1、外文翻译原文THEMANAGEMENTOFREPORTEDEARNINGSTOAVOIDPOLITICALCOSTSASTUDYOFSAUDIARABIANFIRMSINTRODUCTIONAFTERTHE2006ACCOUNTINGRELATEDSCANDALSINSAUDIARABIAEGANAAMINTERNATIONALHOLDINGGROUPANDBISHAHAGRICULTUREDEVELOPMENTCOMPANY,BOTHTHEFINANCIALPRESSANDACCOUNTINGREGULATORSAUDIORGANIZATIONFORCERTIFEDPUBLICACCOUNT
2、ANTS,HEREAFTERSOCPAHAVEEXPRESSEDCONCERNABOUTTHEPERVASIVENESSOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDTHEOVERALLINTEGRITYOFFINANCIALREPORTINGINSAUDIARABIATHEACCOUNTINGEMPIRICALLITERATUREINSAUDIARABIAINDICATESTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBEHAVIOURDOESEXISTAMONGSAUDILISTEDCOMPANIESALMOGHAIWLI2001FOCUSEDONASINGLEACCOUNTINGPOLIC
3、Y,NAMELYTHEZAKATPOLICY,ANDPROVIDEDEMPIRICALEVIDENCEONTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEACCOUNTINGTREATMENTOFZAKATBY48SAUDILISTEDCOMPANIESIN1995ANDINCENTIVESFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTALSEHALI2006TESTEDTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENAGGREGATEACCRUALSANDINCENTIVESFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTHEFOUNDTHAT,DURINGTHEPERIOD20012004,MANAG
4、ERSOF40SAUDICOMPANIESMANIPULATEACCRUALSINORDERTOREACHSPECIFICBENCHMARKSINTHELEVELOFREPORTEDEARNINGSANDUNDERSTATEANYREALUNFAVOURABLEEARNINGSEGEARNINGSLOSSESOREARNINGSDECREASESTHISSTUDYISSOMEWHATSIMILARTOTHESTUDIESOFALMOGHAIWLI2001ANDALSEHALI2006INTHATITSAIMISTOEMPIRICALLYINVESTIGATETHEFACTORSTHATMAYE
5、XPLAINTHEPRESENCEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINSAUDIARABIAHOWEVER,OURSTUDYDIFFERSFROMTHETWOSAUDISTUDIESINTHATITDEVELOPSANEXPLICITLINKBETWEENTHEPOLITICALPROCESSINSAUDIARABIAANDITSEFFECTONCONDUCTINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBEHAVIOURMORESPECIFICALLY,THECURRENTSTUDYPREDICTSTHATMANAGERSOFSAUDILISTEDCOMPANIESMANAGEREPOR
6、TEDEARNINGSSOASTOAVOIDTHEPOTENTIALPOLITICALCOSTSOFTHEGOALSOFTHE20052009SAUDIDEVELOPMENTPLANINCLUDING“PRIVATISATIONOFGOVERNMENTOWNEDENTERPRISES”,“ENDTOTHESUBSIDISATION”,AND“REPLACEMENTOFFOREIGNLABOURWITHSAUDIWORKERS”FURTHERMORE,WEFOLLOWTHEWORKOFDECHOW,SLOAN,ANDSWEENEY1995ANDLEUZ,NANDA,ANDWYSOCKI2003I
