“中国苏州新加坡工业园区”新加坡模式能否被复制？——哪些可以，哪些不能，为什么【外文翻译】.doc

1、 外文翻译 原文 The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park: Can the Singapore Model of Development be Exported?What Worked, What Didnt, and Why. Material Source: National University of Singapore Author: Han Minli As China embarked on a steep process of macroeconomic reforms starting as early as December 19

2、78 during the Third Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Congress, some of the most pressing issues to address included the training and developing of a workforce that was capable of matching international management standards and caliber. The purpose for setting these goals was so that it cou

3、ld increase its own domestic pool of managerial staff in both the public and private sectors to meet the vigorous management standards of foreign companies and governments. This was crucial for China to have a seamless integration into the international financial and economic system. The reform peri

4、od witnessed a fundamental shift in the structuring of Chinas organizational and business systems. Moving away from the wholly centralized government to a system that gave greater authority and responsibility to local governments, enterprises and production units to set and achieve performance targe

5、ts, this new policy direction was in part motivated by a shortage o f adaptable and trained managerial personnel skilled in the understanding and functioning of a market economy within the Central government and the existing Chinese workforce. Realizing that new and more sophisticated management ski

6、lls and technologically skilled labor and human capital were critical for the sustainability and advancement of an economy, the Central Government began to give priority to management training in the workforce. In the 1980s, China began to quickly embrace new and foreign management training programs

7、. To further boost sentiments and support for the reform process, the Central government also introduced a series of legislations to strengthen acceptance and adherence in this respect and in 1984, a document relevant to Chinas economic reform was passed, in which it emphasized greater commitment to

8、wards the improvement of management training and development. The reform movement also benefited from the influx of international training programs organized by global organizations such as the United Nations and the setting up of a number of professional associations such as the Chinese Enterprise

9、Management Association and the China-European Community Management Institute which helped create awareness and advice on managerial training requirements and guidelines (Branine, 1996) As foreign investment and multi-lateral trade began to grow in China, it became all the more apparent that there wa

10、s a serious need for management education and large-scale knowledge transfer amongst personnel at all managerial levels in order to develop and implement new policies that would be suitable for a market-led economy. This was more critical in the foreign investment and trade sector due to the nature

11、of increasingly liberalized arrangements for international trade. Existing managerial personnel had been largely trained in skills relevant only to the socialist central planning economy model, and it was crucial for China to improve the quality of management particularly in areas of finance and acc

12、ounting accountability, marketing and human resource management so as to have the necessary ability to implement market-led economic policies in the future. However no clear framework was set. Indeed, while the Central Government issued directives to embark on learning the management knowledge and s

13、kills of the West, there were no instructions as how to acquire these skills while not contradicting the principles of the Chinese Governments essentially socialist theories. Although the government linked work performance evaluation to acquisition of advanced management skills, most calls for such

14、training and development were phrased vaguely, just like the following report made by then premier Zhao Ziyang to the Second Session of the 6th National Peoples Congress in May 1984: “Cadres engaged in economic work had to learn economic management and modern science and technology. The records of t

15、heir studies should be made an important criterion for appraising their work and for promotion in wage gradeTo obtain practical resu lts the content and requirements of such training should vary with the posts and the ages of employees. From now on, in recruiting workers and staff members, the enter

16、prises must provide pre-job training for candidates and enlist those who have done well in examination.” Further complicating things was the Central governments position towards learning from the West. On one hand, they were keen to acquire the expertise knowledge of their Western counterparts, but

17、on the other hand, they were wary that this would lead to corruption by Western values and ideologies. This ambiguous stance and the possible consequences stemming from this was best demonstrated by how personnel sent to the UK and Canada for management training were sent to re-education centres to

18、study the Chinese communist ideology on their return to China in the early 1990s (Branine 1996). The Chinese Government acknowledged that the management knowledge of Western capitalist societies could be used to change and improve the management structure and style, but its modernization did not imp

