素，特别是在发达国家。CLASSENS,DJANKOV,ANDLANG2000通过对东亚国家上市公司的股权结构进行分析，发现这些地区的企业完全受公司内部的大股东所控制。事实上，泰国公司的管理者和所有者往往是同一个。LIMPAPHAYOM2000从实证数据中总结出，泰国大部分公开交易的公司仍然属于家族企业，受家族控制与管理。表1列出了1990年至1994年期间泰国五大上市公司所有权集中的数据。在整个时期内，前五大股

5、东持有的平均流通股股份为564。事实上，前三大股东占了将近50的流通股。第一大股东的平均持股281。第二大股东的平均持股为12和第三大股东的平均持股为74。这意味着，前五大股东持有绝大多数的股份，完全能支配股东大会。该模式即使是在经历了金融危机后，仍然保持不变。泰国上市公司的前五大股东，同时也持有其相应子公司和分公司的大部分股份，平均持有其总流通股的27。个人和业内人士持有其第二大平均股份，差不多是总流通股的18。在大多情况下，这些个体在股东名单上也有其自己的控股公司。金融机构与商业银行只有非常有限的持有量，只有2的股份。样本与方法这项研究选取的样本是19911994年在泰国发行股票的上市公司

6、。这段时间作为研究区间是因为19911994是泰国股市的活跃期。此外，这段时间也回避了1997年外部冲击对公司经营业绩的混淆影响。对于样本的选取，最关键是这家公司在此研究区间内只有唯一一次发行增资股票。然而，有97家公司在此区间内至少发行了两次股票，自然就被剔除出了样本。还有样本同样剔除了首次公开发行的公司和金融企业。结论此文调查了19911994年在泰国证券交易所发行股票的上市公司随后的业绩情况。本文还分析了这些公司发行股票前两年的业绩和发行后三年的公司业绩。类似于先前的研究成果,该研究结果为增资股票发行前一年的业绩情况提供证据。实证结果也提供支持这样一个观点,即内部人通过发行股票控制市场当

7、它是被高估时。此外,在发行股票后的一段时间里,企业的改变措施为上市公司经营业绩的下降情况提供了强有力的解释。对于泰国的上市公司后期经营绩效下降情况有两个主要并且同样可能的原3因。他们分别是委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称和代理冲突。泰国的资本市场还未完善，是年轻的新兴国家。因此,有理由相信,在这样的环境下,金融市场的参与者们存在着信息高度不对称的情况。在者，我们选取的研究时间正好是泰国股市的活跃期。在这样的情况下,公司的价值可能被高估,信息不对称的程度会变得相当严重。第二，上市公司发行股票后出现业绩下滑的情况可能是由于经理人与外部股东们之间存在利益冲突。委托代理论认为管理者会出现自我放纵的态度。

8、管理者如果不对其进行财务监督，那么他们就无法从股票溢价中实现公司的最大价值。这个问题对于内部股权高度集中的企业来说会表现的更加严重。通过对比不同股权集中度的上市公司的业绩情况而得出的结论为之前的假说提供的依据。虽然上市公司的高股权集中度倾向于具有较高的经营绩效,但他们对公司经营绩效下降问题会承受更严重的压力,尤其是在发行股票后业绩立即下降的问题。这项研究进一步验证了代理矛盾和信息不对称的结果。在委托代理论的支持下，通过控制变量法分析得出，具有较高所有权集中度的企业在发行增资股票后出现了经营业绩下降的情况。在者，发行大量股票的上市公司也同样出现业绩下滑的趋势。上面的发现提醒我们，发行股票成为了未

9、来业绩下降的不佳信号。对于内部股权集中度高的企业来说，股票的发行额对公司以后业绩的负相关性更为显著。虽然未来的前景并不看好，但业内人士仍倾向于向外界发行更多的股份。因此，投资者慎重思考前因后果，并时刻注意发行规模是未来经营业绩的信号。浙江万里学院商学院外文文献原文4外文文献原文TITLEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFFIRMSCONDUCTINGSEASONEDEQUITYOFFERINGSINTHAILANDMATERIALSOURCEJOURNALOFECONOMICSANDFINANCEVOLUME28NUMBER

10、3FALL2004AUTHORPIMANLIMPAPHAYOMANDANCHALEENGAMWUTIKULABSTRACTTHISPAPERINVESTIGATESTHEPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFCOMPANIESTHATCONDUCTEDSEASONEDEQUITY,OFFERINGSEOINTHESTOCKEXCHANGEOFTHAILANDSETDURINGTHEPERIOD1991TO1994ITISDOCUMENTEDTHATSEOFIRMSEXHIBITEDDECLININGOPERATINGPERFORMANCEAFTERTHEOFFERING

