在印度的企业界的保险与股权结构【外文翻译】.doc

1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文INSURANCEANDOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREININDIASCORPORATESECTORASNOTEDEARLIER,CORPORATEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREISESSENTIALLYAGOVERNANCEMECHANISMWHICHINFLUENCESTHEWAYMANAGERIALPERFORMANCEISMONITOREDANDCONTROLLEDINORDERTOENSURECOMPLIANCEWITHOWNERSWEALTHMAXIMIZATIONOBJECTIVESPEARCETHOMSENZOUHOYTMAYERSZ

2、OUZOUETAL,2003SUGGESTTHATPROPERTYINSURANCECANBEANEFFECTIVESTRATEGICPOSTLOSSINVESTMENTFINANCINGMECHANISMTHATCANHELPREDUCEINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESANDFINANCIALDISTRESS/BANKRUPTCYANDOTHEREG,AGENCYCOSTSFORFIRMSINTHISREGARD,MANAGERSMAYBEMOTIVATEDTOPURCHASEPROPERTYINSURANCEINORDERTOPROTECTANDPROMOTETHEIRJOBS

3、ECURITYTHEANALYSISOFFROOTANDCOLLEAGUES1993FURTHERIMPLIESTHATBYPROTECTINGFIRMSFREECASHFLOWSINTHEEVENTOFUNEXPECTEDLYSEVERELOSSEVENTSPROPERTYINSURANCEENABLESMANAGERSTOREALIZEPOTENTIALLYPOSITIVENETPRESENTVALUENPVPROJECTSINTHEFIRMSINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYSETTHEREBYADDINGVALUEFORSHAREHOLDERSIE,THESOCALLED“CR

4、OWDINGOUTPROBLEM”INADDITION,ASINSUREDASSETSHAVETOBEREINSTATEDFOLLOWINGLOSSEVENTSINACCORDANCEWITHTHEINDEMNITYSCHEDULESOFINSURANCEPOLICIESWHICHAREALSOSUBJECTTOCOMPLIANCEMONITORINGBYINSURANCECOMPANIESTHEAGENCYTHEORYBASEDRISKTHATMANAGERSMAYMISUSETHEPROCEEDSFROMCLAIMSANDINVESTINNEGATIVENPVPROJECTSISREDUC

5、EDHAU,2006THESEATTRIBUTESOFPROPERTYINSURANCEENABLESTHEMANAGERSOFFIRMSTOPROTECTTHEIRJOBSECURITY,REDUCETHEIRCOSTOFCAPITAL,MAXIMIZEVALUEFORTHEIRSHAREHOLDERS,ANDPROMOTETHEINTERESTSOFOTHERBUSINESSSTAKEHOLDERSEG,CUSTOMERSSHIMPI,2002FINANCETHEORYARGUESTHATMODERNFIRMSCANINCURAGENCYCOSTSEG,INTHEFORMOFHIGHERB

6、ORROWINGEXPENDITURESARISINGFROMDEBTHOLDERSHAREHOLDERINCENTIVECONFLICTS,ANDTHATDUETOACUTEINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESANDWEAKCREDITORPROTECTIONLAWS,SUCHAGENCYCOSTSCANBEPARTICULARLYACUTEINEMERGINGASIAPACIFICECONOMIESLIKEINDIAMAJUMBERSEN,2009HOWEVER,THEPRESENCEOFAPPROPRIATELEVELSOFPROPERTYINSURANCECOVERALLOWS

7、DEBTHOLDERSPAYOFFSTOBECOMERELATIVELYINDEPENDENTOFPROJECTSELECTIONANDSOLIMITSTHEABILITYOFBORROWINGFIRMSTOSHIFTBUSINESSRISKONTODEBTHOLDERSMACMINN,1987ASARESULT,THECORPORATEPURCHASEOFPROPERTYINSURANCECAN,ASPREDICTEDBYAGENCYTHEORY,HELPMITIGATEPOTENTIALAGENCYINCENTIVECONFLICTSSUCHASBORROWERSASSETSSUBSTIT

8、UTIONINCENTIVESANDTHEREBYLOWERSLENDERSRISKEXPOSURESADDITIONALLY,AFIRMSCLAIMTOINSURANCEPROCEEDSFOLLOWINGANINSUREDLOSSOBVIATESTHENEEDFORITTORAISECOSTLYNEWEQUITYANDDEBT,AND/ORUTILIZEACCUMULATEDCASHRESOURCESTOREPLENISHIMPAIREDAND/ORDEPLETEDASSETSTHISFURTHERHELPSTOREDUCETHEWELLKNOWNAGENCYTHEORYBASEDUNDER