7、NMEASURINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBYINCOMESMOOTHINGVARIABLE,WHICHISEQUALTOONEMINUSTHECONTEMPORANEOUSCORRELATIONBETWEENTHECHANGEINACCOUNTINGACCRUALSANDTHECHANGEINOPERATINGCASHFOWWEEXPECTTHATTHISMETHODWOULDPRODUCEAMOREREFINEDTESTOFTHERESEARCHHYPOTHESESANDENHANCETHERELIABILITYOFOURSTUDYTHECURRENTSTUDYMIGHTAL
8、SOUNIQUEASITOFFERSSOCPANEWEVIDENCEONWHETHERMANAGERSPOLITICALINCENTIVESINSAUDIARABIAINFLUENCEREPORTEDEARNINGS,GIVENTHATSUCHEVIDENCEENABLESANIMPROVEDUNDERSTANDINGOFTHESIGNIFICANTEFFECTOFACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSONRESOURCEALLOCATIONSAUDISTOCKMARKETOVERTHEPERIOD20052007THESTUDYSMULTIVARIATETESTRESULTSCONFIRMO
9、UREXPECTATIONMANAGERSOFSAUDILISTEDCOMPANIESWHICHARELARGEANDHAVEHIGHRATIOOFFOREIGNEMPLOYEESTOTOTALEMPLOYEESTENDTOMANAGEEARNINGSTOAVOIDPOTENTIALPOLITICALCOSTSTHEREMAINDEROFTHEPAPERISORGANISEDASFOLLOWSINSECTION2,WEBRIEFLYREVIEWPRIORLITERATUREONEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHISPROVIDESTHENECESSARYBACKGROUNDFORTHER
10、ESEARCHHYPOTHESESWHICHAREDEVELOPEDINSECTION3SECTION4PRESENTSTHESAMPLEANDVARIABLESSELECTIONANDDATACOLLECTIONSECTION5PROVIDESDESCRIPTIVESTATISTICSONTHETESTSANDCONTROLLEDVARIABLESANDPRESENTSRESULTSTHATRELATETOCROSSSECTIONALANALYSESOFTHESEVARIABLESCONCLUDINGREMARKSANDFUTURERESEARCHAREOFFEREDINSECTION6PR
11、IORRESEARCHONEARNINGSMANAGEMENTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISTHEALTERINGOFREPORTEDFINANCIALINFORMATIONBYMANAGERSTO“INFLUENCECONTRACTUALOUTCOMESTHATDEPENDONREPORTEDACCOUNTINGNUMBERS”SCHIPPER,1989HEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTLITERATURE,INFACT,ADOPTSTHEVIEWTHATAFIRMISANEXUSOFEXPLICITANDIMPLICITCONTRACTSANDEACHSETOFPARTIC
12、IPANTSINTHECONTRACTSWILLSEEKTOPURSUETHEIROWNSELFINTERESTATTHEEXPENSEOFOTHERPARTICIPANTSINTHECONTEXTOFAFRMINTHEPRIVATESECTOR,THESELFINTERESTEDBEHAVIOUROFAFIRMSPARTICIPANTSPRODUCESTWOPOSSIBLECONFLICTSTHECONFLICTBETWEENMANAGEMENTANDSHAREHOLDERSWHEREBYMANAGERSMAYTAKEDECISIONSTHATMAXIMISETHEIROWNEXPECTED
13、UTILITY/WEALTHRATHERTHANTHESHAREHOLDERSEXPECTEDUTILITY/WEALTH,ANDTHECONFLICTBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDDEBTHOLDERSWHEREBYSHAREHOLDERSMAYTAKEDECISIONSTHATARENOTINTHEBESTINTERESTSOFDEBTHOLDERSTHEBONUSPLANMOTIVATIONISANEXAMPLEONTHECONFLICTOFINTERESTBETWEENAFIRMSMANAGERSANDSHAREHOLDERSTHISMOTIVATIONGUIDRY,LE
