1、1外文文献翻译原文VOLUNTARYCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALINITIATIVESANDSHAREHOLDERWEALTHRESEARCHERSDEBATEWHETHERENVIRONMENTALINVESTMENTSREDUCEFIRMVALUEORACTUALLYIMPROVEFINANCIALPERFORMANCEWEPROVIDESOMECOMPELLINGEVIDENCEONSHAREHOLDERWEALTHEFFECTSOFMEMBERSHIPINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALPROGRAMSVEPSCOMPANIESANNOUNCINGMEMBE
2、RSHIPINEPASCLIMATELEADERS,APROGRAMTARGETINGREDUCTIONSINGREENHOUSEGASEMISSIONS,EXPERIENCESIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVEABNORMALSTOCKRETURNSTHEPRICEDECLINEISLARGERINFIRMSWITHPOORCORPORATEGOVERNANCESTRUCTURES,ANDFORHIGHMARKETTOBOOKIE,HIGHGROWTHFIRMSHOWEVER,FIRMSJOININGCERES,APROGRAMINVOLVINGMOREGENERALENVIRONME
3、NTALCOMMITMENTS,HAVEINSIGNIFICANTANNOUNCEMENTRETURNS,ASDOPORTFOLIOSOFINDUSTRYRIVALSOVERALL,CORPORATECOMMITMENTSTOREDUCEGREENHOUSEGASEMISSIONSAPPEARTOCONFLICTWITHFIRMVALUEMAXIMIZATIONTHISHASIMPORTANTIMPLICATIONSFORPOLICIESTHATRELYONVOLUNTARYINITIATIVESTOADDRESSCLIMATECHANGEFURTHER,WEFINDTHATFIRMSTEND
4、TOJOINCLIMATELEADERSEITHERINRESPONSETOCLIMATERELATEDSHAREHOLDERRESOLUTIONSORDUETOWEAKCORPORATEGOVERNANCESTANDARDSWHICHGIVEMANAGERSTHEDISCRETIONTOMAKESUCHVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALLYRESPONSIBLEINVESTMENTDECISIONSDECISIONSTHATMAYRESULTINLOWERFIRMVALUEINTRODUCTIONARAPIDLYGROWINGCORPORATETRENDINRECENTYEARS,
5、THATHASMANYTAKINGNOTICE,ISTHENUMBEROFCOMPANIESENGAGEDINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALLYRESPONSIBLEVERACTIVITIESTHESEACTIVITIESSPANAWIDERANGE,INCLUDINGMEMBERSHIPINPUBLICVOLUNTARYPROGRAMSTHATENCOURAGEPOLLUTIONREDUCTIONS,UNILATERALEFFORTSBYCOMPANIESTOIMPROVETHEIRENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCE,ANDTHEVOLUNTARYPUBLICDI
6、SCLOSUREOFENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEMEASURESKHANNA,2001WITHTHISTREND,AGROWINGNUMBEROFPEOPLEAREASKINGWHETHERBETTERENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCE2TRANSLATESINTOHIGHERFINANCIALPERFORMANCECORPORATEINVESTMENTSINENVIRONMENTALTECHNOLOGIESHAVETRADITIONALLYBEENCONSIDEREDADRAINONAFIRMSRESOURCES,CREATINGANINHERENTCONF
7、LICTBETWEENENVIRONMENTALANDFINANCIALPERFORMANCEEGPALMERETAL,1995WALLEYANDWHITEHEAD,1994HOWEVER,OTHERSHAVEARGUEDTHATCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALRESPONSIBILITYCANACTUALLYIMPROVEFINANCIALPERFORMANCEPOTENTIALGAINSFROMIMPROVEDENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCECANRESULTFROMADIFFERENTIATIONOFPRODUCTINCREASINGCUSTOMERDEMAN