9、INVESTMENTINCENTIVEPROBLEMWHEREBYAFTERASEVEREUNANTICIPATEDASSETLOSSEVENTEG,DUETOCATASTROPHESHAREHOLDERSMAYEXERCISETHEIRDEFAULTPUTOPTIONUNDERLIMITEDLIABILITYRULESANDVOLUNTARILYLIQUIDATETHEFIRMATTHEEXPENSEOFDEBTHOLDERSECONOMICINTERESTSMACMINN,1987THEABILITYOFINSURANCETOMITIGATESUCHAGENCYINCENTIVECONFL

10、ICTSINFIRMSISEXPECTEDTOBEPARTICULARLYIMPORTANTINMANYASIAPACIFICEMERGINGECONOMIESSUCHASINDIAWHEREPUBLICLYQUOTEDANDNONQUOTEDCOMPANIESTENDTORELYHEAVILYONDEBTFINANCING,PARTICULARLYFROMBANKSTHISISBECAUSEDOMESTICSTOCKMARKETSINTHEASIAPACIFICREGIONARENOTDEEPANDLIQUIDMARKETSBYINTERNATIONALSTANDARDSINADDITION

11、,INTHECONTEXTOFINDIA,THEISSUEOFPUBLICEQUITYISSTRICTLYCONTROLLEDBYTHESECURITIESANDEXCHANGEBOARDOFINDIASEBISETUPIN1992CHAKRABARTHIETAL,2008ASNOTEDEARLIER,BANKSINMANYMAJOREMERGINGECONOMIESARENOWINCREASINGLYREQUIRINGCOMPANIESTOINSURECOLLATERIZEDASSETSASACONDITIONOFTHEGRANTINGOFLOANSCONSISTENTWITHTHISSIT

12、UATION,ZOUANDADAMS2008AFINDTHATTHEPURCHASEOFPROPERTYINSURANCEBYCHINESEPLCSENABLESMANAGERSTOEXPANDDEBTCAPACITY,LOWERINTERESTCOSTS,ANDFINANCEGROWTHANDDEVELOPMENTARELATEDBENEFITISTHATEXPANDEDDEBTCAPACITYRESULTINGFROMINCREASINGTHELEVELOFPROPERTYINSURANCECOVERAGEONASSETSINPLACEMAYAFFORDBORROWINGFIRMSALAR

13、GERINTERESTTAXSHIELDBENEFITTHEREBYBEINGPOTENTIALLYVALUEINCREASINGFORSHAREHOLDERSOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURECOULDBEANIMPORTANTCONSIDERATIONONTHEDECISIONOFLENDERSTOREQUIREBORROWERSTOBOTHTAKEOUTINSURANCEANDTHELEVELOFINSURANCEPURCHASEDFOREXAMPLE,SMALLFAMILYOWNEDFIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDRISKARELIKELYTOBEREQUIREDBYTHE

14、IRBANKSTOINSURE/TAKEOUTRELATIVELYMOREINSURANCETHANLARGEMULTINATIONALCOMPANIESORSTATEOWNEDFIRMSTHATAREBETTERABLETODIVERSIFYTHERISKOFLOSSESINTHEFOLLOWINGSECTIONSWECONSIDERHOWPROPERTYINSURANCEDECISIONSINTERACTWITHPARTICULARASPECTSOFTHEOWNERSHIPCONTROLSTRUCTUREOFINDIANFIRMSWEPUTFORWARDFOURHYPOTHESESTOGU

15、IDEEMPIRICALTESTINGSHAREHOLDEROWNERSHIPZHEKA2005452REPORTSTHATINDEVELOPINGECONOMIES,SUCHASINDIA,COMPANYOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURECANSIGNIFICANTLYAFFECTFINANCIALPERFORMANCEBYINFLUENCINGMANAGERIALINCENTIVES,SYSTEMSOFMONITORINGANDCONTROL,ANDTHESTRATEGICDECISIONMAKINGPROCESSASNOTEDEARLIER,SHAREHOLDERSTHATHOLDAH

