1、外文翻译原文GENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDACCOUNTINGINPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESANDREGULATEDINDUSTRIES1INTRODUCTIONPUBLICOWNERSHIPANDREGULATIONAREREGARDEDASTWOOPTIONSAVAILABLETOENSURETHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSFROMAPRINCIPALAGENTPOINTOFVIEW,PUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESANDREGULATEDINDUSTRIESARETHEAGENTSWHOMTHEPUBLIC
2、OWNERSORTHELEGISLATORASTHEREGULATORHAVEENTRUSTEDWITHTHEEXECUTIONOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSTHISLEADSTOTHEQUESTIONOFANAPPROPRIATEREPORTINGSYSTEMTHATPROVIDESTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALSWITHATRUEANDFAIRPICTUREOFWHETHERPUBLICFUNCTIONSHAVEBEENFULFILLEDORNOTONEQUESTIONARISINGINTHISCONTEXTISWHETHERTHEEXISTINGREPORTINGPROCEDU
3、RESARESUFICIENTORIFTHEREISANEEDFORIMPROVEMENTDOTRADITIONALREPORTINGPROCEDURESPROVIDETHEPUBLICOWNERSORREGULATORYSUPERVISORYBODIESWITHENOUGHINFORMATIONONTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSWHATKINDOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESDOEXISTWHICHPROCEDURESHAVEBEENINTRODUCEDTOREDUCETHEPROBLEMOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESFORTH
4、ESUPERVISORYBODIESISTHEREANYNEEDTOIMPROVEEXISTINGREPORTINGREGIMESASFARASITSTHEORETICALBACKGROUNDISCONCERNED,THISPAPERISMAINLYBASEDONTHEPRINCIPALAGENTTHEORYANDITSAPPLICATIONONREGULATIONANDPUBLICOWNERSHIPASPECTSEGBARONANDMYERSON1982,BSANDPETERS1991,LAONTANDTIROLE1986,NOTH1994,PP223THEQUESTIONSRAISEDAR
5、EDEALTWITHINTHISPAPERINSIXCHAPTERSFOLLOWINGANINTRODUCTIONINSECTION1,SECTION2DESCRIBESPUBLICOWNERSHIPANDREGULATIONASTWOPOSSIBILITIESTOENSURETHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSSECTION3OUTLINESTYPICALINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESIDENTIFIEDBYTHEPRINCIPALAGENTTHEORYSECTION4EXAMINESLARGELYFROMAGERMANPERSPECTIVETOWHAT
6、EXTENTTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALSAREPROVIDEDWITHSUFICIENTINFORMATIONONTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSBYTHEEXISTINGSYSTEMSOFMONITORINGONTHEBASISOFTHEFINDINGSOFSECTION4,SECTION5LOOKSATMEASURESDESIGNEDTOIMPROVETHEIDENTIFIEDSHORTCOMINGSOFCURRENTLYADOPTEDPROCEDURESWITHINTHEEXISTINGFRAMEWORKSECTION6CONTAINSASUMMAR
7、Y2AGENTSFORPUBLICFUNCTIONSASMENTIONEDABOVEPUBLICSECTOROWNERSHIPANDREGULATIONARETWOOFTHEOPTIONSTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALSHAVEINDISCHARGINGTHEIRDUTIESOTHEROPTIONSARETHEEXECUTIONOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSTHROUGHPUBLICADMINISTRATIONS,PUBLICLAWASSOCIATIONS,AUTHORISATIONOFPRIVATEECONOMICENTITIESORCONTRACTMANAGEMENTINTHEC
