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纺织服装政策【外文翻译】.doc

1、 外文翻译 原文 THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING Material Source: KI134-Macrory K I134 (V1)-09.tex March 21, 2005 Author: Simon Lester I. Introduction For most of the period after World War II, a special regime has existed for trade in textiles, outside the normal multilateral trade rules. During the

2、 Uruguay Round negotiations, however, the GATT contracting parties agreed to integrate textile products into the GATT/WTO system. The means by which this integration would occur was the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (“ATC”), which provides for the gradual integration of these products into norm

3、al GATT/WTO rules, to be completed by January 1, 2005. The ATC has proved to be one of the most controversial of the Uruguay Round Agreements. The existence of the ATC is due in large part to what has been described as the “Grand Bargain” struck during the negotiations, under which the developing co

4、untries agreed to the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in exchange for greater access to developed country markets for the products of most interest to themtextiles and clothing, and agricultural products. In practice,

5、though, many developing countries have expressed the view that the access that has actually been achieved so far under the ATC (and the Agreement on Agriculture) has been much less than what was promised. The alleged deficiencies in market access for textiles and clothing are said to be due primaril

6、y to delays in integrating key products and, at least in the first years of the Agreement, abuse of the special safeguard mechanism in the ATC. This chapter will examine the regulation of trade in textiles from the GATT era up until the present. It will begin by reviewing the origins of the special

7、regime for textiles under the GATT. It will then examine the Uruguay Round negotiations on textiles and clothing, which led to the ATC. Next, it will look at the ATC itself, discussing in detail its specific provisions and their interpretation through WTO dispute settlement. Finally, it will discuss

8、 some current issues of contention in the area of textiles and clothing trade, and provide some thoughts on the future treatment of textiles and clothing under the WTO system after integration has been completed. II. Background: Regulation of Textiles Trade during the GATT 1947 Era The textile indus

9、try has long been subject to a special set of rules within the multilateral trading system. This special status results in large part from trade tensions between rich and poor countries. Because textile production is relatively uncomplicated compared to other manufacturing industries, it is often an

10、 important stepping-stone in a countrys industrialization process. For developed countries, textile production was part of the early stages of an industrialization process that took place many years ago. Although developed country economies have evolved substantially since this time, the textile ind

11、ustry remains as a mature industry, and still employs large numbers of workers, although it uses production methods that rely heavily on mechanization. At the same time, the economies of developing and least-developed countries, which are in the early stages of their own industrialization process, r

12、ely heavily on textile production as a first step before moving up to more technically demanding industries. Developing and least-developed countries are able to take advantage of their low wages and access to cheap inputs to make labor-intensive, textile products that are very competitive in intern

13、ational markets. As a result of these different production patterns, cheap textiles and clothing products from developing countries often compete with more expensive products from developed countries. This puts enormous pressure on the industries in developed countries, which have difficulty competi

14、ng with the cheaper foreign products. In response, the textile industry in developed countries often lobbies for protection from imports. In the early years of the GATT, trade in textiles did not cause much tension. At its inception, the GATT was seen as a “rich nations club,” with only a few develo

15、ping countries as contracting parties. Therefore, textile trade among the contracting parties did not raise significant problems. By the late 1950s, however, the situation had changed. Japan, which had substantial production of low-priced textiles, acceded to the GATT in 1955.Then in 1958,West Europ

16、ean currencies became externally convertible, which removed the balance-of-payments justification for certain quantitative restrictions imposed by these countries, including those on textiles. Finally, a number of important developing country exporters emerged at around this time. All of these facto

17、rs combined to cause the developed countries to look for a response to “low wage imports” from developing countries. While textiles were not the only products at issue, they were a prime concern. As a response, the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (“STA”) was e

18、stablished, lasting from October 1961 to September 1962.In October 1962, the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (“LTA”) came into effect. This latter instrument remained in force (with extensions) until 1973.These two Arrangements constituted derogations from GATT

19、 rules (although no formal waiver was ever obtained).They were designed to allow developed countries to impose quantitative restrictions on textile imports when these imports caused or threatened to cause “market disruption,” while at the same time providing for gradual increases in the quota amount

20、s. The LTA was limited to trade in cotton textiles. By the mid-1960s, however, synthetic fibers and yarns experienced significant production growth, and wool exports had also increased. In many instances, restrictions were being imposed on these products outside the context of the LTA. To address th

21、is development, a new agreement, the so-called Multi-Fiber Arrangement (“MFA”), was negotiated to address trade in textiles on a more comprehensive basis. The MFA entered into force in January 1974. In essence, the MFA provided a special set of rules and guidelines for trade in textiles. As describe

22、d in Article 1.2 of the MFA, its objective was: To achieve the expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers to such trade and the progressive liberalization of world trade in textile products, while at the same time ensuring the orderly and equitable development of this trade and avoidance of disru

23、ptive effects in individual markets and on individual lines of production in both importing and exporting countries. To achieve this end, the MFA permitted the imposition of country-specific restraints on textile imports. In this regard, exporting and importing countries were encouraged to negotiate

24、 bilateral restraints on textile imports when the domestic market of the importing country was disrupted by imports. The MFA also allowed importing countries to impose unilateral restraints where “market disruption” existed and bilateral restraints could not be agreed. The restraints, whether bilate

25、ral or unilateral, were to be increased by a specified percentage each year, thus allowing for the “orderly” expansion of trade. In addition, the MFA established the Textiles Surveillance Body (“TSB”) to oversee the operation of the MFA. The TSB could make recommendations, but not give binding rulin