14、ONE,ANDROCK,1999GAVER,GAVER,ANDAUSTIN,1995MCNICHOLSANDWILSON,1988HEALY,1985SUGGESTSTHATMANAGERSMAYENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOMAXIMISECOMPENSATIONTHISHAPPENSWHENCOMPENSATIONISATLEASTPARTIALLYRELATEDTOPROFITABILITYRESULTSTHEBASICFORMULATIONOFTHEBONUSPLANHYPOTHESISHEALY,1985STATESTHATMANAGERSTE
15、NDTOREDUCEEARNINGSIFTHEYAREEITHERABOVETHEUPPER,ORBELOWTHELOWER,BONUSPLANLIMIT,WHILETHEYTENDTOINCREASEEARNINGSWHENTHEYAREINBETWEENTHETWOLIMITSTHECONFLICTOFINTERESTBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDDEBTHOLDERSGIVESRISETOTHEAGENCYCOSTSOFDEBTTHESEAGENCYCOSTSAREBORNEBYSHAREHOLDERSIFNOACTIONISTAKENTOREDUCETHEMBYMONIT
16、ORINGANDBONDINGDEVICESTHEREFORE,ITISASSUMEDTHATSHAREHOLDERSHAVEINCENTIVESTOENTERINTOMONITORINGANDBONDINGCONTRACTS,WHICHUSUALLYINCLUDECOVENANTSRESTRICTINGTHEIRABILITYTOENGAGEINOPPORTUNISTICBEHAVIOURTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTLITERATUREEGRISHARDSON,TUNA,ANDWU,2002SWEENEY,1994PRESSANDWEINTROP,1990MAINTAINSTH
17、ATMANAGERSHAVETHEINCENTIVETOMANAGEEARNINGSTOAVOIDVIOLATINGCOVENANTSINDEBTCONTRACTSMORESPECIFICALLY,THELITERATURESUGGESTSTHATMANAGERSTENDTOINCREASEEARNINGSWHENTHEYARECLOSETOTHEVIOLATIONOFCOVENANTSBASEDONPROFITABILITY,INORDERTOAVOIDTHERISKOFCANCELLATIONORRENEGOTIATIONOFDEBTINTHEIRAGGREGATEDEARNINGSMAN
18、AGEMENTSTUDY,HEALYANDWAHLEN1999ALSOSTATEDTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINCLUDETHEALTERINGOFREPORTEDFINANCIALINFORMATIONBYMANAGERSTOMISLEADSOMEOUTSIDERSABOUTTHEUNDERLYINGECONOMICPERFORMANCEOFTHECOMPANYMANAGERS,FORINSTANCE,CANEXERCISEDISCRETIONINTHEPREPARATIONOFFINANCIALSTATEMENTSTOOVERSTATETHETRUELEVELOFEARN
19、INGSANDUNDERSTATEANYREALUNFAVOURABLEEARNINGSEGEARNINGSLOSSESOREARNINGSDECREASESCHIH,SHEN,ANDKANG2008,ALSEHALI2006,BHATTACHARYA,DAOUK,ANDWELKER2003,BUCKMASTER2001,TRUEMANANDTITMAN1988,AMONGSTOTHERS,SUGGESTTHATMANAGERSSTRIVETOAVOIDSIGNIFICANTFLUCTUATIONSINTHEIRREPORTEDEARNINGSANDTOAVOIDREPORTINGADECRE