8、ASEOFPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESCENTRAL,REGIONALORLOCALAUTHORITIESINVOLVETHEMSELVESASOWNERSHISTORICALLY,PUBLICOWNERSHIPHASBEENTHEMAINMODEOFECONOMICREGULATIONINEUROPEMAJONE1996,P11THEJUSTIFICATIONFORTHEEXISTENCEOFPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESDERIVESDIRECTLYFROMTHEFACTTHATTHEYAREAGENTSFORTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFU
9、NCTIONSAPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISEWHICHISEXCLUSIVELYPROFITORIENTATEDNEEDSTOBEPRIVATISEDACCORDINGTOTHEPRINCIPLEOFSUBSIDIARITYITISNOTLEGITIMATEFORTHEPUBLICAUTHORITIESTOINVOLVETHEMSELVESINEXCLUSIVELYSHAREHOLDERVALUEMAXIMISINGENDEAVOURSDUETOTHELEGITIMATIONOFPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESBYTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNC
10、TIONS,PERFORMANCEORMATERIALOBJECTIVESARETHEDOMINANTENTREPRENEURIALGOALSTHEMAINTASKFORPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESISTHEPROVISIONOFGOODSANDSERVICESFORTHIRDPARTIESINPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESFINANCIALGOALSAREONLYAPRECONDITIONFORTHEIREXISTENCEASANENTERPRISE,BUTTHEYARENOTACCORDEDTOPPRIORITYTHEIRPOSITIONASOWNERSG
11、IVESTHEPUBLICAUTHORITIESTHEOPPORTUNITYOFLAYINGDOWNASCORPORATETARGETSTHEPUBLICFUNCTIONSWHICHARETOBEPERFORMEDTHROUGHENTERPRISESUPERVISORYBODIESTHEPUBLICOWNERSHAVETHEPOSSIBILITYTOMONITORTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSINALLPHASESOFTHEMANAGEMENTCYCLEIMPORTANTDECISIONSOFTENNEEDTHEAPPROVALOFENTERPRISESUPERV
12、ISORYBODIESREPORTINGOBLIGATIONALSOESTABLISHAREGULAREXCHANGEOFINFORMATIONBETWEENTHEMANAGEMENTANDTHEENTERPRISESUPERVISORYBODYFORTHERESPECTIVEPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISEREGULATIONISOFTENSEENASANALTERNATIVETOPUBLICOWNERSHIPINTHECASEOFREGULATIONTHEPUBLICAUTHORITIESDONOTINVOLVETHEMSELVESASOWNERSBUTEXERTTHEIRIN
13、FLUENCETHROUGHSECTORSPECIFICLEGISLATIONTYPICALNORMATIVEORNEOCLASSICALREASONSFORREGULATIONMLLERANDVOGELSANG1979,PP31,KNIEPS1988,PP39,KRAKOWSKI1988,PP19ARE,FROMAWELFAREECONOMICSPOINTOFVIEW,MARKETFAILURESINTHEFORMOFASECTORSTENDENCYTOWARDSANATURALMONOPOLY,INFORMATIONFAILURES,NEGATIVEEXTERNALITIES,CUTTHR
14、OATCOMPETITIONANDINADEQUATEPROVISIONOFPUBLICGOODSBYTHEMARKETPROCESSMARKETFAILURESOCCURWHENEVERTHECONDITIONSOFNEOCLASSICALWELFAREECONOMICSARENOTCOMPLIEDWITHABROADERCONCEPTOFREGULATIONISADVANCEDBYVONEYNERNANDTHIEMEYERVONEYNERNVONEYNERN1958,P6JUSTIFIESREGULATIONNOTONLYTOIMPROVEALLOCATIVEEFICIENCY,BUTAL
