1、外文文献翻译原文MANDATORYIFRSREPORTINGAROUNDTHEWORLDEARLYEVIDENCEONTHEECONOMICCONSEQUENCESHOLGERDASKE,LUZIHAIL,CHRISTIANLEUZ,RODRIGOVERDIABSTRACTTHISPAPEREXAMINESTHEECONOMICCONSEQUENCESOFMANDATORYINTERNATIONALFINANCIALREPORTINGSTANDARDSIFRSREPORTINGAROUNDTHEWORLDWEANALYZETHEEFFECTSONMARKETLIQUIDITY,COSTOFCA
2、PITAL,ANDTOBINSQIN26COUNTRIESUSINGALARGESAMPLEOFFIRMSTHATAREMANDATEDTOADOPTIFRSWEFINDTHAT,ONAVERAGE,MARKETLIQUIDITYINCREASESAROUNDTHETIMEOFTHEINTRODUCTIONOFIFRSWEALSODOCUMENTADECREASEINFIRMSCOSTOFCAPITALANDANINCREASEINEQUITYVALUATIONS,BUTONLYIFWEACCOUNTFORTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATTHEEFFECTSOCCURPRIORTOTHEO
3、FFICIALADOPTIONDATEPARTITIONINGOURSAMPLE,WEFINDTHATTHECAPITALMARKETBENEFITSOCCURONLYINCOUNTRIESWHEREFIRMSHAVEINCENTIVESTOBETRANSPARENTANDWHERELEGALENFORCEMENTISSTRONG,UNDERSCORINGTHECENTRALIMPORTANCEOFFIRMSREPORTINGINCENTIVESANDCOUNTRIESENFORCEMENTREGIMESFORTHEQUALITYOFFINANCIALREPORTINGCOMPARINGMAN
4、DATORYANDVOLUNTARYADOPTERS,WEFINDTHATTHECAPITALMARKETEFFECTSAREMOSTPRONOUNCEDFORFIRMSTHATVOLUNTARILYSWITCHTOIFRS,BOTHINTHEYEARWHENTHEYSWITCHANDAGAINLATER,WHENIFRSBECOMEMANDATORYWHILETHEFORMERRESULTISLIKELYDUETOSELFSELECTION,THELATTERRESULTCAUTIONSUSTOATTRIBUTETHECAPITALMARKETEFFECTSFORMANDATORYADOPT
5、ERSSOLELYOREVENPRIMARILYTOTHEIFRSMANDATEMANYADOPTINGCOUNTRIESMAKECONCURRENTEFFORTSTOIMPROVEENFORCEMENTANDGOVERNANCEREGIMES,WHICHLIKELYPLAYINTOOURFINDINGSCONSISTENTWITHTHISINTERPRETATION,THEESTIMATEDLIQUIDITYIMPROVEMENTSARESMALLERINMAGNITUDEWHENWEANALYZETHEMONAMONTHLYBASIS,WHICHISMORELIKELYTOISOLATEI
6、FRSREPORTINGEFFECTS1INTRODUCTIONTHEINTRODUCTIONOFINTERNATIONALFINANCIALREPORTINGSTANDARDSIFRSFORLISTEDCOMPANIESINMANYCOUNTRIESAROUNDTHEWORLDISONEOFTHEMOSTSIGNIFICANTREGULATORYCHANGESINACCOUNTINGHISTORYOVER100COUNTRIESHAVERECENTLYMOVEDTOIFRSREPORTINGORDECIDEDTOREQUIRETHEUSEOFTHESESTANDARDSINTHENEARFU
7、TUREANDEVENTHEUSSECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSIONSECISCONSIDERINGALLOWINGUSFIRMSTOPREPARETHEIRFINANCIALSTATEMENTSINACCORDANCEWITHIFRSSEC2007REGULATORSEXPECTTHATTHEUSEOFIFRSENHANCESTHECOMPARABILITYOFFINANCIALSTATEMENTS,IMPROVESCORPORATETRANSPARENCY,INCREASESTHEQUALITYOFFINANCIALREPORTING,ANDHENCEBENEFI
8、TSINVESTORSEG,ECREGULATIONNO1606/2002FROMANECONOMICPERSPECTIVE,THEREAREREASONSTOBESKEPTICALABOUTTHESEEXPECTATIONSAND,INPARTICULAR,THEPREMISETHATSIMPLYMANDATINGIFRSMAKESCORPORATEREPORTINGMOREINFORMATIVEORMORECOMPARABLETHUS,THEECONOMICCONSEQUENCESOFMANDATINGIFRSREPORTINGARENOTOBVIOUSINTHISPAPER,WEPROV
9、IDEEARLYEVIDENCEONTHECAPITALMARKETEFFECTSAROUNDTHEINTRODUCTIONOFMANDATORYIFRSREPORTINGIN26COUNTRIESAROUNDTHEWORLDUSINGATREATMENTSAMPLEOFOVER3,100FIRMSTHATAREMANDATEDTOADOPTIFRS,WEANALYZEEFFECTSINSTOCKMARKETLIQUIDITY,COSTOFEQUITYCAPITAL,ANDFIRMVALUETHESEMARKETBASEDCONSTRUCTSSHOULDREFLECT,AMONGOTHERTH
10、INGS,CHANGESINTHEQUALITYOFFINANCIALREPORTINGANDHENCESHOULDALSOREFLECTIMPROVEMENTSAROUNDTHEIFRSMANDATEWEEMPLOYFOURPROXIESFORMARKETLIQUIDITY,THATIS,THEPROPORTIONOFZERORETURNS,THEPRICEIMPACTOFTRADES,TOTALTRADINGCOSTS,ANDBIDASKSPREADS,FOURMETHODSTOCOMPUTETHEIMPLIEDCOSTOFEQUITYCAPITAL,ANDUSETOBINSQASAPRO
11、XYFORFIRMSEQUITYVALUATIONSTHEPRIMARYCHALLENGEOFOURANALYSISISTHATTHEAPPLICATIONOFIFRSISMANDATEDFORALLPUBLICLYTRADEDFIRMSINAGIVENCOUNTRYFROMACERTAINDATEONTHISMAKESITDIFFICULTTOFINDABENCHMARKAGAINSTWHICHTOEVALUATEANYOBSERVEDCAPITALMARKETEFFECTSOUREMPIRICALSTRATEGYUSESTHREESETSOFTESTSTOADDRESSTHISISSUEF
12、IRST,USINGFIRMYEARPANELDATAFROM2001TO2005,WEBENCHMARKLIQUIDITY,COSTOFCAPITAL,ANDVALUATIONEFFECTSAROUNDTHEINTRODUCTIONOFIFRSAGAINSTCHANGESINOTHERCOUNTRIESTHATDONOTYETMANDATEORALLOWIFRSREPORTINGWEALSOINCLUDEFIRMSFROMIFRSADOPTIONCOUNTRIESTHATDONOTYETREPORTUNDERIFRSATTHEENDOFOURSAMPLEPERIODBECAUSETHEIRF