8、DANDHENCESALESAND/ORMARGINSBYSIGNALINGTHATTHECOMPANYIS“GREEN”,AREDUCTIONINTHERISKOFFUTUREENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESANDLAWSUITS,ANDACUTINPRODUCTIONCOSTSASARESULTOFPOLLUTIONREDUCINGMEASURESPORTERANDVANDERLINDE,1995REINHARDT,1999MOREOVER,IMPROVINGENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCECOULDSPURGOVERNMENTALREGULATORYACT
9、IONS,GIVINGTHEFIRSTMOVERFIRMSACOMPETITIVEADVANTAGEONCETHEIRINDUSTRYRIVALSAREFORCEDTOCOMPLYREINHARDT,1999THEEMPIRICALEVIDENCEONTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEANDFINANCIALPERFORMANCEHASBEENMIXEDSEVERALAPPROACHESHAVEBEENUSEDTOSTUDYTHISRELATIONSHIP1REGRESSIONANALYSIS2PORTFOLIOANALYSISAND3
10、EVENTSTUDIESREGRESSIONSTUDIESHAVEFOCUSEDONTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEANDACCOUNTINGHOWEVER,OTHERREGRESSIONSTUDIESEG,JAGGIANDFREEDMAN1992,MOLLOY,EREKSON,ANDGORMAN2002,ANDCLARKSONANDLI2004REPORTAMIXEDORNEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEMEASURESANDACCOUNTINGPROFITABIL
11、ITYALTHOUGHACLEAREXPLANATIONFORTHESECONTRASTINGRESULTSISNOTOBVIOUS,INGENERALITSEEMSTHATSTUDIESWHERETHEENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEMEASUREISTIEDTOLIABILITY,COMPLIANCE,ANDREGULATORYRISKSFINDAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEANDFINANCIALPERFORMANCETHISISCONSISTENTWITHTHEFINDINGSOFKHANNAAN
12、DDAMON1999,ANTONETAL2004,DARNALLETAL2008ANDBROUHLEETAL2009WHICHSHOWTHATLIABILITYANDREGULATORYTHREATSAREAMAJORMOTIVATIONFORFIRMSJOININGVOLUNTARYPROGRAMSLIKEEPAS33/50PROGRAMTOREDUCETOXICEMISSIONSANDADOPTINGENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSEMSADDITIONALLY,MALLOY,EREKSONANDGORMAN2002,INTHEIRSTUDYOFINVESTOR
13、PERCEPTIONS,FINDTHATENVIRONMENTAL3INVESTMENTSAREINTERPRETEDBYINVESTORSTORAISECOSTSRATHERTHANLOWERTHEM,EXCEPTINTHECASEWHERETHEFIRMWOULDFACENONCOMPLIANCEPENALTIESIFTHESEINVESTMENTSWERENOTMADETHISWOULDIMPLYTHATFIRMSSHOULDEXPERIENCEANEGATIVEIMPACTONFINANCIALPERFORMANCEFROMENVIRONMENTALINVESTMENTSUNLESST
14、HESEINVESTMENTSAREMADEINRESPONSETOLIABILITY,COMPLIANCE,ORREGULATORYTHREATSAFINDINGCONSISTENTWITHTHEEMPIRICALEVIDENCEPORTFOLIOANALYSISSTUDIESHAVEREPORTEDSIMILARRESULTSWHITE1996ANDGECZYETAL2005FINDTHATSOCIALLYORENVIRONMENTALLYRESPONSIBLEMUTUALFUNDSEARNLOWERRISKADJUSTEDRETURNSZIEGLERETAL2009FINDTHATANI