15、SOASAMEANSTOINTRUMENTALISETHEREGULATEDINDUSTRIES,IRRESPECTIVEOFTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,VIASECTORSPECIFICLEGISLATIONTOENSURETHATPUBLICSECTORFUNCTIONSAREFULFILLEDTHIEMEYERDIRECTLYLINKSREGULATIONWITHTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICTASKSCLASSICALREGULATIONINSTRUMENTSINEUROPEAREMARKETENTRANCEANDMARKETEXITPERMISSIONS,
16、COMPULSORYCONTRACTOBLIGATIONS,PRICECONTROLSYSTEMS,PERFORMANCEANDQUALITYSTANDARDS,ASWELLASVARIOUSAPPROVALPROCEDURES,CONCERNINGFOREXAMPLETHETIMETABLEOFPUBLICTRANSPORTORTHETERMSOFCONTRACTINGERMANY,REGULATORYSECTORSCOMPRISEFOREXAMPLEPUBLICUTILITIES,BANKINGANDINSURANCEINDUSTRIESASWELLASTRANSPORTATIONANDT
17、ELECOMMUNICATIONSSPECIALREGULATIONLAWSPROVIDETHEFRAMEWORKFORREGULATIONALLOVEREUROPE,SPECIALISEDSUPERVISORYBODIESINTHEFORMOFPARLIAMENTARYCOMMITTEES,INTERMINISTERIALCOMMITTEES,PUBLICADMINISTRATIONSEGNORWEGIANPOSTANDTELECOMMUNICATIONAUTHORITIY,INDEPENDENTBODIESEGOFFICEOFTHEDIRECTOROFTELECOMMUNICATIONSR
18、EGULATIONIRELAND,OFFICEOFELECTRICITYREGULATIONGBORSOMETIMESPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESEGDEUTSCHEFLUGSICHERUNGGMBH,OSTERREICHISCHEGESELLSCHAFTFRTELEKOMMUNIKATIONSREGULIERUNGMBHAREENTRUSTEDWITHMONITORINGWHETHERAREGULATEDINDUSTRYISOPERATINGACCORDINGTOTHELEGISLATIVEREQUIREMENTSTHEREGULATORYBODIESOPTIONSTOEX
19、ERTINUENCEONTHEREGULATEDINDUSTRIESAREMUCHMORELIMITEDTHANINTHECASEOFPUBLICOWNERSHIPTHEREGULATORYBODIESARENOTINAPOSITIONTOPUTTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICTASKSINTOTHECENTREOFTHEENTREPRENEURIALOBJECTIVESOFTHEREGULATEDINDUSTRIESASARESULT,THEREGULATEDINDUSTRIESDONOTREGARDTHEMSELVESASDIRECTAGENTSCOMMITTEDTOPERFOR
20、MINGPUBLICSECTORDUTIESREGARDINGTHEPOSSIBILITIESTOCONTROLPUBLICOWNERSHIPOFFERSBETTEROPTIONSFORAPUBLICFUNCTIONORIENTATEDGOVERNANCE3INFORMATIONASYMMETRIESINPRINCIPALAGENTSRELATIONSINBOTHALTERNATIVESFORTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONS,UNDERREVIEWHERE,APRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPEXISTSTHEMANAGEMENTOFTHEPUBL
21、ICSECTORENTERPRISESANDREGULATEDINDUSTRIESACTASAGENTSFORTHEPUBLICOWNERSAND/ORFORTHEREGULATORYAUTHORITIES,RESPECTIVELYACCORDINGTOARROWARROW1985,PP37PRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSCANBEDESCRIBEDASFOLLOWSTHEREARETWOPARTIESINVOLVEDTHEAGENTSACTIONSAFFECTTHEWELFAREOFBOTHPARTIESTHEPRINCIPALOBSERVESTHERESULTSOFTHEAG
