1、外文文献翻译原文QUARTERLYEARNINGSPATTERNSANDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTEMPIRICALEVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATFIRMSMANAGEEARNINGSTOAVOIDREPORTINGLOSSESOREARNINGSDECREASESORTOMEETANALYSTSEXPECTATIONSIFFIRMSMANAGEEARNINGSTOMEETORBEATATARGETNUMBER,ADJUSTMENTSTOEARNINGSARELIKELYTOBEMADEWHENTHEEXCESSORSHORTFALLFROMTHETARGETBECOMES
2、KNOWNHENCE,THETIMINGOFMANIPULATIONISLIKELYTOBEACRITICALDISTINGUISHINGFEATURETHATCOULDPROVIDEAMEANSTODETECTSUCHTARGETMANAGEMENTBEHAVIORCONSISTENTWITHTHISVIEW,INVESTMENTEXPERTSCAUTIONINVESTORSTOWATCHOUTFORLATEYEARSURGESINREVENUESANDEARNINGS,WHICHTHEYREGARDASTELLTALESIGNSOFEARNINGSMANIPULATIONARTICLESI
3、NTHEBUSINESSPRESSDATINGBACKTOTHE1990SCITECASESOFTECHNOLOGYCOMPANIESREPORTINGDISPROPORTIONATEINCREASESINREVENUESANDEARNINGSINTHEFOURTHQUARTERINTHISPAPER,WEEXPLOITTHETIMINGCONSTRAINTONAFIRMSABILITYTOMANAGETOATARGETANDEXAMINEWHETHERTHEPATTERNOFQUARTERLYEARNINGSCANPROVIDEANINDICATIONOFPOTENTIALEARNINGSM
4、ANAGEMENTOURFOCUSONPOTENTIALEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTHEFOURTHQUARTERIMPLICITLYSUGGESTSTHATMANAGERSHAVEGREATERINCENTIVESTOMANAGEANNUALRATHERTHANQUARTERLYRESULTSINSUPPORTOFOURASSUMPTION,MOSTACCOUNTINGBASEDPERFORMANCEMEASURESUSEDINBONUSANDCOMPENSATIONSCHEMESAREBASEDONAUDITEDANNUALEARNINGSALSO,IFCAPITALMARK
5、ETPARTICIPANTSPERCEIVEAUDITEDANNUALEARNINGSASMORECREDIBLETHANINTERIMEARNINGS,THEYMAYPLACEAHIGHERVALUEONANNUALEARNINGS,PROVIDINGMANAGERSWITHSTRONGERINCENTIVESTOMANIPULATEANNUALEARNINGSTHUS,ALTHOUGHMANAGERSMAYHAVEGREATEROPPORTUNITIESTOMANIPULATEINTERIMEARNINGSBECAUSEOFTHEABSENCEOFANINDEPENDENTAUDIT,TH
6、EIRINCENTIVESTOMANAGEEARNINGSININTERIMQUARTERSMAYBEWEAKERTHEVASTLITERATUREONEARNINGSMANAGEMENTRELIESONANACCRUALEXPECTATIONMODELTOESTIMATEABNORMALORDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSEMPIRICALSTUDIESTYPICALLYIDENTIFYASAMPLEFORWHICHTHEDIRECTIONOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISPREDICTEDANDTHENTESTWHETHERTHEABNORMALACCRUALSOFTH
7、ESAMPLESUSPECTEDOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTAREHIGHERORLOWERTHANSOMEBENCHMARKTHEINHERENTDIFFICULTYINMODELINGACCRUALSLEADSTOMODELMISSPECIFICATIONANDLOWPOWERTESTSRESULTINGINSERIOUSINFERENCEPROBLEMSTHUS,THEREAPPEARSTOBEANEEDTOEXPLOREALTERNATIVEAPPROACHESTODETECTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTIFQUARTERLYEARNINGSREVERSALSIND