11、FURTHER,THEREISANEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENINSIDEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEDECLINEINSUPPORTOFTHESIGNALINGEFFECT,THERATIOOFISSUEPROCEEDSTOPREISSUEEQUITYALSONEGATIVELYRELATESTOPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEFURTHER,THENEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENISSUEPROCEEDSANDOPERATINGPERFORMANCEDEC

12、LINEISINTENSIFIEDAMONGSEOFIRMSWITHHIGHINSIDEROWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTHEFINDINGOFFERSEVIDENCEINSUPPORTOFAGENCYCONFLICTSANDINFORMATIONASYMMETRYANDSUGGESTSTHATTHETWOFACTORSAREOPERATINGSIMULTANEOUSLYJELG14,G32,M41INTRODUCTIONTHEPRIMARYOBJECTIVEOFTHISSTUDYISTOEXAMINEPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFCOMPANIE

13、STHATCONDUCTEDSEASONEDEQUITYOFFERINGSSEOINTHAILANDDURINGTHEPERIOD1991TO1994SEVERALEMPIRICALSTUDIESDOCUMENTSUBSEQUENTDECLINEINOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFSEOFIRMSINTHEUS,INCLUDINGHANSENANDCRUTCHLEYI990,MCLAUGHIN,SAFIEDDINE,ANDVASUDEVAN1996,ANDLOUGHRANANDRITTER1997,ANDINJAPAN,INCLUDINGCAIANDLOUGHRAN1998HOWE

14、VER,THAILANDHASANINSTITUTIONALSETTINGTHATISDIFFERENTFROMTHATOFOTHERDEVELOPEDCOUNTRIESFOREXAMPLE,THAILANDISONEOFTHECOUNTRIESKNOWNFORTHEIRLACKOFDISCLOSURESTANDARDSANDLOWTRANSPARENCY,WHICHINTURNCANLEADTOAHIGHDEGREEOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYSEELIMPAPHAYOM2000FURTHER,THEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREOFTHAICOMPANIESLISTE

15、DINTHESTOCKEXCHANGEOFTHAILAND浙江万里学院商学院外文文献原文5SETISQUITECONCENTRATEDTYPICALOFTHOSEINADEVELOPINGCOUNTRY,THAIFIRMSAREMOSTLYOWNED,MANAGED,ANDCONTROLLEDBYINDIVIDUALS,FAMILIES,ANDRELATEDPARTNERSSEECLAESSENS,DJANKOV,ANDLANG2000THEHIGHOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONCANAGGRAVATETHEAGENCYCONFLICTSANDINFORMATIONASYMMET

16、RYBETWEENOUTSIDEINVESTORSANDINSIDERSINTHAILANDINADDITION,NOTALLTHAIFIRMSHAVEHIGHLYCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,ITISPOSSIBLETOTESTTHEEFFECTOFINSIDEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONONPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEAMONGSEOFIRMSINTHAILANDTHETIMEPERIODOFSEASONEDEQUITYISSUINGFORTHISSTUDYIS1991TO1994,WHICHHAPPENSTOB

17、ETHEMOSTACTIVEPERIODOFCORPORATELISTINGANDEQUITYOFFERINGSBYTHAICOMPANIESINTHERECENTHISTORYOFTHESETANDTHUSPROVIDESANIDEALSETTINGFOREXAMININGTHEISSUETHERESTOFTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSTHESECONDSECTIONREVIEWSPREVIOUSSTUDIESANDDEVELOPSTHEMAINHYPOTHESESTOBETESTEDTHETHIRDSECTIONDESCRIBESDATAANDMETHODOLOG

18、YEMPIRICALRESULTSAREPRESENTEDINTHEFOURTHSECTIONTHEFINALSECTIONCONCLUDESTHEPAPERHYPOTHESISDEVELOPMENTLAPORTA,LOPEZDESILANES,ANDSHLEIFER1999CONTENDTHATOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREISTHEDOMINANTFACTORINCORPORATEFINANCEFOREMERGINGMARKETCOUNTRIESANDPERHAPSMORESOINDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIESCLASSENS,DJANKOV,ANDLANG2000EXAMI

19、NETHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREOFEASTASIANFIRMSANDFINDTHATFIRMSINTHISREGIONAREHEAVILYINFLUENCEDANDCONTROLLEDBYMAJORITYSHAREHOLDERSWHOAREINSIDERSINFACT,MANAGEMENTANDOWNERSOFTHAICOMPANIESAREOFTENONEANDTHESAMEFROMEMPIRICALDATA,LIMPAPHAYOM2000CONCLUDESTHATMOSTPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESINTHAILANDREMAINUNDERTHECONTR

