1、外文文献翻译原文FINANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDINSIGHTSFROMTHEACADEMICLITERATUREFACTORSAFFECTINGFINANCIALFRAUDATANORGANIZATIONSTATEMENTONAUDITINGSTANDARDSSASNO99,CONSIDERATIONOFFRAUDINAFINANCIALSTATEMENTAUDIT,STATESTHATTHREECONDITIONSAREGENERALLYPRESENTWHENFRAUDOCCURSFIRST,THEREISANINCENTIVEORAPRESSURETOCOMMITFRAUD
2、SECOND,CIRCUMSTANCESPROVIDEANOPPORTUNITYFORFRAUDTOBEPERPETRATEDWEAKCONTROLSORABILITYOFMANAGEMENTTOOVERRIDECONTROLSFINALLY,THEREISANATTITUDEORRATIONALIZATIONFORCOMMITTINGFRAUDTHESECONDITIONSCOLLECTIVELYAREKNOWNASTHEFRAUDTRIANGLEWEREVIEWEDTHEACADEMICNDINGSRELATEDTOTHEPRESENCEOFTHESECONDITIONSINCASESOF
3、NANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDTHISHELPSPROVIDEABASISFORUNDERSTANDINGTHEDEVELOPMENTOFTHEQUESTIONNAIRESANDCHECKLISTSINSASNO82ANDSASNO99THEFOLLOWINGISADETAILEDDESCRIPTIONOFTHESETHREEELEMENTSINCENTIVES/PRESSURESTHEINCENTIVETOMISSTATEEARNINGSCANARISEDUETOPRESSURETOMEETANALYSTSFORECASTS,COMPENSATIONANDINCENTIVESTR
4、UCTURES,THENEEDFOREXTERNALNANCING,ORPOORPERFORMANCEDECHOWETAL1996,USINGASAMPLEOF92RMSSUBJECTTOACCOUNTINGENFORCEMENTRELEASESDURINGTHEPERIOD19821992,NDTHATANIMPORTANTMOTIVATIONTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSISTHEDESIRETOATTRACTEXTERNALNANCINGATLOWCOSTERICKSONETAL2006INVESTIGATEWHETHEREXECUTIVEEQUITYINCENTIVESARE
5、ASSOCIATEDWITHACCOUNTINGFRAUDTHEYEXAMINEASAMPLEOFRMSACCUSEDOFFRAUDDURINGTHE19962003PERIODANDDONOTNDANYRELATIONBETWEENEQUITYINCENTIVESANDTHELIKELIHOODOFTHERMREPORTINGFRAUDULENTNANCIALINFORMATIONINCONTRAST,EFENDIETAL2007,USINGASAMPLEOFRMSTHATRESTATEDTHEIRNANCIALSTATEMENTS,NDTHELIKELIHOODOFAMISSTATEDNA
6、NCIALSTATEMENTINCREASESWHENTHECEOHASASIZABLEAMOUNTOFSTOCKOPTIONS“INTHEMONEY”THEYALSONDTHATMISSTATEMENTSAREMORELIKELYFORRMSCONSTRAINEDBYDEBTCOVENANTS,RMSRAISINGNEWDEBTOREQUITYCAPITAL,ORRMSTHATHAVEACEOWHOSERVESASTHECHAIRMANOFTHEBOARDBENEISH1999ANDSTHAT,FORAGROUPOFRMSSUBJECTTOACCOUNTINGENFORCEMENTACTIO
7、NSBYTHESEC,MANAGERSAREMORELIKELYTOSELLEQUITYHOLDINGSANDEXERCISESTOCKAPPRECIATIONRIGHTSINPERIODSWHENEARNINGSAREINATED,SUGGESTINGINSIDERTRADINGBEHAVIORMAYBEINFORMATIVEABOUTEARNINGSOVERSTATEMENTSSUMMERSANDSWEENEY1998NDSIMILARRESULTSFORTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENINSIDERTRADINGANDFRAUDMORERECENTLY,THEREISEVID