13、ISCALYEARENDSAFTERDECEMBER2005,WHICH,EXCEPTFORSINGAPORE,ISTHEDATEAFTERWHICHOURSAMPLEFIRMSMUSTUSEIFRSBOTHBENCHMARKSHELPUSTOCONTROLFORCONTEMPORANEOUSCAPITALMARKETEFFECTSTHATAREUNRELATEDTOTHEINTRODUCTIONOFIFRSINADDITION,WEINTRODUCEFIRMFIXEDEFFECTSTOACCOUNTFORUNOBSERVEDTIMEINVARIANTFIRMCHARACTERISTICSSE
14、COND,STILLUSINGFIRMYEARPANELDATA,WEEXAMINEWHETHERTHEESTIMATEDCAPITALMARKETEFFECTSEXHIBITPLAUSIBLECROSSSECTIONALVARIATIONWITHRESPECTTOCOUNTRIESINSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORKSASTHEREGULATORYCHANGEFORCESMANYFIRMSTOADOPTIFRSTHATWOULDNOTHAVEDONESOOTHERWISE,WEEXPECTMANDATORYIFRSREPORTINGTOHAVEASMALLEREFFECTORNOIM
15、PACTINCOUNTRIESWITHWEAKLEGALANDENFORCEMENTREGIMESORWHEREFIRMSHAVEPOORREPORTINGINCENTIVESTOBEGINWITHMOREOVER,ASSUMINGTHATMANDATORYIFRSREPORTINGISPROPERLYENFORCED,THEIMPACTISLIKELYTOBESMALLERINCOUNTRIESTHATALREADYHAVEHIGHREPORTINGQUALITYORWHERELOCALGENERALLYACCEPTEDACCOUNTINGPRINCIPLESGAAPANDIFRSAREFA
16、IRLYCLOSETHIRD,WEEXPLOITTHATFIRMSBEGINAPPLYINGIFRSATDIFFERENTPOINTSINTIMEDEPENDINGONTHEIRFISCALYEARENDSANDTHAT,ASARESULT,THEADOPTIONPATTERNINAGIVENCOUNTRYISLARGELYEXOGENOUSONCETHEINITIALDATEFORIFRSADOPTIONISSETWERELATETHISPATTERNTOCHANGESINAGGREGATELIQUIDITYINAGIVENCOUNTRYANDMONTHIFTHEINTRODUCTIONOF
17、IFRSREPORTINGHASINDEEDDISCERNABLEEFFECTS,WEEXPECTCHANGESINAGGREGATELIQUIDITYTOBEMOSTPRONOUNCEDINMONTHSWHENMANYFIRMSREPORTUNDERIFRSFORTHEFIRSTTIMETHATIS,CHANGESINLIQUIDITYSHOULDMIRRORCOUNTRIESSTEPWISETRANSITIONTOWARDSTHENEWREPORTINGREGIMEANDNOTSIMPLYREFLECTATIMETRENDORAONETIMESHOCKASTHISAPPROACHHASFE
18、WERDATARESTRICTIONS,WEANALYZELIQUIDITYEFFECTSFOR6,500MANDATORYADOPTERS,THATIS,FIRMSTHATREPORTUNDERIFRSFORTHEFIRSTTIMEWHENITBECOMESMANDATORYWEBEGINOURFIRSTSETOFANALYSESWITHASIMPLEDIFFERENCEINDIFFERENCESANALYSISANDFINDTHATMANDATORYADOPTERSEXHIBITASIGNIFICANTLYLARGERINCREASEINMARKETLIQUIDITYTHANARANDOM
19、SAMPLEOFNONADOPTINGBENCHMARKFIRMSFROMAROUNDTHEWORLDINCONTRAST,THECHANGESINTOBINSQFORMANDATORYADOPTERSAREINSIGNIFICANTANDTHEIRCOSTOFCAPITALEVENINCREASESRELATIVETOBENCHMARKFIRMSWHILETHELATTERFINDINGSMAYBESURPRISING,THEYDONOTYETACCOUNTFORTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATMARKETSLIKELYPRICETHEIFRSMANDATEAHEADOFTHEACTUA
