1、外文文献翻译译文原文PRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSONTHESTEWARDSHIPAGENCYAXISTHISARTICLEPROVIDESANOVERVIEWOFTHELITERATUREONNONPROFITPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSITDEPICTSTHENATUREOFAGENCYTHEORYANDSTEWARDSHIPTHEORY,ANALYZESTHEORIGINOFTHEIRSTRUGGLEWITHINTHENONPROFITSTRUCTURE,ANDMARKSDIRECTIONSFORACONCILIATORYAPPROACH
2、WETHEREBYCONTRASTITWITHSTEWARDSHIPTHEORYANDELABORATEONTHEARGUMENTSTHATCANAFFECTTHEPOSITIONOFNONPROFITPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSONTHESTEWARDSHIPAGENCYAXISANALYSISOFTHEEXISTINGLITERATUREPOINTSTOALACKOFCONSENSUSASTOWHICHTHEORYSHOULDBEAPPLIEDWEARGUETHATTHEDIVISIONOFNONPROFITPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSI
3、NTOBOARDMANAGERANDMANAGEREMPLOYEEINTERACTIONSMAYHELPTOCLARIFYTHEBALANCEBETWEENAGENCYTHEORYANDSTEWARDSHIPTHEORYANDMAYLEADTOTHEESTABLISHMENTOFASTRONGLYFOUNDEDTHEORYONNONPROFITPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSWECLOSEWITHADISCUSSIONOFHOWTHISARTICLEMAYPROVEVALUABLETONONPROFITPOLICYMAKERSANDOTHEREMPIRICALRESEAR
4、CHERSWHATISAGENCYTHEORYINORDERTOEXPLAINTHEBASICCONCEPTSUPONWHICHTHEFOUNDATIONSOFAGENCYTHEORYAREBUILT,WESTARTWITHADEFINITIONOFPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSACCORDINGTOJENSENANDMECKLING1976,APRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPCANBEDEFINEDAS“ACONTRACTUNDERWHICHONEORMOREPERSONSTHEPRINCIPALSENGAGEANOTHERPERSONTHEAGE
5、NTTOPERFORMSOMESERVICEONTHEIRBEHALFWHICHINVOLVESDELEGATINGSOMEDECISIONMAKINGAUTHORITYTOTHEAGENT”P308SUCHRELATIONSHIPSAREQUITECOMMONFOREXAMPLE,ACLIENTPRINCIPALMIGHTHIREALAWYERAGENTTODEFENDHISCASEAHOMEOWNERPRINCIPALMIGHTHIREACARPENTERAGENTTOFIXHERSTAIRCASEALTHOUGHBOTHEXAMPLESDESCRIBEINTERACTIONSINAPRI
6、VATESETTING,PRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSALSOCOMMONLYOCCURWITHINORGANIZATIONSHERE,LITERATUREOFTENHANDSTHEROLEOFTHEPRINCIPALTOTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORS,WHICHCONTRACTSAMANAGERTORUNTHEORGANIZATIONINTHEINTERESTOFTHESHAREHOLDERSOR,INTHECASEOFANONPROFITORGANIZATION,INTHEINTERESTOFTHESTAKEHOLDERSAGENCYTHEORYTRADIT
7、IONALLYASSUMESTHATTHESEPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSWILLBECHARACTERIZEDBYACONFLICTBETWEENTHEINTERESTSOFTHEPRINCIPALANDTHOSEOFTHEAGENT,ANDTHATTHEAGENTWILLBEMOTIVATEDTOPURSUEHEROWNGOALSPONTES,1995LEWIS,2003SOWHENTHEAGENTSBEHAVIORISNOTCONTROLLEDORRESTRAINED,THEGOALSOFTHEPRINCIPALAREUNLIKELYTOBEATTAINEDTO