22、ENTSDECISIONSANDDRAWSHISCONCLUSIONSFROMHISFINDINGSTHEAGENTSACTIONISNOTDIRECTLYOBSERVABLEBYTHEPRINCIPALTHEOUTCOMEISAFFECTEDBUTNOTCOMPLETELYDETERMINEDBYTHEAGENTSACTIONSNORMALLYTHEPRINCIPALHASTODEFINETHETASKSCARRIEDOUTBYTHEAGENTASWELLASTHERULETHATSPECIFIESTHEFEETOBEPAIDTOTHEAGENTBEFOREITCOMESTOACONTRAC
23、TINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESANDUNCERTAINTIESEXISTCONCERNINGACCESSTOINFORMATION,THEOWNERSOFPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESASWELLASTHEREGULATORYBODIESBOTHFACETHETYPICALPRINCIPALAGENTPROBLEM,IETHATTHEMANAGEMENTISBETTERINFORMEDTHANTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALGENERALLYTHEPRINCIPALAGENTLITERATUREDISTINGUISHESTHEFOLLOWINGTYPESOF
24、INFORMATIONASYMMETRIESEGSTIGLITZ1974,HOLSTROM1979,SHAVELL1979,GROSMANANDHART1983,ARROW1985ADVERSESELECTIONTHEAGENTUSESHISINFORMATIONADVANTAGETOINFLUENCETHECONTRACTCONDITIONSTOHISADVANTAGEFOREXAMPLE,PRIORTOAPRICEAPPROVALDECISIONAREGULATEDUTILITYCANMAKEUSEOFITSBETTERKNOWLEDGEOFTHECOMPANYSCOSTSTRUCTURE
25、ANDREFRAINFROMINFORMINGTHEREGULATORYINSTITUTIONABOUTITSPRICEFLOORINORDERTODEALWITHTHISKINDOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRYTHEBRITISHOFFICEOFELECTRICITYREGULATION,FOREXAMPLE,ISEMPOWEREDTOADJUSTTHEAPPROVEDRETAILPRICEINDEXMINUSXRPIXFORMULA,IFANENTERPRISEMISLEDTHEOFFICEOFELECTRICITYREGULATIONBYPROVIDINGINCOMPLETE
26、ORINACCURATEINFORMATIONATTHETIMETHEPRICEWASSETUPERRORCORRECTIONMECHANISMTHEGERMANTELECOMMUNICATIONLAWADRESSESTHESAMEPROBLEMIN30TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSGESETZ,WHICHALLOWSINTHECASEOFTHEMARKETDOMINATINGENTERPRISEAPRICEREADJUSTMENTPROCESSTHEPROBLEMOFADVERSESELECTIONALSOOCCURSWITHINPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESFOREX
27、AMPLEPROPOSALSMADEBYTHEMANAGEMENTOFPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESFORDECISIONSTOBETAKENBYTHEENTERPRISESUPERVISORYBODIES,CANBEWORDEDINSUCHAWAYTHATTHEMANAGEMENTISGIVEDISCRETIONARYFREEDOMTOENSURETHEFULFILMENTOFITSINDIVIDUALOBJECTIVES4GENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDREPORTINGPROCEDURESINORDERTOENSURETHEPROVISIONOFPUBL
28、ICSERVICESITISNECESSARYTHATTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALSAREINFORMEDABOUTTHEDEGREETOWHICHPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESORREGULATEDINDUSTRIESHAVECARRIEDOUTPUBLICFUNCTIONSAGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDREPORTINGSYSTEMISREQUIREDTOPUTTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALSINAPOSITIONTOASSESSWHETHERTHEPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESORREGULATEDINDUSTRIESH
