关于建立应收账款管理方法方面的一些经验【外文翻译】.doc

1、 1 外文翻译 原文 A Strategic Approach on Organizing Accounts Receivable Management: Some Empirical Evidence Material source : EBSCO search Author:Assel Bergh In this paper, the organizational behavior in managing accounts receivable is studied. It is based on the recent surge of interest in trade credit m

2、anagement from both academics and practitioners 1) the rather permanent character of these short-term but continuously renewed investments and 2) their strategic potential due to the existence of financial, tax-based, operating, transaction and pricing motives. The paper focuses on a search for sour

3、ces of such a strategic value and for the determinants of its risk. More specifically this potential strategic value is said to create a need for flexibility and control in managing accounts receivable. It will therefore induce a need for internalization of its management. The resulting risks, howev

4、er, favor its externalization. This results in a revision of the existing decision-making processes since, the extension of trade credit becoming a strategic asset, investments in accounts receivable cannot be judged by the financial needs incurred as measured by the traditional DSO-rate anymore. Mo

5、re specifically, a transaction cost theoretic approach is used to explain the decision whether or not to internalize the firms accounts receivable management and its risk, resulting in a set of hypotheses to be tested on a sample of both large and medium-sized Belgian companies. 1. Introduction Firm

6、s rarely require immediate payment for their merchandise. For example, in the UK corporate sector more than 80% of daily business transactions are on credit terms and accounts receivable constitute one of the main assets on corporate balance sheets (35% of total assets) (Summers and Wilson, 1997). A

7、s soon as trade debtors settle their accounts, cash flows into the company. At the same time, however, new sales generate new accounts receivable. The level of debtors thus remains constant when sales figures are stable, while it grows as sales figures increase (Grass, 1972). Although firms extendin

8、g trade credit heavily invest in accounts receivable, the 2 resulting financial need is not the only reason why trade credit decisions merit more careful attention. This paper develops and discusses two additional considerations. First, firms selling on credit open themselves to moral hazard. When e

9、xchange relations are subject to imperfect information, this uncertainty results in transaction costs. Sellers thus have incentives to develop organizational structures that reduce the transaction costs resulting from this asymmetric information problem. Both homemade planning and sales structuring

10、as well as balanced product and market portfolios can reduce this uncertainty, while externalization of risk become attractive when these homemade institutions fail. Second, vendors offering trade credit have to adopt a variety of new responsibilities: the decision whether or not to grant credit to

11、a (new) customer, the assumption of credit-, administration- and collection-policies and the bearing of the credit risk involved. From a managerial point of view this means that the seller 1) finances the buyers inventory, 2) engages in additional accounting and collecting activities, 3) monitors th

12、e financial health of both existing and potential customers and 4) gets involved in assessing and bearing new risks. Not all credit management functions, however, have to be performed by the seller. Indeed, when extending trade credit is thought to add no real value to the firm, its management can b

13、e contracted to a third party. A selling firms decision to extend trade credit thus also requires the seller to decide whether or not to integrate into managing accounts receivable. Moreover, when the seller decides to enter a market transaction, several organizational structures can be employed. In

14、 their paper, Mian and Smith (1992) examine the relationship between the functions to be performed in the credit-administration process and the decision whether or not to subcontract these functions to a third party specialist. In this paper, however, the extension of trade credit is looked upon fro

15、m both a more strategic and a risk-oriented point of view. The strategic approach is based on the extensive financial management literature claiming that the extension of trade credit can become advantageous to the supplier, in which there will be a need for flexibility in managing accounts receivab

16、le. The risk oriented point of view, on the other hand, is based upon those principles that deal with the moral hazard problem. Finally, the implications of these motivational theories are linked to the industrial organization literature on vertical integration. Three types of outsourcing are consid

17、ered. At first, the factoring contract has been chosen to operationalize the externalization of accounts receivable management, since factoring is the most 3 comprehensive type of outsourcing a firms accounts receivable management. Next, we clearly isolate the decision to subcontract the administrat

18、ion process from the decision to subcontract the risks incurred, assuming that they are based on different decision processes with different decision variables. Indeed, we assume that both cost advantages and a need for flexibility in managing accounts receivable will cause integration of the firms

19、credit administration. The assumption of credit risk, however, will not be delegated to a third party when the transaction can be performed in a stable and predictable environmental setting (inducing a low need for monitoring and control). 2. The Nature of Outsourcing Contracts Before analyzing poli