15、NVESTMENTSTRATEGYTHATBUYSSTOCKSOFFIRMSTHATAREMAKINGEFFORTSTOLOWERTHEIRGREENHOUSEGASEMISSIONSANDSELLSSTOCKSOFFIRMSWITHLITTLEORNOCLIMATECHANGEMITIGATIONEFFORTRESULTSINANEGATIVEABNORMALRETURNHOWEVER,COHEN,FENN,ANDKONAR1997ANDDERWALLETAL2005BOTHFINDTHATPORTFOLIOSCONTAININGSTOCKSOFCOMPANIESWITHHIGHENVIRO
16、NMENTALPERFORMANCESCORESHAVEPOSITIVERETURNSAND,INTHECASEOFDERWALLETAL2005,EVENOUTPERFORMPORTFOLIOSCONTAININGLOWENVIRONMENTALPERFORMINGCOMPANYSTOCKSTOUNDERSTANDTHESECONTRASTINGRESULTS,ITISIMPORTANTTOEXAMINETHEENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEMEASUREBEINGUSEDINEACHOFTHESESTUDIESINCOHEN,FENN,ANDKONAR1997,THEENV
17、IRONMENTALPERFORMANCESCOREISBASEDONTOXICRELEASEINVENTORYTRIDATAANDISAFUNCTIONOFTHEPROBABILITYOFNONCOMPLIANCEDETECTION,EXPECTEDSIZEOFSANCTIONS,ANDEXPECTEDREPUTATIONALLOSSALLFACTORSTHATWOULDRESULTINLOWERFIRMVALUEINDERWALLETAL2005,THEENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCERANKINGISBASEDONINNOVESTRANKINGSANDISAFUNCTIO
18、NOFHISTORICALLIABILITIES,OPERATINGRISK,ECOEFFICIENCYRISK,MANAGERIALRISK,ANDENVIRONMENTALLYRELATEDSTRATEGICBUSINESSOPPORTUNITIES,MANYOFWHICHWOULDRESULTINLOWERFIRMVALUETHESEFINDINGSAREALSOCONSISTENTWITHTHEPREDICTIONTHATFIRMSENGAGEDINENVIRONMENTALACTIVITIESTOLOWERRISKWILLEXPERIENCEPOSITIVERETURNSWHEREA
19、SFIRMSENGAGEDINTHESEACTIVITIESFOROTHERREASONSWILLNOTTHERESULTSFROMEVENTSTUDIESAREALSOCONSISTENTWITHTHISPREDICTIONHAMILTON1995,ANEVENTSTUDYBASEDONTRIDATARELEASES,FINDSTHATAFTERTHESEDATAAREMADEPUBLICLYAVAILABLE,FIRMSHIGHLIGHTEDINTHEPRESSDUETOTHEIRHIGHTOXICRELEASE4NUMBERSEARNSIGNIFICANTNEGATIVEABNORMAL
20、RETURNSTHUS,INVESTORSAREINTERPRETINGTHISNEWINFORMATIONASANINCREASEINTHEFIRMSLIABILITYORCOMPLIANCERISKTHATISLIKELYTORESULTININCREASEDCOSTSKLASSENANDMCLAUGHLIN1996FINDTHATENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEAWARDANNOUNCEMENTSRESULTINPOSITIVEABNORMALRETURNSWHILEENVIRONMENTALCRISISANNOUNCEMENTSRESULTINNEGATIVEABNOR
21、MALRETURNS,ALSOCONSISTENTWITHTHEPREDICTIONTHATINVESTORSWILLREWARDINFORMATIONTHATSUGGESTSAFUTUREINCREASEINFIRMVALUEANDPUNISHINFORMATIONTHATSUGGESTSADECLINEINFIRMVALUECAONDEFRANCIAANDGARCSAYERBE2009,INTHEIREVENTSTUDYOFISO14000CERTIFICATIONANNOUNCEMENTS,FINDTHATLESSPOLLUTINGANDLESSINTERNATIONALIZEDFIRM