29、AVEBEENOPERATINGINCOMPLIANCEWITHTHEIRENTREPRENEURIALORREGULATORYOBLIGATIONSREPORTINGPROCEDURESONTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSCANHELPTOREDUCE,THOUGHNEVERREMOVE,THEPRINCIPALSEXISTINGINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESTOINTRODUCEGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDREPORTINGPROCEDURESISINLINEWITHTHETRADITIONALGOVERNANCELITERA
30、TURE,WHICHSTRESSESTHATONLYTHINGSWHICHHAVETOBEREPORTEDGETDONETHEAGENTSREPORTINGOBLIGATIONSAREONEWAYFORTHEPRINCIPALTOWATCHTHEAGENTSACTIONSTHEYAREACONTROLMECHANISMFACILITATINGTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALSSUPERVISIONOFTHEPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESORREGULATEDINDUSTRIES5EFFORTSFORIMPROVEDGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDACCOU
31、NTABILITY51PUBLICENTERPRISESASSHOWNINTHEPRECEEDINGPARAGRAPHS,REPORTINGONTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSISDEALTWITHINPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESINAWAYTHATNEEDSTOBEIMPROVEDTHELACKOFOPERATIONALISEDOBJECTIVESISONEPROBLEM,THEUNSUITABILITYOFTHEESTABLISHEDACCOUNTINGSYSTEMANOTHER52REGULATIONASSHOWNABOVENORMALLYT
32、HEPROBLEMOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESWHICHTHEREGULATIONSUPERVISIONBODIESAREFACINGISEVENBIGGERTHANITISINTHECASEOFPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESTHEINFORMATIONACCESSGIVENBYTHERESPECTIVESECTORLEGISLATIONISNOTTAILOREDTOREPORTTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSBUTTOSUPPORT,MOREORLESSEFFECTIVELY,ADECISIONMAKINGPROCESSREGA
33、RDINGTHEVARIOUSREGULATIONINSTRUMENTSTHEFACTTHATTHEREGULATEDINDUSTRIESINPRIVATEOWNERSHIPDONOTSEETHEMSELVESASAGENTSFORTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICTASKSAGGRAVATESTHEPROBLEMASTHESECOMPANIESLEGITIMACYDOESNOTORIGINATEINTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONS,THEAVOIDANCESTRATEGIESAPPLIEDBYREGULATEDCOMPANIESWILLBENUMEROUS
34、INVIEWOFTHESITUATIONINGERMANY,ONEOPTIONTODECREASETHEINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESCOULDBETHEINTRODUCTIONOFHEARINGELEMENTSSOMETIMESTHEAMERICANSTYLEOFREGULATIONTHROUGHINDEPENDENTCOMMISSIONSISSEENASAMODELMAJONE1996,PP15HEARINGELEMENTSANDTHEQUASIJURIDICALAPPROACHIMPROVEINFORMATIONACCESSNEVERTHELESSTHEAMERICANMO