8、COUNTERACTTHEAGENCYCONFLICTSTHATPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSMAYBRINGABOUT,MATHEMATICALANDTHEORETICALRESEARCHHASFOCUSEDONMECHANISMSTHATMAYHELPTHEPRINCIPALTOCONTROLHISAGENTITDISTINGUISHESBETWEENTWOFRAMEWORKSTHATSTARTFROMDIFFERENTASSUMPTIONSREGARDINGTHELEVELOFINFORMATIONALASYMMETRYBETWEENTHEPRINCIPALAND
9、THEAGENTINTHEFOLLOWINGPARAGRAPHS,WEELABORATEONTHESIMILARITIESANDDIFFERENCESTHATBOTHFRAMEWORKSHOLDTWOINFORMATIONFRAMEWORKSWITHINAGENCYTHEORYAGENCYTHEORYGENERALLYDISTINGUISHESBETWEENTHESYMMETRICINFORMATIONMODELANDTHEASYMMETRICINFORMATIONMODELLEVINTHAL,1988WITHINTHESYMMETRICINFORMATIONMODEL,ITISASSUMED
10、THATTHEINFORMATIONPOSSESSEDBYTHEAGENTISALSOKNOWNTOTHEPRINCIPALINOTHERWORDS,THEPRINCIPALISPERFECTLYINFORMEDASTOTHECHARACTEROFHISAGENTANDISABLETOOBSERVETHEEFFORTEXERTEDONTHETASKINSUCHCASE,LEVINTHAL1988ANDPERLOFF2003SHOWTHATTHEPRINCIPALCANELABORATEACONTRACTTHATISOPTIMALFORBOTHTHEAGENTANDHIMSELFAFIRSTBE
11、STSOLUTIONBYFOUNDINGTHECOMPENSATIONSCHEMESUPONTHEEXERTEDEFFORTLEVELSBYATTACHINGTHEHIGHESTNETUTILITYUTILITYFROMINCOMEMINUSDISUTILITYFROMEFFORTTOTHEEFFORTLEVELMOSTDESIREDBYTHEPRINCIPAL,AUTILITYMAXIMIZINGAGENTCANALWAYSBEPERSUADEDTODEDICATETHELEVELOFEFFORTPREFERREDBYTHEPRINCIPALSINCEINCOMEISCONTINGENTON
12、LYONTHEEFFORTLEVELANDISINDEPENDENTOFTHESTATEOFNATUREANDOFTHEREALIZEDOUTCOME,THEAGENTWILLALSONOTBEFORCEDTOBEARANYUNNECESSARYRISKWITHINTHEASYMMETRICINFORMATIONMODEL,THEINFORMATIONALSYMMETRYBETWEENPRINCIPALANDAGENTISDESTABILIZEDBYTHEINTRODUCTIONOFMORALHAZARDORADVERSESELECTIONMORALHAZARDREFERSTOTHEECONO
13、MICAGENTSTOMAXIMIZETHEIROWNUTILITYATTHESAMETIME,DAMAGETHEEFFECTIVENESSOFTHECLIENTORTHEBEHAVIOROFOTHERAGENTSMORALHAZARDANDMORALFACTORS,ECONOMICACTIVITYISESSENTIALLYNOTMUCH,ANDSO,THEUSEOFTHEWORDHAVEDIFFERENTVIEWS,ITWASSUGGESTEDTOUSE“COVERTACTIONS“TOREPLACEITINAMARKETECONOMY,MORALHAZARDISAUNIVERSALPHEN
14、OMENON,ITISESSENTIALLYANECONOMICONEHIDDENMESSAGEOFTHEIROWNRATIONALRESPONSETOTHEINTRODUCTIONOFANINFORMATIONALASYMMETRYISNOTNECESSARILYAPROBLEMIFTHEAGENTSINTERESTSAREPERFECTLYALIGNEDWITHTHEPRINCIPALS,ASYMMETRYWILLNOTAFFECTTHELEVELOFBENEFITSSTREAMEDTOWARDTHEPRINCIPALHOWEVER,ONEOFAGENCYTHEORYSBASICASSUM