22、SEXPERIENCEADROPINSTOCKPRICEAFTERTHEIRISO14000ANNOUNCEMENTTHEAUTHORSINTERPRETTHISASINVESTORSPERCEIVINGTHERESOURCESREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHISO14000CERTIFICATIONTOBECOSTLYTOTHEFIRMWITHLITTLEORNOOFFSETTINGBENEFITTHEPERVASIVEUSEOFENVIRONMENTALLIABILITYANDTOXICRELEASEDATAINMANYOFTHESEPREVIOUSSTUDIESREPORTING
23、APOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENENVIRONMENTALANDFINANCIALPERFORMANCE,HOWEVER,LIMITOURABILITYTOGENERALIZETHESERESULTTOINVESTMENTSUNRELATEDTOLIABILITY,COMPLIANCE,ANDREGULATORYRISKSVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALPROGRAMSRELATEDTOCLIMATECHANGE,FORINSTANCE,ORIGINATEFROMASTARKLYDIFFERENTREGULATORYCONTEXTMOSTGREENHOUSE
24、GASESGHGARECURRENTLYNOTREGULATEDBYTHEUSENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCYEPAALTHOUGHANUMBEROFREGIONALCLIMATEINITIATIVESEG,THEWESTERNCLIMATEINITIATIVE,THEREGIONALGREENHOUSEGASINITIATIVE,ANDTHEMIDWESTGREENHOUSEGASREDUCTIONACCORDHAVERECENTLYBEENESTABLISHED,MANYOFWHICHONLYTARGETTHEELECTRICPOWERSECTORANDLARGE
25、INDUSTRIALSOURCESASARESULT,LIABILITY,COMPLIANCE,ANDREGULATORYRISKSRELATEDTOCLIMATEARENOTSOCLEARHOWDOINVESTORSINTERPRETCLIMATERELATEDENVIRONMENTALINVESTMENTSASACOSTTOTHEFIRMWITHNOOFFSETTINGBENEFITSIMILARTOTHEFINDINGSOFCAONDEFRANCIAANDGARCSAYERBE2009OR,WILLINVESTORSPERCEIVETHESEINVESTMENTSASADDINGFIRM
26、VALUEORAVOIDINGFUTURECOSTSTOTHEFIRMSIMILARTORUSSOANDFOUTS1997ANDKINGANDLENOX2001ASEMPHASIZEDINKINGANDLENOX2001,THEAPPROPRIATEQUESTIONMAYNOTBE,“DOESITPAYTOBEGREEN”BUTRATHER“WHENDOESITPAYTOBEGREEN”5ENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCETHEDEGREETOWHICHFIRMSRELYONENERGYASANINPUTTOTHEPRODUCTIONPROCESSVARIESACROSSINDU
27、STRIESWECLASSIFYINDUSTRIESBASEDONTHEIROVERALLUSEOFFOSSILFUELS,APPLYINGCRITERIAFROMTHECARBONDISCLOSUREPROJECTONEHALFOFTHESAMPLEFIRMS53AREININDUSTRIESWITHCARBONINTENSIVEPRODUCTIONNOTSURPRISINGLY,THEFRACTIONOFFIRMSINCARBONINTENSIVEINDUSTRIESISLOWERFORCERESTHANFORFIRMSANNOUNCINGAGHGREDUCTIONGOAL45VERSUS
28、61,REFLECTINGTHELOWERPROPORTIONOFMANUFACTURINGFIRMSJOININGCERESTHEMAJORITYOFSAMPLEFIRMS70FIRMSOR60AREINCORPORATEDINASTATEPARTICIPATINGINTHEREGIONALGREENHOUSEGASINITIATIVERGGI,WHILEONLYTHREESAMPLEFIRMS3AREHEADQUARTEREDINAWESTERNCLIMATEINITIATIVEWCISTATE,TWOOFWHICHJOINEDTHECERESPROGRAMWEAREABLETOFINDI