35、DELISALSONOTFREEFROMREGULATIONFAILURESASTHEPOSITIVETHEORYOFREGULATIONPOINTSOUTPELZMAN1976,PP211,SHEPERD1963,PP98,STIGLER,PP3BETTEREXANTEINFORMATIONMIGHTCONTRIBUTETOREDUCINGTHEPROBLEMOFADVERSESELECTIONYET,THEINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESWOULDSTILLBEBIGGERTHANINTHECASEOFPUBLICOWNERSHIPASTHEREGULATORYINSTITUT
36、IONSDONOTHAVETHESAMEACCESSTOCORPORATEPLANNINGANDACCOUNTINGDATAASTHEPUBLICOWNER6SUMMARYINTHEEUROPEANTRADITIONPUBLICOWNERSHIPANDREGULATIONARESEENASTWOINSTRUMENTSFORENSURINGTHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALSASSUPERVISORYBODIESFACEINFORMATIONDISADVANTAGESINBOTHCASESEXAMPLESFORINFORMATIONA
37、SYMMETRIES,IDENTIFIEDBYTHEPRINCIPALAGENTLITERATURE,CANBEFOUNDTAKINGTHEOBLIGATIONSERIOUSLYTHATPUBLICOWNERSHIPANDREGULATIONSHOULDENSURETHEFULFILMENTOFPUBLICFUNCTIONSMAKESITNECESSARYFORTHEPUBLICPRINCIPALTOMONITORIFANDHOWWELLTHESEAGENTSHAVEFULFILLEDTHEIRDUTIESAKEYELEMENTINMAKINGTHEAGENTACCOUNTABLEISTHEE
38、STABLISHMENTOFAGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDREPORTINGSYSTEMIFWELOOKATTHEPRESENTANNUALREPORTINGPROCEDUREAPPLYINGTOGERMANPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISES,REPORTINGONHOWWELLTHEPUBLICFUNCTIONSHAVEBEENCARRIEDOUT,ISNOTTHEMAINFOCUSOFTHEREPORTSINTHECASEOFREGULATION,NORMALLYTHEINFORMATIONDISADVANTAGESOFTHEPUBLICPRINCIPAL
39、SAREEVENBIGGERDUETOTHELEGALISTICAPPROACHREGULATORYBODIESHAVEAMUCHMORELIMITEDACCESSTOTHECOMPANYDATAOFTHEREGULATEDINDUSTRYTHATMAKESITEVENMOREDIFICULTTOEXERTAGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDCONTROLINTHECASEOFPUBLICSECTORSENTERPRISESAPUBLICFUNCTIONORIENTATEDINDICATORSYSTEMWHICHOPERATIONALIZESTHEENTREPRENEURIAL
40、PERFORMANCEOBJECTIVESMIGHTBEAMEANSOFIMPROVINGGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDACCOUNTABILITYINTHECASEOFREGULATIONTHEESTABLISHMENTOFAGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDREPORTINGPROCEDUREISMOREDIFICULTIMPROVEDINFORMATIONACCESSWOULDSTILLPUTTHEREGULATIONSUPERVISORYBODIESINAWEAKERPOSITIONTHANPUBLICOWNERSINBOTHCASESONEFOCU
41、SESONTHEDILEMMAOFTHEINCOMPLETENESSOFCONTRACTSSOURCEGENERALINTERESTORIENTATEDACCOUNTINGINPUBLICSECTORENTERPRISESANDREGULATEDINDUSTRIESJANNALSOFPUBLICANDCOOPERATIVEECONOMIC,1999,2261275译文国有企业和监管行业一般利益导向会计1、介绍公有制和监管被视为可确保公共职能的履行的两种选择。从委托代理人的角度看，国有企业和监管行业是其中的公共职能代理业主或立法者，作为管理者受市民委托与执行。这导致了一个适当的报告制度的问题，不
42、论公共职能是否履行，公众负责人都应该以真实的面貌提供信息。在这方面的一个问题是，现有的报告程序是否足够，或是否有需要改进传统的报告程序为市民业主或履行公共职能的监督机构提供监管所需的足够的信息了吗什么样的信息不对称现象确实存在监管机构已经推出哪些程序去减少信息的不对称问题是否需要改善现有的报告制度至于它的理论背景而言，这个文件主要是基于委托代理理论及其应用管理和公共所有权方面提出的处理，以下是六个章节的内容第一节介绍，第二节描述公众所有权和两种可能的调控力度，确保实现公共职能，第三节概述了典型的信息不对称委托代理理论，第四节主要从德国的观点考察公开负责人能在多大程度上对公众履行监督职能提供足够