20、cy choices and their respective determinants, we first give a description of the basic governance structures studied. 2.1. Factoring and its equivalent Factoring basically offers three types of services: 1) finance, 2) risk control and 3) sales ledger administration (Brandenberg, 1987). However, not

21、 all factoring contracts provide this full array of services. Based upon the scope of his managerial needs the seller can decide on the extensiveness of the contract. The most important distinction between factoring contracts is that between recourse and non-recourse agreements. A non-recourse agree

22、ment implies that the factor makes the credit extension decision, monitors and collects the accounts receivable and bears the credit risk. Under a recourse agreement the firm selling on credit retains the risk of non-recovery of the debt. Moreover, when the contract provides financing, the factoring

23、 contract is called an advance-factoring contract. A full-factoring agreement then is a non-recourse agreement, providing financing for all credit sales (both national sales and export). The equivalents internalizing their accounts receivable management finance their accounts receivable out of gener

24、al corporate credit and manage internally the credit-risk assessment, credit-granting, credit-collection and credit-risk bearing functions. 2.2. The administrative management contract The companies using an administrative management contract are defined as those companies that use credit information

25、 agencies to assess the trade credit risks, to collect accounts receivable when they are due or ARF (Accounts Receivable Financing)-contracts and service contracts offered by a factor. Thus, although the administration of accounts receivable has been outsourced, the firm still bears the trade credit

26、 risk. 4 2.3. The risk management contract The risk management contract is defined as a contract that indemnifies firms against losses on uncollected accounts receivable but does not take care of the firms credit administration process. Examples of such third party specialists are e.g. credit insura

27、nce contracts and partial factoring agreements. 3. Determinants of Alternate Policies Following the transaction cost approach, as developed by Coase (e.g., 1991) and Williamson (e.g., 1975), the transaction (or the exchange of goods and services) is the basic unit of analysis. Each time a transactio

28、n is performed, transaction costs arise. These can be defined as the negotiating, monitoring and enforcement costs that have to be spent to allow an exchange between two parties to take place and result from frictions or difficulties entailed by a combination of both human characteristics (bounded r

29、ationality and opportunism) and environmental factors (uncertainty,“small numbers”, information asymmetry and asset-specificity). Therefore, alternative governance structures, of which markets and firms (hierarchies) are the most important examples, are assessed in terms of their capacities to econo

30、mize on transaction costs (Jones and Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1975, 1987). This means that strategic assets are to be controlled by the firm itself. Next, internalization of an activity becomes more likely whenever there is a need for flexibility in its management since such a flexibility would make

31、it extremely difficult to prepare full contracts (e.g., Hart, 1991; Klein, 1991). Uncertainty and/or bounded rationality, however, generate the opposite effect: parameters that are hard to control and/or increase the uncertainty in management are more likely to cause frictions and are therefore apt

32、to externalization (Anderson and Weitz, 1986). 3.1. The DSO-rate Since in the traditional literature on accounts receivable management the average number of days sales outstanding (DSO) is often mentioned to be the primary reason for outsourcing, the DSO rate has been withheld for further analysis.

33、Indeed, the pure financial theories on trade credit stress the fact that high DSO-rates increase the suppliers financial needs, increasing the likelihood of outsourcing. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that when the firm has no accounts receivable (although it provides its customers with the op

34、portunity to delay their payments), there wont be any need for outsourcing its management. 3.2. Cost advantages 5 Economies of scale and scope are expected to affect the outsourcing decision. Indeed, the fixed costs associated with credit-risk assessment and monitoring and collection policies can be

35、 spread over a larger number of accounts as credit sales increase. Firms with higher credit sales are therefore expected to invest in more specialized personnel, techniques and knowledge, enabling them to realize learning-effects. 3.3. Need for flexibility and control: the incentives for trade credi

36、t extension The more recent developments in accounts receivable management literature (Schwartz, 1974) all emphasize its potential strategic value which is usually translated into a set of motives causing trade credit extension. Among these we discern a pricing motive, an operating motive, a financi

37、ng and a tax-based motive and a transaction motive. The extension of trade credit can be advantageous to the supplier, in which there will be a need for flexibility in managing accounts receivable and a need for controlling the activities involved. Therefore, investments in accounts receivable becom

38、e strategic assets and, following the transaction cost analytic approach as developed by Coase (1991) and Williamson (e.g., 1975), strategic parameters are to be controlled by the firm itself. Moreover, when the extension of trade credit becomes a strategic asset to the firm, the resulting need for