29、NFORMATIONONTHEINITIALGOALFORTHEREDUCTIONOFGREENHOUSEGASEMISSIONSFROMTHEFIRMSSUSTAINABILITYREPORTSFOR19FIRMSJOININGCLIMATELEADERSANDFORALL23FIRMSINTHEGHGSAMPLETHEAVERAGEGOALISA16REDUCTIONOFGREENHOUSEGASESMEDIAN15,WITHTHESMALLESTGOALSETATA4EMISSIONREDUCTIONTHEMOSTAGGRESSIVEGOALISSETBYUNITEDTECHNOLOGI
30、ESCORPORATION,WHOINITIALLYPLEDGEDTOREDUCEITSGREENHOUSEGASEMISSIONSBY46PERDOLLARREVENUEOVERAFIVEYEARPERIODNONEOFTHESAMPLEFIRMSHAVENETZEROGOALSINVOLVINGTHEPURCHASEOFOFFSETPROJECTSTHEAVERAGECOMPANYHOPESTOREACHITSEMISSIONSREDUCTIONGOALINALMOSTSEVENYEARSTHEREISLITTLEDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHEFIRMSINTHECLANDGHG
31、SAMPLESWITHRESPECTTOTHESIZEOFTHEANNOUNCEDGREENHOUSEGASREDUCTIONGOALSANDTHETIMEHORIZONREPORTEDTOREACHTHESEGOALSKLDRESEARCHANDANALYTICS,INCPROVIDESYEARLYASSESSMENTSOFCOMPANYENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEINTHEIRPRODUCT,KLDSTATSWEUSEKLDSTATSTOGAUGETHEENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEOFTHESAMPLEFIRMSINTHEYEARPRIORTOTHE
32、ANNOUNCEMENTKLDRATESCOMPANIESWITHAONEIFPRESENTORZEROIFABSENTINFIVEAREASOFENVIRONMENTALSTRENGTHSANDSEVENAREASOFENVIRONMENTALCONCERNSTHEENVIRONMENTALSTRENGTHSINCLUDEREVENUEFROMENVIRONMENTALSERVICES,PROGRAMSFORPOLLUTIONPREVENTION,ANDTHEUSEOFRECYCLEDMATERIALSANDCLEANENERGY,WHILEENVIRONMENTALCONCERNSINCL
33、UDELIABILITIESFORHAZARDOUSWASTESITES,VIOLATIONSOF6ENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONS,MANUFACTURINGOFOZONEDEPLETINGANDAGRICULTURALCHEMICALS,EMISSIONSOFTOXICCHEMICALS,ANDREVENUEDERIVEDFROMTHESALEOFFOSSILFUELSASSHOWNINTABLE3,WEFOCUSONTWOENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEMEASURESTHENUMBEROFENVIRONMENTALSTRENGTHSANDTHENUMBE
34、ROFENVIRONMENTALCONCERNSWEAREABLETOIDENTIFYKLDRECORDSFOR99SAMPLEFIRMSAND1,246UNIQUEINDUSTRYYEARRIVALSASSHOWNINTABLE3,THEAVERAGEFIRMRANKSLOWERONITSENVIRONMENTALSTRENGTHSTHANITSCONCERNS047VERSUS079,REFLECTINGTHELOWERNUMBEROFSTRENGTHSTHANCONCERNSFIVEVERSUSSEVENTHECOMPANIESINCERESHAVEABETTEROVERALLPREAN
35、NOUNCEMENTENVIRONMENTALSTANDINGTHANFIRMSINCLIMATELEADERS,WITHAMEANSCOREOF043FORENVIRONMENTALCONCERNSAND057FORENVIRONMENTALSTRENGTHSVERSUS081FORENVIRONMENTALCONCERNSAND039FORENVIRONMENTALSTRENGTHSINTHECASEOFTHECLFIRMSMOREOVER,87OFTHECERESFIRMSHAVEANENVIRONMENTALCONCERNSSCOREEQUALTOORHIGHERTHANTHEIRRE