8、EEDREFLECTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBEHAVIOR,THISAPPROACHCANPOTENTIALLYPROVIDEUSWITHANALTERNATIVEDETECTIONTOOLEXAMININGEARNINGSPATTERNSOFAFIRMOVERTIMEAVOIDSTHESPECIFICATIONOFEXPECTEDORNORMALACCRUALSTHISQUARTERLYTIMESERIESAPPROACHUSESAFIRMASITSOWNCONTROLANDCANBEUSEDTODETECTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBYANYFIRM,INCLUDI
9、NGTHOSEWHERETHEMOTIVATIONTOMANAGEISNOTOBVIOUSOFCOURSE,ALIMITATIONOFTHISAPPROACHISTHATITISUSEFULONLYINDETECTINGCASESWHEREFIRMSTIMETHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTEFFORTWETESTWHETHERTHEOBSERVEDFREQUENCYOFFOURTHQUARTERREVERSALSISSIGNIFICANTLYHIGHERTHANEXPECTEDWEUSEASEQUENCEOFFOURQUARTERSWITHRANDOMLYDESIGNATEDINTE
10、RIMANDFOURTHQUARTERSANDDIFFERENTSEQUENCESOFFOURQUARTERSENDINGINAQUARTEROTHERTHANTHEFISCALFOURTHQUARTERASALTERNATIVEBENCHMARKSFORTHEEXPECTEDFREQUENCYOFREVERSALSONTHEBASISOFTHESEBENCHMARKS,WEFINDTHATTHEOCCURRENCEOFREVERSALSINTHEFISCALFOURTHQUARTERISSIGNIFICANTLYGREATERTHANWOULDBEEXPECTEDBYCHANCEINSUMM
11、ARY,OURRESULTSINDICATETHATREVERSALSOFFOURTHQUARTEREARNINGSOCCURINASIGNIFICANTPERCENTAGEOFFIRMSWHETHERTHISREVERSALPHENOMENONISINDEEDAMANIFESTATIONOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBEHAVIORISDIFFICULTTODETERMINEDEFINITIVELYOURGOALISNOTTOPROVIDEINCONTROVERTIBLEEVIDENCEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBYTHEREVERSALFIRMSBUTTOTESTT
12、HEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTHYPOTHESISALONGANUMBEROFDIMENSIONSNUMEROUSINDICATORSSUPPORTOURHYPOTHESISTHATFIRMSWITHREVERSALSAREMORELIKELYTHANOTHERSTOHAVEMANAGEDTHEIREARNINGSOURRESULTSFOCUSONTHESAMPLEAVERAGEANDHENCEDONOTIMPLYTHATALLFIRMSINTHEREVERSALSAMPLESENGAGEINEARNINGSMANAGEMENTTHEWEIGHTOFOUREVIDENCERAISES
13、ASTRONGSUSPICIONTHAT,ONAVERAGE,FOURTHQUARTERREVERSALSREFLECTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBEHAVIOROVERALL,OURPAPERCONTRIBUTESTOTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTLITERATUREINGENERALANDHASSPECIFICIMPLICATIONSFORTHETARGETMEETINGORBEATINGLITERATUREOURFINDINGSSUGGESTTHATINVESTORSSHOULDVIEWLATEYEARCHANGESINGENERALANDFOURTHQUARTER
