全球企业并购为什么这么多的失败？如何使其成功？【外文翻译】.doc

1、 外文翻译 原文 Global Mergers and Acquisitions： Why Do So Many Fail? How to Make Them Successful? Material Source:Managing Complex Mergers Author: Piero Morosini Abstract Cultural and organizational differences arising during the integration phase are often cited as key reasons for the high failure rate o

2、f global mergers and acquisitions (M the various industrial sectors in which these M whether or not the acquirer and the target company operated in closely related businesses; and the type of execution approaches used during the post-M&A integration period. Contrary to previous managerial theories,

3、I found that the higher the national cultural distance between the acquirer and the target company, the better the performance results. In other words, in my study the cross-border M&As that achieved higher revenue, profitability and productivity growth two years after the deal were those that took

4、place across more different as opposed to more similar national cultural divides. Not only was this the first systematic empirical evidence produced in this field but it also suggested that in the “real world” things worked in exactly the opposite way from the one most academics (and a good number o

5、f executives) expected.2 Not surprisingly, the question I hear most often when presenting these findings to an audience of mostly startled executives is: Why? What is behind these empirical results? Why did the M&As in the survey perform better across more distant national cultural divides? My resea

6、rch findings suggest that the type of execution approach used during the post- M&A integration period was the most significant factor explaining the differences in performance. In other words, in the sample I studied, how the M&As were integrated after the deal was the key to understanding why the M

7、&As across more culturally distant countries performed better than the rest. I therefore interviewed a number of executives involved in the more successful M&As in order to look in more detail at exactly how they went about integrating the joining companies. This revealed an insightful picture that

8、is summarized in the following pages. I will especially focus on case examples of so-called mergers of equals.3 The learning potential embedded in these kinds of mergers seems to be summed up in the Liza Minelli song that goes: “If you can make it there, you can make it anywhere.” There are two main

9、 reasons why this might be so. First, large-scale “mergers of equals” taking place within sizeable, highly visible industries and across diverse national and corporate cultures such as Aventis and DaimlerChrysler face uniquely complex and challenging constraints to implementation. These are not only

10、 internally driven but also stem from the intensely competitive and emotional reactions that these mergers usually unleash within their surrounding industrial, social and political milieu. Secondly, as hinted elsewhere,4 I have found that the key implementation principles behind the successful integ

11、ration of a mega “merger of equals” are of a general nature that can be applied to all other mergers, as well as acquisitions. WHICH IS THE BEST POST-MERGER INTEGRATION APPROACH? “It all depends” goes the typical answer from senior executives “on the objectives of the merger, on the national and cor

12、porate cultures of the merging companies, on their specific industrial contexts, on the macro-economic environment, etc.” However, my Research findings suggest an entirely different response to this question. They suggest that the abundance of “mergers of equals” and similar undertakings that we hav

13、e witnessed in the past provides enough empirical evidence for us to discern a number of clear patterns. To put it simply, after looking at a large, representative sample of “mergers of equals” over the past decade, it is possible to identify very few that most M&A academics and practitioners would

14、agree to classify as “successful”. However all “mergers of equals” that have been identified as successful so far carried out a clearly centralized approach to post-merger integration. These patterns are illustrated in Figure 3. Some of the successful “mergers of equals” took on a clearly centralize

15、d approach to post-merger integration from the very beginning. This is the case with Novartis, which as early as 1998 two years after the merger deal between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz was announced was widely regarded as a truly successful “merger of equals” based on stock earnings, revenue, productivit

16、y and profitability growth criteria. By contrast, an unprecedented and disastrous decline in the companys stock value followed the 1996 implementation of the former Pharmacia & Upjohns post-merger management structure. The three highly autonomous regional pharmaceutical product centers (PPCs) that w

17、ere created were widely regarded as preserving the separate identities of the merging companies but at the same time adding to the difficulty of coordinating resources effectively across critical areas such as R&D, supply operations and sales forces. CEO Zabriskie was forced to resign as a result of

18、 the negative stock market reactions to (former) Pharmacia & Upjohns new organization and a new CEO, Fred Hassan, was appointed in mid-1997. The key points of the new CEOs agenda were to : Reduce the companys executive committee from 20 to 5 individuals Introduce a competence criterion rather than “

19、balance of nationalities” for appointing the five executive committee members Implement a centralized organization for global R&D, manufacturing and supply operations Consolidate all pharmaceutical activities under a centralized global management group Introduce a single corporate culture and one co