36、SPECTIVEAVERAGEINDUSTRYRIVALINTERESTINGLY,THESAMPLEFIRMSFORGHGGOALSANDCERESRATESIGNIFICANTLYHIGHERTHANTHEIRRESPECTIVEAVERAGECOMPETITORONENVIRONMENTALSTRENGTHSTHEHIGHESTAVERAGENUMBEROFSTRENGTHS067ISASSOCIATEDWITHFIRMSDECLARINGAGREENHOUSEGASREDUCTIONGOALTHEREISNODISCERNIBLEDIFFERENCEBETWEENTHESAMPLEFI
37、RMSANDTHEIRRIVALSINTHEENVIRONMENTALCONCERNSSCORETHECERESFIRMS,HOWEVER,HAVEONAVERAGEFEWERCONCERNSTHANFIRMSINTHECLIMATELEADERSPROGRAMOVERALL,THESAMPLEFIRMSFORGHGGOALSANDCERESHAVEANENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEEQUALTOORBETTERTHANTHEIRAVERAGEINDUSTRYCOMPETITORINTHEYEARPRIORTOTHEEVENTTABLE3ALSOSHOWSHOWSAMPLEF
38、IRMSRANKONTWOCORPORATEGOVERNANCECHARACTERISTICS,BOTHFROMRISKMETRICSTHEFIRSTISTHEGOMPERSISHIIMETRICKGIMINDEXFROMTHEGOVERNANCEDATABASE,MEASURINGTHENUMBEROFPROVISIONTHATRESTRICTSSHAREHOLDERSRIGHTSTHEMAXIMUMNUMBEROFSUCHPROVISIONSIS18ANDTHEHIGHERTHEINDEXTHEWEAKERARESHAREHOLDERRIGHTSWEAREABLETOOBTAINTHEGI
39、MINDEXFOR96OFTHESAMPLEFIRMSTHEAVERAGERANKONTHEGIMINDEXIS95MEDIAN90,RANGINGFROMALOWOFFOURTOAHIGHOF16THESECONDMEASUREISTHENUMBEROFSHAREHOLDERPROPOSALSRELATEDTOCLIMATECHANGEFILEDINTHEYEAROFANDTHEYEARPRIOR7TOTHEEVENTFROMTHESHAREHOLDERPROPOSALDATABASEACROSSALLFIRMSINTHESAMPLE,THEAVERAGENUMBEROFCLIMATEREL
40、ATEDPROPOSALSFROMSHAREHOLDERACTIVISTSIS012SOURCEKARENFISHERVANDEN，KARINSTHORBURNVOLUNTARYCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALINITIATIVESANDSHAREHOLDERWEALTHJ/OLHTTP/PAPERSSSRNCOM/SOL3/PAPERSCFMABSTRACT_ID1324983，20106148译文企业自愿性环保措施及股东财富研究人员争论环境投资是会降低公司价值还是会真实地改善财务绩效。对此我们提供一些令人信服的证据关于在自愿环保计划中的股东财富效应VEPS。许多公司宣布成为美国
41、环保署的“气候领导者”的会员，该项目以减少温室气体排放量作为目标，体验反常的股价波动。公司治理结构差的和对市场预期高的（高增长）的公司，价格下降的更大。然而，加入CERES计划的企业，该计划涉及更广泛的环境承诺，已经公布作为行业的竞争对手其投资组合回报微不足道。总体而言，企业承诺减少温室气体排放量似乎与公司价值最大化冲突。这对依赖于采取自愿措施以应对气候变化具有重要的意义。此外，我们还发现企业会倾向于加入“气候领导者”，无论是在应对与气候相关的股东决议还是由于较低的企业管理水平，都给了管理人员自由裁量和自愿负起环境责任的投资决策可能导致公司价值降低的决策。简介近年来，一个趋于快速成长的企业需要
42、注意的是许多公司正忙于自愿环保（VER）的活动。这些活动范围广泛，包括成员在公共场合鼓励减少污染的工作计划，公司单方面的努力以改善其环境表现以及自愿公开披露环境绩效的措施（卡纳，2001）。随着这种趋势，越来越多的人在询问更好的环境绩效是否会转变为更高的财务绩效。企业在环保技术上的投资历来被认为是消耗企业资源，这造成了环境绩效和财务绩效之间的内在冲突（如帕尔默等人，1995年瓦莱和WHITEHEAD，1994）。然而，其他人都认为企业环保责任可以改善财务绩效。来自改善环境绩效而产生的潜在收益可以导致产品的差异（增加客户需求从而增加销售和/或利润），通过发出企业是“绿色”的信号，这是一个减少未来