8、ENCETHATHUNDREDSOFRMSWEREINVOLVEDININTENTIONALBACKDATINGOFSTOCKOPTIONSLIE2005,WHICHAGAINPROVIDESEVIDENCETHATSTOCKOPTIONCOMPENSATIONPROVIDESINCENTIVESFORFRAUDULENTBEHAVIORAGLASSLEWISCO2006REPORTSTATESTHATABOUTHALFOFTHECOMPANIESIMPLICATEDINBACKDATINGTHEIRSTOCKOPTIONSHAVERESTATEDTHEIRNANCIALSTATEMENTSW
9、ITHREGARDTOPOORLYPERFORMINGRMS,ROSNER2003EXAMINESWHETHERFAILINGRMSAREMORELIKELYTOENGAGEININCOMEINCREASINGMANIPULATION,ANDWHETHERAUDITORSDETECTTHEOVERSTATEMENTSINRMSTHEYPERCEIVETOBEFAILINGHERNDINGSSUGGESTTHATTHEBEHAVIOROFFAILINGRMSTHATDONOTAPPEARDISTRESSEDONTHEBASISOFACCRUALDATA,BUTNONETHELESSSHOWSIG
10、NICANTDECREASEDCASHOWS,ISCONSISTENTWITHMATERIALEARNINGSOVERSTATEMENTSINNONGOINGCONCERNYEARSTHATAREFOLLOWEDBYOVERSTATEMENTREVERSALSINGOINGCONCERNYEARSTHEACCRUALBEHAVIOROFTHESERMSRESEMBLESTHATOFRMSSANCTIONEDBYTHESECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSIONSECFORFRAUDOPPORTUNITIESSTATEMENTONAUDITINGSTANDARDSNO99AUS
11、ECTION316PROVIDESEXAMPLESOFRISKFACTORSTHATMAYINCREASETHEOPPORTUNITYTOCOMMITNANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDAICPA2002THESERISKFACTORSINCLUDETHENATUREOFTHEINDUSTRYORTHEENTITYSOPERATIONSSUCHASSIGNICANTCOMPLEXORRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONS,INEFFECTIVEMONITORINGOFMANAGEMENT,ACOMPLEXORGANIZATIONALSTRUCTURESUCHASONETHATI
12、NVOLVESSEVERALLEGALENTITIES,ANDINEFFECTIVECONTROLSDUETOALACKOFMONITORINGOFCONTROLSORCIRCUMVENTIONOFCONTROLSALBRECHTANDALBRECHT2003ALSODISCUSSFACTORSINCREASINGTHEOPPORTUNITYTOCOMMITFRAUDANDNOTETHATHAVINGANEFFECTIVECONTROLSTRUCTUREISPROBABLYTHESINGLEMOSTIMPORTANTSTEPTOELIMINATEORMINIMIZEOPPORTUNITYTOC
13、OMMITFRAUDULENTACTSSEVERALSTUDIESHAVESHOWNTHATINEFFECTIVEMONITORINGOFMANAGEMENTINTHEFORMOFWEAKCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISASSOCIATEDWITHAHIGHERLIKELIHOODOFFRAUDDECHOWETAL1996NDTHATRMSMANIPULATINGEARNINGSAREMORELIKELYTOHAVELESSINDEPENDENTBOARDS,MORELIKELYTOHAVEAUNITARYSTRUCTUREFORCHAIRMANANDCEO,MORELIKELYTO