39、flexibility will make it extremely difficult to prepare full contracts, which once again leads to internalization (e.g., Hart, 1991; Klein, 1991). 译文 关于建立应收账款管理方法方面的一些经验 资料来源 : 中国期刊网 作者：阿塞尔轧贝格 这篇文章对 应收账款管理的组织行为进行了研究。它是 随着研究者和实践者对 贸易信贷管理兴趣 的不断高涨为基础发展起来的。（ 1）这些短期投资 具有永久 的 性质 但又不断更新。（ 2） 并且存在着以 财政，税收为基

40、础 ， 经营，交易和定价 为 动机 的能力。本文的重点是对这个有战略意义价值的来源和其风险的决定因素的探索。 更具体的 说 这个潜在的战略价值 就是使灵活的 控制应收账款管理 变得有必要性 。 因此，它将 引起 其 内部管理需要的产生 。 然而 由此产生的风险 却有助于 它的外化。 在现有的决策过程结果 中 ，贸易信贷 的扩展 成为 了 一6 种战略 性的 资产，应收账款 的投资 不能 再 作为 以 传统 的应收账款回收期比例来测量财政 需求 的依据了 。 更具体地说，交易成本理论的方法 是用来 解释决定是否 应该使 公司的应收账款管理和风险 内部化，这个 假设的设定须以比利时 的 两个大型和

41、中型公司为样本进行测试。 1.简介 企业很少需要为他们的商品立即付款。 例如，在英国企业界超过 80 的日常业务交易，信用 条件和应收账款构成对公司资产负债表中（总资产的 35 ）（萨默斯和威尔逊， 1997 年）的主要资产之一。当应收账款 进到了 公司的账户，现金 就流向了企业 。但是在同一时间，新的销售产生 了新的 应收账款。 当 销售量 稳定 时 债务人 的 水平保持不变，而 当 它的销售 量 增加 时应收账款也增加 （ 草，1972 年）。虽然企业 大量的 扩大 在应收账款上的 贸易信贷投资，由此产生的 财政需求却 不是唯一 的 贸易信贷决策 需要 更 密切 关注 的 原因。 本文 探

42、讨并扩展了这 两个额外考虑。 首先，企业 的 赊销 增加了道德风险 。当交换关系 受制于 不完全 的 信息 时 ，这种不确定性 导致了 交易 成本的 产生 。卖方 因此 有动力从这个信息不对称 的问题出发 发展 组织结构从而 降低交易成本 。 自制的规划和销售结构产生以及均衡的产品和市场组合， 都 可以减少这种不确定性，当这些 国产 机构 倒下时， 风险外化 就变的 有吸引力 。 其次 ，供应商 要求 贸易信贷必须 接受一系列 新的 义务 ：是否给予（新）客户 信用的决定 ，信贷，管理和收集，政策 方面的 的假设，承担 相关 的信贷风险 。从管理的角度 看， 这意味着卖方 （ 1） 为 买方

43、提供资金 ， （ 2） 参与 额外的会计 资料 收集， （ 3） 监督 现有和潜在客户的财务状况 （ 4）得到 相关的估计 和 应承担的新风险。并非所有的信用管理职 能都必须由卖方进行。事实上，当扩大贸易信贷被认为是 没有给企业增加什么真实的价值时 ，其管理可 转让给第三方。 一个销售公司决定 扩大 贸易信贷 的同时销售 方 也需要决定是否应结合 管理应收账款。 此外，当卖方决定进入市场交易 时 可以采用一些组织结构。在他们的论文 中 ，绵和史密斯（ 1992）研究 了 在信贷管理过程中执行的职能 和 决定是否将这些职能转包给第三方专家的关系。 然而在本文中，贸易信贷 的扩展 是 从更具战略性

44、 同时又以 风险 为 导向 来的角度进行研究 。战略方针是基于广泛的金融管理 观点认为 贸易信贷可以 对 供应商 变得有利 ，其中将 包括 灵活 管理 应收 账款的 必要性方面的文章 。 从风险导向 的角度来看，另一方面是根据这些原则 来处理 道德风险。最后，这些激励理论的 影响同工业 产业组织 的 文 章 联系在一起。这 三种 类型 被认为是 外包： 首先，保理合同已被 确定 实施应收账款 的 管理，由于保理业务是 企业最广泛 的应收账款 管理外包业务。其次， 最全面的类型，我们 将把 从分包管理过程 的决定从 分包合同发生的风险 决定中分离出来 ，假设他7 们是 以 不同的决策过程 中出现