43、环境负责风险、诉讼费用和由于削减污染的措施而减少的产品成本的信号（波特和VANDER林德，1995莱因哈特，1999）。此外，改善环境绩效可能会刺激政府的监管行动，给最先采取环境绩效措施的企业一个竞争优势，从而他们的行业竞争对手也被迫采取措施（莱因哈特，1999）。关于环境绩效和财务绩效关系的实证研究已经被混淆。几种方法已被用于研究这种关系（1）回归分析，（2）组合分析，（3）实证研究。回归研究都9集中在环境绩效与会计之间的关系。然而，其他回归研究，例如，JAGGI和弗里德曼（1992），莫洛伊，EREKSON和戈曼（2002），CLARKSON和李（2004）提到，在环境绩效措施和会计盈利能
44、力之间存在混合或负相关关系。虽然这些对比结果的解释不是很明显，但总体上看来，在对环境绩效措施与责任、遵守法规和监管风险相联系的研究中发现环境绩效和财务绩效之间存在一个正相关关系。这与KHANNA与达蒙（1999年）、安东（2004年）、达纳尔（2008年）和BROUHLE（2009）的调查发现相一致，该结果表明赔偿责任和监管威胁是企业加入自愿环保计划的主要动机，如环保署的用以减少有毒物质排放和采取环境管理系统（EMS）的33/50计划。此外，马洛伊，EREKSON和戈曼（2002年）在投资者洞察力的研究中发现环保投资被投资者用来解释成本的增加（而不是降低），除了公司面临违约处罚时需要不可缺少的
45、投资的情况外。这意味着，企业要经历一个来自环境绩效对财务绩效审计的负面影响，除非这些投资是用以赔偿责任、遵守法规或监管威胁的这一发现与实证研究相一致。投资组合分析研究报告了类似的结果。WHITE（1996）和GECZY（2005年）发现，社会或环境责任的共同专款赚取低风险调整回报。齐格勒（2009）发现，购买股票的公司的投资策略是正在努力降低温室气体排放量，而销售股票的公司很少或根本没有做减缓气候变化的努力，结果导致一个负的异常报酬。然而，科恩、芬恩与科纳雷（1997年）和DERWALL（2005）都发现投资组合中包含环境绩效成绩较高的股份企业有积极的回报，在这种情况下DERWALL（2005
46、年）提到，这甚至较投资组合中包含环境绩效审计成绩低的公司股票优越。为了了解这些对比结果，检查环境绩效措施在每项研究中的运用是很重要的。在科恩，芬恩和科纳雷（1997年）的研究中提到，环境绩效评分是根据有毒物质排放清单（TRI）上的数据得出的，环境绩效评分具有发现可能违规行为的功能，用来预计制裁的轻重和预期名誉损失的大小所有这些因素将导致公司价值的降低。在DERWALL（2005年）的研究中提到，环境绩效排名是根据国际管理咨询公司的排名进行的，环境绩效排名可以观察到一个公司的历史负债功能、经营风险、生态效益风险、管理风险以及与环境有关的战略性商业机会，其中许多因素会导致公司价值的降低。这些结果也
47、与预测一致，即从事环保活动来降低10风险的公司将有一个积极的回报，而由于其它原因从事那些活动的公司将不会有。实证研究的结果也与这一预测一致。HAMILTION（1995年）提到，根据TRI上的相关数据进行实证研究，发现这些数据被公开后，公司最突出的优势在减小由于他们较高的有毒物质排放的相关数据造成重大的消极的反常的回报。因此，投资者正在解释因为一个公司的责任或合规风险的增加而可能导致成本增加的新信息。KLASSEN和MCLAUGHLIN（1996）发现，环境绩效成就奖的公布导致积极地异常报酬，而环境危机的公布导致消极的异常报酬，这也与预测一致，该预测是说投资者将酬谢暗示公司价值在未来增加的信息
48、和痛击暗示公司价值下降的信息。CAONDEFRANCIA和GARCSAYERBE2009在ISO14000认证公告实证研究中发现少污染、少国际化的公司在ISO14000公布后经历了股票价格的下跌过程。作者们解释了这个现象，因为投资者察觉到对资源的使用要符合ISO14000认证要求是昂贵的，公司很少或根本没有利益。以前在许多的关于普遍使用环境责任和有毒物质排放数据的研究中，报告到环境绩效和财务绩效之间存在正相关关系，然而，限制了我们归纳这些的能力，结果导致投资与责任、遵守法规和监管风险没有关系。涉及气候变化的自愿环保计划，例如，来自一个完全不同的监管环境目前美国没有规定的大部分温室气体（GHG）
49、。环境保护署（EPA）虽然最近已成立区域气候倡议（例如，西部气候倡议、区域温室气体倡议和中西部地区温室气体减量协议），但是其中许多只针对电力部门和大的工业污染源。因此，责任、合规，以及涉及气候的监管风险没有那么明确。投资者如何解释涉及气候的环境投资是对于没有抵消成本的公司利益，类似于CAONDEFRANCIA和GARCSAYERBE2009发现的那样还是投资者认为这些投资作为增加企业价值或避免公司未来的成本，类似于RUSSO和FOUTS1997，KING和LENOX2001的研究正如KING和LENOX2001强调的那样，正确的问题可能不是“它是绿色的支付吗”，而是“什么时候支付是绿色的”环境绩效公司对作为生产过程中投入的能源的依赖程度各行业各不相同。研究样本中我们对行业的分类是根据他们对化石燃料的整体使用和应用碳排放披露计划11的标准进行的，其中一半的样本公司（53）是碳密集型生产行业。毫不奇怪，加入CERES计划的小部分的碳密集型公司低于其宣布的温室气体减排的目标（45比61），这反映了制造企业加入CERES计划的比例较低。大部分的样本公司（70个或60）是区域温室气体倡议（RGGI）的参加国，而只有三个样本公司（3）被设立西部气候倡议（WCI）总部的情形，其中两个加入了CERES计划。我们能够从公司可持续发展的报告中找到关于加入“气候领导