14、HAVEACEOWHOISALSOTHERMSFOUNDER,LESSLIKELYTOHAVEANAUDITCOMMITTEEANDLESSLIKELYTOHAVEANOUTSIDEBLOCKHOLDERBEASLEY1996ALSONDSTHATTHEPROPORTIONOFINDEPENDENTMEMBERSONTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSISLOWERFORRMSEXPERIENCINGNANCIALFRAUDCOMPAREDTONOFRAUDRMSSIMILARLY,FARBER2005NDSTHATFRAUDRMSHAVEPOORGOVERNANCERELATIVETONO
15、FRAUDRMSFEWERINDEPENDENTBOARDMEMBERS,FEWERAUDITCOMMITTEEMEETINGS,FEWERNANCIALEXPERTSONTHEAUDITCOMMITTEE,ASMALLERPERCENTAGEOFBIG4AUDITINGRMS,ANDAHIGHERPERCENTAGEOFCEOSWHOAREALSOCHAIRMANOFTHEBOARDTHERESULTSARECONSISTENTWITHINDEPENDENTCORPORATEGOVERNANCEMECHANISMSBEINGMOREEFFECTIVEINTHEMONITORINGFUNCTI
16、ONBECAUSEOFTHEIRABILITYTODETECTAND,INSOMECASES,INVESTIGATEFRAUDULENTNANCIALREPORTING,EXTERNALAUDITORSALSOACTASASIGNICANTDETERRENTBYREDUCINGTHEOPPORTUNITYTOCOMMITFRAUDMOSTOFTHESTUDIESEXAMININGTHEAUDITORSROLEINCONSTRAININGMANAGERSATTEMPTSTOMANAGEEARNINGSEXAMINEDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSHIGHDISCRETIONARYACC
17、RUALSARENOTNECESSARILYINDICATIVEOFFRAUD,BUTPOSSIBLYAREINDICATIVEOFAGGRESSIVEANDOPPORTUNISTICREPORTINGRESEARCHERSHAVEARGUEDTHATBIGNAUDITORSCONSTRAINMANAGERSATTEMPTSTOMANAGEEARNINGSTHROUGHACCRUALSANDDOCUMENTEVIDENCECONSISTENTWITHHIGHERDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSFORRMSAUDITEDBYNONBIGNAUDITORSBECKERETAL1998；F
18、RANCISETAL1999CARCELLOANDNAGY2002EXAMINETHERELATIONBETWEENAUDITORINDUSTRYSPECIALIZATIONANDNANCIALFRAUDANDNDANEGATIVERELATIONKNAPPANDKNAPP2001EXAMINETHEEFFECTSOFAUDITEXPERIENCEONTHEEFFECTIVENESSOFANALYTICALPROCEDURESINDETECTINGNANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDANDNDTHATAUDITMANAGERSAREMOREEFFECTIVETHANAUDITSENIOR
19、SINASSESSINGTHERISKOFFRAUDWITHANALYTICALPROCEDURESSIMILARLY,BERNARDI1994NDSTHATMANAGERSOUTPERFORMSENIORSINAFRAUDDETECTIONCASEWHENTHEYAREEXPOSEDTOANINITIALEVALUATIONOFCLIENTINTEGRITYANDCOMPETENCE；HOWEVER,THISNDINGISATTRIBUTABLETOMANAGERSWITHAHIGHLEVELOFMORALDEVELOPMENTACADEMICSTUDIESHAVEALSOINVESTIGA
20、TEDWHETHERTHELENGTHOFTHECLIENTAUDITORRELATIONSHIPISLIKELYTOIMPACTTHEQUALITYOFTHEAUDITFINDINGSGENERALLYSUGGESTTHATLONGERAUDITORTENUREISASSOCIATEDWITHGREATEREARNINGSQUALITYIYERANDRAMA2004；MYERSETAL2003SPECICALLYRELATEDTOTHEFREQUENCYOFNANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUD,CARCELLOANDNAGY2004COMPARERMSCITEDFORFRAUDULEN