20、LADOPTIONDATENEXT,WERUNFIRMLEVELPANELREGRESSIONSTHATCONTROLFORTIMEVARYINGFIRMCHARACTERISTICS,MARKETWIDECHANGESINTHEDEPENDENTVARIABLE,INDUSTRYYEARFIXED,ANDFIRMFIXEDEFFECTSWEFINDTHATMARKETLIQUIDITYINCREASESFORFIRMSTHATADOPTIFRSREPORTINGWHENITBECOMESMANDATORYINOURMAINSPECIFICATION,THEPERCENTAGEOFDAYSWI
21、THOUTTRADESDECLINESBY100BASISPOINTSFORMANDATORYADOPTERS,WHICHISCLOSETOA4LIQUIDITYIMPROVEMENTRELATIVETOTHEMEDIANLEVELPRIORTOIFRSADOPTIONTOTALTRADINGCOSTSANDTHEPERCENTAGEBIDASKSPREADSBOTHDECLINEBY12BASISPOINTS,INDICATINGLIQUIDITYINCREASESOF3AND6,RESPECTIVELY,RELATIVETOTHEMEDIANLEVELPRIORTOIFRSADOPTION
22、THERESULTSFORPRICEIMPACTAREINSIGNIFICANTINTHEMAINSPECIFICATIONFORPARSIMONYANDTOREDUCEMEASUREMENTERROR,WEAGGREGATEALLFOURLIQUIDITYPROXIESINTOASINGLELIQUIDITYFACTORANDAGAINFINDASTATISTICALLYSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINLIQUIDITYFORMANDATORYIFRSADOPTERSWEALSOVARYTHECOMPOSITIONOFTHEBENCHMARKSAMPLEUSINGTHECOMPLE
23、TEWORLDSCOPEPOPULATIONORUSFIRMSONLYWHILETHESEVARIATIONSDONOTCHANGETHETENOROFTHERESULTS,THEYINDICATETHATBENCHMARKINGANDTHESPECIFICCHOICEOFTHEBENCHMARKAREIMPORTANTINEVALUATINGTHELIQUIDITYEFFECTSAROUNDTHEIFRSMANDATETHECOSTOFCAPITALANDTOBINSQRESULTSAREMIXEDOURBASESPECIFICATIONINDICATESANINCREASEINTHECOS
24、TOFCAPITALANDADECREASEOFTOBINSQINTHEYEARWHENIFRSREPORTINGBECOMESMANDATORY,SIMILARTOTHEDIFFERENCEDIFFERENCESANALYSISITISPOSSIBLE,THOUGH,THATTHESERESULTSSTEMFROMTRANSITIONEFFECTS,SUCHASTEMPORARYDIFFICULTIESINFORECASTINGEARNINGSUNDERTHENEWACCOUNTINGREGIME,WHICHCANAFFECTTHEIMPLIEDCOSTOFCAPITAL,ORCHANGES
25、INTHEMEASUREMENTOFTOTALASSETS,WHICHCANAFFECTTOBINSQANOTHEREXPLANATIONISTHATMARKETSANTICIPATETHEEFFECTSOFTHEIFRSMANDATE,INWHICHCASEINCLUDINGOBSERVATIONSOFSWITCHINGFIRMSBEFORETHEINTRODUCTIONOFIFRSASOURPANELAPPROACHDOESLIKELYWORKSAGAINSTFINDINGADECREASEINCREASEINTHECOSTOFCAPITALTOBINSQCONSISTENTWITHTHE
