1、外文文献翻译原文VOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESBYLARGEUKCOMPANIES2INFLUENCESONVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREDECISIONSVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESAREATTEMPTSTOREMOVEINFORMATIONALASYMMETRIESBETWEENTHEFIRMANDEXTERNALAGENTS,PRIMARILYAGENTSINTHEINVESTMENTCOMMUNITYASRECENTEVENTSINTHEARENAOFCORPORATESOCIALRESPONSIBILI
2、TYHAVEDEMONSTRATED,ETHICAL,SOCIAL,ANDENVIRONMENTALASPECTSOFBUSINESSACTIVITIESAREASSOCIATEDWITHSIGNIFICANTFINANCIALCONSEQUENCESGIVENTHEPOSSIBILITYOFHIDDENCORPORATEATTRIBUTES,INVESTORSMAYPREFERNOTTOINVESTINCOMPANIESTHATFAILTOVOLUNTEERINFORMATIONCONCERNINGTHEIRENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCETHEPOINTISTHAT,ABS
3、ENTDISCLOSURE,INVESTORSWILLASSUMETHEWORSTANDWILLBIDDOWNITSSTOCKPRICECORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003,P47INTHATSENSE,VOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESMAYBEVIEWEDASATTEMPTSBYFIRMSTOREDUCETHEINFORMATIONRISKSANDTHEIRASSOCIATEDCOSTSFACEDBYPOTENTIALANDACTUALINVESTORSHOWEVER,NOTALLFIRMSCHOOSETOMAKESUCHDISCLOSURES,AND
4、THOSEDISCLOSURESTHATAREMADEAREOFVARYINGQUALITYTHISISBECAUSEDISCLOSUREISCOSTLYINTWORESPECTSTHECOSTSOFMEASURING,VERIFYING,COLLATINGANDPUBLISHINGENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONTHELOSSOFSTRATEGICDISCRETIONASSOCIATEDWITHMAKINGPUBLICCOMMITMENTSTOVERIFIABLEFUTUREACTIONSAND/ORPERFORMANCEVERRECCHIA,1983LIETAL,1997C
5、ORMIERANDMAGNAN,1999ANDSKINNER,1994CORPORATEDECISIONSCONCERNINGTHEPROVISIONANDQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESARETHEREFOREEXPECTEDTOHINGEUPONARANGEOFFIRMANDINDUSTRYCHARACTERISTICSTHATINFLUENCETHERELATIVECOSTSANDBENEFITSOFDISCLOSINGSUCHINFORMATIONCORMIERANDMAGNAN,1999AND2003ANDLIETAL,1997TH
6、EEXISTINGLITERATUREDEMONSTRATESTHATTHESECOSTSANDBENEFITSAREASSOCIATEDWITHPRESSUREFROMEXTERNALAGENTSSUCHASLEGISLATORS,REGULATORS,COMMUNITYANDENVIRONMENTALLOBBYGROUPS,CONSUMERSANDSOCIALLYRESPONSIBLEINVESTORSROBERTS,1992LIETAL,1997SINCLAIRDESGAGNEANDGOZLAN,2003ANDWILLIS,2003,THEFIRMSVULNERABILITYTOTHOS
7、EPRESSURESASCAPTUREDBYITSSIZEANDMEDIAVISIBILITYCORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003PATTEN,2002BANDROBERTS,1992,ITSENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEPATTEN,2002ANDULLMANN,1985,ITSOWNERSHIPANDGOVERNANCESTRUCTURESCORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003ROBERTS,1992ANDCULLENANDCHRISTOPHER,2002,ANDRESOURCEAVAILABILITYCORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003ANDROBERT
8、S,1992WEWILLDISCUSSEACHOFTHESEFACTORSINTURNITHENATUREOFBUSINESSACTIVITIESTHEEXISTINGENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURELITERATUREIDENTIFIESANUMBEROFLEGISLATIVE,REGULATORYANDINSTITUTIONALSOURCESOFPRESSUREONTHEFIRMTOMAKESUCHDISCLOSURES,ANDNOTESTHATINDUSTRIESDIFFERINRESPECTOFTHEIRINHERENTENVIRONMENTALIMPACTHALMEAN
