经济附加值：与规模有关联吗？【外文翻译】.doc

1、原文EVADOESSIZEMATTERVALUEADDEDPERFORMANCEMEASURES,SUCHASECONOMICVALUEADDEDEVA,AREPROMOTEDASAMEANSTOBETTERALIGNMANAGERIALINCENTIVESANDIMPROVEFIRMPERFORMANCETHISPAPEREMPIRICALLYEXAMINESWHETHEREVAADOPTERSOUTPERFORMAPEERGROUPOFNONADOPTERSOVERALONGTERMHORIZONITALSOEXPLORESTHEDETERMINANTSASSOCIATEDWITHDIFF

2、ERENCESINRELATIVEMARKETPERFORMANCEOFTHESETWOGROUPSWEFINDMIXEDRESULTSCONSISTENTWITHPREVIOUSSTUDIESINEXAMININGRISKADJUSTEDMARKETRETURNS,WEFINDTHATTHEFULLSAMPLESIGNIFICANTLYUNDERPERFORMSTHEMARKETHOWEVER,DURINGTHEPERIODOFTHESTUDY,EVAADOPTERSEXHIBITLESSNEGATIVEPERFORMANCETHANNONADOPTERSMOREOVER,OVERTHEEN

3、TIRESTUDYPERIOD,ADOPTERPERFORMANCEIMPROVESINAPOSITIVEDIRECTION,WHILENONADOPTERSEXPERIENCEAPERFORMANCEDECLINEADOPTINGFIRMSALSOEXHIBITHIGHEREARNINGSGROWTHANDHIGHERRETURNSINPERSPECTIVE,THESERESULTSSUGGESTTHEREISSOMEBENEFITTOEVAADOPTION,RELATIVETOAPEERGROUP,ASADOPTERSOUTPERFORMTHEIRPEERGROUPINACOMPARISO

4、NOFPEERMATCHEDGROUPS,FIRMSIZEANDGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESAREFOUNDTOHAVEASIGNIFICANTIMPACTONPERFORMANCEFORTHREESIZEBASEDGROUPSINTRODUCTIONVALUEADDEDPERFORMANCEMEASURESWEREENTHUSIASTICALLYEMBRACEDBYCORPORATIONSINTHE1990SASAMEANSTOBETTERALIGNMANAGERIALINCENTIVESANDIMPROVEFIRMPERFORMANCEINTHEORY,BETTERALIGNME

5、NTOFMANAGERANDSHAREHOLDERINTERESTSREDUCEAGENCYCOSTSANDIMPROVEFIRMPERFORMANCEADVOCATESALSOARGUETHATVALUEBASEDMEASURESAREBETTERINDICATORSOFFIRMPERFORMANCETHANACCOUNTINGMEASURESSINCETHEYPROVIDEAMOREACCURATEANDTIMELYMEASUREOFRESIDUALINCOMETHEEXTRAORDINARYRATEOFADOPTIONOFSUCHMEASURESWASINPARTFUELEDBYTHEE

6、CONOMICVALUEADDEDEVAMEASUREPROMOTEDBYSTERNSTEWARTWHENINCORPORATEDINTOAPERFORMANCEMANAGEMENTSYSTEM,THEEVAMEASUREISPROMOTEDASREDUCINGACCOUNTINGDISTORTIONSANDIMPROVINGALIGNMENTOFMANAGERIALINTERESTSWITHSHAREHOLDERSDESPITEEAGERADOPTIONOFTHEEVACONCEPTBYTHECORPORATEWORLD,THEEVIDENCEOFITSIMPACTONSHAREHOLDER

7、PERFORMANCEHASBEENMIXEDPREVIOUSRESEARCHHASFOUNDBOTHPOSITIVEANDNEGATIVERETURNSTOEVAADOPTERSTHISPAPERADDSTOTHEBODYOFEVIDENCEBYEXAMININGWHETHEREVAADOPTERSOUTPERFORMAPEERGROUPOFNONADOPTERSOVERALONGTERMHORIZONITALSOEXPLORESTHEDETERMINANTSASSOCIATEDWITHDIFFERENCESINRELATIVEMARKETPERFORMANCEOFTHESETWOGROUP