26、EXISTENCEOFANTICIPATIONEFFECTS,WEFINDTHATTHECOSTOFCAPITALDECREASESBY26BASISPOINTSANDTOBINSQINCREASESBY7WHENWEMEASURETHEEFFECTONEYEARBEFORETHEMANDATORYADOPTIONDATEWHILETHELIQUIDITYANDTHEANTICIPATIONADJUSTEDCOSTOFCAPITALANDVALUATIONEFFECTSFORMANDATORYADOPTERSAREECONOMICALLYSIGNIFICANT,THEYAREGENERALLY
27、SMALLERTHANTHECORRESPONDINGCAPITALMARKETEFFECTSOFVOLUNTARYADOPTERSTHATIS,THELATTERGROUPEXHIBITSSIGNIFICANTLIQUIDITY,VALUATION,ANDCOSTOFCAPITALEFFECTSAROUNDTHEINTRODUCTIONOFMANDATORYIFRSREPORTING,DESPITETHEFACTTHATTHESEFIRMSHAVEALREADYSWITCHEDTOIFRSPRIORTOTHEMANDATETHEREARESEVERALWAYSTOINTERPRETTHISF
28、INDINGFIRST,ITCOULDREFLECTCOMPARABILITYBENEFITSTHATACCRUETOTHEVOLUNTARYADOPTERSWHENTHEOTHERFIRMSINTHECOUNTRYHAVETOSWITCHTOIFRSWECONDUCTSOMETESTSONTHEROLEOFCOMPARABILITYEFFECTS,BUTAREUNABLETOPROVIDESTATISTICALSUPPORTFORTHISARGUMENTSECOND,THECAPITALMARKETEFFECTSFORVOLUNTARYADOPTERSCOULDSTEMFROMCONCURR
29、ENTCHANGESINTHEENFORCEMENTANDGOVERNANCEREGIMESTHATSOMECOUNTRIESINTRODUCETOGETHERWITHTHEIFRSMANDATESUCHCHANGESSHOULDAFFECTMANDATORYANDVOLUNTARYADOPTERSINAGIVENCOUNTRYAND,HENCE,COULDEXPLAINTHECAPITALMARKETEFFECTSOURCROSSSECTIONALRESULTS,WHICHWEDISCUSSNEXT,ARECONSISTENTWITHTHISINTERPRETATIONFINALLY,AST
30、HECAPITALMARKETEFFECTSAREPARTICULARLYPRONOUNCEDFOREARLYVOLUNTARYADOPTERS,ITISALSOPOSSIBLETHATTHEMANDATEINCREASESTHECOMMITMENTASSOCIATEDWITHIFRSREPORTINGASITELIMINATESDUALREPORTINGPRACTICESANDTHEOPTIONTOREVERSEBACKTOLOCALGAAPOURSECONDSETOFEMPIRICALTESTS,THECROSSSECTIONALANALYSES,SHOWTHATTHECAPITALMAR
31、KETEFFECTSAROUNDTHEINTRODUCTIONOFMANDATORYIFRSREPORTINGARENOTEVENLYDISTRIBUTEDACROSSCOUNTRIESANDFIRMSWEFINDTHATTHECAPITALMARKETSEFFECTSAROUNDMANDATORYIFRSADOPTIONOCCURONLYINCOUNTRIESWITHRELATIVELYSTRICTENFORCEMENTREGIMESANDINCOUNTRIESWHERETHEINSTITUTIONALENVIRONMENTPROVIDESSTRONGINCENTIVESTOFIRMSTOB