16、IGHPROPORTIONOFTHEIRWEALTHINAFIRMEG,ASISOFTENTHECASEWITHFAMILYFIRMSARELIKELYTOHAVELESSDIVERSIFIEDPORTFOLIOSTHANINVESTORSWITHWIDELYHELDSHAREHOLDINGSZOUADAMS,2008AASARESULT,THEMANAGERSOFFIRMSWITHCONCENTRATEDSHAREOWNERSHIPAREMORELIKELYTOTRANSFERRISKTOTHIRDPARTIESUSINGINSURANCETHANTHEIRCOUNTERPARTSINFIR

17、MSWITHMOREDISPARATESHAREHOLDINGSDOHERTY,2000CHHIBBERANDMAJUMDAR1999,KHANNAANDPALEPU2000,ANDSARKERANDSARKER2000EXAMINETHEROLESOFDIFFERENTTYPESOFSHAREHOLDERSINMONITORINGGOVERNANCEANDRISKCONTROLPRACTICESININDIANFIRMSTHEYFINDTHATCERTAINLARGESHAREHOLDERSEG,OWNERSOFFAMILYCONTROLLEDFIRMSACTIVELYENGAGEINMON

18、ITORINGTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFSYSTEMSOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDRISKMITIGATION,PARTICULARLYWITHINAFFILIATEDGROUPSTHISIMPLIESTHATTAKINGOUTPROPERTYINSURANCEWILLBEIMPORTANTTOSHAREHOLDERSWITHAMAJORITYCONTROLLINGINTERESTININDIANFIRMSASBOTHTHEEXANTEDECISIONTOINSUREASSETSANDENSURINGADEQUATEINDEMNITYCOVERAGEEXPOSTH

19、ELPSTOSAFEGUARDPRODUCTIVEASSETSAGAINSTMISHAP,ENSURESTHEGENERATIONOFFUTURECASHFLOWS,ANDSOMAXIMIZESVALUEFORSHAREHOLDERSTHEREFOREHYPOTHESIS1OTHERTHINGSBEINGEQUAL,THEREISLIKELYTOBEAPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENFIRMS,CONCENTRATEDSHAREHOLDINGSANDTHEINCIDENCEANDLEVELOFPROPERTYINSURANCEPURCHASEDMANAGERIALOWNERSHI

20、PTHEREARETWOMAINCOMPETINGTHEORETICALARGUMENTSCONCERNINGTHEINFLUENCEOFMANAGERIALOWNERSHIPONCORPORATERISKMANAGEMENT,NAMELY,THEMANAGERIALINCENTIVEALIGNMENTANDTHEMANAGERIALRISKAVERSIONHYPOTHESESTHEFORMERARGUMENT,ADVANCEDBYSAUNDERSANDCOLLEAGUES1990,CONTENDSTHATSHAREHOLDERSPOSITIONSCANBEVIEWEDASACALLOPTIO

21、NWHOSEVALUEWILLINCREASEWITHTHEGROWINGRISKEXPOSUREOFTHEUNDERLYINGASSETSOFTHEFIRMSUCHRISKEXPOSUREINCLUDESBOTHFINANCIALEG,MARKETPRICERISKSASWELLASTHERISKOFASSETLOSSDUETOPUREEG,CATASTROPHICRISKEVENTSHANMACMINN,2006THISARGUMENTPREDICTSTHATASINSIDEROWNERSHIPINCREASES,MANAGERSINTERESTSBECOMEMORECLOSELYALIG

22、NEDWITHSHAREHOLDERSINTERESTS,ANDASARESULT,MANAGERSHAVEINCENTIVESTOINCREASETHELEVELOFBUSINESSRISKANDEITHERNOTINSURETHEIRASSETSINTHEFIRSTPLACEORPROVIDEINSUFFICIENTINDEMNITYCOVERAGEEXPOSTINORDERTOREDUCETHECOSTSOFRISKTRANSFERTHISENABLESMANAGEROWNERSTORETAINCASHRESOURCESSOTHATTHEYCANINVESTINPROSPECTIVEPO

23、SITIVENPVPROJECTSINTHECONTEXTOFPROPERTYINSURANCE,HOYTANDKHANG2000FINDEVIDENCECONSISTENTWITHTHISARGUMENTINTHEUSCORPORATESECTORTHUSHYPOTHESIS2AOTHERTHINGSBEINGEQUAL,THEREISLIKELYTOBEANINVERSERELATIONBETWEENFIRMSWITHHIGHLEVELSOFINSIDEOWNERSHIPANDTHEINCIDENCEANDLEVELOFPROPERTYINSURANCEPURCHASEDONTHEOTHE