14、EARNINGSREVERSALSINPARTICULARWITHCAUTIONONTHEBASISOFOUREVIDENCE,THEFOURTHQUARTERREVERSALPATTERNCANBEUSEDASAHEURISTICTHATTRIGGERSANINQUIRYINTOPOTENTIALEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINCONJUNCTIONWITHOTHERINDICATORS,SUCHASDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSORMEETINGORBEATINGEARNINGSTARGETSINCENTIVESTOMANAGEANNUALRATHERTHANINTER
15、IMQUARTERSEARNINGSMAYBESTRONGERFORSEVERALREASONSMOSTBONUSANDCOMPENSATIONPLANSBASEDONACCOUNTINGPERFORMANCERELYONAUDITEDANNUALRESULTSRATHERTHANNOTAUDITEDQUARTERLYRESULTSSUCHREMUNERATIONSCHEMESPROVIDEINCENTIVESFORMANAGERSTOMANIPULATEFISCALYEARINCOMETOACHIEVEPRESETTARGETSINORDERTOMAXIMIZETHEIRCOMPENSATI
16、ONTHEFIRMSSTANDINGINRELATIONTOTHESETARGETSWILLLIKELYBEMOSTCLEARLYAPPARENTINTHEFOURTHQUARTER,THUSPROVIDINGMANAGERSWITHTHESTRONGESTINCENTIVETOMANAGEEARNINGSINTHEFOURTHQUARTERFURTHERMORE,AUDITEDANNUALEARNINGSMAYHAVEHIGHERVALUATIONIMPLICATIONSIFINVESTORSATTACHGREATERCREDIBILITYTOTHEMRELATIVETOINTERIMEAR
17、NINGS,PROVIDINGMANAGERSWITHSTRONGERINCENTIVESTOMANIPULATEANNUALEARNINGSPRIOREMPIRICALSTUDIESPROVIDEINDIRECTEVIDENCECONSISTENTWITHMANAGERSHAVINGSTRONGERINCENTIVESTOMANAGEEARNINGSATTHEFISCALYEARENDSEVERALOFTHESESTUDIESEXAMINETHEMARKETRESPONSETOEARNINGSANNOUNCEMENTSFORABROADCROSSSECTIONOFFIRMSANDINFERW
18、HETHERFIRMSMANAGEEARNINGSDIFFERENTIALLYACROSSINTERIMANDFOURTHQUARTERSFOREXAMPLE,KROSSANDSCHROEDER1989ANDSALAMONANDSTOBER1994FINDTHATTHEMARKETSREACTIONTOANEARNINGSSURPRISEISLOWERINTHEFOURTHQUARTERRELATIVETOINTERIMQUARTERSBOTHSTUDIESATTRIBUTETHEIRFINDINGSTOEARNINGSMANAGEMENTATTHEFISCALYEARENDORTOTHESE
19、TTLINGUPOFINTERIMACCRUALSINTHEFOURTHQUARTEROTHEREMPIRICALSTUDIESEXAMINEPROPERTIESOFEARNINGSDISTRIBUTIONSANDDRAWINFERENCESABOUTPOTENTIALEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTHEFOURTHQUARTERJETERANDSHIVAKUMAR1999EXAMINESQUAREDABNORMALACCRUALSOFINTERIMVERSUSFOURTHQUARTERSANDFINDTHATTHEEVIDENCEOFPOTENTIALEARNINGSMANAGEM
20、ENTISGREATERINTHEFOURTHQUARTERTHANININTERIMQUARTERSALSO,THEFINDINGSOFDEGEORGE,PATEL,ANDZECKHAUSER1999SUGGESTTHATTHESPECIALSALIENCYOFANNUALREPORTSCREATESADDITIONALINCENTIVESTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSTOCROSSANANNUALTHRESHOLDRELATIVETOQUARTERLYTHRESHOLDSASREFLECTEDBYTHEVARIATIONINFOURTHQUARTEREARNINGSSIMILAR