45、 的不同的决策变量为基础。 事实上，我们认为在成本优势和在 灵活 管理应收账款 的必要性上 将导致该公司的信用管理 的整合 。但是 ，当 交易可以在一个稳定和可预 见的环境 中进行时， 信用风险的假设不会委 派 给第三方（ 导致 进行监测和控制的低需求）。 2. 外包合同的性质 在 分析政策 的 选择和他们各自的决定因素之前，我们首先给出一个基本的治理结构描述 。 2.1 保理业务 和其等效 保理业务基本上提供三种类型的服务： （ 1） 融资 ， （ 2）风险控制 ，（ 3）销售 分类 账管理（勃兰登堡， 1987）。然而，并非所有的保理合同 都提 供这种全套的服务。基于对管理 范围的 需要，

46、卖方可以决定合同 的 范围。保理合同之间最重要的区别是追索权和无追索权的协议。无追索权的协议意味着该因素使 信贷扩展的 决策 对 应 收账款 进行监督 和收集 以及 承担信贷风险。根据协议，该公司赊销保留了债务 的无 回收风险。此外，当合同提供融资，保理合同被称为提前保理合同 。一个全保理协议，然后是无追索权的协议，为所有的赊销提供了融资（包括国内销售和出口）。它使内化的 应收账款管理 的 等 效就是在 一般 的 企业信用管理 中进行融资 ，承担内部的信用风险评估，授信，信贷收集和信用风险的职能。 2.2 行政管理合约 公司使用 行政 管理合同是指 当应收账款 到期时或 由某个因素 提供合同和

47、服务 进行 应收帐款融资 时，那些利 用 征信 机构 进行 评估贸易信贷风险 来 收取 应 收账款 的企业。 因此， 虽然应收账款的管理已经外包，该公司仍 承担着 贸易信贷风险。 2.3 风险管理合约 风险管理合同是指在未收 到款项 而 导致企业的 应收账款 发生 损失，但并没有考虑到该公司的 信用管理 过程 的合同 。 这些 例子 有 信用保险合同和部分保理协议 等 。 3.替代政策的决定因素 交易成本 随着 由科斯（ 1991）和威廉姆森（ 1975）交易（或货物和服务 的 交换）是分析的基本单位 而逐渐发展起来 。 当 每一个交易 发生时 ，交易成本 也随之 产生。 这些可以被定义为 协

48、商 ， 为了 允许双方之间的交流而必须花费 的 监督和执行 成本 ， 是人为因素 （ 受限的 理性和机会主义） 和环境因素的结合 涉及到的 摩擦或 困难引起的结果 （不确定， “小数字 ”，信息不对称和资产特异性）。 因此，替代 的 治理结构 以 节约交易成本 的 能力 为评估标准， 其中市场和企业（层次）是最重要的例子，（琼斯和希尔， 1988； 威廉姆森， 1975， 1987）。这意味8 着，战略 性的 资产 将 由公司本身控制。其次 ， 只要 需要灵活的管理， 活动 的 国际化 就 变得更有可能 。 因为这种灵活性的需求将会使其很难充分准备合同（例如，哈特， 1991 年克莱因， 19

49、91）。 但是不确定性和 /或 受限的 理性 会 产生相反的效果：参数难以控制和 /或增加不确定性的管理 将 更容易引起摩擦，因此容易外部化（安德森和韦茨， 1986）。 3.1 应收账款的回收期比率 由于应收账款 回收天数的 平均 天数 在传统文学 中 经常提到是外包的首要原因， 应收账款的回收天数有待 进一步分析。事实上，单纯的金融贸易信贷压力理论 即应收账款的高回收期会 增加供应商的资金需求，增加了外包的可能性。此外，它可以合理地假定，当企业没有应收账款（虽然它提供了 客户 延迟付款的 机会），不会 产生 任何 外包 管理的需要。 3.2 成本优势 经济 的 规模和范围将影响外包决策。事实上， 随着赊销的 增加 ， 信用风险评估和监测，收集相关政策的固定 成本 可以分摊到一个 大的 账户。因此 赊销额较高的企业 预计 将 投入更多的专业人才，技术和知识，使他们认识到学习 的 效果。 3.3 需要灵活 性 和控制 ：扩大 贸易信贷 的动力 最近的应收账款管理文献 的 发展（施瓦茨， 1974）都强调其潜在的战略价值，通常 翻译为引起 贸易信贷 扩大的一系列 动机。其中，我们 发现 定价动机，经营动机