21、TNANCIALREPORTINGFROM1990THROUGH2001TOASETOFCONTROLRMSANDOTHERNONFRAUDRMSANDNDTHATFRAUDULENTNANCIALREPORTINGISMORELIKELYTOOCCURINTHERSTTHREEYEARSOFTHEAUDITORCLIENTRELATIONSHIPATTITUDES/RATIONALIZATIONSACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSCANCONTRIBUTETOREDUCINGBOTHTHEOPPORTUNITYANDATTITUDETOWARDFRAUDULENTNANCIALREPOR
22、TINGNELSONETAL2002NDTHATTHEPRECISIONOFACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSINUENCESMANAGERSATTEMPTSTOMANAGEEARNINGSTHEYNDTHATWHENACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSAREPRECISE,MANAGERSAREMORELIKELYTOATTEMPTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTWITHTRANSACTIONSTRUCTURINGSUCHASSTRUCTURINGALEASEINAPARTICULARWAYTOAVOIDACAPITALLEASECLASSICATIONORBYOPPORTUNIS
23、TICALLYTIMINGSALESOFAVAILABLEFORSALESECURITIES,ANDAUDITORSARELESSLIKELYTOADJUSTTHOSEATTEMPTSMANAGERSWEREMORELIKELYTOMAKEATTEMPTSTHATDECREASEINCOMEWITHUNSTRUCTUREDTRANSACTIONSSUCHASINCREASINGORDECREASINGESTIMATESINVOLVINGJUDGMENTWHENSTANDARDSWEREIMPRECISEMANAGERSAREMORELIKELYTOMAKEATTEMPTSTOINCREASEE
24、ARNINGS,BUTAUDITORSAREMORELIKELYTOREQUIREADJUSTMENTINTHOSECASES,PARTICULARLYIFTHEAMOUNTISMATERIALHERNANDEZANDGROOT2007AUSEASAMPLEOFAUDITPARTNERRISKASSESSMENTSMADEASPARTOFCLIENTACCEPTANCEORCONTINUANCEDECISIONSFORABIG4AUDITRMINTHENETHERLANDSANDNDTHATMANAGERINTEGRITY,HONESTY,ANDETHICSARECONSIDEREDTOBET
25、HEMOSTIMPORTANTFACTORSINFRAUDRISKASSESSMENTS,FOLLOWEDBYCONCERNSABOUTAGGRESSIVEREVENUERECOGNITIONANDACCOUNTINGESTIMATESGILLETTANDUDDIN2005NDTHEATTITUDEOFTHECFOTOWARDTHEBEHAVIOROFFRAUDULENTREPORTINGTOBEAMAJORINUENCEONINTENTIONTOMISREPORT；HOWEVER,COMPENSATIONSTRUCTUREWASNOTFOUNDTOBEAGOODINDICATOROFINTE
26、NTIONSTOREPORTFRAUDULENTLYINSUMMARY,ACADEMICRESEARCHDOCUMENTSEVIDENCEOFARELATIONBETWEENMANYOFTHEINCENTIVES,OPPORTUNITIES,ANDATTITUDESIDENTIEDINTHEAUDITINGSTANDARDSANDTHEEXISTENCEOFFRAUDTHISWOULDSUGGESTTHATTHEUSEOFCHECKLISTSIDENTIFYINGTHEEXISTENCEORABSENCEOFTHESEINCENTIVESAND/OROPPORTUNITIESFORPARTIC
27、ULARCLIENTSWOULDBEHELPFULINANAUDITINGSETTINGASDISCUSSEDINTHENEXTSECTION,HOWEVER,THENDINGSONTHEBENETSOFCHECKLISTSINIDENTIFYINGFRAUDAREMIXEDPROCEDURESANDABILITYOFAUDITORSTODETECTFRAUDCURRENTPROFESSIONALSTANDARDSANDAUTHORITATIVEGUIDANCEREQUIREAUDITORSTOPROVIDEREASONABLEASSURANCETHATNANCIALSTATEMENTSARE
