1、1外文翻译原文WHYDOWENEEDMANDATEDRULESOFPUBLICDISCLOSUREFORBANKSTHEECONOMICANDACCOUNTINGRESEARCHINDISCLOSUREBYNOWTHEDISCLOSURERELATEDLITERATUREHASDEVELOPEDINTOADISTINCTBRANCHOFECONOMICANDACCOUNTINGRESEARCHFOLLOWINGATAXONOMYSUGGESTEDBYVERRECCHIA,10ONECANDISTINGUISHTHREEMAJORRESEARCHPROBLEMSCONFRONTEDBYTHELI
2、TERATUREFIRST,RESEARCHSEEKSANSWERSTOTHEGENERALQUESTIONABOUTWHETHERINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISECONOMICALLYEFFICIENTINGENERALTHEORISTSSUGGESTATWOFOLDEXPLANATIONFORTHEPERSEDESIRABILITYOFINFORMATIONDISCLOSURE11,10ONTHEONEHAND,KUNKEL12SHOWSTHATINANECONOMYINCLUDINGBOTHPRODUCTIONANDEXCHANGE,INFORMATIONDISCLOSU
3、REMAYBYPREFERREDBECAUSEALTEREDPRODUCTIONPLANSLEADTOMOREEFFICIENTALLOCATIONOFRESOURCESACROSSTIMEANDFIRMSONTHEOTHERHAND,DIAMOND13ALSOSUGGESTSTHATINAPUREEXCHANGESETTINGWITHCOSTLYACQUISITIONOFPRIVATEINFORMATION,THECOSTLESSINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISDESIRABLEBECAUSEITWILLALLOWINVESTORSTOECONOMIESONTHEACQUISI
4、TIONOFPRIVATEINFORMATIONANDMAKETHEMBETTEROFF,DESPITEADVERSERISKSHARINGEFFECTSTHELATTERAPPROACHHASBEENMOREPOPULAR,DEVELOPINGINTOTHEORETICALCONSTRUCTSWITHTESTABLEPREDICTIONSINPARTICULAR,THERESEARCHSHOWSTHATTHEEXISTENCEOFPRIVATELYHELDINFORMATIONCANLEADTOINVESTORSDEMANDINGEITHERALIQUIDITYPREMIUM14,15ORA
5、COMPENSATIONFORCOMPETITIVEDISADVANTAGE,16ANDPUBLICDISCLOSURECANLOWERTHECOSTOFCAPITALSINCEITMAKESPRIVATEINFORMATIONPUBLICANDTHUSREDUCESTHEINFORMATIONASYMMETRYCOMPONENTOFTHECOSTOFCAPITALANUMBEROFEMPIRICALSTUDIESHAVESUPPORTEDTHEPREDICTIONOFTHENEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENDISCLOSUREANDTHECOSTOFCAPITAL,1723THU
6、SESTABLISHINGANIMPORTANTLINKBETWEENINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREANDECONOMICEFFICIENCYANOTHERSTRANDOFTHEDISCLOSURERELATEDRESEARCHFOCUSESONTHEEFFECTOFINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREONTHEAGGREGATEBEHAVIOROFECONOMICAGENTS,ANDINPARTICULARONTHEBEHAVIOROFFINANCIALMARKETAGGREGATESLIKESTOCKPRICESANDTRADINGVOLUMETHELITERATUREA
7、TTEMPTSTOEXPLAINEMPIRICALLYOBSERVEDPHENOMENAINTHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREANDMARKETRESPONSESUSINGPLAUSIBLEASSUMPTIONSABOUTDIVERSITYAMONGMARKETPARTICIPANTS10,24THEORISTSHAVE2MODELEDTHEEFFECTSOFDISCLOSUREWHENINVESTORSAREDIVERSELYINFORMED,25,26WHENINVESTORSINTERPRETDISCLOSUREINDIVERSEWAYS