24、RHAND,THEMANAGERIALRISKAVERSIONHYPOTHESIS,ADVANCEDBYSMITHANDSTULZ1985,HOLDSTHATMANAGERSAREOFTENUNABLETOEFFECTIVELYDIVERSIFYRISKSSPECIFICTOTHEIRFINANCIALCLAIMSONTHECORPORATIONBOTHECONOMICWEALTHBASEDANDFIRMSPECIFICHUMANCAPITALRELATEDTHEREFORE,ASTHEPROPORTIONOFMANAGERSHOLDINGSOFSHARESINCREASES,THEYBECO

25、MEINCREASINGLYRISKAVERSEANDSOAREMORELIKELYTOPURSUEHEDGINGANDOTHERRISKREDUCTIONSTRATEGIESSUCHASTHEPURCHASEOFPROPERTYINSURANCEINDEED,PURCHASINGINSURANCECAN,ASFROOTANDCOLLEAGUES1993HYPOTHESIZE,MINIMIZELIQUIDITYRISKSARISINGFROMUNEXPECTEDLYSEVERELOSSEVENTSANDENABLETHEOWNERSOFFIRMSTOREALIZEPOSITIVENPVPROJ

26、ECTSINTHEIRINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYSETINADDITION,BECAUSETHEPAYOFFOFHOLDINGORDINARYSHARESISEXPECTEDTOBEALINEARFUNCTIONOFAFIRMSTRADEDVALUE,MANAGERSMAYBEHESITANTTOENGAGEINRISKTAKINGBEHAVIOREVENIFDOINGSOWOULDPOTENTIALLYINCREASETHEMARKETVALUEOFTHEFIRMSEQUITYTHISISBECAUSEOPTIMIZINGMANAGERSLONGRUNCOMPENSATION

27、ANDRATESOFPERQUISITECONSUMPTIONDEPENDSONTHESURVIVALOFTHECOMPANYINITSPRODUCTMARKETSDEMARZODUFFIE,1995MAY1995CITESEVIDENCESUPPORTINGTHEMANAGERIALRISKAVERSIONHYPOTHESISWITHINTHECONTEXTOFSHAREOWNERSHIPAMONGCHIEFEXECUTIVESOFFICERSCEOSINDIVERSIFIEDUSCORPORATIONS,WHILEZOUANDADAMS2006PROVIDEEVIDENCESUPPORTI

28、NGTHEMANAGERIALRISKAVERSIONHYPOTHESISAMONGCHINESEPLCSSARKERANDSARKER2000FURTHERREPORTTHATDUETOTHEPREVALENCEOFFAMILYOWNEDFIRMSINTHEDOMESTICECONOMYMANAGERIALOWNERSHIPTENDSTOBEMUCHMORECOMMONININDIATHANINMANYOTHERLARGEEMERGINGECONOMIESOFTHEASIAPACIFICREGIONSUCHASCHINASUGGESTINGTHATINTHEINDIANCORPORATESE

29、CTORINSURANCECOULDBEEMPLOYEDTOMITIGATERISKSTOINSIDERSUNDIVERSIFIEDRESIDUALCLAIMSCONSEQUENTLY,ANALTERNATIVEHYPOTHESISISHYPOTHESIS2BOTHERTHINGSBEINGEQUAL,THEREISLIKELYTOBEAPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENFIRMSWITHHIGHLEVELSOFINSIDEOWNERSHIPANDTHEINCIDENCEANDLEVELOFPROPERTYINSURANCEPURCHASEDFOREIGNOWNERSHIPTHEI

30、MPACTOFFOREIGNINVESTORSONTHEPROPERTYINSURANCEDECISIONSOFLOCALMANAGERSCOULDBEIMPORTANTINDEVELOPINGINDIASCORPORATESECTORINFACT,ZOUANDADAMS2006PREDICTTHATFOREIGNINVESTORSWILLEXPECTLOCALMANAGERSTOINSUREASSETSINPLACEANDENSURETHATSUFFICIENTPROPERTYINDEMNITYCOVERAGEISPURCHASEDINORDERTOCONTROLFORTHEPOTENTIA