20、ASEININCOMEFIGURESTHEYFOUNDTHATWHENTHECURRENTPROFITABILITYISPARTICULARLYLOWHIGH,MANAGERSTENDTOUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOINCREASEDECREASEEARNINGSANDTOREPORTSMOOTHERRESULTSALSO,WHENCURRENTPROFITABILITYISBELOWRECENTPASTPROFITABILITY,MANAGERSENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINORDERTOINCREASETHEIRREPORTEDIN
21、COMEANDSIGNALTHEIREXPECTEDRATEOFEARNINGSGROWTHTHISISUSUALLYDONEBECAUSETHESTOCKMARKETTENDSTOAPPRECIATESMOOTHEARNINGSSTREAMSANDREACTSNEGATIVELYTOEARNINGSDECREASEMANAGERSMAYALSOEXERCISEDISCRETIONINTHEPREPARATIONOFFINANCIALSTATEMENTSANDHENCETHEUNDERLYINGECONOMICPERFORMANCEOFTHECOMPANYSOASTOAVOIDPOLITICA
22、LCOSTSRESULTINGFROMGOVERNMENTINTERVENTIONMORESPECIFICALLY,THISPOLITICALCOSTMOTIVATIONVILLALONGA,ANDAMIT,2006CRISMAN,CHUA,ANDLITZ,2004AGGIANDLEE,2002SWEENEY,1994WATTSANDZIMMERMANN,1986SUGGESTSTHATMANAGERSOFCOMPANIESWHICHAREPOLITICALLYVISIBLEHAVETHEINCENTIVETOMANAGEEARNINGSTOAVOIDWEALTHTRANSFERSRESULT
23、INGFROMGOVERNMENTINTERVENTIONTHEMOTIVATIONFORTHECURRENTSTUDYISDRAWNFROMTHISPOLITICALCOSTHYPOTHESISWHICHISTHEORISEDBELOWRESEARCHHYPOTHESESTHEECONOMYOFSAUDIARABIAHASBEENDEVELOPEDTHROUGHASERIESOFFIVEYEARPLANS,THEFIRSTOFWHICHCOMMENCEDIN1970THEEIGHTHFIVEYEARDEVELOPMENTPLAN,COVERINGTHEPERIOD20052009,OFFIC
24、IALLYCOMMITSTHEGOVERNMENTTOFOURPRINCIPALECONOMICGOALS1ABALANCEDBUDGET,2THEPRIVATISATIONOFGOVERNMENTOWNEDENTERPRISES,3ANENDTOTHESUBSIDISATIONOFSAUDIINDUSTRYANDPUBLICUTILITIES,AND4THEREPLACEMENTOFFOREIGNLABOURWITHSAUDIWORKERSWEARGUETHATTHEGOALSOFTHISFIVEYEARPLANENCOMPASSPOTENTIALWEALTHTRANSFERSPOLITIC
25、ALCOSTSONTHEONEHAND,THEGOALSOFPRIVATISATION,ENDTOSUBSIDISATION,ANDREPLACEMENTOFFOREIGNLABOURWITHSAUDIWORKERSWILLINCREASETHEFNANCIALRESOURCESAVAILABLETOTHEGOVERNMENTANDENABLEITTOREDUCEITSBUDGETDEFICITSONTHEOTHERHAND,THESEGOALSWILLIMPOSEUNFAVOURABLEWEALTHTRANSFERSONCOMPANIESOPERATINGINTHEPRIVATESECTOR
26、FORINSTANCE,CONSIDERTHESTRATEGICECONOMICGOALOFPRIVATISATION,ONEASPECTOFPRIVATISATIONISTHESALEOFSTATEHELDSHARESGIVENTHATONETHIRDOFTHESHARESOFSAUDICOMPANIESABOUT40PERCENTOFTHESTOCKMARKETSCAPITALISATIONWEREHELDBYTHESAUDIGOVERNMENTINDECEMBER2007,THEREMIGHTSOMEPROBABILITYTHATTHESALEOFSTATEOWNEDSHARESWILL