21、LY,JACOBANDJORGENSEN2007SHOWTHEMANAGERSATTEMPTSTOAVOIDLOSSESEARNINGSDECREASES,REFLECTEDBYTHEDISCONTINUITYINTHEDISTRIBUTIONSOFFISCALYEAREARNINGSEARNINGSCHANGESATZERO,ARENOTOBSERVABLEINANNUALPERIODSENDINGINEACHOFTHEFIRSTTHREEFISCALQUARTERSOFAYEARUNLIKEPRIORSTUDIES,WEDONOTINFERTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTOCC
22、URSONAVERAGEINTHEGENERALPOPULATIONOFFIRMSINCONTRAST,WERELYONTHESESTUDIESFINDINGS,WHICHSUGGESTTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISMORELIKELYTOOCCURATFISCALYEAREND,ANDEXAMINETHEPATTERNOFQUARTERLYEARNINGSTOIDENTIFYPOTENTIALEARNINGSMANAGERSWHOMAYHAVETIMEDTHEIREFFORTSTOMANAGEANNUALEARNINGSINTHEFOURTHQUARTERTOCORROBO
23、RATETHATOURIDENTIFIEDSAMPLEFIRMSAREINFACTMANAGINGEARNINGS,WEEXAMINETHESEFIRMSONANUMBEROFDIMENSIONSTHATHAVEBEENOFFEREDBYPRIORRESEARCHASINDICATORSOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTWEEXPLOREANUMBEROFALTERNATIVEEXPLANATIONSFORTHEFOURTHQUARTERREVERSALPHENOMENONFIRST,ITISPOSSIBLETHATTHEREVERSALSAREMERELYINCIDENTALANDAR
24、ISEASACONSEQUENCEOFTHEFIRMSOPERATINGANDINVESTINGDECISIONSSECOND,REVERSALOFTHESIGNOFEARNINGSCHANGEINTHEFOURTHQUARTERRELATIVETOINTERIMQUARTERSMAYBETHERESULTOFANATURALMEANREVERSIONOFQUARTERLYEARNINGSTHIRD,THEREVERSALSMAYBEDUETOACHANGEINTHE“SETTLINGUP“OFINTERIMACCRUALSINTHEFOURTHQUARTERFOURTH,THEREVERSA
25、LSMAYRESULTFROMEARNINGSMANAGEMENTININTERIMQUARTERSANDNOTINTHEFOURTHQUARTERWEEXAMINETHEVALIDITYOFTHESECOMPETINGEXPLANATIONSFOREACHOFOURTESTSRECENTEVIDENCEINDICATESTHATMANAGERSMAYALSOMANIPULATEREALACTIVITIESTOAVOIDREPORTINGANNUALLOSSESSEEROYCHOWDHURY2006THESEACTIVITIESCOULDINCLUDEBOOSTINGANNUALSALESBY
26、OFFERINGSUBSTANTIALPRICEDISCOUNTSORREDUCTIONOFDISCRETIONARYEXPENDITURESSUCHASPLANTMAINTENANCEANDRESEARCHANDDEVELOPMENTUNLIKEACCRUALSMANIPULATION,MANAGEMENTOFREALACTIVITIESHASANEFFECTONTHEFIRMSCASHFLOWSREALOPERATINGACTIVITIESARE,HOWEVER,MOREDIFFICULTANDCOSTLYTOMANIPULATETHUS,ALTHOUGHWEDONOTRULEOUTMAN
27、AGEMENTOFOPERATINGCASHFLOWS,WEEXPECTTHEHIGHERLOWERFOURTHQUARTEREARNINGSOFTHENPPNSAMPLETORESULTMOSTLYFROMACCRUALSRATHERTHANFROMCFOSBECAUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISAMANIPULATIONOFTHETIMINGOFREVENUEANDEXPENSERECOGNITION,FOURTHQUARTERACCRUALCHANGESOFTHEREVERSALSAMPLESAREEXPECTEDTOBENEGATIVELYCORRELATEDWITHAC
