信息不对称的市场信贷配比【外文翻译】.doc

1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译外文文献译文标题信息不对称的市场信贷配比资料来源美国经济评论作者STIGLITZJE,WEISSA信贷配比的原因是什么也许最根本的经济原则是市场的供需均衡；因为当需求大于供给，价格会上涨，减少需求或增加供给直到供需平等，以致产生新的均衡价格。所以当价格产生效应时，配比就不存在了。然而，信贷配比和失业事实上真的存在。他们似乎意味着可贷资金的超额需求或是劳动力过剩。解释这些情况的方法之一是把它们和短期或长期的不均衡状态联系起来。从短期来看它们被看作是临时工不均衡现象；换而言之，经济遭受外因的冲击，而不能完全来解释清楚，劳动力和资本是很有联系的，所以在过渡期出现了工作或信贷的配

2、比。另一方面，长期失业率或信贷配比被解释为通过政府的约束产生了如此高利的法律或最低工资的法律。这类文件的内容是在均衡条件下市场贷款也许被信贷配比为特征。银行借贷关心的是利率。他们借到贷款，也同时承担贷款的风险。然而，银行利率和手续费可能自动影响着贷款的风险1）分类潜在借款人；2）影响借款人的行为；这两种效果直接起源于剩余的信息不对称，它在银行已经评估贷款申请之后出现了贷款市场。当价格影响了交易的本质，它可能不会使市场清晰化。利息的逆向选择方向是不同借款人有不同还款能力的结果。显而易见的是银行的预期回报依赖于偿还的可能性，所以银行还是喜欢去鉴定那些更有能力还款的借款人。鉴定好的借款人是很难的，这

3、就需要银行采用多种多样的经过刷选的方法。个体的利率是乐于支付作为一种刷选的方法平均下来，那些乐于支付高利息的人是更糟糕的风险，那些借款的人平均风险增加不少，有可能降低银行的利润。同样地，当利率和那些其他合同条款的行为变化，这种借款人的行为也可能会改变。例如，提高利率来降低成功的项目回报率。我们将展现出高利率引起那些成功的企业去处理降低成功的可能性但是提高报酬的项目。在一个完整的和无成本的信息化世界中，银行将准确地规定所有那些借款人可能承担的行为。然而，银行不是能够直接控制那些借款人的行为，因此，他就要用一种方案来制定贷款合同的条例，它的目的是为了引导那些借款人去采取那些为了银行利益的行动，也要

4、去吸引那些接受低风险的借款人。因为这两个原因，那些预期从银行得到回报可能比利率迅速地降低得少；超过了这个2点，根据表1的描述，实际上可能会减少。银行的预期回报利率最大化，我们把它称作为最理想银行利率R。贷款的需求和资金的供给两者都是利率的功能。很明显，可想象的是因为利率，对资金的需求超过了资金的供给。传统的理解将会争论的是在超额需求贷款的前面，抬价利率知道需求等于供给。但是尽管在利率下，供给不能满足需求，它也是均衡的利率银行将不会借款给那些不能提供偿还能力高于一定利率的个体。在银行的判断中，如此的贷款似乎在一定利率P下比平均贷款具有更加糟糕的风险，而且预期回报租借在利率的R实际上是以上低于预期

5、重返贷款银行是目前制造。因此，没有竞争能力会领导供应等于需求,信贷配比。但是利率不是合同中唯一的重要条例。大量的贷款和大量的抵押物或等于银行贷款申请的需求，同样将影响借款人和借款人分布的行为。在第3块区域，我们会展现出增加借款人抵押物的需求将会减少银行的回报，或者通过减少平均风险厌恶的借款人，或者是在多期模型下引起个人投资者来处理更加风险的项目。所以，当银行存在信贷需求时，增加利率或抵押物的需求可能不是有利可图的；反而，银行拒绝了贷款给那些经过观察后难以辨别可以接受贷款的借款人。信贷配比总是将资本市场特征化，这不是我们的论点，我们认为它可能发生在不是难以相信的假设就借款人和贷款人行为而言。这篇