8、SEVAEVIDENCEREVISITEDTHECONCEPTOFEVAISNOTNEWITISGROUNDEDINTHEECONOMICPRINCIPLEOFRESIDUALINCOMEWHEREBYTOADDVALUE,COMPANIESMUSTEARNARATEOFRETURNONINVESTEDCAPITALGREATERTHANTHECOSTOFTHATCAPITALIFFIRMSARESUCCESSFULINTHIS,THEVALUEOFTHEFIRMWILLINCREASE,AND,INANEFFICIENTMARKET,SOWILLSHAREHOLDERWEALTHFIRMST

9、HATTAKEONPROJECTSWHOSEVALUEISLESSTHANTHEIRCOSTWILLEXPERIENCEDECLINESINVALUEANDSHAREHOLDERWEALTHWHILESIMPLEINCONCEPT,THEIMPLEMENTATIONOFRESIDUALINCOMEMEASURESHASNOTBEENWITHOUTDIFFICULTYTHEMEASUREMENTOFECONOMICRETURNSANDCOSTSOFTENRELIESONACCOUNTINGCOSTANDRETURNPROXIESWHICHAREINCOMPLETEWHENITCOMESTOMEA

10、SURINGTRUEECONOMICPROFITTWOISSUESLIEATTHEHEARTOFTHEMEASUREMENTPROBLEMACCOUNTINGADJUSTMENTSTHATDISTORTECONOMICEARNINGS,ANDTHEOMISSIONOFACHARGEFORTHECOSTOFEQUITYCAPITALSINCEACCOUNTINGMEASURESUSEHISTORICAL,COSTBASEDINFORMATION,THERESULTINGACCOUNTINGVALUESARETYPICALLYNOTREFLECTIVEOFECONOMICVALUEMOREOVER

11、,THETYPICALRETURNPROXIESONLYCAPTUREINTERESTBEARINGCAPITALCHARGESCONSEQUENTLY,THEREEXISTSAPOTENTIALBIASTODECISIONSBASEDONACCOUNTINGMETRICSSTEWART1991ADVOCATESEVAASAPERFORMANCEMEASURETHATOVERCOMESTHESEPROBLEMSTOPROVIDEATRUERMEASUREOFECONOMICEARNINGSITACCOMPLISHESTHISBYADJUSTINGACCOUNTINGINCOMEFORNUMER

12、OUSGENERALLYACCEPTEDACCOUNTINGPRINCIPLESGAAPANDNONUSGAAPADJUSTMENTSTHATDISTORTECONOMICPROFITAMONGTHEMOSTCOMMONADJUSTMENTSARETHOSEFORRESEARCHANDDEVELOPMENT,ADVERTISING,EXPENSE,DEFERREDTAXES,PROVISIONFORBADDEBTS,DEPRECIATION,GOODWILL,RESTRUCTURINGCHARGES,ANDLIFORESERVESINADDITION,EVAINCLUDESACAPITALCH

13、ARGETHATACCOUNTSFORALLSOURCESOFCAPITAL,NOTJUSTINTERESTBEARINGDEBTASDEVELOPED,EVAISDEFINEDASEVANOPATCOSTOFINVESTEDCAPITAL,WHERENOPATISTHENETOPERATINGPROFITAFTERTAX,ANDTHECOSTOFINVESTEDCAPITALISTHEWEIGHTEDAVERAGECOSTOFCAPITALRWACCMULTIPLIEDBYINVESTEDCAPITALINVESTEDCAPITALISTYPICALLYDEFINEDASINTERESTBE

