风险资本和私募股权资本利润的大小【外文翻译】.doc

1、 外文翻译 原文 The size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios Material:Journal of Corporate Finance Author: Gennaro Bernile Venture capital provides an opportunity for young, innovative firms to develop and grow.Unlike most investors,venture capitalists (VCs) are actively involved in manag

2、ing their portfoliocompanies. VCs provide assistance with strategic and operational planning, managementrecruitment, marketing, and obtaining additional capital.However, the relationship between VCsand entrepreneurs is characterized by double-sided moral hazard. In most cases, the parties effortleve

3、ls are unobservable thus,noncontractible.Unlike the optimal contracting between VCs and entrepreneurs. The optimal size of VCsportfolios has received little attention in the theoretical and empirical venture capital literature.Investing in multiple ventures, as opposed to a single project, allows a

4、VC to make the best use ofher funds, while reducing the risk of her investment. However, because the VC invests time andeffort in advising portfolio firms, increasing the number of firms in the portfolio dilutes thequantity quality of managerial advice to each entrepreneurial venture.Because the num

5、ber of experts is limited, venture capital is not easily scalable. The higher thenumber of ventures financed and advised by a VC, the lower the amount of advice provided toeach venture. It is well established that the development of a business idea into a successful business enterprise depends on th

6、e ability of the venture capitalists (special category of entrepreneurs) to identify the potentiality of the idea to the promoter (entrepreneurs as well as intrapreneurs), timely financing, and value addition. It is also accepted that the success of venture capital financing in a region depends on t

7、he prevalence of technological advancement of that region. The last 60 years have evidenced that the greater the technological advancement in a region, the more active the venture capital financing there. Though many traditional sources of financing exist, for the start-up business venture with most

8、ly intangible assets (in particular, the idea inset), the only source of financing may be venture capital, which glimmers with the prospect of generating wealth in ways not envisioned by other sources of financing. Venture capital has the inherent capability of generating wealth in many avenues: to

9、the promoters (those who nurture the business idea), to the venture capitalists (those who offer blood to the idea in the form of financial as well as non-financial support), and to the economy at larix (the playground where the first two players engage in their game). The detailed picture of how th

10、is happens is shown in Exhibit 1. With the first two players (promoters and PEs) falling under the category of entrepreneurs (PEs are categorized as a special breed to entrepreneurs whose primary aim is to embrace high-risk business ventures conceived by the potential promoters), union of these two

11、will assert a multiplier effect on the economy. When promoters and PEs join forces, the result, ideally, will be the successful completion of the entrepreneurship process: the birth of a successful enterprise. Following this, both players wealth is maximized and the economy also receives an indirect

12、 boost. This is the reason venture capital financing is considered one of the most important financing media for new business ventures. Very few studies have undertaken analysis of be wealth management practices of successful promoters as well as PEs. Thus there exists a broad landscape for conducti

13、ng a detailed study in this area. If entrepreneurs and VCs efforts are complementary, reduced VCs advice can also lead to a lower commitment of entrepreneurs to their ventures. On the other hand, if VCs wealth is unconstrained, investing in more ventures increases the expected total dollar return of

14、 her portfolio. Thus, the choice of the optimal portfolio size involves a trade-off between the number of projects and each projects expected value net of the cost of VCs effort devoted to it. Our paper builds on a few recent important papers in the VC literature. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, KK hence

15、forth, provide seminal theoretical analysis of the optimal size of VCs portfolios. Fulghieri and Sevilirs model considers a VCs incentives to concentrate on a single venture versus investing in two ventures. Cumming provides an empirical analysis of VCs portfolio sizes using a Canadian dataset. Kapl

16、an and Strmberg (2003) and Hege et al. provide some evidence on the allocation of cash flows between VCs and entrepreneurs. Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we extend the theoretical literature by examining simultaneous choice VCs portfolio size and the allocation flow rig

17、hts between a VC and entrepreneurs.We show endogenizing the profit sharing between the partiesis instrumental in analyzing the determinants of the optimal VCs portfolio structure. Second, wetest the predictions of our model using a unique international VC and private equity dataset.The essential ele

18、ments of our model are as follows. AVC chooses not only the number of firms in her portfolio, but also the shares of the ventures profits that the entrepreneurs retain. Profit sharing affects the optimal effort levels exerted by the VC and the entrepreneurs, which, in turn,determine the expected val

19、ues of entrepreneurial ventures. The complexity of the model allows us to derive only the equilibrium effort levels of the VC and the entrepreneurs in a general form.We make two compromises while solving for the optimal portfolio structure. First, we assume specific functional forms for the probabil