20、OLOFFOUNDINGFAMILIESANDMANAGEMENTTABLE1SHOWSTHEDATAONTHETOPFIVEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONOFPUBLICLYLISTEDTHAICOMPANIESDURINGTHEPERIOD1990TO1994FORTHEENTIREPERIOD,THETOPFIVESHAREHOLDERSHOLD,ONAVERAGE,564PERCENTOFOUTSTANDINGSHARESINFACT,THETOPTHREELARGESTSHAREHOLDERSACCOUNTFORALMOST50PERCENTOFOUTSTANDINGS

21、HARESTHEAVERAGESHAREHOLDINGOFTHELARGESTSHAREHOLDERSIS281PERCENTTHEAVERAGESHAREHOLDINGOFTHESECONDLARGESTSHAREHOLDERSIS12PERCENTAND74PERCENTFORTHETHIRDLARGESTSHAREHOLDERSTHISIMPLIESTHATTHETOPFIVESHAREHOLDERSGENERALLYHOLDMAJORITYSHARESANDFULLCONTROLOFOUTCOMESOFSHAREHOLDERMEETINGSTHEPATTERNISTHESAMETHRO

22、UGHOUTTHEPERIODANDCONTINUEDEVENAFTERTHEFINANCIALCRISIS浙江万里学院商学院外文文献原文6AMONGTHEFIVELARGESTSHAREHOLDERSOFTHAICOMPANIESLISTEDONTHESET,HOLDINGCOMPANIESANDAFFILIATEDCORPORATIONSACCOUNTFORTHELARGESTPROPORTIONOFSHARES,WITHANAVERAGEHOLDINGOF27PERCENTOFTOTALOUTSTANDINGSHARESINDIVIDUALSANDINSIDERSHAVETHESECON

23、DLARGESTAVERAGESHAREHOLDINGATABOUT18PERCENTOFTOTALOUTSTANDINGSHARESINMANYCASES,THESEINDIVIDUALSALSOOWNHOLDINGCOMPANIESONTHESAMESHAREHOLDERLISTFINANCIALINSTITUTIONSHAVEAVERYLIMITEDAMOUNTOFSHAREHOLDINGSWITHCOMMERCIALBANKS,HOLDINGONLYABOUTTWOPERCENTOFTOTALOUTSTANDINGSHARESDATAANDMETHODOLOGYTHISSTUDYUSE

24、SASAMPLEOFCOMPANIESTHATCONDUCTEDSEASONEDEQUITYOFFERINGSINTHESETDURINGTHEPERIOD1991TO1994THESTUDYPERIODISSELECTEDBECAUSEOFTHELEVELOFACTIVITYINTHESETINADDITION,THETIMEPERIODISRESTRICTEDTOAVOIDTHECONFOUNDINGEFFECTSONOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFANECONOMYWIDEEXTERNALSHOCKIN1997THEKEYCRITERIONFORSAMPLESELECTION

25、ISTHATTHEFTRRNMUSTHAVEAMAXIMUMOFONLYONEOFFERINGDURINGTHESTUDYPERIODHOWEVER,97FIRMSCONDUCTEDSEOATLEASTTWICEDURINGTHEPERIODANDARE,THEREFORE,DROPPEDOUTOFTHESAMPLEINITIALPUBLICOFFERINGSANDFINANCIALCOMPANIESAREEXCLUDEDFROMTHESAMPLEMOREOVER,SEOSBYTHESAMEFUMSDURINGTHETHREEYEARPERIODPRIORTOANDAFTERTHESEOARE

26、NOTINCLUDEDINTHESAMPLEINORDERTOREDUCETHEDEPENDENCEINSTATISTICALTESTSSEELOUGHRANANDRITTER1997THUS,ONCEAFIRMCONDUCTSANSEO,ITCANNOTREENTERTHESEOSAMPLEFORAPERIODOFTHREEYEARSFROMTHEISSUEDATEBANK,FINANCE,ANDINSURANCECOMPANIESAREEXCLUDEDBECAUSETHESEFNRNSAREUNIQUEANDTHEIROPERATINGPERFORMANCEMEASURESCANNOTBE

27、COMPAREDTOOTHERNONFMANCIALFIRMSINTHEEND,ANUMBEROFSEOFIRMSARESCREENEDOUTTOREACHTHEFINALSAMPLEOF62QUALIFIEDCOMPANIESBASEDONSTATEDCRITERIATABLE2SHOWSTHEYEARLYDISTRIBUTIONOFSEASONEDEQUITYOFFERINGSINTHAILANDDURINGTHESAMPLEPERIODANDTHEINDUSTRYCLASSIFICATIONSOFSEOFIRMSINTHESAMPLECONCLUSIONTHISPAPERINVESTIG