6、论文因此提供首次有关信贷配比的理论性的理由。先前的学术研究在追求去解释每一个个体面对下滑利率表的原因。那些被提供的解释是一些特别的借款人违约的可能性和大量借款增加一样增加，或者借款人逆向地变化混合。在这些情况下，我们不要期待复杂的贷款来偿还相同的利率，很多超过了我们所期盼的两种贷款人，一种是以谨慎性闻名的，另一种是以坏信用危机闻名的，是为了能够以相同利率贷款的。我们预约信贷配比条例为了下列情况那些出现相同的一些收到贷款和没有收到贷款的信贷申请人，和那些被拒绝的申请人，他们即使可以提供用来偿还更高的利率却没办法拿到贷款；或者那些可辨认的个体小组，能够提供信用供给，一群在一些利率下不能获取贷款的人

7、，即使他们将由更高的信用供给。在我们的信贷配比均衡模式情况下，我们表述了许多银行和许多潜在借款人的市场均衡。借款人和银行追求利润最大化，前者通过他们对项目的选择，后者通过利率，他们负责借款人和他们要求借款人的抵押物，显而易见地，我们不是在讨论价格的均衡。我们的均衡观念是银行竞争；另外一种意味着他们要竞争着选择利润最大化的价格。读者应该注意到模型下有利率的可贷资金需求量等于可贷资金供应。然而,这些都是不均衡的,一般情况下,利率。如果,在3那些利率,银行将会增加他们的利润,降低利率收取借款人,他们愿意这么做。尽管这些都是存在于当今信贷市场的现象，我显示在V区域的这些为了扩宽一个等级关于代理问题。我

8、们已经提出的信贷模式配给，在其中一些观测相同的借款人获得贷款和别人不。被拒绝贷款的潜在的借款人不会甚至可以借用，如果他们表示愿意支付超过市场利率，或把更多的抵押品贷款接受者家长的要求。提高利率或增加抵押品的要求，可以增加银行的贷款组合港的风险，阻止更安全的投资者，或通过诱导借款投资于高风险的项目，因此可以减少银行的利润。因此仪器都将必然等同于可贷资金可贷资金的需求的供应。在这种情况下，采取信贷限制将使银行，而不是每笔贷款的规模限制，或利率的贷款数量限制的形式，在最先前的讨论收取的贷款规模的增函数，信贷配给。注意配给均衡的范围内，货币政策成功地在转移资金的供给，它会影响投资水平，而不是通过利率机

9、制，而是通过提供信贷。虽然这是一个“货币主义”的结果，它应该是明显的，这一机制通常把货币主义文学中的不同。虽然我们集中分析信贷市场存在超额需求均衡，不完善的信息可能会导致供应过剩的平衡以及。我们将参数大纲草图（将出现一个更全面地讨论的问题和宏观经济的影响本文的作者在今后的工作中与布鲁斯格林沃尔德）。“让我们假设银行提出更高的上一些比其他借款人的预期回报率他们知道谁是他们最值得称道的客户，但竞争银行不如果一家银行试图吸引其竞争对手的客户提供较低的利率，它会发现，其提供反驳同样的低利率时被争夺的客户是一个“好”的信用风险，将不匹配，如果借款人是不是一个有利可图的客户的银行，因此，银行很少会设法窃取

10、客户他们的竞争对手，因为它们只会在成功地吸引了最不赚钱的那些客户（在系统中引入一些噪音，使一个平衡的发展）。与银行的可贷资金的供给过剩，必须评估贷款的盈利能力较低利率会吸引，每家银行在平衡可能的可贷资金的供给过剩，但没有一家银行将降低利率。我们已经能够以模型的过度需求和信贷市场的供应过剩的均衡的原因是利率直接影响事项的方式，向银行贷款的质量。价格竞争和非市场出清的均衡存在的共享属性的一种商品的预期质量是其价格的函数（见魏斯，1976年，1980年，斯蒂格利茨，1976A，B，劳动力市场的其他车型C威尔逊二手车市场）在任何在其中，例如，工资会影响劳动力素质，最大限度地减少劳动力成本的工资，如果有

11、一个工人供应过剩这些模型，不一定是为低工资的企业诱因。供求规律，其实也不是法律，也不应被视为竞争力分析所需的假设看。这是相当的价格既没有排序，也没有激励效果的基本假设所产生的结果。通常的结果是经济理论，明确的市场价格，是模型的具体的，不是一般的市场，失业和信贷配给的财产不是幻想。4外文文献原文TITLECREDITRATIONINGINMARKETSWITHIMPERFECTINFORMATIONMATERIALSOURCEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEWAUTHORSTIGLITZJE,WEISSAWHYISCREDITRATIONEDPERHAPSTHEMOSTBASICTEN