28、FREEFROMMATERIALMISSTATEMENTS,WHETHERCAUSEDBYERRORSORFRAUDWHATCONSTITUTES“REASONABLEASSURANCE”HASBEENEXTENSIVELYANDINCONCLUSIVELYDEBATEDINTHELITERATUREANDWITHINTHEACCOUNTINGPROFESSIONPCAOB2005；REZAEE2004；HARRINGTON2003THELACKOFACOMMONLYACCEPTEDDENITIONOFREASONABLEASSURANCECOUPLEDWITHLIMITATIONSOFAUD
29、ITMETHODSINIDENTIFYINGFRAUD,COSTCONSTRAINTSOFAUDITS,ANDHIGHEXPECTATIONSBYINVESTORSHAVEWIDENEDTHEEXPECTATIONGAPREGARDINGAUDITORRESPONSIBILITYFORDETECTINGNANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDTHECEOSOFTHESIXLARGESTINTERNATIONALAUDITNETWORKSBELIEVETHATTHERESHOULDBEACONSTRUCTIVEDIALOGAMONGINVESTORSOFGLOBALCOMPANIESANDCA
30、PITALMARKETS,AUDITORS,ANDREGULATORSTONARROWTHE“EXPECTATIONGAP”INTERNATIONALAUDITNETWORKS2006SYMPTOMSOFFRAUDAREOFTENREFERREDTOAS“REDAGS”SASNO99IDENTIES“REDAGS”ASRISKFACTORSANDFURTHERCATEGORIZESTHOSERISKFACTORSINTHETHREEAREASINCLUDEDINTHEFRAUDTRIANGLEPRESSURES/INCENTIVE,OPPORTUNITY,ANDATTITUDES/RATION
31、ALIZATIONSALBRECHTANDALBRECHT2003CATEGORIZETHESYMPTOMSOFFRAUDINTOSIXTYPES1ACCOUNTINGANOMALIES；2INTERNALCONTROLWEAKNESSES；3ANALYTICALANOMALIES；4EXTRAVAGANTLIFESTYLES；5UNUSUALBEHAVIORS；AND6TIPSANDCOMPLAINTSONEOFTHEMAJORCHALLENGESINIDENTIFYINGFRAUDISTHATWHILESYMPTOMSOFFRAUD“REDAGS”AREOBSERVEDFREQUENTLY
32、,THEPRESENCEOFSUCHISSUESISNOTNECESSARILYINDICATIVEOFFRAUDALBRECHTANDROMNEY1986ANDINVESTIGATIONOFSUCHANOMALIESUSUALLYRESULTSINACONCLUSIONTHATFRAUDWASNOTTHEUNDERLYINGCAUSEITISALSODIFCULTTOCOMBINEANDWEIGHTFRAUDRISKFACTORSTOASSESSOVERALLFRAUDRISKANDFORMULATEANAUDITPLANPATTERSONANDNOEL2003FURTHER,DUETOAT
33、TEMPTSBYPERPETRATORSTOCONCEALTHEIRACTS,“REDAGS”MAYBERELATIVELYFEWINFREQUENCYANDMINORINAMOUNT,ATLEASTINTHEEARLYSTAGESOFFRAUDULENTNANCIALREPORTINGSTUDIESEXAMININGTHEUSEOFQUESTIONNAIRESORCHECKLISTSINASSESSINGFRAUDRISKHAVEFOUNDMIXEDRESULTSINONEOFTHERSTSTUDIESINTHISAREA,PINCUS1989EXAMINESTHEEFCACYOFA“RED
34、AGS”QUESTIONNAIREFORASSESSINGTHERISKOFMATERIALFRAUDOFACLIENTUSING137AUDITORSASSUBJECTSHERNDINGSSUGGESTTHATTHEUSEOFAQUESTIONNAIREWASDYSFUNCTIONALFORTHEFRAUDCASE,IE,QUESTIONNAIREUSERSASSESSEDTHERISKOFFRAUDTOBELOWERTHANNONUSERSSIMILARLY,ASAREANDWRIGHT2004STUDYTHEIMPACTOFALTERNATIVERISKASSESSMENTMETHODS