15、PTIONSISTHATACONFLICTEXISTSBETWEENTHEINTERESTSOFTHEPRINCIPALANDTHOSEOFHISAGENTTHEPRINCIPALWILLTHEREBYBEFORCEDTOAPPLYNEWWAYSOFCONTRACTINGINORDERTOMINIMIZETHEDEVIATIONFROMTHEFIRSTBESTSOLUTIONINTHECASEOFMORALHAZARD,THEDEVIATIONFROMTHEFIRSTBESTSOLUTIONISELICITEDBYTHEFACTTHATCOMPENSATIONCANNOLONGERBEBASE
16、DONTHELEVELOFEFFORTCLOAKEDFROMTHEPRINCIPALEXERTEDBYTHEAGENTCOMPENSATIONSHOULDINSTEADDEPENDONTHEOUTCOMEOUTCOMEBASEDCOMPENSATIONWOULDINDUCETHEAGENTTOEXERTMORETHANTHEMINIMUMLEVELOFEFFORTTHEREASONINGBEHINDTHISARGUMENTISTHATBECAUSETHEPRINCIPALISUNABLETOEVALUATEHISAGENTSEFFORTANDTHEAGENTDRAWSDISUTILITYFRO
17、MEXERTINGIT,AFIXEDFEEWOULDONLYSTIMULATETHEAGENTTOPERFORMATTHEMINIMUMLEVELRAISINGTHEFEESWOULDNOTALTERTHISSITUATIONTHEAGENTCANBEEXPECTEDTOACCEPTHIGHERWAGESSINCEHIGHERWAGESRESULTINHIGHERUTILITY,BUTALSOTOMINIMIZEHEREFFORTINORDERTOMINIMIZETHEDISUTILITYDERIVEDFROMITRAISINGTHEFIXEDFEEWOULDTHEREFOREONLYWIDE
18、NTHEGAPBETWEENGAINSANDCOSTSFACEDBYTHEAGENTANDFEEDHERBANKACCOUNTBUTWOULDNOTALTERHERCHOICEOFEFFORTBECAUSETHEBASISOFTHECOMPENSATIONSCHEMESMUSTBEALTEREDFROMEFFORTBASEDPAYFIXEDFEESTOOUTCOMEBASEDPAYCONTINGENTPAYANDOUTCOMESAREPARTLYINFLUENCEDBYSTATESOFNATURETHATAREBEYONDTHEAGENTSCONTROL,THEAGENTWILLBEFORCE
19、DTOACCEPTARISKFACTORINTOHERCONTRACTANDMAYBEHELDACCOUNTABLEFORFACTORSSHECANNOTCONTROLSUCHANARRANGEMENTWOULDBEINEFFICIENTWHENARISKNEUTRALINDIVIDUALENTERSINTOACONTRACTWITHARISKAVERSEINDIVIDUAL,ITISEFFICIENTTOLEAVEALLOFTHERISKINTHEHANDSOFTHERISKNEUTRALPARTYTHEREFORE,ATRADEOFFEXISTSWITHINTHEASYMMETRICINF
20、ORMATIONMODEL,FORCINGTHEPRINCIPALTOTRADEHIGHERINCENTIVESFORHISAGENTFORLESSEFFICIENCYINTHERISKBEARINGFEATURESOFTHECONTRACTHOLMSTROM,1979ASNOTEDBYLEVINTHAL1988,SWITCHINGCOMPENSATIONSCHEMESTOOUTCOMEBASEDPAYISNOTTHEONLYPOSSIBLERESPONSETOTHEINTRODUCTIONOFANINFORMATIONALASYMMETRYINTOTHEPRINCIPALAGENTRELAT
21、IONSHIPINSTEADOFATTEMPTINGTOIMPROVETHEINCENTIVESWITHINTHEASYMMETRICINFORMATIONMODEL,ONEMIGHTALSOTRYTOPULLTHERELATIONSHIPBACKTOWARDTHESYMMETRICINFORMATIONMODELWHENTHEASYMMETRICINFORMATIONISRENDEREDBYMORALHAZARD,SUCHANATTEMPTMAYBEGENERATEDBYINTRODUCINGAMONITORINTOTHERELATIONSHIP,THEREBYENLARGINGTHEPRI
22、NCIPALSKNOWLEDGEOFTHEAGENTSEFFORTIFSUCHMONITORINGCOULDBEMADEPERFECT,THESIGNALSENTBYTHEMONITORWOULDBEAPERFECTINDICATOROFTHEAGENTSEFFORT,ALLOWINGTHEPRINCIPALTOREVIVETHECONNECTIONBETWEENEFFORTANDCOMPENSATIONANDTOFREETHEAGENTFROMTHEINEFFICIENTRISKBEARINGARRANGEMENTSWITHINHERCONTRACTPROCURINGAPERFECTMONI