31、LLYLARGEBUSINESSRISKEXPOSURESTOASSETLOSSESTHATCOULDARISEFROMINVESTINGINHIGHLYASYMMETRICASIAPACIFICEMERGINGECONOMIESFOREIGNINVESTORSAREALSOLIKELYTOHAVEDEVELOPEDKNOWLEDGEANDEXPERTISEINTHEFIELDSOFSTRATEGICRISKMANAGEMENTANDINSURANCEWHICHTHEYCANIMPARTTOTHEMANAGERSOFEMERGINGECONOMYBASEDCOMPANIESINWHICHTHE

32、YHAVEMADEANINVESTMENTINCONTRAST,THEMANAGERSOFINDIANFIRMSWITHLITTLEORNOOVERSEASHELDSHAREHOLDINGSARELIKELYCOMEUNDERLESSPRESSUREFROMTHEIRSHAREHOLDERSTOTAKEOUTPROPERTYINSURANCEASARESULT,WEPREDICTTHATHYPOTHESIS3OTHERTHINGSBEINGEQUAL,THEREISLIKELYTOBEAPOSITIVERELATIONBETWEENFIRMSWITHHIGHLEVELSOFFOREIGNOWN

33、ERSHIPANDTHEINCIDENCEANDLEVELOFPROPERTYINSURANCEPURCHASEDCONCLUSIONUSINGSURVEYDATAFROMINDIANFIRMSWORLDBANK,2005,THISSTUDYTESTSEMPIRICALLYTHEEFFECTSOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONTHECORPORATEDECISIONTOFIRSTINSUREASSETSANDIFSO,THECHOICEOFTHEAMOUNTOFINSURANCECOVERAGEPURCHASEDTHELINKBETWEENINSURANCEANDCORPORATEG

34、OVERNANCEISALSODEEMEDTOBETIMELYANDRELEVANTGIVENTHERECENTGROWTHOFINDIASCORPORATESECTORANDTHEINCREASINGIMPORTANCEOFRISKMANAGEMENTINEMERGINGECONOMIES,PARTICULARLYFORFOREIGNINVESTORSINOURPROBITANALYSESWEFINDTHATFIRMSWITHAHIGHDEGREEOFMANAGERIALOWNERSHIP,ANDFIRMSWITHHIGHGROWTHOPTIONSANDASSETTANGIBILITYARE

35、MORELIKELYTOINSURETHEIRASSETSTHANOTHERENTITIESHOWEVER,INTHESECONDSTAGECRAGGREGRESSIONWEFINDTHATDIFFERENTFACTORSARELIKELYTOINFLUENCETHEAMOUNTOFPROPERTYINSURANCEPURCHASEDCOMPAREDWITHTHEINITIALDECISIONTOINSURECORPORATEASSETSFOREXAMPLE,MANAGERIALOWNERSHIPANDTHELENGTHOFTIMEAFIRMHASOPERATEDINAMARKETAPPEAR

36、TOBEINVERSELYRELATEDTOTHELEVELOFPROPERTYINSURANCECOVERAGETHISOBSERVATIONSUGGESTSTHATMANAGEROWNERSMAYMORESELECTIVELYINSURETHEIRASSETSINPLACEINORDERTOREDUCETHECOSTSOFINSURANCEMOREOVER,THEMANAGERSOFYOUNGERFIRMSMAYBEMOTIVATEDTOINCREASETHELEVELOFINDEMNITYCOVERAGEONPHYSICALASSETSBECAUSETHEYHAVEGREATERINTR

37、INSICRISKOFLOSINGVALUABLEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESINTHEEVENTOFCATASTROPHICLOSSESCOMPAREDWITHOTHERFIRMSWEALSOFINDTHATTHEAMOUNTOFPROPERTYINSURANCEPURCHASEDISDECREASINGINLEVERAGEINDICATINGTHATTHEMANAGERSOFHIGHLYINDEBTEDINDIANFIRMSMAYFINDTHECOSTSOFINCREASINGPROPERTYINSURANCECOVERAGETOOPROHIBITIVEAND/ORTHE