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14、STICKINESSINTHEPRICESOFLABORORCAPITALWAGESANDINTERESTRATESSOTHATTHEREISATRANSITIONALPERIODDURINGWHICHRATIONINGOFJOBSORCREDITOCCURSONTHEOTHERHAND,LONGTERMUNEMPLOYMENTABOVESOME“NATURALRATE“ORCREDITRATIONINGISEXPLAINEDBYGOVERNMENTALCONSTRAINTSSUCHASUSURYLAWSORMINIMUMWAGELEGISLATIONTHEOBJECTOFTHISPAPERI

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20、WERPROBABILITIESOFSUCCESSBUTHIGHERPAYOFFSWHENSUCCESSFULINAWORLDWITHPERFECTANDCOSTLESSINFORMATION,THEBANKWOULDSTIPULATEPRECISELYALLTHEACTIONSWHICHTHEBORROWERCOULDUNDERTAKEWHICHMIGHTAFFECTTHERETURNTOTHELOANHOWEVER,THEBANKISNOTABLETODIRECTLYCONTROLALLTHEACTIONSOFTHEBORROWERTHEREFORE,ITWILLFORMULATETHET

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23、CEOFANEXCESSDEMANDFORLOANS,UNSATISFIEDBORROWERSWOULDOFFERTOPAYAHIGHERINTERESTRATETOTHEBANK,BIDDINGUPTHEINTERESTRATEUNTILDEMANDEQUALSSUPPLYBUTALTHOUGHSUPPLYDOESNOTEQUALDEMANDATR,ITISTHEEQUILIBRIUMINTERESTRATETHEBANKWOULDNOTLENDTOANINDIVIDUALWHOOFFEREDTOPAYMORETHANRINTHEBANKSJUDGMENT,SUCHALOANISLIKELY

24、TOBEAWORSERISKTHANTHEAVERAGELOANATINTERESTRATEP,ANDTHEEXPECTEDRETURNTOALOANATANINTERESTRATEABOVERISACTUALLYLOWERTHANTHEEXPECTEDRETURNTOTHELOANSTHEBANKISPRESENTLYMAKINGHENCE,THEREARENOCOMPETITIVEFORCESLEADING6SUPPLYTOEQUALDEMAND,ANDCREDITISRATIONEDBUTTHEINTERESTRATEISNOTTHEONLYTERMOFTHECONTRACTWHICHI

25、SIMPORTANTTHEAMOUNTOFTHELOAN,ANDTHEAMOUNTOFCOLLATERALOREQUITYTHEBANKDEMANDSOFLOANAPPLICANTS,WILLALSOAFFECTBOTHTHEBEHAVIOROFBORROWERSANDTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFBORROWERSINSECTIONIII,WESHOWTHATINCREASINGTHECOLLATERALREQUIREMENTSOFLENDERSBEYONDSOMEPOINTMAYDECREASETHERETURNSTOTHEBANK,BYEITHERDECREASINGTHEAVERA

26、GEDEGREEOFRISKAVERSIONOFTHEPOOLOFBORROWERSORINAMULTIPERIODMODELINDUCINGINDIVIDUALINVESTORSTOUNDERTAKERISKIERPROJECTSCONSEQUENTLY,ITMAYNOTBEPROFITABLETORAISETHEINTERESTRATEORCOLLATERALREQUIREMENTSWHENABANKHASANEXCESSDEMANDFORCREDITINSTEAD,BANKSDENYLOANSTOBORROWERSWHOAREOBSERVATIONALLYINDISTINGUISHABL

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28、CHINDIVIDUALFACESANUPWARDSLOPINGINTERESTRATESCHEDULETHEEXPLANATIONSOFFEREDAREATHEPROBABILITYOFDEFAULTFORANYPARTICULARBORROWERINCREASESASTHEAMOUNTBORROWEDINCREASESSEESTIGLITZ1970,1972MARSHALLFREIMERANDMYRONGORDONDWIGHTJAFFEEGEORGESTIGLER,ORBTHEMIXOFBORROWERSCHANGESADVERSELYSEEJAFFEEANDTHOMASRUSSELLIN