14、ARINGDEBTANDLONGTERMCAPITALEVAMEASURESTHEAMOUNTOFECONOMICPROFITRESULTINGFROMMANAGERIALDECISIONSFIRMSCANENHANCEEVABYINCREASINGPROFITABILITYTHROUGHIMPROVINGOPERATIONALEFFICIENCY,DIVESTINGPOORLYPERFORMINGASSETS,ORINVESTINGINASSETSTHATEARNARETURNGREATERTHANTHEIRCOSTOFCAPITALASAMEASUREOFWEALTHCREATION,IT

15、ALLOWSCOMPANIESTOTRACKAMANAGERSDECISIONSANDDEVELOPCOMPENSATIONPACKAGESTHATREFLECTTHEAMOUNTOFADDITIONALVALUECREATEDTHEAPPEALOFTHEEVAAPPROACHISTHATITDIRECTLYLINKSCHANGESINECONOMICVALUETOMANAGERIALDECISIONSINAREASWHEREPERFORMANCEMEASURESAREMOSTOFTENUSEDCOMPENSATION,FIRMPERFORMANCE,ANDCAPITALEXPENDITURE

16、STRADITIONALLY,AVARIETYOFMETRICSHAVEBEENUSED,OFTENCONFLICTINGCAPITALEXPENDITUREMETRICSCOMECLOSESTTOUSINGANECONOMICINCOMEMEASURETHROUGHTHEEMPLOYMENTOFDISCOUNTEDCASHFLOWTECHNIQUESINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONANDFIRMPERFORMANCEMETRICSHAVEOFTENRELIEDONACCOUNTINGBASEDMEASURESSUCHASRETURNONINVESTMENTROI,RETURNONE

17、QUITYROE,ANDEARNINGSPERSHAREBASEDMEASURESEVAPROVIDESAPERFORMANCEMEASURETHATMARRIESTHESETHREEAREASWITHACONSISTENT,ANDECONOMICALLYDEFENSIBLE,SETOFMETRICSTHEESTIMATIONOFEVAISNOTWITHOUTCOMPLEXITYASWEAVER2001NOTESINDEVELOPINGANEVAESTIMATEFORAHYPOTHETICALFIRM,THEREAREUPTO164POTENTIALITEMSTHATREQUIREADJUST

18、INGTOMOVEFROMANACCOUNTINGTOANECONOMICBASEDMEASUREOFNOPATANDCAPITALTHESEADJUSTMENTSREFLECTBOTHUSGAAPANDNONUSGAAPADJUSTMENTSTHECONCEPTBEHINDTHEADJUSTMENTSTONETINCOMEISTOREMOVETHEEFFECTOFONETIMEEVENTSANDNONOPERATINGITEMS,ANDTOREFLECTMORECLOSELYTHEECONOMICCASHFLOWARISINGFROMTHEFIRMSASSETBASEFORTHECALCUL

19、ATIONOFEVACAPITAL,THEGOALISTODEVELOPAMEASUREOFLONGTERMCAPITAL,ANDEXCLUDESUCHITEMSASNONINTERESTBEARINGLIABILITIESANDOTHERSHORTTERMACCOUNTSNOTRELATEDTOTHEACQUISITIONANDUSEOFLONGTERMASSETSATTHESAMETIME,ADJUSTMENTSTOCAPITALINCLUDESUCHNONGAAPADJUSTMENTSASRESTRUCTURINGCHARGESANDTHECAPITALIZATIONOFGOODWILL

20、MOREDETAILSASSOCIATEDWITHTHEPOTENTIALNUMBEROFADJUSTMENTSCANBEFOUNDINYOUNGANDOBRYNE2001,ANDYOUNG1999DESPITETHEGREATNUMBEROFPOTENTIALADJUSTMENTS,THEACTUALNUMBEROFADJUSTMENTSMADEBYCOMPANIESISMUCHSMALLERYOUNG1999ANDERSONETAL,2005,ANDRANGESBETWEENZEROANDABOUT15ADJUSTMENTSYOUNGANDOBRYNE2001SUGGESTTHATTHEM