20、mpany headquarters based in New Jersey. As shown in Figure 3, in response to Hassans agenda, one year after the conclusion of the merger deal the former Pharmacia & Upjohn carried out a dramatic managerial U-turn in order to espouse a decidedly centralized integration approach. The companys performa

21、nce improved significantly during 1998 and 1999, and the following year it entered into another “merger of equals” with US-based Monsanto to create the new company Pharmacia. In the global automotive industry, DaimlerChryslers stock price experienced a steady decline of over 40 percent from mid-1999

22、 to the end of 2000, significantly lagging its main competitors. However, this conceals the fact that DaimlerChryslers hybrid approach to integrating its May 1998 “merger of equals” was in fact quite successful. The PMI task force organization leading the merger integration activities exceeded its t

23、arget of delivering US$1.4 billion in savings, and this was achieved ahead of time. As a result, the companys PMI organization was disbanded in mid-1999, scarcely over a year after it had been formed. However, unlike the former Pharmacia & Upjohn, after its first year of post-merger task force integ

24、ration activities DaimlerChrysler did not move to a more centralized merger integration approach. On the contrary, it deliberately persevered in maintaining an organizational structure that preserved the separate identities of the merging companies. This decision by DaimlerChrysler leadership aimed

25、to “maintain the integrity of the merging companies brands and their distinct pre-merger corporate cultures.”8 However controversial, as a result of this decision, the company did not implement a common organizational structure nor a unified global leadership group across the former Daimler Benz and

26、 Chrysler. Consequently, few of the expected engineering and product design know-how exchanges between the merging companies actually materialized between 1999 and 2002. 译文 全球企业并购 :为什么这么多的失败？如何使其成功？ 资料来源 :复杂并购的管理 作者： 皮耶罗 摩洛西尼 摘要 在并购阶段的过程中所产生的文化和组织的差异常被引为全球并购高失败率的主要原因 (企业并购 ).然而 ，皮耶罗 摩洛西尼在 这篇文章中介绍了最新

27、研究结果表明 文化差异并不会不利于全球的企业并购绩效。恰恰相反，如果合宜地处理文化差异，这些差异可以提高绩效 。 许多 巨型的案例 例证了“ 平等的合并 ” 说明 了 这些研究结果 ， 建议 建立 一套 共同实施法则可以增加您公司并购后 整合 的成功率。 概 述 问一组经验丰富的国际高管们问题：为什么那么多跨国并购会失败？比如“国家文化差异”，“与加入公司不同的价值观念 “等原因通常被他们列在列表的首位。我在过去五年我教的国际商业学校的教室收到这些类型的答案。这么一致性的答复是非常不平常的，尤其是在一个认为大量的民族多样性和这些不同的工业和公司的高管们一样多的情况下。 是文化的差异难以管理吗？

28、这些差异能真正解释企业并购在过去的令人沮丧的绩效跟踪记录吗？或可能有其他更重大的挑战在这严峻的图片后面吗？更重要的是： 如何可以管理人员管理所有这些挑战并使他们公司未来的并购 旅程为所有利益有关者带来的更大的成功？ 这些问题揭幕的一些当代全球管理中最相关的问题。统计数字表明全世界在八十年代和九十年代的过程中所有国外直接投资的 70%表现为跨国企业并购。然而，作为行政主管和学者都认为这是值得考虑的，所有相同的两个几十年的大量实证文献发现在所有跨国企业并购中有超过一半的是失败的。但这似乎并不影响他们进入公司并购。事实上，在美国和欧洲公开上市公司由于并购活动在新千年的第一个两年活动量所损失的价值总额

29、很容易超过并购交易在八十年代的任何一年的总价值。 在这篇文章中我会有系统地研究怎样在国家文 化的差异会影响性能的跨国并购。然后，我将解说这一关键问题行政人员可以用什么方式来管理这些文化和组织的差异使在这笔交易完成后增加的加入公司价值。 在以下页中，我将提出的调查结果来自于第一手的实证研究，从连接国家文化差异、 执行能力和绩效的跨国并购。与已建立理论相反，这些调查结果表明 “文化适合 “可能远不及通过一组特定的社会功能去管理并购交易结束后的文化和组织界限的。这些研究结果表明通过颁布一套共同实施原则被成功的并购者所使用，国际高管们可能越过文化迷思而接近更重要的因素，这将会增加并购成功的机会。 在这