8、,27,28ASWELLASWHENINVESTORSINCORPORATEDISCLOSUREINTHEIRBELIEFSINDIVERSEWAYSBOTHRATIONALANDHEURISTICTHISEMPHASISONINVESTORDIVERSITYDEEPENSOURUNDERSTANDINGOFTHEMECHANISMOFDISCLOSEDINFORMATIONBEINGDISSEMINATEDTHROUGHTHEMARKETANDHELPSINORDERTOARRIVEATAMORECORRECTASSESSMENTOFTHEQUALITYOFDISCLOSUREMADEONT
9、HEBASISOFOBSERVEDMARKETREACTIONSANOTHERIMPORTANTIMPLICATIONOFTHERESEARCHISTHATDISCLOSINGINFORMATIONMAYINCREASEUNCERTAINTYOFMARKETPRICINGSINCEFREQUENTDISCLOSURESCREATESPECULATIVETRADINGOPPORTUNITIES,STEPSTOINCREASETHEFREQUENCYOFDISCLOSURESTAKENBYAFIRMMAYSUBSEQUENTLYATTRACTMOREINVESTORSWITHSHORTTERMHO
10、RIZONANDINCREASETHEVOLATILITYOFTHEFIRMSSTOCKALTERNATIVELY,IFTHEDISCLOSEDINFORMATIONISNOISYBYITSNATURE,THENINVESTORSWILLFACEUNCERTAINTYWITHTHEIDENTIFICATIONOFTHESTATENATUREOFTHEFIRMREALIZED,ANDTHISCANCAUSETHEMARKETTOPERCEIVEASIGNIFICANTLYMOREVOLATILESIGNALPROCESSTHATITACTUALLYISFINALLY,THEDISCLOSUREL
11、ITERATUREDEVOTESMUCHATTENTIONTOTHECIRCUMSTANCESSURROUNDINGTHEDECISIONTOMAKEPRIVATEINFORMATIONPUBLICASTANDARDARGUMENTHEREISTHATMANAGEMENTSDECISIONABOUTWHETHERTODISCLOSEINFORMATIONORNOTISBASEDONWEIGHINGEXPECTEDCOSTSANDBENEFITSOFMAKINGTHEINFORMATIONPUBLICTHELITERATUREHASSUGGESTEDMANYWAYSHOWAFIRMORITSMA
12、NAGEMENTCANBENEFITFROMIMPROVEDDISCLOSURETHEMOSTPOPULAREXPLANATIONTURNSTOTHEPROBLEMOFADVERSESELECTIONUNDERASYMMETRICINFORMATIONASPOINTEDBYMYERSANDMAJLUF,IFAFIRMISABOUTTOISSUEEQUITYORPUBLICDEBTTOTHEMARKET,ITHASANINCENTIVETODISCLOSEITSSUPERIORINFORMATIONSINCERATIONALINVESTORSINTERPRETWITHHOLDINGINFORMA
13、TIONONAFINANCIALASSETASINFORMATIONTHATISUNFAVORABLEABOUTTHEASSETSVALUEORQUALITY,THEYWILLDISCOUNTTHEASSETUNLESSTHEINFORMATIONISREVEALED,ANDTHEEXISTINGSHAREHOLDERSOFTHEFIRMWILLBEBETTEROFFIFTHEYCREDIBLYDISCLOSETHEINFORMATIONBEFORETHEFIRMACCESSESTHECAPITALMARKETTHEHYPOTHESISFINDSBROADSUPPORTINEMPIRICALS
14、TUDIESDIRECTEVIDENCETHATFIRMSINCREASETHEINTENSITYOFTHEIRDISCLOSUREEFFORTSBEFOREOFFERINGPUBLICDEBTANDEQUITYHASBEENOBTAINEDBYLANGANDLUNDHOLM,FRANKELETAL,HEALYETAL,ETCTHELISTOFOTHERSUGGESTEDEXPLANATIONSOFVOLUNTARYINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREINCLUDESMOTIVESRELATEDTOINSTITUTIONALFACTORSANDSIGNALINGTOTHEMARKETTH