29、THESECIRCUMSTANCESWEWOULDNOTEXPECTLOANSOFDIFFERENTSIZETOPAYTHESAMEINTERESTRATE,ANYMORETHANWEWOULDEXPECTTWOBORROWERS,ONEOFWHOMHASAREPUTATIONFORPRUDENCEANDTHEOTHERAREPUTATIONASABADCREDITRISK,TOBEABLETOBORROWATTHESAMEINTERESTRATEWERESERVETHETERMCREDITRATIONINGFORCIRCUMSTANCESINWHICHEITHERAAMONGLOANAPPL

30、ICANTSWHOAPPEARTOBEIDENTICALSOMERECEIVEALOANANDOTHERSDONOT,ANDTHEREJECTEDAPPLICANTSWOULDNOTRECEIVEALOANEVENIFTHEYOFFEREDTOPAYAHIGHERINTERESTRATEORBTHEREAREIDENTIFIABLEGROUPSOFINDIVIDUALSINTHEPOPULATIONWHO,WITHAGIVENSUPPLYOFCREDIT,AREUNABLETOOBTAINLOANSATANYINTERESTRATE,EVENTHOUGHWITHALARGERSUPPLYOFC

31、REDIT,THEYWOULDINOURCONSTRUCTIONOFANEQUILIBRIUMMODELWITHCREDITRATIONING,WEDESCRIBEAMARKETEQUILIBRIUMINWHICHTHEREAREMANYBANKSANDMANYPOTENTIALBORROWERSBOTHBORROWERSANDBANKSSEEKTOMAXIMIZEPROFITS,THEFORMERTHROUGHTHEIRCHOICE7OFAPROJECT,THELATTERTHROUGHTHEINTERESTRATETHEYCHARGEBORROWERSANDTHECOLLATERALTHE

32、YREQUIREOFBORROWERSTHEINTERESTRATERECEIVEDBYDEPOSITORSISDETERMINEDBYTHEZEROPROFITCONDITIONOBVIOUSLY,WEARENOTDISCUSSINGA“PRICETAKING“EQUILIBRIUMOUREQUILIBRIUMNOTIONISCOMPETITIVEINTHATBANKSCOMPETEONEMEANSBYWHICHTHEYCOMPETEISBYTHEIRCHOICEOFAPRICEINTERESTRATEWHICHMAXIMIZESTHEIRPROFITSTHEREADERSHOULDNOTI

33、CETHATINTHEMODELPRESENTEDBELOWTHEREAREINTERESTRATESATWHICHTHEDEMANDFORLOANABLEFUNDSEQUALSTHESUPPLYOFLOANABLEFUNDSHOWEVER,THESEARENOT,INGENERAL,EQUILIBRIUMINTERESTRATESIF,ATTHOSEINTERESTRATES,BANKSCOULDINCREASETHEIRPROFITSBYLOWERINGTHEINTERESTRATECHARGEDBORROWERS,THEYWOULDDOSOALTHOUGHTHESERESULTSAREP

34、RESENTEDINTHECONTEXTOFCREDITMARKETS,WESHOWINSECTIONVTHATTHEYAREAPPLICABLETOAWIDECLASSOFPRINCIPALAGENTPROBLEMSINCLUDINGTHOSEDESCRIBINGTHELANDLORDTENANTOREMPLOYEREMPLOYEERELATIONSHIPWEHAVEPRESENTEDAMODELOFCREDITRATIONINGINWHICHAMONGOBSERVATIONALLYIDENTICALBORROWERSSOMERECEIVELOANSANDOTHERSDONOTPOTENTI

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36、FERINVESTORS,ORBYINDUCINGBORROWERSTOINVESTINRISKIERPROJECTS,ANDTHEREFORECOULDDECREASETHEBANKSPROFITSHENCENEITHERINSTRUMENTWILLNECESSARILYBEUSEDTOEQUATETHESUPPLYOFLOANABLEFUNDSWITHTHEDEMANDFORLOANABLEFUNDSUNDERTHOSECIRCUMSTANCESCREDITRESTRICTIONSTAKETHEFORMOFLIMITINGTHENUMBEROFLOANSTHEBANKWILLMAKE,RA