23、TORCANBEDIFFICULT,ESPECIALLYWITHINNONPROFITORGANIZATIONS,WHEREACCURATEOUTPUTMEASUREMENTISOFTENHARDTOATTAINITCANALSOBECOSTLYANDINTRODUCENEWCOMPLICATIONSINTOTHEPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPFOREXAMPLE,THEMONITORINGOFFICERMIGHTPURSUEINTERESTSTHATDEPARTFROMTHOSEOFTHEPRINCIPALORTHEOFFICERMIGHTCOLLUDEWITHTHEP
24、RINCIPALSAGENTMISHRA,2002ASPECIALCASEOFAGENCYTHEORYSTEWARDSHIPTHEORYSTEWARDSHIPTHEORYDIFFERSFROMTRADITIONALAGENCYTHEORYINTHATITQUESTIONSTHEASSUMPTIONTHATAPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPWILLALWAYSBECHARACTERIZEDBYAGENCYCONFLICTSTHETHEORYEMBODIESTWOBRANCHESTHEFIRSTBRANCHDEPICTSARELATIONSHIPINWHICHTHEGOALSO
25、FTHEAGENTCONFLICTWITHTHOSEOFTHEPRINCIPALUNLIKETRADITIONALAGENCYTHEORY,HOWEVER,THEFIRSTBRANCHASSUMESTHATTHEAGENTWILLBEMOTIVATEDTOACTWITHINTHEINTERESTSOFTHEPRINCIPALANDTHATSHEWILLNOTPURSUEHEROWNGOALSDAVISANDDONALDSON,1997THISIMPLIESTHATTHEAGENTVALUESTHEEFFECTOFHERACTIONSONTHEUTILITYOFTHEPRINCIPALANDTH
26、ATPURSUINGHEROWNOBJECTIVESGENERATESHIGHERCOSTSINUTILITYTERMSTHANBENEFITSINSUCHCASE,THEAGENTCANATTAINAHIGHERUTILITYLEVELWHENSHECOOPERATESWITHTHEPRINCIPALTHESECONDBRANCHEXTENDSTHETHEORYBYASSUMINGTHATTHEAGENTSGOALSAREPERFECTLYALIGNEDWITHTHOSEOFTHEPRINCIPALLEWIS,2003ALTHOUGHPREVIOUSRESEARCHTENDSTOCHARAC
27、TERIZESTEWARDSHIPTHEORYASCOMPLETELYDIFFERENTFROMAGENCYTHEORYANDTOVIEWBOTHFRAMEWORKSASBEINGMUTUALLYEXCLUSIVEDONALDSONANDDAVIS,1991DAVIS,SCHOORMAN,ANDDONALDSON,1997WESTPHAL,1999,ITISOURVIEWTHATSTEWARDSHIPTHEORYSHOULDBESEENASALIMITINGCASEOFTHEAGENCYFRAMEWORKONANAXISOFASCENDINGAGENCYCONFLICTSTHATSTARTFR
28、OMZEROATTHELEFTHANDSIDE,STEWARDSHIPTHEORYCONSTITUTESTHELOWERENDFIGURE1ALLOTHERPOINTSRESIDEUNDERTHEAGENCYFRAMEWORKSINCENUMEROUSPOSITIONSCANBEPROPOSED,THEQUESTIONARISESWHEREONTHEAXISONESHOULDLOCATETHEPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSENCOUNTEREDWITHINTHENONPROFITORGANIZATIONWEARGUETHATTHESTRUGGLEBETWEENSTEWA
29、RDSHIPTHEORYANDAGENCYTHEORYMIGHTBESOLVEDBYDIVIDINGINTERNALNONPROFITPRINCIPALAGENTINTERACTIONSINTOTWOMAINRELATIONSHIPSINSTEADOFAPPLYINGONETHEORYTOFITTHEORGANIZATIONASAWHOLE,WEPROPOSETODIVIDETHESTUDYOFPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSWITHINNONPROFITORGANIZATIONSINTO1BOARDMANAGEMENTINTERACTIONSAND2MANAGEMENT