35、RISKCHECKLISTVERSUSNOCHECKLISTANDAUDITPROGRAMDEVELOPMENTSTANDARDPROGRAMVERSUSNOPROGRAMONTHEQUALITYOFAUDITPROCEDURESCHOSENANDTHEPROPENSITYTOCONSULTFRAUDEXPERTS,WITHDATABASEDONACASEFROMANSECACCOUNTINGANDAUDITINGENFORCEMENTRELEASEAAERTHEAUTHORSNDTHATAUDITORSGIVENTHESTANDARDAUDITPROGRAMDESIGNEDARELATIVE
36、LYLESSEFFECTIVEAUDITPROGRAMTHANTHOSEWITHOUTTHESTANDARDPROGRAMRELATIVETOABENCHMARKPROGRAMFROMAPANELOFEXPERTS,ANDAUDITORSUSINGASTANDARDCHECKLISTMADELOWERRISKASSESSMENTSTHANTHOSEWITHOUTACHECKLISTHOWEVER,THEYDIDNDAHIGHERFRAUDRISKASSESSMENTWASASSOCIATEDWITHAPROPENSITYTOSEEKCONSULTATIONOFFRAUDEXPERTSSOURC
37、ECHRISEHOGANANDUMAKVELURYFINANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDINSIGHTSFROMTHEACADEMICLITERATUREJJOURNALOFPRACTICETHEORY,2008,11231252译文财务报表舞弊从学术的角度分析（一）财务舞弊的动因组织的影响因素SAS第99号审计准则对舞弊财务报告的思考得出构成财务报告舞弊的因素有以下三点首先，因激励或压力而进行舞弊；其次，环境提供了一个机会，诱使舞弊行为的发生，例如，控制或管理能力薄弱的环境更容易引发舞弊。最后，认为舞弊行为合理化的思想不断滋生。这些要素被称为集体舞弊三角形理论。我们审查财务报表欺诈的
38、这些条件存在的情况下学术相关的结果。这有助于对SAS第82号和SAS第99会计准则的理解。以下是对这三个要素的详细描述1、激励/压力谎报收入的动力可能是由于达到会计师的预期，补偿和奖励结构合理化，外部融资的需要，或者是贫穷等。DECHOW等人（1996年）研究发现，19821992年企业使用的会计科目执行期间释放的样品有92个，都显示了一个重要的动机操纵盈利的愿望，以低成本来吸引外部资金。埃里克森等人在2006年调查是否有欺诈行为的执行股权激励与会计时发现，他们检查的在19962003年这一期样本公司的欺诈指控中并没有找到任何信息表明股权激励之间的关系和财务舞弊有关。与此相反，爱芬迪等人（20
39、07年）使用该公司的抽样调查重述其财务报表，找到信息表明财务报表错报的可能性与CEO拥有多少股票期权有关。他们还发现，有更多的公司可能虚报可能与债务协议，公司提出新的债务或股本或公司由谁来担任CEO有关。BENEISH（1999）认为，当一个企业集团受到美国证券交易委员会的会计执法行动时，经理人更容易出售其所持有的股份和行使股票增值权，这表明内幕交易行为也有可能多报企业盈利。萨默斯和斯威尼1998年发现了类似的结果，舞弊与交易内幕之间的关系。最近，有证据表明，公司数百人参与的舞弊行为在故意回溯股票期权（李群2005年），再次提供的证据表明股票期权激励补偿的规定。刘易斯在一个玻璃有限公司2006
40、年的报告发言中指出，他们在回溯股票时发现约一半的公司有牵连的金融股权重列现象。对于业绩不佳的公司，罗斯纳（2003）检查了是否有公司可能从事增加收入的操作，以及是否在公司的审计中发现了这些多报。她的调查结果表明，企业行为没有出现不良的权责发生制基础上的数据，但仍然呈现着下降的现金流量体现出，多报收入与原材料相一致的非持续经营和持续经营是相一致的。这些权责发生制的行为相似的企业都是由证券交易委员会批准的。2、环境机会以316条报表审计准则第99号盟科为例子，其2002年的财务报表表明风险因素可能会增加机会去舞弊。这些风险因素包括行业的性质或实体的操作，如复杂或重大关联方交易、监管不力的管理；一个
41、复杂的组织结构，如一个涉及许多法律实体；由于控制装置的控制不到位或规避缺乏等。ALBRECHT（2003）还讨论了环境因素增加了舞弊的可能性，有效的控制结构可能是最重要的步骤，以消除或尽量减少机会去实施舞弊行为。一些研究表明，在管理监管不力的公司治理形式可能会导致舞弊行为的发生。DECHOW等人在1996年的研究发现，较少独立董事会成员、首席执行官单、CEO或公司的创始人等人员操纵企业盈余的可能性比较大，审核委员会或公司大股东的可能性比较小。比斯利（1996年）还认为，独立董事与董事会成员的比例大小与公司的舞弊行为发生可能性的大小有关。同样，2005年法伯认为，公司治理结构较差的企业独立董事成