21、AJORITYOFCOMPANIESMAKEATMOSTFIVEORFEWERADJUSTMENTS,WHILEMANYFIRMSMAKENOADJUSTMENTSATALLRESEARCHISSUESALIGNMENTOFMANAGERIALINTERESTSAGENCYCONFLICTSARISEWHENMANAGERIALANDSHAREHOLDERSINTERESTARENOTALIGNEDMANAGEMENTACTINGINTHEIROWNINTERESTSWILLCONSUMEMORERESOURCESANDACTLESSEFFICIENTLYTHANIFTHEYPERCEIVET

22、HEMSELVESTOBEOWNERSEVAADOPTIONHASTHEPOTENTIALTOBETTERALIGNMANAGERIALINCENTIVESWALLACE,1997STEWART,1991ANDIMPROVEOPERATIONALEFFICIENCYANDDECISIONMAKINGORGANIZATIONALSTRATEGYALSOMAYPLAYAROLELOVATAANDCOSTIGAN2002PRESENTFINDINGSTHATSUGGESTEVAADOPTERSAREMORELIKELYTOBEDEFENDERFIRMSIE,THOSEWHOCOMPETEONCOST

23、LEADERSHIPBECAUSEOFTHEIRFOCUSONFINANCIALPERFORMANCETHESEFIRMS,INTURN,AREMORELIKELYTOHAVEAGENCYCONFLICTSANDTURNTOANEVASYSTEMASAMECHANISMTOMITIGATEAGENCYCOSTSANDIMPROVEPERFORMANCETHEYFINDTHATEVAADOPTERSAREMORELIKELYTOHAVEHIGHERINSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPANDLESSINSIDEROWNERSHIPTHANAPEERGROUPOFNONADOPTERSTOG

24、ETHER,THESEFACTORSLEADTOTHEHYPOTHESISTHATASARESULTOFIMPROVEDMANAGERIALINCENTIVES,EVAADOPTERSSHOULDSEEIMPROVEDPOSTADOPTIONRETURNSRELATIVETONONADOPTERSINTHEPOSTADOPTIONPERIOD,ITISEXPECTEDTHATSUCCESSFULIMPLEMENTATIONWILLLEADTOMOREALIGNMENTOFSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGERIALINTERESTSFORADOPTERS,ANDTHUSGREATERRE

25、TURNPERFORMANCESIZEEFFECTSAFIRMSIZEEFFECTHASBEENRELATEDTODIFFERENTIALABNORMALRETURNSBROWNANDWARNER,1985ASSMALLERSECURITIESTENDTOTRADEATLOWERPRICESOFTENWITHGREATERVOLATILITY,THECOMBINATIONOFSMALLANDLARGEFIRMSINANEVENTSTUDYMAYMASKUNDERLYINGRELATIONSHIPSNOTRELATEDTOSIZEINADDITION,FIRESIZEHASALSOBEENASS

26、OCIATEDWITHTHEAMOUNTOFPREDISCLOSUREINFORMATIONLARGERFIRMSAREMORELIKELYTOHAVEMORESOURCESDISSEMINATINGINFORMATIONABOUTTHEM,SUGGESTINGTHATTHEREISLESSUNEXPECTEDINFORMATIONCONVEYEDTOTHEMARKETASARESULTOFANANNOUNCEMENTSEE,FOREXAMPLE,BAMBER,1987ANDZIEBART,1990THISWOULDSUGGESTTHESIZEOFTHEUNEXPECTEDABNORMALRE

27、TURNWOULDBESMALLERASFIRMSIZEINCREASESSTUDIESTODATEHAVEFOCUSEDONEXCESSRETURNSTOEVAADOPTERSINAGGREGATEADDITIONALSIZERELATEDFACTORSMAYBEASSOCIATEDWITHTHESUCCESSOFEVAADOPTIONIMPLEMENTATIONOFARESIDUALPERFORMANCESYSTEMISCOSTLYANDTIMECONSUMINGLARGERFIRMSAREMOREABLETOTAKEONTHEINVESTMENTNECESSARYTOIMPLEMENTE