27、LEADTOLOWERSTOCKPRICESALSO,ANOTHERASPECTOFPRIVATISATIONISDEREGULATIONOFMONOPOLIES,IEFORESTALLINGMONOPOLYACTIVITIESANDENHANCINGCOMPETITIONTHISIMPLIESTHATTHESAUDIGOVERNMENTWILLENCOURAGEOTHERFIRMSTOENTERTHEAFFECTEDINDUSTRIESANDTHEREFORE,THEREWILLBEAPOSSIBILITYTHATTHEVALUEOFTHESHARESOFEXISTINGCOMPANIESW
28、ILLDECLINEINSUM,WEARGUETHATSAUDICOMPANIESWILLBEARRELATIVELYLARGEWEALTHTRANSFERSPOLITICALCOSTSASARESULTOFTHEGOVERNMENTS20052009DEVELOPMENTPLANANDASACONSEQUENCE,MANAGERSOFTHESECOMPANIESWILLHAVEINCENTIVESTOFORESTALL,ORATLEASTDELAY,THEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHEPLANVIAEXERCISINGDISCRETIONINTHEPREPARATIONOFTHEIR
29、FINANCIALSTATEMENTSTHEABOVEANALYSISSUGGESTSTHATIFTHE20052009SAUDIDEVELOPMENTPLANISIMPLEMENTED,SOMESAUDICOMPANIESWILLBEARCONSIDERABLEPOLITICALCOSTSANDASACONSEQUENCE,THESEFIRMSWILLHAVEINCENTIVESTOFORESTALLTHE20052009PLANORATLEASTDELAYITSIMPLEMENTATIONINTHISCONTEXT,INTERVIEWSWITHTHEGOVERNMENTREGULATORS
30、APPOINTEDTOADMINISTERTHE20052009PLANINDICATETHATTHEYPLACEPARTICULARATTENTIONONSAUDIFRMSREPORTEDNETINCOMEFIGUREANDEARNINGSPERSHAREASAGUIDEFORDETERMININGWHENANDHOWTHEPRINCIPALECONOMICGOALSOFTHE20052009PLANARETOBEASSESSEDANDIMPLEMENTEDTHISSUGGESTSTHATMANAGERSOFSAUDICOMPANIES,WHICHAREMORELIKELYTOBEAFFEC
31、TEDBYTHEPOLITICALCOSTSOFTHE20052009PLAN,WILLHAVEINCENTIVESTOEXERCISEDISCRETIONINTHEPREPARATIONOFFINANCIALSTATEMENTSANDHENCETHEUNDERLYINGECONOMICPERFORMANCEOFTHEIRCOMPANIESSOASTOREDUCETHELIKELIHOODTHATTHEGOVERNMENTWILLIMPLEMENTTHE20052009PLANINITSENTIRETYBASEDONTHEABOVEANALYSIS,TWOPOLITICALENVIRONMEN
32、TORIENTEDVARIABLESOFDIRECTCONCERNAREINTRODUCEDASLIKELYTOBEFORSAUDICOMPANIESPOLITICALVISIBILITYWEFIRSTHYPOTHESISETHATCOMPANIESWHICHHAVEGOVERNMENTDEBTSAND/ORDONATIONSINTHEIRCAPITALSTRUCTURESWILLINCURRELATIVELYLARGERPOLITICALCOSTSTHANOTHERCOMPANIESTHISISBECAUSETHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHEANENDTOSUBSIDISATION
33、GOALWILLFORCESUCHCOMPANIESTO1BORROWFROMBANKSANDTHUSPAYINTEREST,AND/OR2RAISETHEPRICESOFTHEIRGOODSANDSERVICESANDHENCEEITHERBEARLOSSESAND/ORINCURCONSUMERDISSATISFACTION,ATLEASTINTHESHORTRUNTHEFOLLOWINGHYPOTHESISISBASEDONTHISLINEOFREASONINGH1OTHERTHINGSBEINGEQUAL,THELARGERACOMPANYSGOVERNMENTDEBTS/TOTALL