28、CRUALCHANGESOFTHEIMMEDIATELYFOLLOWINGQUARTERSTHISFOLLOWSBECAUSEINFLATEDDEFLATEDACCRUALSINONEPERIODMUSTBEOFFSETBYLOWERHIGHERACCRUALSINSUBSEQUENTPERIODSDECHOW1994ANDDECHOW,KOTHARI,ANDWATTS1998SHOWTHATCHANGEINACCRUALSOFYEARTISNEGATIVELYCORRELATEDWITHCHANGEINACCRUALSOFYEART1IFTHISNEGATIVESERIALCORRELATI
29、ONINANNUALACCRUALCHANGESALSOHOLDSFORQUARTERLYACCRUALCHANGES,WEEXPECTTHEREVERSALSAMPLESTOEXHIBITTHISPATTERNSIMPLYBECAUSEOFTHEACCRUALREVERSALPROPERTYHENCE,WETESTWHETHERTHENEGATIVECORRELATIONBETWEENCHANGESINFOURTHQUARTERACCRUALSANDCHANGESINACCRUALSOFSUBSEQUENTQUARTERSISSTRONGERFORTHEREVERSALSAMPLESRELA
30、TIVETOTHECONTROLSAMPLESSTRONGERNEGATIVESERIALCORRELATIONINACCRUALSWILLARGUEAGAINSTTHEALTERNATEHYPOTHESISTHATTHEREVERSALPATTERNISMERELYREFLECTINGMEANREVERSIONINACCRUALSIFTHEFOURTHQUARTERREVERSALOCCURSBECAUSEACCRUALSBEGINTOREVERTTOTHEMEANINTHEFOURTHQUARTER,THENTHETRENDWOULDCONTINUEUNTILTHEYCONVERGETOA
31、STEADYSTATEANDWEWOULDNOTEXPECTASTRONGNEGATIVESERIALCORRELATIONBETWEENTHEFOURTHANDSUBSEQUENTQUARTERSACCRUALSWEPROVIDEEVIDENCEONTHESENUMEROUSDIMENSIONSTOEXAMINEWHETHERTHEREVERSALSREFLECTEARNINGSMANAGEMENTBEHAVIOROURRESULTSSHOULDBEINTERPRETEDNOTASIMPLYINGTHATALLFIRMSINTHEREVERSALSAMPLESENGAGEDINEARNING
32、SMANAGEMENT,BUTASSUGGESTIVEEVIDENCETHATTHESEFIRMSAREMORELIKELYTHANOTHERSTOHAVEMANAGEDTHEIREARNINGSWEINTENDFOROURRESULTSTOSHEDLIGHTONWHETHERTHESEEARNINGSREVERSALPATTERNSARESUSPICIOUSANDWARRANTFURTHERINVESTIGATIONIFTHEEARNINGSREVERSALPATTERNREFLECTSACCRUALSMANIPULATION,THENWEEXPECTOTHERINDICATORS,SUCH
33、ASTHECHANGEINACCRUALS,MAGNITUDEOFDISCRETIONARYACCRUALS,ANDMAGNITUDEOFSPECIALITEMS,TOCORROBORATETHEHIGHERLIKELIHOODOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTHEREVERSALSAMPLESRELATIVETOTHECONTROLSAMPLESBECAUSECONCLUSIVEEVIDENCEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISDIFFICULTTOPROVIDE,WESHOWCONTRASTSBETWEENTHEREVERSALANDCONTROLSAMPLESONS
34、EVERALDIFFERENTDIMENSIONS,WHICHMAYCOLLECTIVELYSUGGESTTHATFOURTHQUARTERREVERSALSREFLECTEFFORTSTOMANAGEEARNINGSTHESIGNIFICANTOVERLAPOFTHESAMPLESOFFIRMSREPORTINGSMALLPROFITSORSMALLEPSINCREASESWITHTHEREVERSALSAMPLESPROVIDESANINTERESTINGINSIGHTBECAUSEMUCHATTENTIONHASBEENPAIDTOFIRMSTHATMEETORJUSTBEATEARNI
35、NGSTARGETSASPOTENTIALEARNINGSMANAGERS,OURRESULTSHEDSLIGHTONTHEMANNERINWHICHTHESEFIRMSACHIEVETHESEANNUALTARGETSONTHEBASISOFTHEOBSERVEDKINKINEARNINGSDISTRIBUTIONSATZERO,THEPRESUMPTIONINPREVIOUSSTUDIESISTHATFIRMSTHATMEETORJUSTBEATEARNINGSTARGETSARELIKELYTOHAVEMANAGEDEARNINGSUPWARDTOAVOIDREPORTINGALOSSO