28、VATHANSMALLERFIRMSTHECOSTISAHEAVIERBURDENTOBEARFORTHESEFIRMSANDISLIKELYTOREDUCETHESIZEOFABNORMALRETURNSFORSMALLERFIRMSYETTHEINCREASEDCOMPLEXITYANDSIZEOFLARGERFIRMSMAYWORKAGAINSTPERFORMANCEIMPROVEMENTANDCUSTOMERSATISFACTIONCHALLENGESOFCOMMUNICATINGANDENFORCINGANEWPERFORMANCESYSTEMINCREASEASFIRMSIZEIN

29、CREASESANDMAYAFFECTTHEDEPTHANDSUCCESSOFIMPLEMENTATIONMANAGERIALFOCUSONCUSTOMERSATISFACTIONMAYBEDIVERTEDWITHANEWSYSTEMIFPERFORMANCEINCENTIVESARENOTADEQUATELYDEVELOPEDATTHESAMETIME,MONITORINGCOSTSINCREASEASSIZEINCREASES,THEREBYINCREASINGAGENCYCOSTSLOVATAANDCOSTIGAN,2002THEEXISTENCEOFASIZEEFFECTISSUGGE

30、STEDBYTHISCONSTELLATIONOFFACTORSWHILEWEWOULDEXPECTTOSEESMALLERFIRMSEXHIBITINGCHANGESINPERFORMANCEBEFORELARGERFIRMS,THEDIRECTIONOFTHENETIMPACTONRETURNSFORMEACHSIZEGROUPCOULDGOEITHERWAYDISCUSSIONANDCONCLUSIONEVAISAPERFORMANCEMEASUREMENTSYSTEMAIMEDATALIGNINGMANAGERIALINCENTIVESWITHSHAREHOLDERSINTERESTI

31、FSUCCESSFUL,ITISEXPECTEDTHATADOPTERSOFEVASYSTEMSWOULDOUTPERFORMNONADOPTERSTHEEVIDENCEONTHEEFFICACYOFEVAISBYNOMEANSCONCLUSIVEPREVIOUSRESEARCHHASFOUNDMIXEDRESULTSANDTHISSTUDYISNOEXCEPTIONINEXAMININGRISKADJUSTEDMARKETRETURNS,WEFINDTHATTHEFULLSAMPLESIGNIFICANTLYUNDERPERFORMSTHEMARKETHOWEVER,DURINGTHEPER

32、IODOFTHESTUDYEVAADOPTERSEXHIBITLESSNEGATIVEPERFORMANCETHANNONADOPTERSMOREOVER,OVERTHEENTIRESTUDYPERIOD,ADOPTERPERFORMANCEIMPROVESINAPOSITIVEDIRECTIONWHILENONADOPTERSEXPERIENCEAPERFORMANCEDECLINEADOPTINGFIRMSALSOEXHIBITEDHIGHEREARNINGSGROWTHANDHIGHERRETURNSINPERSPECTIVE,THESERESULTSSUGGESTTHEREISSOME

33、BENEFITTOEVAADOPTION,RELATIVETOAPEERGROUP,ASADOPTERSOUTPERFORMTHEIRPEERGROUPWHATMIGHTEXPLAINTHEPOORRESULTSRELATIVETOTHEMARKETASAWHOLEEVAIMPLEMENTATIONISNOTWITHOUTITSPROBLEMSASWEAVER2001,MCLAREN2003ANDOTHERSHAVEPOINTEDOUT,ITISACOMPLEXANDEXPENSIVESYSTEMTOBOTHIMPLEMENTANDCONVEYMOREOVER,SOMEHAVEARGUEDTH

34、ATIMPLEMENTATIONOFASYSTEMTHATFOCUSESONONEMEASUREDIVERTSATTENTIONFROMTHECOLLECTIONOFFACTORS,TANGIBLEANDOTHERWISE,THATAFFECTAFIRMSSUCCESSINTHEMARKET,INCLUDINGCUSTOMERSATISFACTIONIGNORINGTHESEFACTORSCANADVERSELYAFFECTFIRMPERFORMANCEMOREOVER,INCONSISTENTUSEOFEVAADJUSTMENTSACROSSFIRMSMAYLEADTODIFFICULTYI