34、IABILITYRATIO,THEMORELIKELYTHECOMPANYSMANAGERSARETOENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTWEALSOPREDICTTHATTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHESAUDIZATIONGOALWOULDGENERATEANOTHERCOMPONENTOFPOLITICALCOSTSGIVENTHATSAUDIFIRMSHAVELONGBEENRELYINGHEAVILYONFOREIGNMANAGERSANDWORKERS,THESAUDIZATIONGOALWILLPLACEACONSIDERABLEFINANCIALBU
35、RDENONPAYROLLSOFFIRMSBECAUSE1SAUDIRELEVANTPROXIESWORKERSWITHEQUALQUALIFICATIONSANDEXPERIENCEWITHFOREIGNWORKERSTENDTOREQUIREHIGHERSALARIES,AND2,INSOMECIRCUMSTANCES,FIRMSMAYALLOCATERESOURCESANDINCURCONSIDERABLECOSTSINIMPROVINGTHESKILLSOFTHEIRPOTENTIALSAUDIWORKERSINOTHERWORDS,ONCETHISSAUDIZATIONGOALTAK
36、ESEFFECT,SAUDICOMPANIES,WHICHRELYHEAVILYONFOREIGNEMPLOYEES,SAUDIRELEVANTPROXIESWORKERSWITHEQUALQUALIFICATIONSANDEXPERIENCEWITHFOREIGNWORKERSTENDTOREQUIREHIGHERSALARIES,WILLHAVETOALLOCATERESOURCESANDINCURCONSIDERABLECOSTSINORDERTOAPPOINTSAUDIWORKERSANDIMPROVETHEIRSKILLSTHISMOTIVATESTHEHYPOTHESISTHATT
37、HEHIGHERACOMPANYSFOREIGNEMPLOYEES/TOTALEMPLOYEESRATIO,THEHIGHERISTHEPOTENTIALPOLITICALCOSTSTHATTHECOMPANYWILLHAVETOBEARH2OTHERTHINGSBEINGEQUAL,THELARGERACOMPANYSFOREIGNEMPLOYEES/TOTALEMPLOYEERATIO,THEMORELIKELYTHECOMPANYSMANAGERSARETOENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTFINALLY,THEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTLITERATUREE
38、GRISHARDSON,TUNA,ANDWU,2002LEEANDCHOI,2002CHRISTIE,1990HOLTHAUSENWATTSGAVER,GAVER,AUSTIN,1995MCNICHOLS,WILSON,1998HEALY,1985建议管理者可能为了获得最大限度的补偿从事于盈余管理。当发生这种情况，至少部分补偿与盈利报告结果有关。奖金计划制定的基本假设HEALY,1985声明管理者受奖金计划限制，如果他们的收入高于上限或低于下限，就会趋向于减少盈余，当他们在这两者之间他们可能会增加收入。在股东和债权人之间的利益冲突引起代理机构的负债成本。如果不采取行动，通过监测和粘贴设备减少成
39、本，那么这些代理成本由股东负担。因此，假设股东有动机进入监测和粘接合同，通常包括条款限制其能力，使其从事投机行为。盈余管理文献（例如，RISHRDSON,TUNA,WU,2002；SWEENEY,1994PRESS和WEINTROP,1990）主张管理者有动机去操纵盈余以避免违反债务合约条款。更具体的说，文献认为管理者为了避免取消或重新谈判债务的风险，当他们接近违反契约基础上的盈利能力时有增加收益的倾向。在他们组成的盈余管理研究里，HEALY和WAHLEN1999还指出盈余管理包括管理人员误导有关本公司的一些外地人有关本公司的经济实绩而变更财务报告资料。例如，管理者在编制财务报表时可行使斟酌权
40、去夸大收益的真实水平和低估任何真实的不利盈利（例如，收入损失或收益减少）。CHIH,SHEN和KANG2008,ALSEHALI2006,BHATTACHARYA,DAOUK,WELKER2003,BUCKMASTER2001,TRUEMAN和TITMAN1998,在其他人当中，建议管理者在他们的收益报告中努力避免重大的波动和避免报告收入数字的下降。他们发现当前的盈利能力特别的高或特别的低时，管理者为了减少或增加收益和平滑报告的结果就会有利用盈余管理的倾向。当本期的收益低于最近过去一期的收益时，管理者为了增加他们报告收益和他们预期收益率的增长会从事于盈余管理。这通常是因为证券市场欣赏即高又平稳