38、IROWNERSMAYBECONTEMPLATINGHIGHRISKACTIONSANDVOLUNTARILYLIQUIDATINGTHEFIRMINTHEEVENTOFSTRATEGICFAILURETHESEFINDINGSWHICHSUGGESTTHATRELATIVELYNEWFIRMSWITHHIGHGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESAPPEARTOBEPARTICULARLYKEENTOPURCHASEPROPERTYINSURANCECOULDBEOFWIDERINTERESTTOINSURANCESUPPLIERSOPERATINGINOTHEREMERGINGECONOM

39、IESFOREXAMPLE,BYENABLINGTHEMTOBETTERTARGETTHEIRSALESANDMARKETINGSTRATEGIESTHERESULTSOFTHISSTUDYMAY,HOWEVER,NEEDTOBETEMPEREDBYRECOGNITIONOFSOMEOFTHEINHERENTLIMITATIONSOFTHERESEARCHSUCHASTHERELATIVELYLARGENUMBEROFSMESINOURINDIANDATASETNEVERTHELESS,WEBELIEVETHATOURFINDINGSCONTRIBUTEIMPORTANTINSIGHTSINT

40、OTHESTRATEGICINSURANCERISKMANAGEMENTBEHAVIOROFFIRMSININDIA,WHICHISANINCREASINGLYIMPORTANTEMERGINGECONOMYFORINTERNATIONALBUSINESSINVESTORS,CORPORATEMANAGERS,ANDPOLICYMAKERS,AMONGOTHERSTHISATTRIBUTESHOULDENCOURAGEOTHERRESEARCHERSTOADDTOTHEINTERNATIONALBUSINESSLITERATUREBYEXAMININGFURTHERTHESTRATEGICFU

41、NCTIONOFRISKMANAGEMENTPRACTICES,SUCHASINSURANCE,INOTHEREMERGINGECONOMIESAHLSTROM,2010SOURCE2010JOYJIAMIKEADAMSMIKEBUCKLESPRINGERSCIENCEBUSINESSMEDIAP2339译文在印度的企业界的保险与股权结构SHAREHOLDEROWNERSHIPZHEKA2005452报告说,发展中国家经济体印度,公司的所有权结构会明显影响财务业绩通过影响报酬激励机制、系统的监测和控制和战略决策过程。如前面所提到的,股东持有了高比例的财富在一家公司例如,通常情况下与家庭公司可能

42、有更少的多样化投资组合比投资者持股在很多的公司ZOUADAMS,2008A。因此,公司的经理们集中份额所有权转移风险更有可能给第三方使用保险而不是他们的公司有更截然不同的股权DOHERTY,2000。CHHIBBERANDMAJUMDAR1999,KHANNAANDPALEPU2000,ANDSARKERANDSARKER2000检查不同类型的股东监测管理和风险在印度的防治措施的公司的角色。他们发现,某些公司的大股东例如,主人FAMILYCONTROLLED事务所的主动参与的有效监测系统公司治理结构和风险缓解,尤其是在所属团体。这意味着把财产保险会影响股东带来大多数印度公司控制股权,这决定以确

43、保台湾资产和保证足够的赔偿范围事后有助于保障生产性资产与不幸事件之后,确保一代的未来现金流量,所以价值最大化为股东分红。因此假设1，其他的事情都是公平的,很可能是一种积极的关系企业之间的股权,集中和发病率和水平的财产提供保险。管理所有权有两个主要的理论是关于管理资产对公司的风险影响,即管理诱因融合度和管理风险厌恶假说。SAUNDERS和同事们1990年以前提出的论点,认为股东头寸可以被视为一个电话期权的价值与日益增加的风险的基础资产的公司。这些风险暴露包括财务例如,价格和风险资产的风险损失，例如,纯粹的灾难性事件风险HANMACMINN,2006。这个论点预计随着内幕所有权增加,管理者利益变得

44、更加紧密联系股东利益,因此,经理激励水平的提高,生意风险不是保证他们的资产或提供不足赔偿范围以减少事后成本的风险转移。这使管理公司的股东保留现金资源,使他们可以投资未来的积极的净现值的项目。语境中的财产损失保险，HOYTANDKHANG2000发现有证据证明论点在一致的美国公司部门。因此假设2A,其他的事情都是公平的,极有可能有逆关系企业间内的高水平的财产所有权和发生率和水平的财产保险购买的。另一方面,管理风险规避的假说,SMITHANDSTULZ1985认为,管理者经常无法有效地分散风险具体到他们的金融债权的企业包括经济WEALTHBASED,特定人类CAPITALRELATED。因此,作为