35、NCOMPARISONANDUNEVENPERFORMANCEOUTCOMESAFACTORNOTACCOUNTEDFORINTHISSTUDYISTHENATUREOFMARKETWIDEPERFORMANCEDURINGTHEPERIODOFTHESTUDYTHEBULKOFMARKETRETURNSWENTTOSMALLERCAPITALIZATIONANDHIGHTECHNOLOGYFIRMSOVERTHISPERIODTOTHEEXTENTTHATTHISSAMPLEISMOREHEAVILYBIASEDTOWARDLARGERINDUSTRIALANDSERVICEFIRMS,RE

36、LATIVEPERFORMANCEMAYINFACTBEMUCHLESSTHANTHEMARKETINDEXFINALLY,WITHANINVESTMENTENVIRONMENTHEAVILYFOCUSEDONEPS,THEUSEOFANEVAPERFORMANCESYSTEMMAYNOTBESUFFICIENTTOWARRANTATTENTION,ESPECIALLYIFEPSFALLSINEARLYYEARSASTHECOSTOFADOPTIONAREABSORBEDTHEDETERMINANTSOFRETURNDIFFERENTIALSBETWEENADOPTERSANDNONADOPT

37、ERSWEREALSOEXAMINEDSIZEANDGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESWEREFOUNDTOHAVEASIGNIFICANTIMPACTONPERFORMANCELARGERRETURNSWEREASSOCIATEDWITHSMALLERSIZEANDGREATERGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESFORBOTHTHEFULLSAMPLEANDADOPTERSONLYSMALLERFIRMSMAYBENEFITFROMEVAADOPTIONMOREREADILYTHANLARGERFIRMSDUETOLESSCOMPLEXORGANIZATIONSTRUCTURESAN

38、DEASEOFCOMMUNICATIONACROSSTHEFIRMWHENCONSIDERINGADOPTERSONLY,EBITMARGINWASALSOSIGNIFICANT,SUGGESTINGTHEIMPORTANCEOFEFFICIENCYINOPERATIONSFORTHISGROUPFORNONADOPTERS,THELOWERTHEINSIDEROWNERSHIP,THELOWERTHERELATIVERETURNSTHISRESULTSUGGESTSTHATTHEREISLESSALIGNMENTOFMANAGERIALINTERESTSWITHSHAREHOLDERSINN

39、ONADOPTINGFIRMSSOURCEJANETHAMILTON,2009“EVADOESSIZEMATTER“REVIEWOFPACIFICBASINFINANCIALMARKETSANDPOLICIES,VOL12,NO2,PP267287译文经济附加值与规模有关联吗关于附加值的绩效措施,如经济附加值是一种推进管理创新使其更好地协调一致和提高公司业绩的手段。本文着重从实证角度检视采用经济附加值是否在长期不变的水平线上超越同类没采用的，并且在两个团体的市场表现差异上还探讨了相关影响因素。我们发现其结果符合之前的研究。在研究风险调整市场回报时，我们发现充分样本明显差于市场。然而，在学习周期

40、期间，经济附加值的采用者与未采用者相比展示了较少的负面效绩。此外，在整个学习期间，采用者在积极方向改善了效绩,与此同时未采用者却经历了一种成绩下降的过程。采用的公司还具有较高的收入增长和回报。这些结果表明,相对于同类团体，采用经济附加值具有一些益处。比较同类匹配团体、公司规模和发展机会，你会发现它有明显的绩效影响。简介关于附加值的措施在90年代一直被企业当作使管理创新更好地协调一致和提高公司业绩的手段而被关注。理论上，管理者与股东利益的结合可以降低代理成本,提高公司业绩。此外，倡导者们还认为附加值措施是一个比会计核算办法更好的公司业绩指标,因为他们提供更及时、准确的剩余收入。采用这种措施的惊人