26、gs, with respect to unilateral restraints. The MFA was created as a four-year agreement entering into force on January 1, 1974.However, it was later extended through several Protocols of Extension, and remained infect until December 31, 1994. Although its precise legal status is difficult to ascerta

27、in, and there was never any formal waiver under the GATT, the MFA has been described by many commentators as “derogation” from the GATT. The original MFA provided for restraints on textiles made of cotton, wool and synthetics. Its coverage was later extended to include almost all fibers, with the ex

28、ception of pure silk. As of 1991, approximately two-thirds of the worlds trade in textiles was subject to the MFA framework. At the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations, nine developed countries (counting the European Community as one country) were participating in the MFA, although natal wer

29、e applying restraints: Austria, Canada, the European Community, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. When the Uruguay Round ended, only Canada, the European Community, Norway and the United States were imposing restraints. III. The Uruguay Round Negotiations It is beyon

30、d the scope of this chapter to systematically document every aspect of the Uruguay Round negotiating history. Other authors have already done so. Instead, this Section will highlight certain important features of these negotiations, focusing on the views of the different actors involved and the key

31、issues with which they dealt. The Ministerial Declaration that initiated the Uruguay Round negotiations stated the following regarding the negotiations on textiles and clothing: Negotiations in the area of textiles and clothing shall aim to formulate modalities that would permit the eventual integra

32、tion of this sector into GATT on the basis of strengthened GATT rules and disciplines, thereby also contributing to the objective of further liberalization of trade. Thus, the primary goal of the negotiations was the “eventual integration” of the sector into the GATT. By contrast, “liberalization” o

33、f trade in this sector appeared to be of lesser importance, a secondary goal to which “integration” would contribute. The vagueness of the Ministerial Declaration led to some initial disagreement as to the scope of the negotiations. The countries facing restrictions under the MFA were of the view th

34、at the objective of the negotiations was simply to integrate the products subject to MFA restraints into the GATT system. By contrast, the restraining countries argued that other restrictions, outside of MFA restraints, should also be discussed. These other restrictions included restrictions not con

35、sistent with the GATT(e.g., restrictions claimed to be for BOP purposes, but not meeting those requirements)as well as GATT-consistent restrictions(e.g., unbound tariffs).In addition, the developed countries emphasized the importance of the strengthened GATT rules and disciplines(referred to as “SGR

36、AD”)being discussed by other Uruguay Round negotiating groups. This difference of viewpoint is not surprising, since developed countries imposed most of their restrictions on textile imports under the MFA, whereas trade barriers imposed on these products by developing countries usually arose through

37、 a failure to follow general GATT disciplines. A series of negotiating groups was formed to conduct the Uruguay Round negotiations. Four groups were established to deal with so-called “market access” questions, covering textiles and clothing, tariffs, non-tariff measures and tropical products. The n

38、egotiating group on textiles and clothing began its work in February of 1987.The most active individual developing countries were Hong Kong, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. In addition, the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (“ITCB”), an inter-governmental organization founded in 1984 by a nu

39、mber of textile exporting developing countries, also played an important role, as did the ASEAN countries acting jointly. Those developed countries that were applying restrictions under the MFA at that timeCanada, the European Community, Norway and the United Stateswere very active. Japan and Switze

40、rland also played key roles. The most contentious issues that came up in the negotiations were the following: the length of the time period in which textile and clothing trade was to be integrated into the GATT system the rate at which existing MFA quotas that would not be immediately integrated wou

41、ld grow the scope of the products to be integrated the nature of the special safeguard mechanism that would be available during the integration period the role of a monitoring body the application of other GATT rules to textile and clothing trade. Each of these issues is discussed below. A. The Spee

42、d of Integration It was agreed early on that the final goal of the negotiations was the integration of textiles and clothing into the GATT/WTO system. However, the question of how long this integration would take was strongly contested, and was one of the last issues agreed upon. There were two aspe

43、cts to this issue: the time period within which final integration would occur, and the pace of integration within that time period. With regard to the time period for integration, proposals ranged from five to ten years, with developing countries generally favoring a shorter period, and developed co

44、untries generally preferring a longer period. As discussed in Part IV.B below, the final period agreed upon was ten years. As for the pace of integration, the debate centered round the percentage of products to be integrated at each of various stages of integration. Again, developing countries favor

45、ed a faster integration schedule, with developed countries preferring a slower one. The final text attempted to balance these opposing views. B. Quota Growth Rates For those products subject to MFA-restraints that were not immediately integrated into the GATT 1994, and therefore would remain subject

46、 to these restraints during the transition period, there was discussion as to the level at which these quota amounts would grow. Once again, this issue was marked by a split between developed and developing countries. Developed countries argued for slower growth in the quota levels, whereas developi

47、ng countries preferred faster growth. C. The Scope of Products to be Integrated With regard to product coverage, countries facing MFA restraints generally argued that only those products subject to MFA restraints should be covered by the proposed Agreement and subject to gradual integration. Any tex

48、tile and clothing products not currently subject to these restraints should be deemed integrated, and therefore subject to normal GATT rules immediately. By contrast, developed countries urged that a much wider range of textile and clothing products should be subject to the integration process and i

49、ntegrated on a gradual basis, in order to allow them to delay the integration of the import competing products currently subject to restraints. As discussed in Part IV.G below, the final agreement covers a broad range of products. D. The Development of a Special Safeguard Mechanism Having agreed to bring textiles and clothing into the multilateral trading system, developed countries wanted to ensure that they had a means of protecting domestic industries from the effects of increased imports. To this end, a special safeguard mechanism was proposed that could be invoked

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