19、ly that China would also become Westernized. As China opened up its market and sped up economic reforms, two significant changes led to the official and explicit call by the Central Government for the transfer of management knowledge and skills from Western countries. First, international trade and

20、foreign investment surged ahead and numerous joint ventures and the establishment of a large number of new foreign trading companies helped to enhance the reforms into the international market. Second, the Chinese Government began to accept private ownership, which was an important concession given

21、the socialist governance of the country. 1992 proved to be a pivotal point in the reform movement for improved management methods. It saw a renewed attempt to encourage the adoption of Western management methods. It was around this period that the subject of software transference was conceptualized

22、between the Singapore government and the local Suzhou government. The idea was for the Singapore government with its solid track record in developing top notch industrial parks and world class management standards of operation and human resource management, to impart its knowledge and experience in

23、these areas to the Suzhou government. According to a number of the Chinese respondents interviewed, the Chinese Government felt that the Singapore model of development and management was representative of efficiency, reliability, transparency and importantly, a seeming unity and solidarity in policy

24、 making and implementation at all levels: qualities which the Western developed nations and corporations were drawn to. In line with the economic reform movement in China, the Suzhou government was hopeful that such a transfer would provide the much needed impetus and opportunity for its residents a

25、nd workers to acquire modern Westernized management skills and practices, fast tracking Suzhous overall infrastructure development and economic growth, thus giving Suzhou the competitive edge over other counties and municipalities in terms of attracting foreign investors and raising its profile both

26、 at the national and international level. In the words of a Singaporean bureaucrat who was part of the exploratory dialogue process in its infant stage, the Suzhou leaders were keen to “leave their mark in history.” The expectations for this transference program were high even at the initial stages

27、of discussion, with plans for the collaboration model, both its hardware component and the software aspect, to be replicated in other parts of China if proven to be successful in raising the standards of management style and infrastructure development to world class standards in Suzhou. Adopting and

28、 learning the Singaporean way of management was more appealing and in many ways, a more functional and acceptable choice for the local Suzhou Municipal Government and then subsequently for the Chinese Central Government as well. While the green light had been given by the Central government to proce

29、ed with experimenting with Western style business and management practices, there was still an air of caution and uncertainty as to which countrys model could be effectively adopted in China and yet not contradict the socialist principles governing Chinas political system and society. Singapore with

30、 its soft-authoritarian structure and a governing polity that was effectively in control of its citizens, had been criticized in the Western media for its limited democratic reforms and its interpretation democracy that went against the conventional norms of Western ideals and practices. However, th

31、e Singapore Government had still managed to transform back-water island with no natural resources into one of the most important and advanced financial centers in the region, with international business standards and a highly educated and mobile workforce. It has thus drawn rave reviews and admirati

32、on from both critiques and supporters alike. These above reasons, coupled with Deng Xiaopings personal admiration for the Singaporean economic growth model, put any fears of overly idolizing the West to ease for both local and Central Chinese governments. Another reason why the Chinese was keen to w

33、ork with Singapore, was that it believed that a Singaporean approach to investment and industrial development would attract transnational investors from outside Asia better than how the other economic zones in China did at that point in time. Primarily, the Chinese government felt that investors wer

34、e more familiar with Singapores style of management and business methods than traditional Chinese business methods, and hence the Singapore brand name could attract those investors who were hesitating to invest in China. There were two levels of learning that the Suzhou government was keen to pursue

35、 with Singapore. The first consisted of hardware and urban planning expertise skills. This was to be centered on the Singapores infrastructure blueprint, in particular the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) model which changed the industrial and investment landscape of Singapore by providing advanced and

36、 specialized ready-built business and industrial facilities and spaces allowing foreign investors to set up operations in Singapore in a very short period of time. By providing excellent business services and logistical assistance such as reducing significantly the application time for land, premise

37、s, lease approval and endorsement of plans, JTC has helped make Singapore a choice investment location in the region for foreign investors. These JTC initiatives have been largely credited with significantly drawing new and sustainable foreign investors and operations into Singapore and the Suzhou g