41、比率在某种程度上是由斯图尔特公司提倡的经济附加值推动的。当引入了绩效管理系统,经济附加值措施可以减少会计失真和提高管理者的兴趣及股东利益。尽管急切的在公司里采用经济附加值这个概念,但影响股东绩效的证据却被混淆。此前的调查发现采用经济附加值有正面和负面的。本文列举的证据主要是为了检视采用经济附加值是否在长期不变的水平线上超越同类未采用者，并且还探讨了两个团体的市场表现差异上的相关影响因素。经济附加值的重访证据经济附加值的概念并不是新的想法。它是建立在剩余收益的经济原则上增加的价值,公司必须要赚取一个比资本成本更高的投资报酬率。如果公司在这方面是成功的,企业的价值将会增加,在一个有效的市场内,股东

42、财富也会增加。公司承担低于成本价值的项目将会经历价值和股东财富的下降。虽然概念很简单，但实施剩余收入的措施并不是没有困难。当谈到测量真正的经济效益时，经济效益和成本的测量通常依靠成本和返还不完整的代理。其中出现的两个核心问题是关于测量扭曲经济收入的会计调整和股权资本成本费用的遗漏。自从会计核算办法使用历史的基于成本的信息,由此产生的会计价值往往并不能反映出经济价值。此外,典型的代理回报只是捕捉利益轴承的资本费用。因此，基于会计绩效指标存在着潜在的倾向。斯图尔特（1991）倡导的经济附加值作为绩效评价的措施,解决了这方面的问题以提供一个更真实的经济收入。它通过调整一般公认会计原则和扭曲经济效益的

43、非美国公认会计准则基础上的会计利润来达成。调整中最常见是这些研究和发展广告、费用、递延税金、坏帐准备、折旧、信誉、重组费用和后进先出的储量。此外,经济附加值还包括能解释所有资本来源的资本费用,而不只是利益轴承的债务。经济附加值被定义为经济附加值税后净营业利润投资成本投资成本是加权平均资本成本（RWACC）乘以投资资本。投资资本通常定义为投资利益轴承的债务加上长期资本。经济附加值是用来测量管理决策造成的经济利益的数量。公司可以通过提高利润率，提高运行效率,清理表现差的资产,或投资比资本成本高的回报来提高经济附加值。作为衡量财富的措施,它允许公司跟踪经理的决定和反映一定数量附加价值和补偿金。经济附

44、加值的魅力在于它直接将经济价值的变化与最常用到的补偿、公司业绩和资本性支出这三种管理决策的地区相联系。传统上,各种各样的度量标准已经在被使用并且经常出现矛盾。资本支出的度量标准,与通过使用一个就业的现金流贴现技术来衡量经济收入最接近。奖金和企业绩效度量经常依赖于会计基础措施,诸如投资回报率,净资产收益率和每股收益这些基础措施。经济附加值在这三个领域上提供了一种绩效测量措施以一致经济防御绩效指标。经济附加值的估算不是没有复杂性。据威福（2001）的记录在发展一个假定公司的经济附加值,有近164潜在项目需要从会计调整到衡量税后净营业利润和资本的经济。这些调整反映美国会计准则和非美国公认会计准则调整

45、。调整净收益以后的概念是消除一次性事件和非盈利项目的影响,使经济与公司资产产生的现金流量更紧密地结合在一起。计算经济附加值的目标是发展一种长期的资本,排除无利息的负债、其他短期账户不相关的和长期资产的项目。与此同时,调整包括非一般公认会计准则调整的重组成本和资本化的商誉这样的资本。欧布莱尼（2001），杨（1999）发现了与潜在的数量调整相关的更多细节。尽管有大量的潜在调整,但是公司实际调整的数量比较小（杨，1999，安德森纳特等人,2005）,范围的调整从0到15。杨和欧布莱尼（2001）建议,大多数公司只作5或更少的调整,而许多公司直接没有调整。研究问题管理利益的排列当管理者和股东利益出现