32、ETRANSPARENTTHESEFINDINGSARECONSISTENTWITHTHEVIEWTHATIFRSIMPLEMENTATIONISLIKELYTOBEHETEROGENEOUSACROSSCOUNTRIESEG,BALL2006,ANDWITHTHEIDEATHATFIRMSREPORTINGINCENTIVES,WHICHARESHAPEDBYMARKETSANDCOUNTRIESINSTITUTIONALENVIRONMENTS,PLAYACRUCIALROLEFORREPORTINGOUTCOMESEG,BALL,ROBIN,ANDWU2003,BALLANDSHIVAK
33、UMAR2005,BURGSTAHLER,HAIL,ANDLEUZ2006WEALSOFINDTHATTHEEFFECTSFORMANDATORYADOPTERSARESMALLERINCOUNTRIESTHATHAVEFEWERDIFFERENCESBETWEENLOCALGAAPANDIFRSANDAPREEXISTINGCONVERGENCESTRATEGYTOWARDSIFRSASEXPECTEDUNDERTHEREPORTINGINCENTIVESVIEW,THESEEFFECTSARELARGESTFORCOUNTRIESWITHLARGEGAAPDIFFERENCESTHATAL
34、SOHAVESTRONGLEGALREGIMESFINALLY,CAPITALMARKETEFFECTSARESTRONGERINMEMBERSTATESOFTHEEUROPEANUNIONEU,POSSIBLYREFLECTINGITSCONCURRENTEFFORTSTOIMPROVEGOVERNANCEANDENFORCEMENTHAILANDLEUZ2007INOURLASTSETOFANALYSES,WEEXAMINEMONTHLYCHANGESINAGGREGATELIQUIDITYASIFRSREPORTINGBECOMESMOREWIDESPREAD,CONTROLLINGFO
35、RCONTEMPORANEOUSCHANGESINWORLDMARKETLIQUIDITYAVERAGEDOVER100RANDOMSAMPLES,CHANGESINLIQUIDITYFORTHESAMECALENDARMONTHINTHEPRIORYEAR,LAGGEDLEVELSINLIQUIDITY,VOLATILITY,MARKETCAPITALIZATION,ANDCOUNTRYFIXEDEFFECTSWESHOWTHATINCREASESINIFRSREPORTINGBYMANDATORYADOPTERSAREASSOCIATEDWITHDECREASESINTHEPERCENTA
36、GEOFZERORETURNS,INBIDASKSPREADSAND,TOALESSEREXTENT,INTHEPRICEIMPACTOFTRADESTHESEFINDINGSCONFIRMOURFIRMYEARANALYSESBUTARECONSIDERABLYSMALLERINMAGNITUDEASTHECOUNTRYMONTHANALYSISISLIKELYTHECLEANESTTESTINTERMSOFSEPARATINGTHECONSEQUENCESOFTHEIFRSMANDATEFROMOTHERFACTORSEG,TIMETRENDS,UNRELATEDINSTITUTIONAL
37、CHANGES,THESMALLERMAGNITUDEOFTHEEFFECTSPROVIDESFURTHEREVIDENCETHATTHEDOCUMENTEDLIQUIDITYIMPROVEMENTSINTHEFIRMYEARANALYSISCANNOTBEATTRIBUTEDENTIRELYTOTHEIFRSMANDATEDESPITETHECONSISTENCYOFOURFINDINGSACROSSVARIOUSANALYSES,WECAUTIONTHEREADERTOINTERPRETTHISSTUDYCAREFULLYFIRST,ASSEVERALCOUNTRIESAROUNDTHEW