28、ATESTHEPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFCOMPANIESCONDUCTINGSEASONEDEQUITYOFFERINGSINTHESETBETWEEN1991AND1994THEANALYSESOFTHEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFSEOFIRMSCOVERTWOYEARSPRIORTOTHEISSUEANDTHESUBSEQUENTTHREEYEARSAFTERTHEISSUESIMILARTOTHOSEOFPREVIOUSSTUDIES,THERESULTSOFTHISSTUDYPROVIDEEVIDENCEOFTHEPERFORMA

29、NCERUNUPPRIORTOTHESEOISSUINGYEARTHEEMPIRICALEVIDENCEALSOPROVIDESSUPPORTTOTHENOTION浙江万里学院商学院外文文献原文7THATINSIDERSTIMETHEMARKETBYISSUINGEQUITYWHENITISOVERVALUEDFURTHERMORE,INTHEYEARSFOLLOWINGTHESEO,THECHANGESINOPERATINGPERFORMANCEMEASURESOFFERSTRONGEVIDENCEOFSIGNIFICANTPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEDECLI

30、NESAMONGSEOFIRMSINTHAILANDTHEREARETWOPRIMARYANDEQUALLYPOSSIBLEEXPLANATIONSFORTHEPOSTOPERATINGPERFORMANCEDECLINEAMONGTHESEOFIRMSINTHAILANDTHESEAREINFORMATIONASYMMETRYANDAGENCYCONFLICTSTHAILANDISUNDOUBTEDLYAYOUNGANDEMERGINGNATIONWITHAGROWINGCAPITALMARKETTHEREFORE,ITISREASONABLETOASSUMETHAT,UNDERSUCHAN

31、ENVIRONMENT,THEREEXISTSAHIGHLEVELOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYAMONGPARTICIPANTSINTHEFINANCIALMARKETFURTHER,THEPERIODOFTHISSTUDYCOINCIDEWITHTHEBULLMARKETTRENDINTHESETUNDERSUCHCIRCUMSTANCES,WHEREFIRMVALUESMIGHTHAVEBEENOVERVALUED,THEEXTENTOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYCANBEQUITESEVERESECOND,THEAGENCYTHEORYIMPLIESTHAT

32、POSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEDECLINEMAYBEARESULTOFINCENTIVECONFLICTSBETWEENMANAGERS/INSIDERSANDNEWOUTSIDESHAREHOLDERSTHEAGENCYTHEORYPOSITSTHATMANAGERSWOULDBEHAVEINASELFINDULGENTMANNERANDWOULDNOTNECESSARILYPRODUCEAFIRMVALUEMAXIMIZINGACTIVITYFROMTHEADDITIONALPROCEEDSOFTHESEOWITHOUTADISCIPLINARYFINANCI

33、ALPOLICYMONITORINGTHISPROBLEMMAYBEMORESEVEREFORFIRMSTHATHAVEAHIGHCONCENTRATIONOFINSIDEROWNERSHIPTHERESULTSCOMPARINGPOSTISSUEOPERATINGPERFORMANCEOFHIGHANDLOWINSIDEROWNERSHIPFIRMSPROVIDESOMESUPPORTFORTHEHYPOTHESISALTHOUGHSEOFIRMSWITHAHIGHOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTENDTOEXHIBITBETTEROPERATINGPERFORMANCE,TH

34、EYSUFFERMORESEVEREOPERATINGPERFORMANCEDECLINES,ESPECIALLYIMMEDIATELYAFTERTHEISSUETHISSTUDYTHENFURTHERTESTSTHECOMBINEDEFFECTOFAGENCYCONFLICTSANDINFORMATIONASYMMETRYINAREGRESSIONCONTEXTINSUPPORTOFTHEAGENCYTHEORY,ITISDOCUMENTEDTHAT,AFTERCONTROLLINGFOROTHERVARIABLES,SEOFIRMSWITHAHIGHOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATI

35、ONTENDTOPERFORMWORSEAFTERTHEISSUEINADDITION,SEOFIRMSTHATISSUEALARGEAMOUNTOFSHARESTENDTOEXHIBITTHEWORSTOPERATINGPERFORMANCEAFTERTHEISSUETHISFINDINGPROVIDESSUPPORTFORTHENOTIONTHATISSUEPROCEEDSCANACTASASIGNALOFPOORFUTUREPERFORMANCEFURTHER,THENEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENISSUEPROCEEDSANDOPERATINGPERFORMANCEDECLINEISINTENSIFIEDAMONGSEOFIRMSWITHAHIGHINSIDEROWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTHISFINDINGIMPLIESTHAT,WHENFUTUREPROSPECTSARENOTGOOD,INSIDERSTENDTOISSUEMORESHARESTOOUTSIDERSTHEREFORE,INVESTORSSHOULDBEAWAREOFTHEINCENTIVESANDCONSIDERISSUESIZEASASIGNALOFFUTUREOPERATINGPERFORMANCE