43、的信息的现有系统，在现有的框架上第五节着眼于载改善措施的基础上提出目前采用的程序所具有的缺点，第六节包含一个总结。2、代理商的公共职能如上所述公共部门的所有权和监管是公众负责人在履行职责时的两个方案，其他的方案通过公共管理、公共法律协会、授权私营经济实体或合同管理执行。在公共部门企业的中央，地区或本地个案当局业主以自身的身份参与。从历史上看，公有制一直是欧洲经济调控的主要模式（1996年的主要模式，第11页）。对于公共部门企业存在的理由直接来自一个事实，即他们履行代理公共职能。公共部门的企业，完全是需要被私有化的利润导向。根据辅助性原则，它是不合法的公共机构，只涉及自身在专门股东价值最大化的努
44、力。由于公共职能的履行确定了公共部门企业的合法性，性能或材料的目标是占主导地位的企业目标。公营部门的主要任务是为缔约方提供公共商品和第三方服务。公共部门企业以企业的存在为前提，财务目标只有一个，但他们却没有给予优先。他们作为所有者的地位，给予公共部门一个奠定哪些是需要履行的公共职能的机会。通过企业监督机构，公共业主有可能监察公共职能在管理循环所有阶段的履行。重要的决策往往需要企业监管机构的批准。报告义务也为国有企业在企业管理的公共部门和企业的监督机构之间建立了定期的信息交换系统。在管理的情况下，公共权力拥有者不把自己看作权力拥有者，而是通过具体的立法部门施加自己的影响力。规章的典型规范性或新古
45、典原因是（米勒和博赫尔森1979年，第31页，凯尼皮1988年，第39页，克拉考斯基1988年，第19页），从福利经济学角度看，市场失灵是一个从区域倾向、信息失效走向自然垄断，消极客观性，恶性竞争和公共产品提供不充分的市场化进程。每当新古典福利经济学的条件不被遵守时就会出现市场失灵。一个比监管更广泛的概念是由汉斯冯和提梅尔提出，汉斯冯（1958年，第6页）证明正当调控不仅要提高资源配置效率，而且作为一种来管制所有制结构调整的手段，不论是否完成都应该通过具体部门的立法以确保公共部门的职能。提梅尔直接把规章与公众职能的履行联系起来。欧洲古典调控手段是制定市场准入和市场退出的权限，强制合同义务，价格
46、控制系统，性能和质量标准，以及各种审批程序，例如关于公共时间表运输或合同的条款。在德国，监管部门包括公用事业，银行和保险工业以及交通运输和电信。专项整治活动提供了法律监管框架。所以在欧洲，特别是会议形式的监督机构委员会，部际委员会，公共管理部门（如挪威邮政和电信管理局），独立机构（如电信管理局办公室主任（爱尔兰），办公室电信管理局局长（国际），有时公开被调控的产业是否根据立法要求经营。该监管机构的方案，对所管辖行业施加的影响远比在公有制的情况下有限。管理机构不把公共职能的履行放在被调控的产业的企业宗旨的中心。因此，被调控产业的企业认为自己不是尽国有部门职责的直接代理。公有制的可能性，为以控制为
47、导向的治理提供了更好的选择。3、信息不对称的委托代理关系为履行公共职能，回顾已经存在的委托代理关系，市民业主及/或监管当局分别根据阿罗（阿罗1985年，第37页）主要的代理关系可以概括如下有两个当事人代理人的行动影响了双方的福利主要观察代理的结果，并从发现中得出结论。代理的行动不是直接由委托人观察的代理人的行动是影响结果，但不完全决定结果正常情况下，委托人确定委托代理专利机构所进行的任务以及规则，以指定的费用，以支付代理前它涉及到的一个合同信息存在不对称和不确定性关于获得信息，国有企业和监管机构都面临着典型的委托代理问题，即管理机构应更好的了解公众主体，一般情况下，委托代理理论区别以下类型的信
48、息不对称（如斯蒂格利茨1974年，霍尔斯特罗姆1979年，1979年沙维尔,克鲁斯和哈特1983年，阿罗1985）逆向选择代理人用他的信息优势去影响有利于他的合同条件,例如，在价格批准决定之前，一个有效的调节可以利用有关公司的成本结构的更好知识，避免告知关于它的价格下限的调整。为了处理这种信息不对称，英国电力管理办公室，例如，被授权调整批准的零售价格指数，如果企业通过提供残缺不全或不精确的信息误引了当时被设定的电力章程办公室价格错误校正的机制。德国电信法律在30条德国电信法中没有忽略同样的问题，允许在市场控制的情况下价格再调整过程。逆向选择问题同样也发生在公共部门企业。例如企业为决策部门提出建
49、议，由管理机构履行企业监管职能，管理方式酌情给予自由，以确保个人满足其目标。4、一般的利益为导向的报告程序为了确保公共服务的履行，公共部门企业或调节行业进行了公共职能有必要向公众告知信息。以一般利益为导向的报告制度，要求有能力的公告负责人评估国营部门企业或被调控的产业经营与他们的企业理念或管理职责是否一致。公共职能报告程序的履行，可以帮助减少现有的信息不对称，虽然从未消除。引入通用的利益为导向的报告程序是符合传统的管理方式，其中强调必须有唯一的报告得到完成，代理人的报告义务是了解代理行为的一种主要的方式，是一种控制机制，方便公众对主要的公共部门的企业或监管行业的监管。5、努力改善一般利益为导向的问责制51公共企业正如在前面的段落中提到的，在履行公众职能时，报告作为一种管理公共部门企业的方式，需要加以改进。缺乏目标的可操作性是一个问题，所建立的会计制度又不合适。52规例如上所示，该规例的监管机构所面对的通常是信息不对称的问题，甚至比它在国营部门企业的情况更严重。由各自区域立法考虑的信息存取是不适合报告公共职能的履行情况，但公众支持，与决策过程有关的各种调节手段或多或少有效。事实上，在私人所有权受管制行业并不认为他们自己是代理人。由于这些公司的合法性不是由于公共职能的履行而产生的，被调控的产业运用的退避战略将会更多。从