30、篇文章 中 集中于 要结合重要战略资产和资源的加入公司的动机，而不涉及很大程度上出于财务风险多样化、资金周转、创业的实验等 企业并购 。此外，这条条款 中企业并购 “成功 “和 “绩效 “指的 是在获取和合并后交易的公司增加的价值。更具体地说， 与企业并购 相关联的值增 ， 我 考虑到的是 一个 根本 的性质， 很大程度上 来自于 主流的收入、盈利能力和 /或生产效率的增长等 ， 而不是所产生的协同作用的一次或投机获得的财政收益 。 最好的合并后的整合方法是什么？ “一切取决于” 这典型答案来自于高级主管人员 “并购的目标，并购的公司的国家和企业文化，它们的具体的产业环境和宏观经济环境等。但是

31、，我研究调查结果表明了对这一问题一个完全不同的反应，。他们建议许多“平等的合并”和类似的承诺，我们能提供过去足够实验性证据证明，去发现大量的明确模式。 要很简单，看过去十年里大的有代表性的“平等的合并”的样本，就可以确定很少，大多数并购专业学者和实践者会同意归类为 “成功 “。但是，迄今进行所有已确定成功的“平等的并购”已清楚集中的显示合并后的整合方法。 这些模式如图 3 所示。一些成功的“平等 的合并”对于合并后的整合从一开始采取了一种明确集中的方法。这是这种案子关于诺华，早在 1998 年 两年后汽巴 -嘉基公司和山德士公司之间的并购交易宣布后 被广泛认为是一个真正成功“平等的并购”，基于

32、股票收益、 收入、 生产效率和利润增长。 相比之下， 该公司的股票价值 有 一个前所未有和灾难性的下降 自从跟随1996 实施前者 的 法玛西亚和普强的并购之后的 管理结构。三个高度自治的区域医药产品中心 的 创建广泛被视为 保留 合并公司的 单独身份 ，但同时将困难的添加有效地协调资源 的关键领域，比如 研发、供应操作和销售队伍等关键领 域。首席执行官 斯基 被迫辞职 由于 负股票市场反应的结果和一个新的总裁 -弗雷德哈桑被任命为于 1997 年年中。新的首席执行官议程的关键点是： 公司的行政委员 人数 会从 20 个减少到 5 个人 采用 能力标准，而不是以 “ 民族平衡 ”来 委任五名执

33、行委员会成员 实施 用 一个集中的部门 来管理全球 的研发 、 生产和供应 操作 整合集中的全球管理下的所有制药活动组 采用 一个单一的企业文化和设一个公司总部在新 泽西 州 。 哈桑的议程的响应 如 第 3 图中所示 ， 一年后合 并购 结束处理 结果，前法玛西亚和普强实施 进行了戏剧性的管 理转为信奉一种绝对集中的 整合 的 方法。公司的业绩 有了 大大改善在 1998 年和 1999 年 ， 下一年进入另一个 “ 平等的 并购”与美国孟山都公司创建新公司 法玛西亚。 在全球的汽车工业 ， 戴姆勒 -克莱斯勒公司的股票价格经历了一个稳定下降的过程， 从 1999 年年中到 2000 年 超

34、过 40%以上，大大落后的其主要竞争对手。但是，这掩盖了戴姆勒 -克莱斯勒的混合方法 在 1998 年 5 月 “ 平等的 并购” 相当成功的事实。 PMI 专责小组组织领导并购整合活动超出其目标 节省 了 1.4 亿美元和 提前完成 。这样一来在 1999 年年中被解散公司的 PMI 组织 仅仅在 一年后 就 成立了。 但是，与 前 法玛西亚和普强 不同 的是， 第一年后专责小组的 并购 后 整合 活动戴姆勒 -克莱斯勒公司并不移动更集中的 在 并购整合方法。与此相反，故意坚持维护一个组织结构 来隐藏 合并公司 保留 的 单独身份 。戴姆勒 -克 莱斯勒公司领导这一决定的目的是保持合并公司的品牌和他们 并购前 不同的 企业文化 。 然而争议 关于 这项决定的 结果，该公司没有实行共同的组织结构也没有一个统一的全球领导小组 衔接 前戴姆勒 -奔驰和克莱斯勒公司。因此，很少的预期的工程和合并公司的产品设计知识交流实际上实现 在 1999 年至 2002 年 。