38、ORLDSUBSTANTIALLYREVISETHEIRENFORCEMENT,AUDITING,ANDGOVERNANCEREGIMESTOSUPPORTTHEINTRODUCTIONOFIFRSREPORTING,ITISLIKELYTHATOURRESULTSREFLECTTHEJOINTEFFECTSOFTHESEEFFORTSANDHENCECANNOTSOLELY,OREVENPRIMARILY,BEATTRIBUTEDTOTHESWITCHTOIFRSSECOND,OURANALYSESAREBASEDONARELATIVELYSHORTTIMEPERIODANDITISPOSS
39、IBLETHATTHEDOCUMENTEDEFFECTSARESHORTLIVEDBUTTHEEFFECTSCOULDALSOINCREASEOVERTIMEASMARKETPARTICIPANTSGAINMOREEXPERIENCEWITHIFRSORASRECENTCHANGESTOCOUNTRIESENFORCEMENTANDGOVERNANCEREGIMESTAKEFURTHERHOLDTHIRD,OURVALUATIONANDCOSTOFCAPITALPROXIESMAYEXHIBITSUBSTANTIALMEASUREMENTERRORAND,INPARTICULAR,MAYBEA
40、FFECTEDBYTHECHANGEINACCOUNTINGMEASUREMENTPERSE,WHICHINTURNCOULDBIASTHEMAGNITUDEOFTHEESTIMATEDEFFECTSFORINSTANCE,TAKENATFACEVALUE,OURESTIMATESOFTHEVALUATIONEFFECTSSEEMTOOLARGETOBESOLELYATTRIBUTABLETOTHEIFRSMANDATEFINALLY,WHILEWEATTEMPTTOACCOUNTFORANTICIPATIONANDEARLYPRICINGOFTHEIFRSMANDATEASWELLASFIR
41、STTIMEIFRSINTERIMREPORTING,THESEEFFECTSANDTRANSITIONALPROCEDURESSEEIFRS1LIKELYREDUCETHEPOWEROFOURTESTSSOURCEHOLGERDASKE,LUZIHAIL,CHRISTIANLEUZ,RODRIGOVERDIMANDATORYIFRSREPORTINGAROUNDTHEWORLDEARLYEVIDENCEONTHEECONOMICCONSEQUENCESJJOURNALOFACCOUNTINGRESEARCH,2008，465543568译文世界各地强制使用国际财务报告准则关于经济后果的早期证
42、据HOLGERDASKE,LUZIHAIL,CHRISTIANLEUZ,AADRODRIGOVERDI摘要本文探讨了强制性国际财务报告准则在世界各地报告的经济后果。我们大量收集26个国家中采用IFRS的公司作为样本分析了市场流动性、资本成本以及托宾Q值。我们发现，平均而言，引进国际财务报告准则时市场流动性增加。我们还证明了只有当IFRS在正式通过之日前使用使，企业资本成本可能降低，股票价值可能会增加。根据我们的样本数据，我们发现只有在一个国家中，企业政策比较透明，国家的执法力度比较强大，强调对企业的申报奖励和国家的强制执行制度为中心的重要性财务报告的质量时，才会产生资本市场收益。对强制性使用者
43、和自愿使用者的比较，我们发现当企业自愿采用IFRS时，不管是采用当期还是当IFRS成为强制实施时再采用，其资本市场的影响是最明显的。前者的结果可能是由于自我选择，而后者的结果提醒我们可能仅仅是强制性使用者的资本市场影响或者主要是IFRS的强制性通过产生的。很多采用IFRS的国家努力改善执法环境和政府体制，这些可能有助于我们的研究成果。与我们的解释相一致，当我们以月为基础研究时，其流动性改善幅度较少，也有可能是国际财务报告准则单独报告时的影响。1引言IFRS在世界上许多国家的上市公司中引进是会计史上最重大的监管变化之一。近期超过100个国家已经采用了国际财务报告准则进行报告或者决定在不久的将来实
44、施该准则，甚至是美国证券交易委员会（SEC）也正在考虑允许美国公司编制其财务报表时与国际财务报告准则保持一致（美国证券交易委员会，2007）。监管机构预计IFRS的使用将提高财务报表的可比性，增加公司透明度，提高财务报表的质量，因此使投资者收益（例如，欧共体条例第1606条，2002年）。从经济角度看，我们有理由怀疑这些预期，尤其是强制执行IFRS的前提下使企业财务报告的内容更丰富或者更具有可比性。因此，强制执行IFRS的经济后果尚不明显。本文中，我们提供世界各地26个国家引进强制性国际财务报告准则对资本市场产生影响的初步证据。根据超过3100家公司采用IFRS的样本数据，我们分析了股市的流动