20、ity of a ventures success, as well as for the costs of VCs and entrepreneurs efforts. Second, we assume that VCs and entrepreneurs efforts are additive and, thus, not complementary to the probability of projectssucces The framework of our model in the portfolio structure choice stage is more similar

21、 to that in Casamatta (2003), who examines the rationale for the joint provision of funds and advice by VCs to entrepreneurs. To test the predictions of the model we obtained comprehensive data for 42 generalist venture capital and private equity funds based in Europe and North America through a sur

22、vey and follow-up phone interviews. We analyze the determinants of VCs portfolio sizes and entrepreneurs profit shares while accounting for the inherent endogeneity of the profit sharing rule using instrumental variables. The results of the analysis provide some support for the predictions of our mo

23、del. In particular, we find strong support for the prediction that portfolio size varies nonmonotonically with the profit shares held by entrepreneurs. In addition, consistent with the model, entrepreneurs profit shares are found to be positively related to the number of firms in VCs portfolio. The

24、framework of our model in the portfolio structure choice stage is more similar to that in Casamatta (2003), who examines the rationale for the joint provision of funds and advice by VCs to entrepreneurs. To test the predictions of the model we obtained comprehensive data for 42 generalist venture ca

25、pital and private equity funds based in Europe and North America through a survey and follow-up phone interviews in 2004. We analyze the determinants of VCs portfolio sizes and entrepreneurs profit shares while accounting for the inherent endogeneity of the profit sharing rule using instrumental var

26、iables. The results of the analysis provide some support for the predictions of our model. In particular, we find strong support for the prediction that VCs portfolio size varies nonmonotonically with the profit shares held by entrepreneurs. In addition, consistent with the model, entrepreneurs prof

27、it shares are found to be positively related to the number of firms in VCs portfolio. Overall, while the data do not support every specific detail of the model, the evidence is consistent with the notion that VCs portfolio size and profit sharing rule are determined jointly. Entrepreneurs are assume

28、d to be identical. This assumption may seem unrealistic, since VCs screening ability is limited, and they typically have both “good” and “bad” projects in their portfolios. However, the distinction between “good” and “bad” projects is made ex-post, while the portfolio structure decisions are based o

29、n entrepreneurial ventures ex-ante characteristics. In addition, this assumption reflects the largely documented specialization of the majority of VCs, who tend to invest in similar projects. When promoters and VCs join forces, the result, ideally, will be the successful completion of the entreprene

30、urship process: the birth of a successful enterprise. Following this, both players wealth is maximized and the economy also receives an indirect boost. This is the reason venture capital financing is considered one of the most important financing media for new business ventures. Very few studies hav

31、e undertaken analysis of be wealth management practices of successful promoters as well as VCs. Thus there exists a broad landscape for conducting a detailed study in this area. 译文 风险资本和私募股权资本利润的大小 资料来源 ： Journal of Corporate Finance 作者： Gennaro Bernile 风险资本提供了年轻，创新型企业的发展机遇和成长 。 与大多数投资者相同，风险资本家的积极参与

32、管理使他们获得利润。风险投资提供援助战略和业务规划，管理 招聘，市场营销，并获得额外的资金。然而，风险投资家和企业家之间的关系的特点是双面的道德风险。在大多数情况下，各方的努力水平是无法观察的，因此，风险不可收缩。风险投资家和企业家之间的最佳承包比率是不同的。 风险投资对 最优规模 的 投资组合接受理论和实证的考究是很少注意风险的。最好使用 风投公司 的资金，同时降低了它的投资风险。但是，由于风险投资投入时间和努力，增加了每个创业企业数量组合，稀释企业管理咨询的数量和质量 ，所以 建议投资它的组合公司。另一方面，由于专家人数有限，风险资本是不容易 控制 的。一个 风险投资 表示，资助企业数额越

33、高，提供 给 企业 的 意见越 少 。 众所周知，确定哪些 有 潜力 的 创意 ，并及时筹措资金，增加价值 ，形成 一个经营理念 并把它 变成一个成功的企业取决于风险资本家的能力 。 大家还 认同 ，一个区域中创业资金投资的成功取决于该地区技术进步的发 展程度，过去 60年已经证明一个地区的技术越进步，那么就存在更积极的风险资本融资。虽然许多传统的资金来源存在， 但 为开办主要 是 无形资产（特别是思想）的合资企业，唯一的资金来源可能是风险资本， 这 产生了其他资金来源除外创造财富的希望。 风险资本具有多种途径创造财富的能力 ， 风险资本家向发起人（那些培育经营理念的人） ， 那些具有合伙人背