30、EMPLOYEEINTERACTIONSASSUCH,WEALLOWFORTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATTHETHEORYRULINGTHEFIRSTTYPEOFINTERNALRELATIONSHIPDIFFERSFROMTHEDOMINANTTHEORYINTHESECONDONE,ANDTHATEVENWITHINBOTHRELATIONSHIPSPLAYERSMAYSTARTFROMDIFFERENTVIEWPOINTSTHANTHEIRCONTRACTUALCOUNTERPARTSINTHENEXTSECTIONWEELABORATEONTHESEINTERNALNONPROF
31、ITPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSTHROUGHANEXTENSIVESURVEYOFTHEEXISTINGLITERATUREONBOARD,MANAGEMENT,ANDEMPLOYEEBEHAVIORANDINTERACTIONTHEFIRSTINTERNALPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPBOARDANDMANAGEMENTTHEFIRSTINTERNALPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPCONCERNSTHEINTERACTIONSBETWEENTHENONPROFITBOARDOFDIRECTORSTHEPRINCIPAL
32、ANDITSMANAGERTHEAGENTINTHEFIRSTEXTERNALPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIP,THENONPROFITBOARDOFDIRECTORSTAKESTHEROLEOFTHEAGENTWHOISASKEDTOPERFORMSERVICESONBEHALFOFTHEORGANIZATIONSSTAKEHOLDERSORDONORSWEWILLNOTENTERTHEDEBATEONWHETHERTHEBOARDSHOULDBEACCOUNTABLETOALLSTAKEHOLDERSORONLYTOITSDONORSANDWHETHERAGENCYCO
33、NFLICTSARISEBETWEENEITHERPARTYANDTHEBOARDSEEKAPLAN,1999INSTEAD,WESTARTFROMTHEPROPOSITIONTHATTHEBOARDHASOBJECTIVESITEMBEDSINAMISSIONSTATEMENTINTHEFIRSTINTERNALPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIP,THEBOARDTAKESTHEROLEOFPRINCIPAL,ACTINGASTHEPRIMEDEFENDEROFTHEMISSIONSTATEMENTANDASCHAMPIONOFITSACHIEVEMENTCONSIDERI
34、NGTHEASSUMPTIONSOFTHEAGENCYPERSPECTIVE,THEBOARDSHOULDTHEREFOREDECIDEWHETHERTOAPPLYMEASURESTOCONTROLTHEBEHAVIOROFAGENTSWHOMAYPURSUEOBJECTIVESOFTHEIROWNTHESECONDINTERNALPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPMANAGEMENTANDSUBORDINATESASTHEBOARDSAGENT,ONEOFTHENONPROFITMANAGERSPRIMERESPONSIBILITIESISTORUNTHENONPROFIT
35、ORGANIZATIONINACCORDANCEWITHTHEMISSIONOFTHEORGANIZATION,WHILERESPECTINGITSFINANCIALHEALTHHOWEVER,THEFINANCIALASPECTOFANONPROFITORGANIZATIONISQUITEDIFFERENTFROMTHATOFAFORPROFITORGANIZATIONFORPROFITSAIMTOMAXIMIZETHEPROFITSTHEYCANEXTRACTFROMTHEIRACTIVITIESANDENTERTHEPROFITLEVELINTOTHEIRUTILITYFUNCTIONA
36、NONPROFITORGANIZATION,ONTHEOTHERHAND,WILLPURSUEDIFFERENTGOALSANDWILLVIEWTHEFINANCIALASPECTASANECESSARYCONDITIONTHATSHOULDBEMETBEFORETHEUTILITYDERIVINGACTIVITIESCANBEENGAGEDINCONCLUSIONWEHAVEPRESENTEDTHECURRENTVIEWSONPRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIPSWITHINTHENONPROFITSECTORBASEDONTHERESEARCHCONDUCTEDSOFAR,