45、性，权益资本成本以及公司价值的影响。这些以市场为基础的结构应该反映财务报告质量的变化并由此反映各地国际财务报告准则的完善程度。我们采用市场流动性的四种代表，即零返回，交易价格的影响，总交易成本和买卖价差，这四种方法计算权益资本隐含的成本，并且采用托宾Q值作为企业权益价值的代表。我们分析的主要挑战是IFRS的应用是针对某个国家某一日起所有上市公司的交易。这使得我们很难找到一个标准并以此来评估任何观察到的资本市场效应。我们的实证研究采用了三种测试来解决这一问题。首先，我们使用公司从2001年到2005年的年报表数据，并测试流动性，资本成本，以及其它国家还未授权或允许引进IFRS的估值的影响。我们最
46、后的样本数据包括了那些采用了IFRS的国家中尚未采用该准则报告的企业，因为它们的会计年度在2005年12月之后结束，除了新加坡是在我们样本企业必须使用国际财务报告准则的日期之后。这两个指标帮助我们控制了同期资本市场的影响与IFRS的引进无关。另外，我们介绍了企业固定影响来说明未观察到的静态时点的企业特征。其次，仍然使用公司的年报数据，我们研究了评估资本市场的影响是否能够合理地揭示国家体制框架报告。由于监管变化迫使企业采用IFRS但却没有真正使用该准则，我们期望强制性国际财务报告准则对法律和执法制度薄弱的国家或拥有不完善报表报告制度的企业产生较小的影响。此外，假设强制性国际财务报告准则得到恰当的
47、执行，则对财务报告质量较高的国家或当地一般公认会计原则GAAP和IFRS比较接近的国家产生的影响可能较小。最后，我们利用公司依据其会计年度的不同时点采用IFRS的分析，结果是一个国家的采用模式主要是通过其采用IFRS的初始日期设置。我们认为在一个特定的国家和月份中，该种模式与总流动性有关。如果IFRS报告的出台确实有有迹可寻的影响，我们预期当公司第一次采用IFRS报告时当月总流动性的变化是最明显的。流动性的变化应该能够反应国家逐步向新报告体制过渡，而不仅是简单的反映一段时期的趋势或一次性的使用。由于这种方法的数据限制较少，我们分析了当IFRS需强制性使用时6500家公司第一次采用IFRS报告对
48、其流动性的影响。我们开始第一组简单的差异性分析并发现从全世界各地的企业来看强制性使用的企业的市场流动性明显大于采用非基准的企业。相反，强制性使用的企业其托宾Q值的变化不显著，相对于基准公司他们的资本成本也较高。而后者的结果可能令人惊讶，他们还未考虑IFRS早于实际通过日期采用时的市场可能价格。接着，我们运行企业层面的回归分析，即控制企业的时变特征，相关变量的市场变化以及一定时期固定行业、固定企业的影响。我们发现当IFRS成为强制性时，公司采用IFRS进行报告的市场流动性会增加。在我们的主要参数中，强制性采用企业的行业跌幅为100个基点，接近于4的流动性改善幅度相对于IFRS采用之前的中等水平。
49、总交易费用和买卖价差的百分比都下降了12个基点，表明流动性增加了3和6，相对于IFRS通过之前的中等水平。在我们主要参数中价格影响的结果尚不明显。由于节约性原则及为了减少测量误差，我们将4种流动性代表汇总成一种单一的流动性因素，并且再次发现采用强制性国际财务报告准则的流动性显著增加。我们还使用全世界人口范围或者只有美国公司来改变基准样本的构成。虽然这些变化并没有改变结果的本质，但它们表明基准与特定基准的选择对于评估采用IFRS时的流动性是非常重要的。资本成本和托宾Q的结果好坏参半。我们的基本数据表明强制性采用IFRS报告的当期会计年度资本成本会增加，托宾Q值将下降，与差异分析相似。尽管这些结果来源于过渡的效应，如新会计制度下收益的预期暂时较为困难，但仍然可能影响资本的隐含成本或总资产的计量变化，也会影响托宾Q值。另一种解释是对国际财务报告准则授权的市场预期，包括在引进IFRS之前公司之间对可能引起资本成本（或托宾Q值）的降低或上升交换意见（与我们小组做法一致）。当我们测量强制性实施通过之日前一年的影响，我们发现资本成本下降了26个基点，托宾Q值上升了7,结果符合预期效果。虽然强制性采用的流动性，（预期的）资本成本以及估值影响经济意义重大但比起自愿采用者，其资本市场影响一般较小。也就是说，后者表明在强制性IFRS报告引进前后对流动性、估