9、DHUSE,1996,THEVISIBILITYOFENVIRONMENTALISSUESANDTHEDEGREEANDTYPEOFREGULATORYINTERVENTIONINDUSTRIESWITHAHIGHENVIRONMENTALIMPACTARECHARACTERISEDBYTHEIRASSOCIATIONWITHPARTICULARLYVISIBLEENVIRONMENTALISSUESBOWEN,2000SUCHASGLOBALWARMINGANDTHERISKOFOILSPILLSTHEACTIVITIESOFFIRMSINTHESEINDUSTRIESARESUBJECTT
10、OINTENSESCRUTINYFROMENVIRONMENTALPRESSUREGROUPS,ANDRECENTSTUDIESEMPHASIZETHEVISIBILITYOFENVIRONMENTALISSUESINDETERMININGENVIRONMENTALRESPONSIVENESSBOWEN,2000ANDDUTTONETAL,1990THEASSOCIATIONOFTHEORGANIZATIONWITHENVIRONMENTALISSUES,INTHEEYESOFEXTERNALGROUPSINCLUDINGINVESTORSANDREGULATORS,MAYSTIMULATEE
11、NVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREBECAUSEOFTHEENHANCEDURGENCYOFVISIBLEISSUESTHISPROMOTESANEEDTOREMOVEINFORMATIONALASYMMETRIESBETWEENTHEFIRMANDEXTERNALAGENTSINORDERTOREASSURETHELATTERREGARDINGTHEACTIVITIESOFTHEFIRMDUTTONETAL,1990EMPIRICALSTUDYHASASSOCIATEDHIGHENVIRONMENTALIMPACTWITHTHEMETALS,RESOURCES,PAPERANDPU
12、LP,POWERGENERATION,WATER,ANDCHEMICALSSECTORSBOWEN,2000SHARMA,1997ANDHOFFMAN,1999H1ATHELIKELIHOODOFAFIRMMAKINGAVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISHIGHERININDUSTRIESASSOCIATEDWITHVISIBLEENVIRONMENTALISSUESONEDISTINCTIVEFACETOFOUREMPIRICALANALYSISINVOLVESACLEARDISTINCTIONBETWEENTHEDECISIONTOPARTICIPATEI
13、NANY,PERHAPSMINIMAL,LEVELOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURE,ANDTHEINFLUENCESUPONTHEQUALITYOFSUCHDISCLOSURESSINCLAIRDESGAGNEANDGOZLAN2003INTRODUCEATHEORETICALMODELTHATPERMITSCOMPANIESTOCHOOSETHEQUALITYOFTHEIRENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESACCORDINGTOTHENATUREOFTHEIRPREVAILINGSTAKEHOLDERENVIRONMENTTHEYCONCLUDETHAT,TH
14、EQUALITYOFVOLUNTARILYDISCLOSEDENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONISLARGELYDEMANDDRIVENP380INTHESENSETHATHIGHQUALITYDISCLOSURESAREEXPECTEDTOBEASSOCIATEDWITHFIRMSTHATFACEENVIRONMENTALLYCONCERNEDSTAKEHOLDERSHENCE,INADDITIONTOSYSTEMATICVARIATIONACROSSINDUSTRIESINTHELIKELIHOODTHATCOMPANIESMAKEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUR
15、ES,WEALSOHYPOTHESISESUCHVARIATIONINTHEQUALITYOFDISCLOSURESH1BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISHIGHERININDUSTRIESASSOCIATEDWITHVISIBLEENVIRONMENTALISSUESIITHEENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEOFFIRMDISCLOSUREFULFILSAVARIETYOFIMPORTANTFUNCTIONSINCLUDINGINFORMINGRELEVANTGROUPSABOUTTHEFIRMSENVIRONMEN
16、TALPERFORMANCE,ATTEMPTINGTOALTERPERCEPTIONSABOUTTHEORGANIZATIONSPERFORMANCEANDALTERINGSOCIETALEXPECTATIONSOFFIRMPERFORMANCELINDBLOM,1994PATTEN,2002AANDGRAYETAL,1995CONSISTENTWITHTHIS,DISCLOSUREMAYBEMOTIVATEDBYTHEDESIRETOCREATEANIMPRESSIONOFSENSITIVITYTOIMPORTANTNONMARKETINFLUENCESTHATMAYBEINTHELONGT