15、EECONOMICANDACCOUNTINGLITERATUREADVANCESSEVERALARGUMENTSABOUTWHYINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREMAYBECOSTLYFORFIRMSMOSTFREQUENTLYTHERESEARCHREFERSTO3THEPROBLEMOFPROPRIETARYCOSTSVERRECCHIA,DARROUGHANDSTOUGHTON,NEWMANANDSANSING，ANDMANYOTHERSHYPOTHESIZETHATFIRMSDECISIONTODISCLOSEINFORMATIONTOINVESTORSISINFLUENCED
16、BYCONCERNTHATSUCHDISCLOSURESCANDAMAGETHEIRCOMPETITIVEPOSITIONINPRODUCTMARKETSANOTHERARGUMENTPOINTSTOTHECOSTSASSOCIATEDWITHUNCERTAINTYABOUTTHEQUALITYOFINFORMATIONBEINGDISCLOSEDTHEUNCERTAINTYWORKSASADISCLOSURECOSTBECAUSEITCREATESDOUBTINTHEMINDSOFTHEUNINFORMEDAND,THEREBY,REDUCESTHEBENEFITSOFINFORMATION
17、DISCLOSUREFROMAMELIORATINGTHEADVERSESELECTIONPROBLEMALTHOUGHSUGGESTINGDIFFERENTTYPESOFUNCERTAINTY,THEORETICALCONSTRUCTSBYDYE,51TEOHANDHWANG,52NAGAR,53ETCSHOWTHATFIRMSORMANAGERSAREBETTEROFFIFTHEYCONCEALSOMEDISCRETIONARYINFORMATIONFINALLY,THELITERATUREAGAINRESORTSTOTHEINSTITUTIONALFACTORSTOEXPLAINHIGH
18、CORPORATEANDPERSONALCOSTSOFDISCLOSINGUNFAVORABLEORFORWARDLOOKINGINFORMATIONTHEHYPOTHESESADVANCEDINACADEMICLITERATUREAREGENERALLYROBUSTWITHRESPECTTOTHEACTUALMOTIVESWHYFIRMSMANAGEMENTANDMARKETPARTICIPANTSFAVOROROPPOSEDISCLOSUREASTUDYBYPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSREPORTSTHATINANOPINIONPOLLOFCEOS,TRADERS,ANDA
19、NALYSTSTHEMOSTFREQUENTLYSTATEDBENEFITOFIMPROVEDCORPORATEDISCLOSUREISTHEINCREASEDCREDIBILITYOFMANAGEMENTOTHERFREQUENTPOSITIVERESPONSESALSOINCLUDEINCREASEDNUMBEROFLONGTERMINVESTORS,IMPROVEDACCESSTONEWCAPITAL,INCREASEDANALYSTFOLLOWING，ANDINCREASEDSHAREVALUESTILLFIRMSMANAGEMENTSEESDISCLOSURE,ONAVERAGE,L
20、ESSFAVORABLYTHANTHEMARKETPARTICIPANTS,BECAUSETHECEOSEITHERDONOTEXPECTTHEMARKETTOREWARDTHEMFORTHEIMPROVEDDISCLOSURETHEMARKETLOOKSONLYATEARNINGS,THEMARKETWONTBESATISFIEDEVENIFGIVENADDITIONALINFORMATION,NOBODYBELIEVESDISCLOSEDFIGURES,ETCORWORRYABOUTADDITIONALCOSTTHEYMAYINCURIFDISCLOSEDFURTHERSHAREVALUE
21、WOULDDECLINEIFBADRESULTFIGURES,COMPETITIVEDISADVANTAGEIFCOMPETITORSNEWTHEINFORMATION,ETCTHEDISCUSSIONSHOWSTHATWHILEINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREISSOCIALLYDESIRABLE,THEINTERPLAYBETWEENITSBENEFITSANDCOSTSMAYLEADTOPARTIALORNODISCLOSUREANDONETHEREUPONSHOULDASKWHETHERTHEDISCLOSURESHOULDBEVOLUNTARYORMANDATORYTHEE