37、WEHAVEARGUEDTHATALTHOUGHTHEAPPLICATIONOFAGENCYTHEORYISWIDESPREADTHROUGHOUTTHELITERATUREONTHEFORPROFITSECTOR,ITISNOTYETCOMMONLYUSEDTODESCRIBELABORRELATIONSINNONPROFITORGANIZATIONSTHENONPROFITLITERATUREISSTILLNOTCOMPLETELYCLEARONWHETHERAGENCYORSTEWARDSHIPTHEORYSHOULDBEAPPLIEDBOTHTHEORIES,EACHSTARTINGF
38、ROMDIFFERENTASSUMPTIONSONTHECHARACTERISTICSOFNONPROFITPERSONNEL,SEEMTOPOSSESSSTRONGARGUMENTSANDENGAGEEACHOTHERINASTRUGGLEFORDOMINANCEWESUGGESTEDTHATSTEWARDSHIPTHEORYSHOULDBEVIEWEDMOREASALIMITINGCASEOFAGENCYTHEORYTHANASANOPPOSINGFRAMEWORKWEALSOARGUEDANALYSISOFTHERELATIONSHIPSWITHINNONPROFITORGANIZATI
39、ONSSHOULDBEDIVIDEDINTOTWOAREASOFSTUDYTHERELATIONSHIPSBETWEENTHESTAKEHOLDERSREPRESENTEDBYTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSANDTHEMANAGER,ANDBETWEENTHEMANAGERANDHISEMPLOYEESASOLUTIONMAYBEFOUNDBYACKNOWLEDGINGTHATTHESETWOCATEGORIESOFRELATIONSHIPSMAYDIFFERASOPPOSEDTOAPPLYINGONEFRAMEWORKTOFITTHEORGANIZATIONASAWHOLESOURC
40、ECAERS,RALF,DUBOIS,CINDY，JEGERS,MARC，DEGIETER,SARA，SCHEPERS,CATHERINE，PEPERMANS,ROLANDNONPROFITMANAGEMENT戴维斯，斯库曼，和唐纳森，1997年韦斯特法尔，1999年），这是我们的观点。管家理论应该被看作是限制情况下的代理框架。该代理冲突的轴从零开始往左侧延伸，管家理论逐渐构成了低端。所有其他点驻留在该机构框架内。由于许多职位可能会被提出，问题出现在哪里，这是每个人都会在非营利组织找到该委托代理关系中遇到的问题。我们认为管家理论之间的斗争和代理理论可能解决内部非营利组织的委托代理关系，并由此可
41、划分为两大部分的相互作用关系。这不是用一种将适应组织视为一个整体的理论,而是提出将研究委托代理关系中在非营利组织成为（1）董事会管理的相互作用和（2）管理和雇员之间的相互作用。因此，我们允许的可能性，即执政理论的内在关系不同于第一种类型，因为占主导地位的其实在第二个，而且即使在双方之间可能比他们的合约开始有不同的观点更早。在下一节中，我们将通过对董事会，管理层和员工的行为与互动，通过广泛的调查来阐释非盈利的委托代理关系。第一个内部委托代理关系董事会和管理层第一个内部委托代理关系有关之间的相互作用非营利组织之间董事会委托人和它的经理代理人。在第一个外部委托代理关系中,非营利董事要求代理人作为一个
42、履行服务利益相关者或是捐资者。我们暂不考虑董事会的成员是否应该对所有利益相关者或只对它的捐助国和机构之间发生冲突参见卡普兰1999。相反,我们先从命题考虑，董事会已在目标任务中嵌入了它的使命描述。在第一次内部委托代理关系,董事会作为主体地位，作为首要任务进行说明。从假设的考虑机构的角度来看,董事会应采取措施来控制代理者追求他们自己的目标。第二个内部委托代理关系管理和下属作为董事会的代理人，非营业经理的首要职责之一是执行该组织的命令，按照企业的任务进行，同时尊重其财务状况。然而，一个非营利组织在财务方面与营利性组织是有很大的区别的。对于分红目标来说，最大限度的利润，可以干预到他们的活动，并进入他
43、们的效用理论。一个非营利性组织，另一方面，追求不同的目标，并会认为这是必要条件之前并与效用活动相符合的。结论我们已经提出了在非营利部门中，关于委托代理关系的看法。到目前为止，我们一直在研究的基础上进行，我们认为，虽然代理理论广泛应用于各地的营利部门，但是它尚未普遍用于非营利组织的劳动关系中。非盈利组织文学还不清楚是否应该采用管理理论。这两种理论，丛非营利人员的特点进行假设，似乎都拥有有力的论据，比对方拥有一定的优势。我们建议，管家理论应该被看作是一个限制的代理理论，理论框架不是作为一个反对的内容。我们还认为非营利组织的内部关系的分析应分为两个领域，分别是利益相关者（由董事会代表）和经理之间，以及经理和他的员工之间。一个解决方案可能是通过承认这两类关系，从而发现其中会有所不同，而不是申请一个框架，用以适应整个组织。出处凯尔，拉尔夫，杜波依斯，辛迪，杰克，马克，莎拉，凯瑟琳，佩尔，罗兰非营利管理与领导，2006（1）2547