36、RANEARNINGSDECREASECONSISTENTWITHTHISBELIEF,WEFINDTHATASIGNIFICANTNUMBEROFTHESEFIRMSMANAGEEARNINGSUPWARDINTHEFOURTHQUARTERTOOFFSETTHEIRPOORPERFORMANCEININTERIMQUARTERSNPSAMPLETHEMOREINTRIGUINGFINDINGTHATISNOTADEQUATELYCONSIDEREDBYPRIORRESEARCHISTHATABOUTONEFOURTHOFTHEFIRMSTHATMEETORJUSTBEATEARNINGST
37、ARGETSAPPEARTOSMOOTHANNUALEARNINGSBYMANAGINGEARNINGSDOWNWARDINTHEFOURTHQUARTERPNSAMPLETHISCOULDPERHAPSEXPLAINTHEFINDINGOFDECHOWETAL2003THATSMALLPROFITANDSMALLLOSSFIRMSHAVEABOUTTHESAMELEVELOFDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSINCONCLUSION,THEPAPERCONTRIBUTESBYESTABLISHINGTHATCERTAININTRAYEAREARNINGSPATTERNSSHOULDB
38、EVIEWEDWITHSUSPICIONFROMAPRACTICALPERSPECTIVE,WEPROPOSETHATFOURTHQUARTEREARNINGSREVERSALSSHOULDTRIGGERFURTHERINVESTIGATIONINTOACOMPANYSEFFORTSTOMANAGEEARNINGSBECAUSEOURLARGESAMPLEANALYSISCANONLYPROVIDEONAVERAGEEVIDENCE,WERECOMMENDTHATANALYSTSANDINVESTORSUSETHISAPPROACHINCONJUNCTIONWITHOTHERINDICATOR
39、SOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENT,SUCHASTHEDIRECTIONANDSIZEOFDISCRETIONARYACCRUALSANDMEETINGORBEATINGTARGETSRESOURCESOMNATHDAS,PERVINKSHROFF,HAIWENZHANGQUARTERLYEARNINGSPATTERNSANDEARNINGSMANAGEMENTCONTEMPORARYACCOUNTINGRESEARCH,2009P797831译文季度收入模式和盈余管理实证研究表明，公司盈余管理以避免报告损失或收入减少还是为了满足分析师的预期。如果公司的盈余计划达到一个目标数额，收益的
40、调整数可能超过或不足这个既定的目标。因此，操纵的时间选择可能是发现这种行为的一个重要特征。根据这一观点，投资专家警告投资者小心年底掀起获利的狂潮，他们视此为利润操纵的迹象。追溯到90年代商业期刊上的文章，收益不成比例增加通常在第四季度。在本文中，我们利用这种时间约束来达到公司管理的目的，并检查季度收入的模式是否可以提供潜在盈余管理的迹象。我们专注于第四季度的潜在盈余管理，潜在地表明管理者有更大的动机去经营年度业绩而非季度业绩。支持我们的假设，大多数用于奖金和补偿方案的业绩指标都是基于受审查的年收入。同时，如果资本市场参与者认为受审查的年收入比临时收入更加可靠，他们将年收入放到了更高的价值，给管
41、理者更高的动机来操纵年收入。因此，虽然管理者由于缺了一个独立审计可能有很多机会操纵临时收入，他们在过渡期管理盈余的动机减弱了。关于盈余管理的大量文献有赖于期望收益模型来估计异常或操控性应计利润。典型的实证研究识别了盈余管理的方向是预知的，并检验了反常的收益是否超过或低于一些基准。建立收益模型的内在难度是导致模型设定误差和小型测试造成严重推理问题。因此，似乎需要去探索多种途径来检测盈余管理。假如季度收益逆转确实反映盈余管理行为，这种方法可以潜在地为我们提供另一种检测工具。检测盈利模式避免了预期的规格或正常的应计利润。这个方法利用一个公司作为其控制，可以用来检测任何公司盈余管理，包括那些管理动机不
42、明显的。当然，这种方法的限制是只有在探测企业盈余管理的成就时是有用的。我们测试了第四季度的观察次数是否显著高于预期。我们用一系列任意指定的偶然期、第四季度和不同系列的结束期作为比较的标准。在这些标准的基础上，我们发现第四季度发生的收益逆转显然大于偶然所预期的。我们的研究结果表明，第四季度收益逆转发生在具有一定规模的公司。这种逆转现象是否真的是盈余管理行为的表现，是很难确定的。我们的目标不是提供逆转公司盈余管理的确凿证据，而是检测若干规模下盈余管理的假设。许多指标支持逆转公司更有可能去管理盈余这个假设。我们的研究结果集中于所抽取公司的平均数，因此这并不意味着所有公司从事盈余管理。我们所拥有证据的