22、XPLICITREGULATORYREQUIREMENTFORPUBLICLYTRADEDFIRMSTODISCLOSETHEIRINFORMATIONWASFIRSTSETUPINTHE1930SINTHEUNITEDSTATESHISTORICALLY,USLEGISLATORSWEREPRIMARILYCONCERNEDWITHPROTECTINGILLINFORMEDOUTSIDEINVESTORSANDINSURINGTRADEATFAIRPRICESSINCEAFIRMSINSIDERSAREBOTHBETTERINFORMEDANDABLETOCONTROLTHE4RELEASE
23、OFINFORMATIONBYTHEFIRM,THEYCANCONCEALUNFAVORABLENEWSANDTRADEATUNFAIRPRICESTHEREBYPROFITINGATTHEEXPENSEOFOTHERINVESTORSMORERECENTLY,THECONSENSUS,HOWEVER,BEGANTOBREAKDOWNASTHEDISCUSSIONOFTHEISSUESTARTEDBEINGINFUSEDWITHFINANCIALECONOMICSANDITSFOCUSSHIFTEDTOTHEISSUEOFECONOMICEFFICIENCYASSHOWNBYROSS,GROS
24、SMAN,ANDMILGROM,IFLACKOFDISCLOSUREISTAKENTOBEBADNEWS,THISFORCESTHEINFORMEDINSIDERSTOREVEALTHEIRINFORMATIONTHEREFORE,DISCLOSUREREGULATIONSHOULDNOTBENECESSARYSINCETHEDISCLOSUREISINTHEFIRMSBESTINTERESTIFDISCLOSUREISCOSTLYFORFIRMS,THEYWONTDISCLOSEALLINFORMATIONANDRELEASEITONLYTOTHEPOINTWHERETHECOSTSEQUA
25、LBENEFITSSTILL,ASPOINTEDOUTBYFISHMANANDHAGERTY,THEPRESENCEOFCOSTPERSEDOESNOTIMPLYTHATDISCLOSUREREGULATIONISDESIRABLE,SINCEITISQUITEPOSSIBLETHATTHEFIRMSDISCLOSUREPOLICIESARESOCIALLYOPTIMALGIVENTHECOSTOFDISCLOSUREFROMTHISPERSPECTIVE,DISCLOSUREREGULATIONCANBEDESIRABLEONLYIFVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREFALLSSHORT
26、OFTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALEFFICIENTLEVELASTANDARDARGUMENTSUGGESTSTHATONECANEXPECTTHISINTHEPRESENCEOFEXTERNALITIESIFAFIRMITSMANAGEMENTCANNOTCAPTUREALLBENEFITSOFDISCLOSUREORINCURADDITIONALCOSTSTHROUGHTHEMARKETPRICINGMECHANISM,THENITGETSANINCENTIVETOMAKEPUBLICLESSINFORMATIONTHANITSHOULDDOATTHESOCIALLYOPTIMAL
27、LEVELTHEEXTERNALITYARGUMENTCOVERSMANYSITUATIONSWITHSPILLOVEREFFECTSAFIRMISLIKELYTORECOVERNOTALLCOSTSOFDISCLOSUREEGASADECLINEINTHECOSTOFCAPITALIFTHERELEASEDINFORMATIONSERVESALSOASASIGNALABOUTOTHERSIMILARFIRMSTHEDISCLOSUREMAYHAVEANEGATIVESPILLOVEREFFECTONTHECOMPETITIVEPOSITIONOFTHEFIRMINTHEPRODUCTMARK
28、ETRELEASEOFINFORMATIONABOUTTHEFIRMSPERFORMANCEMAYSERVEASANEGATIVESIGNALABOUTTHEQUALITYOFITSMANAGEMENTINFLICTINGUNCOMPENSATEDPERSONALCOSTSONTHECEOSSOLUTIONSTOTHEEXTERNALITYPROBLEMRELYONTHEINTERNALIZATIONOFDISCLOSURERELATEDCOSTSBYFREERIDERSOTHERPARTIESWHOBENEFITFROMTHESPILLOVEREFFECTSOFDISCLOSURETHEGE