42、员较少，审核委员会会议较少召开，审核委员会中的金融专家叶比较少，四大会计师事务所所占比例较小，而董事长兼CEO的比例较高。这个结果表明具有独立法人治理机制的监测功能更加有效。因为外部审计师有能力检测，并在某些情况下，调查舞弊性财务报告，他们作为一个重要的威慑，减少了舞弊的机会。大部分的研究表明，审计师在约束管理者的角色，尝试自行检查应计盈余管理。可操纵应计利润比较高不一定是欺诈的体现，但很可能是积极的和机会主义的报告。研究人员认为，内部审计师试图通过审计应计收益大的证据和不符合文件来约束管理者，而审计师事务所负责外部审计BECKERETAL1998；FRANCISETAL1999。CARCEL
43、LOANDNAGY2002审查了审计人员专业化与金融舞弊的关系，找到了一个负相关关系。KNAPPANDKNAPP（2001）进行了审计经验是否对财务报表舞弊检测审核程序的有效性产生影响的研究，发现年轻审计比年长审计师更能有效的进行审计评估与分析程序。同样，BERNARDI（1994）发现，年轻审计师在对舞弊财务报表进行审计时，他们得出的初步评估报告比年长审计师更完整，但这基于企业有良好的管理。学术界还对客户与审计师之间的关系是否会影响审计质量进行了研究。研究表明客户与审计师之间的关系会对审计质量产生影响（IYERANDRAMA2004；MYERSETAL2003）。具体涉及到财务报表舞弊的频率
44、，CARCELLOANDNAGY（2004）对1990年至2001年的一组财务舞弊报告和非财务舞弊报告进行了比较，发现虚假财务报告更可能发生在审计师受委托人委托的前三年。3、态度合理化会计标准能有效的约束进行财务舞弊的心态和减少舞弊机会。NELSONET等人（2002）发现会计标准的精度会影响经理人是否进行盈余管理。他们发现，当会计标准越准确，管理人员更可能试图进行盈余管理，而审计师很少去调整。当会计标准不正确时，管理人员会尝试减少收入与非结构化交易等舞弊手段。管理人员更可能做出努力，以增加收入，但审计人员就必须对此保持关注，特别是如果金额是重大的项目。HERNANDEZ和GROOT2007对
45、四大会计师事务所的审计合伙人为荷兰的一个客户所做的风险评估样本进行了研究，得出管理人员的正直，诚实和道德被认为是在舞弊风险评估中最重要的因素，其次是积极关注有关收入确认和会计估计。GILLETTANDUDDIN2005发现首席财务官的态度该财务报告有重大的影响，甚至会误报；然而，工资结构没能防止这一结果的发生。总之，奖励或压力、环境的影响、态度这三个要素对财务舞弊有很大的影响。这表明，如果没有这三个要素的存在，对审计工作将有很大的帮助。（二）审计程序与审计师发现舞弊的能力当前的专业水准和权威性的指导要求审计人员提供合理保证财务报表无重大失实陈述，无论是由错误或欺诈造成的。什么是“合理的保证”，
46、在各种文献中并没有得出结论，并在会计界引起了争论。一个没能被普遍接受的“合理保证”的定义加上审计方法在查明舞弊方面的局限性、审计成本的约束，扩大了审计师与投资者之间的期望差距。六个最大的国际审计网络的首席执行官认为，全球性公司和资本市场，审计师，投资者和监管机构之间能进行建设性的对话以缩小这种“期望差距”（2006年国际审计网络）。舞弊的特征通常被称为“红旗”三角形要素，进一步三角形的风险分类的三个领域包括压力/激励，机会和态度/合理化。ALBRECHTANDALBRECHT（2003）把舞弊的特征划分为六个类型（1）会计异常；（2）内部控制薄弱环节；（3）分析异常；（4）奢侈的生活方式；（5
47、）不寻常的行为；（6）技巧及投诉。在确定是否舞弊的主要挑战之一是，虽然舞弊症状被频繁观察，但这种异常通常不是判定为舞弊的根本原因ALBRECHTANDROMNEY1986，这也导致无法用舞弊风险因素来评估整体舞弊风险，进而制定审核计划。此外，由于受肇事者企图掩盖自己行为的影响，“红旗”要素可能是比较少的频率出现且数额较小，至少在舞弊性财务报告的早期阶段会如此。研究审查舞弊风险评估的问卷或检查单的使用状况，发现不同的结果。在这一领域的首批研究之一，PINCUS1989以评估检查了使用的材料为研究对象，对137个舞弊审计的客户进行了问卷调查。她的调查结果表明问卷用户评估的舞弊风险比未使用者低。相似的，ASAREANDWRIGHT2004对替代风险评估方法的影响、选择的审计方案制定程序的质量、倾向舞弊的专家咨询进行了研究，这些数据都是逐期从SEC的会计和审计执法中得来的，他们发现由于没有标准的审计程序而设计了一个较有效的审计程序和审计人员使用标准的清单，清单没有变得比低风险评估好。然而，他们却发现一个更高的舞弊风险评估是倾向与专家协商，以寻求舞弊。出处CHRISEHOGANANDUMAKVELURYFINANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDINSIGHTSFROMTHEACADEMICLITERATUREJJOURNALOFPRACTICETHEORY,2008,11231252