34、景的 人提供资金并帮助他们去的成功。 私募股权投资 是以特殊的企 业家素质来划分的，其主要目的是接受高风险企业所设想的潜在推动者 ，这两个的联合将会产生乘数效应。 因此在理想的情况下，当推动者和 私募 股权投资 加入队伍中，创业过程将会 成功地完成 并 诞生一个成功的企业。在此之后，双方参与者的财富达到最大化， 也间接的推动了经济 。这也是风险资本融资被认为是新企业最重要的融资媒介的原因，只有极少数的研究进行了促进 私募股权投资 的财富管理的成功做法 的 分析，因此，在这一领域进行详细的研究具有广泛的前景。 企业家和 VC 的努力是相辅相成的，降低 VC 的意见，可能也会导致 降低企业家对他们

35、企业的承诺。另一方面，如果 VC 的财富不受约束，在更多的企业投资组 合中会预计它的总投资回报。因此，选择最佳投资组合的规模涉及到权衡项目数量和每个项目之间对 VC 的预计成本净值。我们 在 文件 的基础上，专门研究了 最近几个在 VC 文学的重要文件。 Kanniainen 和 Keuschnigg，提供开创性的最优规模风险资本家的投资组合理论分析。 Fulghieri 和 Sevilir 的模型研究了 在一个合资企业的两个相对集中的 VC 的 投资 回报。 卡明使用加拿大的数据集提供创投的投资组合规模的实证分析。卡普兰和 伯格 教授 与赫奇等提供了 风险资本和企业家之间现金流量分配的一些证

36、据。我们的论文有助于两种文学方式 。首先，我们通过理论文献的延伸检查 了 同时选择 VC 和现金分配之间的流权的投资组合规模，分析了最佳 VC 的投资组合工具结构的决定因素。第二，采用了独特的国际风险投资和私人股票数据集测试我们的模型。我们的模型的基本内容如下 ，私募股权投资 的选择不仅是的公司数量，在它的组合中，还对企业股份的利润，该企业家保留 的利润有严格的把握 。反过来， 它也会 确定创业企业的预期值。该模型的复杂性使我们能够得到均衡的水平， VC 一般会和企业家作出两项让步，从而求解最佳组合结构。首先，我们承担一个企业的成功的具体概率函数形式，以及 VC 对企业家 支持 的费用。第二，

37、我们假设VC 对 企业家的努力是添加剂，因此，他们是不互补的概率 。 然而 ， 当我们共享标志之间简化式的关系规则，最优参数和最优投资组合的规模就将变得模糊。因此，我们 应该 证明两者哪个应占 分享利润 和投资组合的规模内生性这实证研究。 我们选择的投资组合模型框架结构十分的相似， Casamatta（ 2003 年）为企业家提供了检查风险投资咨询和资金的理论。为了检验该模型的假设，我们于2004 年通 过一项资金调查，得到了在欧洲和北美创业资本和私人股本全面的数据。 我们分析了风险资本家的投资组合规模的决定因素和企业 家的利润份额，使用工具变量，分析固有的内生性利润规则。根据分析结果为我们的

38、模型预测提供了一些支持。特别是，我们找到了能大力支持的 VC 的投资组合的规模与变化有股份的利润预测的论据。此外，与模型一致的是，我们发现企业家的利润份额和许多公司在 VC 的投资组合正相关。总体而言，虽然数据并不支持该模型所有的具体细节，但该结论与 VC 的投资组合规模，利润分享确定共同的规则的理念一致。 企业家被认为是相同的。这种假设似乎是不现实的，因为风险资本家鉴别能力是有限的，他们通常都会判断投资组合的“好”与“坏”。然而，项目的“好”与 “坏”都是事后的，而组合结构的决定都是基于创业企业发展之前的特点。此外，这种假设在很大程度上反映了大多数风险资本家专业化记录，那就是谁倾向于投资相类似的项目。 当推动者和风险投资加入队伍中，因此在理想的情况下，将成功地完成了创业过程：诞生一个成功的企业。在此之后，双方参与者的财富达到最大化，经济也得到了间接的推动作用。这也是风险资本融资被认为是新企业最重要的融资媒介的原因，只有极少数的研究进行了分析促进风险投资的财富管理的成功做法，因此，在这一领域进行详细的研究具有广泛的前景。