29、NERALARGUMENTSTANDSTHATMANDATORYDISCLOSUREREGULATIONISLIKELYTODOMINATEOTHERSOLUTIONSEGPRIVATECOLLECTIVEAGREEMENTSWHENITISDIFFICULTTOIDENTIFYTHEFREERIDERS,ORTOOCOSTLYTOEXCLUDETHEMDISCLOSUREREGULATIONISARELATIVELYLESSDEVELOPEDTOPICINTHEECONOMICANDACCOUNTINGLITERATUREADMITANDPFLEIDEREREXPLICITLYMODELAS
30、ITUATIONWHENSPILLOVEREFFECTSCAUSEVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREBYFIRMSTOBEBELOWORINEXCESSOFTHESOCIALOPTIMUM,AND,THEREBY,MANDATORYDISCLOSURERULESMAYHAVEAWELFAREIMPROVING5ROLETHEAUTHORSSTRESSTHATIFFIRMSDIFFERFROMEACHOTHERINSUCHPARAMETERSASTHEEFFECTIVECOSTOFDISCLOSUREORTHEPRODUCTIVEBENEFITTHATCANACCRUETOTHEFIRMIF
31、INFORMATIONASYMMETRIESARERESOLVED,THENOPTIMALDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTSEGONTHEPRECISIONOFTHEDISCLOSEDINFORMATIONSHOULDBEDESIGNEDFOREACHFIRMINDIVIDUALLYSINCESUCHREGULATIONISPRACTICALLYINFEASIBLE,THEIMPRECISEDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTSMAYINDUCETHEIROWNWELFARELOSSES,ANDTHEDESIRABILITYOFDISCLOSUREREGULATIONDEPEN
32、DSONTHERELATIVESIZEOFWELFAREIMPROVEMENTSOVERTHEVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREREGIMEANDWELFARELOSSESDUETOTHEIMPRECISIONOFTHEREGULATIONTHESETHEORETICALFINDINGSENJOYSOMELIMITEDSUPPORTFROMEMPIRICALRESEARCHINAREVIEWOFRELATEDSTUDIES,KOTHARICONCLUDESTHATREGULATEDFINANCIALREPORTSPROVIDENEWANDRELEVANTINFORMATIONTOINVES
33、TORS,ANDTHATTHEINFORMATIVENESSOFTHEREQUIREDACCOUNTINGVARIESSYSTEMATICALLYWITHFIRMANDCOUNTRYCHARACTERISTICSINSUM,THEECONOMICANDACCOUNTINGLITERATUREHASASSERTEDTHATINTHEVIEWOFINFORMATIONALASYMMETRY,COSTLESSDISCLOSUREOFPRIVATEINFORMATIONBRINGSGENERALGAINSINECONOMICEFFICIENCYTHESIZEOFTHEGAINSANDTHEULTIMA
34、TEEFFECTONFINANCIALPRICESMAYVARYCONSIDERABLYDEPENDINGONTHEINFORMATIVENESSOFDISCLOSEDINFORMATIONANDONTHEWAYSTHEINFORMATIONISDISSEMINATEDANDUSEDINTHEPRESENCEOFDISCLOSURERELATEDCOSTSANDTHEHETEROGENEITYOFECONOMICAGENTS,OPTIMALDISCLOSUREIMPLIESNEITHERRELEASEOFALLPROPRIETARYINFORMATION,NORITSUNIFORMRELEAS
35、EREGULATORYDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTSMAYBEDESIRABLEIFTHEYBRINGINFORMATIONDISCLOSURECLOSERTOTHEOPTIMALLEVELANDTHEREALIZEDWELFAREGAINSARELARGERTHANASSOCIATEDCOSTSCONCLUDINGREMARKSINTHISSTUDY,WEHAVEREVIEWEDTHEORETICALANDEMPIRICALSTUDIESRELATEDTOTHEPROBLEMOFPUBLICDISCLOSUREINBANKINGOURPRIMARYFOCUSWASTODETER