46、不一致时会出现代理冲突。管理代理为了他们自己的利益将消耗更多的资源和比自己是主人时更低的行为效率。经济附加值的采用潜在地更好地协调了管理者激励机制（华莱士,1997，斯图尔特,1991）以及提高了运营效率和决策。组织战略也可能发挥作用。洛夫特和科斯提根（2002）研究的结果是建议经济附加值的采用者更有可能的作为防御性的公司（例如,那些竞争以成本为导向），因为他们所关注的是财务业绩。反过来,这些公司更可能出现代理冲突,由此转变成一种减轻代理成本、提高绩效的经济附加值系统。他们发现经济附加值的采用者与未采用者相比更有可能有较高的学术拥有权和更少的内幕所有权。总之,这些因素假设要想提高管理激励制度，

47、经济附加值的采用者要提高相对于未采用者更高的回报。在采用期间,预计将会实现更多的股东和管理者共同利益以及更大的绩效采用回报。规模效应一个公司的规模效应与它不同的异常收益率有关（布朗和华纳,1985）。因为较小的证券交易往往倾向于较低的价格，拥有较大的波动,小型和大型公司的组合在这一事件的研究中掩饰了与规模无关的潜在关系。此外,解雇的数量也被认为与披露的信息的数量有关。较大的公司很可能会有更多的信息来源,很少由于公告意想不到的信息而影响市场（例如，班布,1987，泽布特,1990）。这个说明了意想不到的非正常报酬规模会随公司规模的增加而增加。到目前为止的研究主要集中在经济附加值的采用者的额外回报

48、上。增加较多的相关因素可能与成功采用经济附加值有关。实施剩余业绩评价系统花费较大,而且费时。大公司较小公司更有能力承担投资必须的实施经济附加值的费用。这些公司比小公司更难以承受较重的成本负担而很有可能降低异常收益率。然而日趋复杂,且大公司的规模违背了对工作绩效的改进及客户的满意。交流的挑战和执行一个新的绩效系统会随着公司规模的增大而影响它的的深度和成功的实施。在激励制度不适当发展的情况下管理者集中于客户满意度会被转移到一个新的系统。与此同时,监测随着规模的增加而增加,从而增加代理成本（洛夫特，科斯提根,2002）。这些因素说明了规模效应的存在。当我们希望看到小公司在绩效上的表现比大公司好，各个

49、小群体的净影响可以向任何一个方向发展。讨论和结论经济附加值是针对管理者激励机制与股东利益的业绩评价系统。如果成功,它预计采用经济附加值的系统会比未采用的好。经济附加值效果的证据绝非定论。此前的调查发现结果被混淆,本研究也不例外。在研究风险调整市场回报时,我们发现充分样本明显要表现差于市场。然而，在学习周期期间，经济附加值的采用方与未采用方相比展示了较少的负面效绩。此外，在整个学习期间，采用方在积极方向改善了效绩,与此同时未采用方经历了一种成绩下降的过程。采用的公司还具有较高的收入增长和更高的回报。这些结果表明,相对于同类团体，采用经济附加值具有一些益处。比较同类匹配团体、公司规模和发展机会，会发现有明显的绩效影响。相对于市场的完整，什么可以解释这个可怜的结果经济附加值的实施并不是说它就没有问题。像威福（2001）,麦克劳仁（2003）和其他人指出，在系统双方都实施和传达时这是一个很复杂的和昂贵的。此外,有些人认为,实现系统的重点在于关注收集的因素的转移，如有形资产和其他任何在市场竞争力上影响公司成功的因素（例如，客户满意度）。无视这些因素会影响公司的业绩。此外,公司不一致的调整经济附加值可能会导致产生比较困难以及影响其结果。不确定因素在这研究里的本质是市场范围的自然表现。大量的市场回报在这一时期进入资本化和高技术的小公司。在某种程度上,这个简单的例子偏向于更大的工业及