41、的收益，对收入减少有消极的反应。管理者在编制财务报表的时候也可能行使酌情权，因此，公司潜在的了经济表现以避免政府干预造成的政治代价。更具体的说，这个政治成本动机VILLALONGA和AMIT,2006CRISMAN,CHUA和LITZ,2004AGGI和LEE,2002SWEENEY,1994WATTS和ZIMMERMANN,1986表明公司的管理者在政治上有明显的盈余管理的动机去避免由政府干预造成的财富转移。目前研究的动机是从这种政治成本假设中得到，推论如下。研究假设沙特阿拉伯的经济通过一系列的五年计划已经成长起来，最先从1970年开始。在第八个五年发展计划，涵盖20052009期间，正式提
42、交政府的四项主要经济目标（1）平衡预算，（2）政府的国有企业私有化，（3）结束沙特工业和公共事业的补贴，（4）更换外籍劳工和沙特工人。我们认为这个五年计划的目标包括潜在的财富转移（政治成本）。一方面，“私有化的目标”，“补贴的结束”，和“更换外籍劳工和沙特工人”可以为政府提供和增加财政资源，并使其能够减少预算赤字。另一方面，这些目标可以限制公司私营部门对不利财富的转移。比如，把私有化当做经济战略目标，私有化的一方面是出售国家持有的股票，考虑到2007年的12月沙特公司的三分之一的股票（大概百分之四十股市的市值）被政府所持有，可能有一些概率是国有股份的出售将导致股票价格的下跌。尽管私有化的另一面
43、是放松对垄断的管制，也就是防范垄断行为和加强竞争。这意味着沙特政府将会鼓励其他公司进入受影响行业；所以，现有公司股份的价值很可能会下降。总而言之，我们认为沙特公司将会忍受较大财富的转移（政治成本）作为政府20052009年间发展计划的结果；作为结果，这些公司的管理者在编制财务报表的时候将有动力去预先阻止，至少延迟通过自由裁量权实施计划。上述分析表明，如果20052009年间沙特发展计划已经实施，一些沙特公司将会承受相当大的政治成本；因此，这些公司有防止20052009年的计划或者至少延迟它的实施。在这个背景下，与政府调整者面谈任命管理20052009年间的计划，指出他们特别关注的地方是沙特财政
44、资源管理处公布的净盈余数字和每股盈余是作为评估和实施决定何时以及如何在20052009年经济计划的主要目标的确定指南。这表明沙特公司的管理者很可能受20052009年间计划的政治成本的影响，在编制财务报表的时候有动机去行使酌情权，因此，他们公司潜在的经济表现是减少这样的可能性，政府会全面的实施20052009年间的计划。基于上面的分析，两个政治环境为导向的直接涉及的变量被引进作为沙特公司的政治能见度。我们首先假设公司有政府债务和/或在其资本结构捐款，与其他公司相比引起相当大的政治成本。这是因为履行“结束私有化”目标将会迫使这些公司（1）向银行借款和支付利息，（2）因此无论是承担损失和/或招致消
45、费者不满，至少在短期内提高其商品和服务的价格。下面的假设是基于这样的推理H1其他条件相同的情况，大公司的政府债务/总负债比例，使公司的管理者更有可能进行盈余管理。我们也预测该SAUDIZATION目标的实施会产生另一种政治成本的组成部分。鉴于沙特公司长期以来一直依靠大量外籍经理和工人，SAUDIZATION目标将大部分的财政负担放到就业企业，因为（1）沙特工人的有关代理和同等资格和资历的外籍工人趋向于要就更高的工资，（2）在一些情况下，企业在改善他们潜在的沙特工人技能上可能分配资源和承担相当大的成本。换句话说，一旦这个SAUDIZATION目标生效，沙特公司，严重依赖外籍员工，沙特工人的有关代
46、理和同等资格和资历的外籍工人趋向于要就更高的工资，必须为改善他们潜在的沙特工人技能上，可能分配资源和承担相当大的成本。这激发了一个假设，即公司/外籍员工占员工总数的比例越高，该公司将要承担较高的潜在的政治成本H2其他条件相同的情况，一个公司的外籍劳工/总雇佣IH人数的比率越大，公司管理者进行盈余管理的可能性就越大。最后，盈余管理文献，（例如RISHARDSON,TUNA,WU,2002CHRISTIE,1990HOLTHAUSENWATTSZIMMERMAN,1978和1986）认为，大公司在政治上比小公司更明显，从而更容易受到来自政府的干预影响转移财物。我们建议，变量的大小也可能成为沙特公司政治能见度的一个有关代理。H3其他条件相同的情况，一个公司的规模越大，公司的管理者进行盈余管理的可能性就越大。资源来源HTTP/WEBEBSCOHOSTCOM/BSI/RESULTSVID4HID108SID9AF164F123A7445F9A3005EB2D2EE8D040SESSIONMGR112BQUERYTHEANDMANAGEMENTANDOFANDREPORTEDANDEARNINGSANDTOANDAVOIDANDPOLITICALBDATAJMRIPWJ1ACZKYJ1ID2GMDHLWZT0WJNNPDGU9YNNPLWXPDMU3D