36、MINEECONOMICUNDERPINNINGSFORTHESUGGESTEDENHANCEMENTOFMANDATORYDISCLOSURERULESANDTOUNDERSTANDWHYTHEFINANCIALCOMMUNITYISDIVIDEDINITSATTITUDETOTHEPROPOSALTHEREVIEWHASHIGHLIGHTEDTHEPREVAILINGUNDERSTANDINGOFTHEISSUEWEHAVEFOUNDTHEECONOMICRESEARCHASSERTSTHATUNDERASYMMETRICINFORMATION,DISCLOSUREOFPRIVATEINF
37、ORMATIONBRINGSGENERALGAINSINECONOMICEFFICIENCYTHESIZEOFTHEGAINSANDTHEULTIMATEEFFECTONFINANCIALPRICESMAYVARYCONSIDERABLYDEPENDINGONTHECONTENTOFDISCLOSEDINFORMATIONANDONTHEWAYSTHEINFORMATIONISDISSEMINATEDANDUSEDINTHEPRESENCEOFDISCLOSURERELATEDCOSTSANDTHEHETEROGENEITYOFECONOMIC6AGENTS,OPTIMALDISCLOSURE
38、IMPLIESNEITHERRELEASEOFALLPROPRIETARYINFORMATION,NORITSUNIFORMRELEASEREGULATORYDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTSMAYBEDESIRABLEIFTHEYBRINGINFORMATIONDISCLOSURECLOSERTOTHEOPTIMALLEVELANDTHEREALIZEDWELFAREGAINSLARGERTHANASSOCIATEDCOSTSBUILDINGONTHEGENERALUNDERSTANDING,WEHAVESOFAREXPLOREDTHEEXISTINGVIEWSOFTHEPOSIT
39、IVEANDNEGATIVEEFFECTSOFDISCLOSUREINBANKINGWEHAVESEENTHATTHEINHERENTOPACITYOFBANKINGFIRMSMAKESTHEIRDISCLOSURESOCIALLYDESIRABLESTILL,COMPLETEBANKDISCLOSUREWOULDBESUBOPTIMAL,MOSTLYBECAUSETHEBANKSWOULDINCURSIGNIFICANTPRIVATECOSTSIFMADETHEIRPROPRIETARYINFORMATIONPUBLICTHESPECIFICREGULATORYENVIRONMENTOFTH
40、EBANKINGINDUSTRYISLIKELYTOBERESPONSIBLEFORTHEOBSERVEDRELUCTANCEOFTHEBANKSTODISCLOSEVOLUNTARILYTHEDISCUSSIONOFTHEADVANCEDEXPLANATIONSOFBANKDISCLOSUREHASHELPEDTODEVELOPANINSIGHTINTOWHYWEHAVEMANDATORYDISCLOSURERULESINBANKINGINOURVIEW,THEMANDATEDDISCLOSURESCANBEEXPLAINEDASACONSEQUENCEOFTHEGOVERNMENTPOLI
41、CYOFFINANCIALSAFETYNETPOTENTIALLY,THEMANDATORYRULESBRINGTHEBANKSDISCLOSURETOTHESOCIALLYDESIRABLELEVEL,BUTITMAYREQUIREFURTHERGOVERNMENTINTERVENTIONTOFULLYREALIZETHEEXPECTEDIMPROVEMENTINTHELOCATIVEEFFICIENCYOFTHEBANKINGSYSTEMHENCE,ONECANJUSTIFYASYSTEMOFMANDATORYPUBLICDISCLOSURESONLYASANECESSARYELEMENT
42、OFTHEGOVERNMENTSPRUDENTIALSUPERVISIONOFBANKSINTHISSTUDYWEHAVEFOUNDTHAT,ULTIMATELY,ANECONOMICJUSTIFICATIONOFTHERECENTLYPROPOSEDENHANCEMENTOFMANDATEDPUBLICDISCLOSURESCANNOTRESTONANARGUMENTOFGENERALECONOMICEFFICIENCYINSTEAD,ITISLIKELYTOBELIMITEDTOTHESPECIFICISSUEOFTHEOPERATIONEFFICIENCYOFBANKINGSUPERVI
43、SORSTHEOBSERVEDSHARPDIFFERENCEBETWEENINVESTORSANDBANKERSINTHEIRATTITUDETOTHEBASELRECOMMENDATIONSREFLECTSTHEFACTTHATTHETWOGROUPSAREASYMMETRICALLYAFFECTEDBYTHEGOVERNMENTSFINANCIALSAFETYNETTHEFORMERREPRESENTSTHEMOSTLYUNPROTECTEDMINORITYOFTHEBANKCREDITORS,ANDTHELATTERDECIDESITSSTEPSTAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHEL
44、IKELYAVERAGERESPONSEOFALLTHEBANKCREDITORSINCLUDINGBOTHTHEUNPROTECTEDMINORITYANDPROTECTEDMAJORITYITALSOFOLLOWSTHATREACHINGAMUTUALLYSATISFYINGAGREEMENTBETWEENTHETWOGROUPSISRATHERDIFFICULT,ANDONEOFTHEMHASTOPREVAILATTHEENDSOURSEMIKHAILFROLOVWHYDOWENEEDMANDATEDRULESOFPUBLICDISCLOSUREFOR7BANKSJJOURNALOFBA
45、NKINGREGULATION,2007,82177191译文为什么我们需要对银行规定公开披露规则经济与会计披露的研究现在披露相关文献发展成为一个独特的分支经济与会计研究。经过凡略阙的建议，10个人能区分面临文学的三个主要研究问题。首先，研究的目的是对一般问题关于信息披露在总体上是否经济效率得回答。理论家提议对信息披露本身可取性的一个两方面解释。在一方面，金克儿表明在一个经济中包括生产和交换，信息披露可能首先是因为改变了生产计划导致更有效地跨时间和公司分配资源的。另一方面，戴门得也建议在纯交换的设置用昂贵的私人信息采集，无成本的信息披露是可取的因为它将使投资者在节省私人信息和收购对他们更有利，
46、尽管会受分担风险的影响。后者的做法已经比较普遍，为理论建构与发展提供可检测的预测。特别是，研究表明私人持有信息的存在可以导致投资者要求无论是流动性收益或补偿为竞争优势，和公开披露使私人信息公开，可以使资金成本降低，从而对资本成本降低了信息不对称的组成部分。一些实证研究支持了披露和资金成本的负相关的预测，从而建立信息披露和经济效率之间重要的链接。另一个披露有关的研究链的重点是信息的披露对经济主体的聚集行为的影响，特别是对金融市场聚集的行为如股票价格和交易量。文献是试图解释观察到的市场参与者与经验的多样性现象之间的关联，信息披露的假设和可信的市场反应的用。理论家建模了当投资者多方面获悉，当投资者不
47、同方式披露，也当投资者以自己的信念各种方式披露，有理性的也有启发式的，披露的影响。这个重点在投资者的多样性上加深了我们对通过市场和帮助传播的信息披露机制的了解，以得出一个观察市场反应的基础上作出的更为正确的评估在信息披露质量。该研究另一个重要的意义在于揭露可能会增加市场的不确定性定价的信息。由于频繁披露创造贸易机会投机，被一个公司采取增加披露的次数的步骤随后因短期视野和这公司股票的波动的增加可能吸引更多的投资者。或者，如果披露的信息其性质是喧闹，那么投资者将面临对国家性质识别（该公司）的不确定性，这可能导致市场对显着更为波动信号的过程感知，而它实际上也是。最后，8披露文献对私人信息公开作出的决
48、定的来龙去脉的广泛关注。这里一个标准的争论是管理层是否要披露的信息决定，那是基于信息公开时权衡预期成本和收益。文献已经提出了许多关于怎样使一个公司或它的管理层可以从提高披露来收益的建议。最流行的解释市在信息不对称的逆向选择问题。正如迈尔斯和麦吉罗夫提出的观点，如果公司即将对市场发行股票或公共债务，它有一个披露其优越的信息激励。由于理性投资者知情对有关资产的价值或质量不利的金融资产的信息不报解释，他们将会使资产打折扣，除非信息被揭示，以及如果他们访问资本市场时对该公司之前披露的信息可信，该公司现有股东会更好。该假说在实证研究中广泛支持。直接证据表明，企业努力在公共债券和股票方面增加其披露强度，由
49、郎和隆德和弗兰克尔等获悉，希利等。其他建议名单的说明有自愿性信息披露包括相关的制度因素的动机和市场的信号。经济和会计文献提出了许多关于为什么信息披露可能对公司高昂的成本的论据。大多数研究往往指的是专利费用的问题。凡里炔，达拉弗和斯托顿，纽曼和三星，和许多另外人的假定，企业对投资者信息披露的决定会被因披露而可能在生产市场上损害其竞争地位受影响。另一种说法指的是相关费用与关于信息披露的质量存在不确定。作为一种披露成本这种不确定会起作用，因为它会在不了解情况的头脑中产生疑问，并由此降低从改善信息披露的不利选的问题的好处。虽然建议不确定性的不同类型，由戴尔，惕噢和黄，格尔等等构建此理论，表明公司（或管理层）如果隐瞒一些可随意支配信息，会更好。最后，文献再次采取制度性因素来解释（公司和个人）的不利披露或前瞻性信息高成本。先进的假设是实际的动机，学术文献一般强劲，对于为什么企业的经营管理和市场参与者的青睐（或反对）披露。一个由价格水房屋铜丝报告的研究和分析，在一个民意调查的首席执行官，商人，最经常说提高企业效益的披露是管理提高公信力。其他（正面的）的答复往往还包括增加资本数量的长期投资者，获得新资本的提高，增加下列分析师，和增加股票价值。不过公司的管理层认为披露，平均而言，逊于市场参与者因为首席执行官们要么不希望市场披露奖励他们