37、THERTHANLIMITINGTHESIZEOFEACHLOAN,ORMAKINGTHEINTERESTRATECHARGEDANINCREASINGFUNCTIONOFTHEMAGNITUDEOFTHELOAN,ASINMOSTPREVIOUSDISCUSSIONSOFCREDITRATIONINGNOTETHATINARATIONINGEQUILIBRIUM,TOTHEEXTENTTHATMONETARYPOLICYSUCCEEDSINSHIFTINGTHESUPPLYOFFUNDS,ITWILLAFFECTTHELEVELOFINVESTMENT,NOTTHROUGHTHEINTERE

38、STRATEMECHANISM,BUTRATHERTHROUGHTHEAVAILABILITYOFCREDITALTHOUGHTHISISA“MONETARIST“RESULT,ITSHOULDBEAPPARENTTHATTHEMECHANISMISDIFFERENTFROMTHATUSUALLYPUTFORTHINTHEMONETARISTLITERATUREALTHOUGHWEHAVEFOCUSEDONANALYZINGTHEEXISTENCEOFEXCESSDEMANDEQUILIBRIAINCREDITMARKETS,IMPERFECTINFORMATIONCANLEADTOEXCES

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40、EDITWORTHYCUSTOMERSARE,BUTCOMPETINGBANKSDONOTIFABANKTRIESTOATTRACTTHECUSTOMERSOFITSCOMPETITORSBYOFFERINGALOWERINTERESTRATE,ITWILLFINDTHATITSOFFERISCOUNTEREDBYANEQUALLYLOWINTERESTRATEWHENTHECUSTOMERBEINGCOMPETEDFORISA“GOOD“CREDITRISK,ANDWILLNOTBEMATCHEDIFTHEBORROWERISNOTAPROFITABLECUSTOMEROFTHEBANKCO

41、NSEQUENTLY,BANKSWILLSELDOMSEEKTOSTEALTHECUSTOMERSOFTHEIRCOMPETITORS,SINCETHEYWILLONLYSUCCEEDINATTRACTINGTHELEASTPROFITABLEOFTHOSECUSTOMERSINTRODUCINGSOMENOISEINTHESYSTEMENABLESTHEDEVELOPMENTOFANEQUILIBRIUMABANKWITHANEXCESSSUPPLYOFLOANABLEFUNDSMUSTASSESSTHEPROFITABILITYOFTHELOANSALOWERINTERESTRATEWOU

42、LDATTRACTINEQUILIBRIUMEACHBANKMAYHAVEANEXCESSSUPPLYOFLOANABLEFUNDS,BUTNOBANKWILLLOWERITSINTERESTRATETHEREASONWEHAVEBEENABLETOMODELEXCESSDEMANDANDEXCESSSUPPLYEQUILIBRIAINCREDITMARKETSISTHATTHEINTERESTRATEDIRECTLYAFFECTSTHEQUALITYOFTHELOANINAMANNERWHICHMATTERSTOTHEBANKOTHERMODELSINWHICHPRICESARESETCOM

43、PETITIVELYANDNONMARKETCLEARINGEQUILIBRIAEXISTSHARETHEPROPERTYTHATTHEEXPECTEDQUALITYOFACOMMODITYISAFUNCTIONOFITSPRICESEEWEISS,1976,1980,ORSTIGLITZ,1976A,BFORTHELABORMARKETANDCWILSONFORTHEUSEDCARMARKETINANYOFTHESEMODELSINWHICH,FORINSTANCE,THEWAGEAFFECTSTHEQUALITYOFLABOR,IFTHEREISANEXCESSSUPPLYOFWORKER

44、SATTHEWAGEWHICHMINIMIZESLABORCOSTS,THEREISNOTNECESSARILYANINDUCEMENTFORFIRMSTOLOWERWAGESTHELAWOFSUPPLYANDDEMANDISNOTINFACTALAW,NORSHOULDITBEVIEWEDASANASSUMPTIONNEEDEDFORCOMPETITIVEANALYSISITISRATHERARESULTGENERATEDBYTHEUNDERLYINGASSUMPTIONSTHATPRICESHAVENEITHERSORTINGNORINCENTIVEEFFECTSTHEUSUALRESULTOFECONOMICTHEORIZINGTHATPRICESCLEARMARKETS,ISMODELSPECIFICANDISNOTAGENERALPROPERTYOFMARKETSUNEMPLOYMENTANDCREDITRATIONINGARENOTPHANTASMS