43、重要性是它提出了强烈的质疑，那就是在通常情况下，第四季度的逆转反映了盈余管理行为。我们的论文有助于从总体来看盈余管理的文献，并对目标成本和战略管理方面有特定的蕴涵。我们的研究结果显示，投资者一般会考虑年末机会，且特别留意第四季度的收益逆转。基于我们的证据，第四季度的逆转模式可以连同其他指标触发潜在盈余管理的调查，例如操纵利润或达到或超过盈利目标。相较于季度收入，管理年度收入的动机可能更强。大多数奖金和补偿计划是基于一定的财务成果，是依赖于受审查的年度收入，而不是不受审查的季度收入。这样的报酬计划激励管理者操纵会计年度收入，从而达到预期目标，使报酬最大化。在第四季度，与这一目标相适应，企业的立场
44、就显得格外清晰，因而应提供最强烈的动机去管理盈余。此外，如果投资者对年度收入寄予更大的信任感，那么受审计的年度收入就会有更高的评估意义。先前的实证研究提供了管理者在会计年末经营收入的间接证据。这些研究的很大一部分检测了市场对盈利公告的反应，并推断在临时和第四季度公司是否会不同地经营盈余。例如，克劳斯、施罗德1989和赛拉蒙、斯特博1994发现在第四季度市场的反应会比较小。研究将他们的发现归因于会计年末的盈余管理，或者是第四季度临时收益的了结。其他实证研究检测了盈余分配的性能，在第四季度对潜在盈余管理进行推断。皮特、西瓦库玛1999发现了在第四季度，潜在盈余管理的证据会比临时期更多。同时，迪格欧
45、格、帕特尔、赛克郝瑟1999的调查结果表明年度财务报告的特性决定了其激励操纵盈余的作用，以达到年末的收益目标。同样地，雅各布和约根森2007表明管理者尝试避免损失增加收入，会计年度收入的不断分配，通常在每一年的前三个季度是不易发现的。不像之前的研究，我们没有推断盈余管理一般是发生在母公司。相反地，我们的研究发现表明盈余管理更有可能发生在会计年末，并通过检测季度收入模式来鉴定潜在盈余管理者在第四季度如何为管理年度收入安排合理的时间。为了证实确实存在盈余管理，我们检测了一些具有一定规模的公司，从而作为研究盈余管理的指标。我们探索了关于第四季度逆转现象的多种解释。第一，它有可能是偶尔发生的，仅仅是公
46、司操作和投资决定的结果。第二，相对于临时期，第四季度收入逆转可能是季度收入自然逆转的结果。第三，逆转可能是出于在第四季度，临时收入得到结清这一改变。第四，逆转可能是由临时期的盈余管理所造成的，而不是第四季度。在我们的每一研究中，我们都检测了这些相互抵触的解释的有效性。最近的证据指出，管理者也许会操纵实际行动来避免报告年度损失罗西哈瑞2006年。这些活动可以包括通过提供实质性的价格折扣来促进年度销售，减少任意性开支，如工厂保养费和研究开发费用。和利润操纵不同，实质活动的管理对公司的现金流有很大的影响，我们认为更高的第四季度盈余主要来自于收益，而不是来自首席财务官。因为盈余管理是收入的定时操纵和开
47、支的认可，第四季度收益的逆转将消极地与以后季度的收益改变发生对应关系。这是因为在一段时期抬高（降低）收益，必定在随后的时期降低（抬高）收益来与前期相抵消。迪奇弗1994和迪奇弗，科赛瑞，瓦茨1998表明，T年收益的改变需要T1年收益的改变来与之相抵消。如果年度自然增长改变的消极序列相关同样适用于季度自然增长改变，那么我们应该基于自然增长额的逆转特性，坦白地展示这种模式。因此，我们测试了第四季度的收益改变是否比以后期的收益改变具有更大的消极影响。更强的消极序列相关会反对逆转模式仅仅反映了收益的平均逆转这一假设。如果收益在第四季度开始恢复到平均值，然后这种趋势将会持续下去，直到他们达到一种稳定的状
48、态，那么我们不指望第四季度和随后季度之间的盈余有很大的消极序列相关。我们提供了大量的证据来反映这种逆转是否会反映盈余管理行为。我们的结果并不应该解释为逆转法是公司从事着盈余管理活动的肯定性证据，但是可以作为有可能从事盈余管理的建议性证据。我们打算阐明这些收益逆转模式是否可疑，是否需要进一步的调查。如果收益逆转模式反映了收益操纵，那么我们期望其他操作指标例如收益的改变、任意收益的大小、特别项目的重要程度，来证实盈余管理的更高可能性。因为盈余管理的决定性证据是很难提供的，在几个不同规模下，我们展示了逆转和控制的区别，哪一个会全面表明第四季度逆转是有由于盈余管理的作用。公司报告的小额利润或每股利润更
49、令人关注。作为潜在盈余管理者，当达到或超过盈利时，会引起更多的关注。同样，我们的研究成果阐述了公司完成盈利目标的方式。先前研究推断，当公司达到或超过盈利目标时，更有可能将盈利往上提，来避免报告损失或者少报盈利。根据这一信念，我们发现大量的这些公司在第四季度向上提盈利，来抵消他们在临时季度的不良表现。更有趣的是，四分之一的公司当达到或刚超过盈利目标时，为了使年收益平稳，会在第四季度把盈利向下降。这可以解释为迪奇弗在2003的发现，小额盈利和小额亏损公司在任意决定收益方面处于同一层次。这些作者是否真正结果扭结盈余管理或取得之方式。总之，本文通过建立某种盈利模式，并一直用怀疑的眼光看待这项研究。从现实的角度来看，我们建议第四季度收益逆转会激起公司管理盈余的进一步调查。因为我们的分析仅仅提供一些证据，我们建议分析师和投资者使用这个方法并结合盈余管理的其他指标，如任意收益的趋势、大小和达到或超过盈利目标。出处大弗索姆纳特，什罗夫佩文，张海文。季度收入模式和盈余管理。时代会计研究，2009第797页到831页。