45、经理人的比例持有的股份增加,变得风险厌恶的,因此增加了可能继续套期保值和其他风险降低策略，如购买财产保险业务。事实上,购买保险能够按照FROOT和同事们的1993假设,减少因流动性风险竟然重大的损失事件和使业主的公司实现积极的净现值项目的投资机会。此外,由于支付举办普通股票的线性函数将是对公司的交易价值,基金经理可能会不愿意从事风险行为,即使这样做会潜在的增加市场价值的公司股权。这是因为优化管理者的长期补偿和收费标准,消费取决于做生存的公司产品的市场DEMARZODUFFIE,1995。MAY1995引用证据支持管理风险规避假设在其职权范围内股票所有权,首席执行官职员CEOS投资各种各样的美国

46、公司,而ZOUANDADAMS2006提供了证据支持管理风险规避假设在中国的PLCS。SARKERANDSARKE2000进一步的报告指出,由于家族企业的流行国内经济管理所有权在印度比许多其他的大型新兴经济体的亚太地区如中国更多，表明在印度企业界保险可以被使用，业内人士认为可以降低风险的UNDIVERSIFIED剩余索取权。因此,替代的假设是假设2B,其他的事情都是公平的,很可能是一种积极的关系企业间内的高水平的财产所有权和发生率和水平的财产保险购买的。外资所有权在发展中印度的机构部门，外国投资者的影响在财产保险业务本地经理的决定可能是非常重要的。实际上，ZOUANDADAMS2006预言的,

47、外国投资者期望的一样本地经理确保ASSETSINPLACE和确保足够的财产赔偿范围采购为了控制潜在地大业务风险暴露一些可能发生资产损失投资的高度评价不对称亚太经济快速发展的国家。外国投资者也可能已经开发出的知识和经验在该领域的战略风险管理及保险,他们能给予ECONOMYBASED公司的管理者浮出水面,他们取得了一项投资。相比之下,印度公司的经理与很少或没有OVERSEASHELD股权可能是在从他们的股东的压力较小拿出财产保险。因此,我们预测假设3，其他的事情都是公平的,很可能是一种积极的关系企业之间的外国投资的高水平和发病率和水平财产保险购买的。结论从印度企业问卷调查得出了一些数据WORLDB

48、ANK,2005,该测试研究进行了实证分析的影响股权结构对公司决定首先保证资产，如果是这样的话,选择投保金额购买。保险和公司治理的联系也被视为及时和相关的建议最近的增长的印度公司部门和重要性不断增加的风险管理在新兴经济体,尤其是外国的投资者。在我们的分析中我们发现公司以高度的管理所有权制度,公司高增长的选择和资产显示比其他的实体更容易保证他们的资产。然而,在第2段CRAGG回归我们发现不同的因素会影响财产保险的数量与原始决策,以确保公司资产。例如,管理所有权和长时间经营的公司在一个市场操作就会出现呈负相关关系的水平保险。这个观察表明,管理者有更多的选择可以保证他们的ASSETSINPLACE也

49、可以用来降低成本的保险。此外,经理们的年轻公司激发水平的提高赔偿金额的实物资产，因为他们有更大的内在风险信用的很有价值的投资机会在灾难性损失的事件中，相比较于其他公司。我们还会发现,数量财产保险购买杠杆降低表明了经理高负债的印度公司可能会发现,成本越来越多的财产保险机型太过和/或他们的主人可以考虑高风险行为和自愿清算公司在事件的战略的失败。这些研究结果显示相对较新的公司高速增长机会出现时尤其渴望购买财产保险能更为广泛的兴趣是运行在保险供应商其他新兴经济体。例如,通过使他们能够更容易地锁定他们的销售、营销策略。这项研究的结果,但可能会缓和了,需要对一些固有的局限性等的研究相对许许多多的中小企业在我们的印度的数据集。虽然如此,我们相信我们的发现贡献重要的启示,战略保险风险管理行为的公司在印度,是一种越来越重要国际的新兴经济国家商业投资者、企业经理以及政策制定者的行为,等等。这属性应该鼓励其他研究人员加入到国际业务进一步研究文学战略性作用的风险管理实践,如保险费,在其他的新兴经济实体AHLSTROM,2010。出处JOYJIAMIKEADAMSMIKEBUCKLE,科学商业媒体，2010（2）2339