38、overnment was hoping that they too could develop an investment environment of international standards whereby its investors could grow and become more competitive. The second level of learning, which this chapter focuses on, involves Singapores software capabilities. Software here refers to the busi

39、ness and administration methods utilized by the Singapore government and organizations, and encompasses the more abstract but equally important area of management knowledge transfer and policy making processes which are tacit in nature. The Singapore government having achieved international recognit

40、ion for its principals of meritocracy, efficiency and anti-corruption measures, as well as the rapidness in which it transformed Singapore into a regional financial powerhouse based on its unique set of economic and urban planning blueprints distinct from the traditional Western models, was an attra

41、ctive example by which the socialist Chinese government could learn from. In particular, the Singapore experience demonstrated to the Chinese that any shortfalls or critiques that foreign investors have towards the host countrys political system could be countered and addressed by providing a compet

42、itive and effective business and investment environment for foreign investment. The focus for the Chinese was thus on adopting, adapting and putting into practice the Singapore experience in terms of governance both at the private and public sector into Suzhou to improve productivity, efficiency and

43、 transparency. The direct benefits to the Chinese from such collaboration explain their eagerness towards the project. However, the rewards to the Singapore Go vernment were not as tangible. In a typical corporate context, most management skills and processes are safeguarded carefully as they are po

44、tentially an important strategic resource against competition (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). It was thus unusual that the Singapore Government was so keen to transfer their know-how and managerial experience and culture to the Chinese without expecting any form of payment for accepting this lop-sided

45、arrangement. According to some of the Singaporean respondents, the Singapore Government and its leaders viewed the SIP project as necessary and important at the national level because it could serve as a conduit for Sino-Singapore political relations. More importantly, it was seen as a platform by w

46、hich Singapores new generation of leaders could regular meet and dialogue with their Chinese counterparts to facilitate greater economic cooperation, opportunities and understanding about the Chinese culture and business system. It was seen as a fast-track program to allow Singapore to play catch up

47、 with other foreign investors who had jumped on to the China boat much earlier such as investors from Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the question of the applicability of the Singaporean model to Suzhou long term did not seem to surface throughout the entire negotiation process. T

48、his is telling, for it may point out a politicized blind-spot in Singapores outward investment that was to surface later in the form of collaborative problems and hiccups during the transition period. 译文 “ 中国苏州新加坡工业园区 ” 新加坡模式能否被复制？ 哪 些 可以，哪些不能，为什么 资料来源 :新加坡国立大学 作者： 韩民利 早在 1978 年 12 月，党的第十一届三中全会通过了宏观

49、经济改革政策，并解决了一些最紧迫的问题，包括对劳动力的培训与发展，从而使其具有符合国际管理标准的素质和才干。设定这些目标的主要目的在于增加国内公有经济和民营经济领域的技术人员，以满足外国公司和政府多变有力的经营管理标准。这对中国全面融入国际金融与经济体系起着至关重要的作用。 在改革期间，中国的组织结构和企业体制发生了根本性的转变，不再是政府的完全中央集权政策，而是将更多的权力与职责下放给当地政府，企业和生产单位，让其自行设定并实现生产目标。这个新政策产生的部分原因在于我国中央政府和现存的劳动力中缺少适应能力强并接受过训练的管理人员来理解和把握市场经济的运转。在认识到这一新的尖端管理技能 ， 科技熟练劳动力和人力资源在经济的前进与可持续发展中的重要性后，国务院开始优先考虑员工管理能力的培训。 在 20世纪 80年代，中国开始迅速接受新的外国管理培训方案。为了进一步激励人们并推动改革进程， 国务院也出台了一系列法律法规来加强这方面的接受和遵守，并于 1984年通过了一份有关中国经济改革的文件，其中强调了要把更多的精力放在对管理培训与发展的改善上。这一改革运动同样也得益于一些全球性组织所设置的国际培训项目，