17、ERMINTERESTOFTHESHAREHOLDERSBELKAOUIANDKARPIK,1989,P39THENEEDTOCREATE,ANDBENEFITFROMCREATING,SUCHANIMPRESSIONWOULDBEEXPECTEDTOFALLMOSTHEAVILYONFIRMSTHATHAVEARECORDOFPOORENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEFURTHERMORE,ANIMPETUSTODISCLOSEAMONGPOORPERFORMERSISDRIVENBYTHERISKOFDAMAGETOTHEREPUTATIONOFSENIORCORPORATE
18、MANAGEMENTTHATACCOMPANIESFAILURETOREPORTBADNEWSINATRUELIGHTTRUEMAN,1997HUGHESANDSANKAR,1997ANDSKINNER,1994THEREFORE,WEPROPOSETHEFOLLOWINGHYPOTHESESH2ATHELIKELIHOODOFPARTICIPATIONINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISNEGATIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHAFIRMSENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEH2BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONM
19、ENTALDISCLOSURETENDSTOBEHIGHERTHEWORSEISAFIRMSENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEIIIFIRMSIZEANDORGANIZATIONALVISIBILITYORGANIZATIONALSIZEANDVISIBILITYARECOMMONLYPROPOSEDASFIRMLEVELDRIVERSOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREPATTEN,2002AAND2002BHACKSTONANDMILNE,1996ANDCORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003LARGEFIRMSTENDTOBEMOREVISIBLETOREL
20、EVANTPUBLICSANDSOTENDTOBESUBJECTTOGREATERPOLITICALANDREGULATORYPRESSUREFROMEXTERNALINTERESTSBELKAOUIANDKARPIK,1989PATTEN2002BANDBROWNANDDEEGAN,1998BECASUCEOFTHIS,LARGEFIRMSMAYBEESPECIALLYDRIVENTOMAKEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTODEMONSTRATETHATTHEIRACTIONSARELEGITIMATEANDCONSISTENTWITHGOODCORPORATECITIZ
21、ENSHIPFURTHERMORE,COWENETAL1987ARGUETHATLARGERORGANIZATIONSAREMORELIKELYTOUSEFORMALCHANNELSOFCOMMUNICATIONSUCHASDISCLOSURESINANNUALREPORTSOROTHERCORPORATEDOCUMENTATIONINORDERTODISSEMINATEINFORMATIONCONCERNINGCORPORATEACTIVITIESH3ATHELIKELIHOODOFPARTICIPATIONINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISPOSITI
22、VELYRELATEDTOFIRMSIZEH3BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETENDSTOBEHIGHERTHELARGERISTHEFIRMALTHOUGHFIRMSIZEHASOFTENBEENUSEDASAPROXYFORCORPORATEVISIBILITY,MUCHOFTHERECENTDISCLOSURELITERATUREEMPHASISESTHEIMPORTANCEOFMEDIAEXPOSUREPATTEN,2002AAND2002BANDBROWNANDDEEGAN,1998THELINKBETWEENMEDIAEX
23、POSUREANDORGANIZATIONALVISIBILITY,WHICHISWELLESTABLISHEDINTHELITERATURESHARMAANDNGUAN,1999ANDMEZNARANDNIGH,1995,IMPLIESTHATORGANISATIONSWITHAHIGHERDEGREEOFMEDIAEXPOSURETENDTOBEMOREPRONETOPRESSUREFROMSOCIALANDPOLITICALSTAKEHOLDERSINDEED,EVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATORGANISATIONALVISIBILITYPROMPTSFIRMSTOTAKELE
24、ADINGROLESINMANAGINGENVIRONMENTALIMPACTSSHARMAANDNGUAN,1999THUS,WEHYPOTHESISETHATMEDIAEXPOSURESTIMULATESANACTIVEPOLICYOFDISCLOSUREH4ATHELIKELIHOODOFPARTICIPATIONINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOAFIRMSMEDIAEXPOSUREH4BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETENDSTOBEHIGHERTHE
25、GREATERISTHEFIRMSMEDIAEXPOSUREIVCOMPANYOWNERSHIPTRADITIONALLY,RELATIONSHIPSBETWEENTHEOWNERSOFCOMPANIESANDTHEIRMANAGERSHAVEBEENDESCRIBEDFROMTHEPERSPECTIVEOFTHEPRINCIPLEAGENTMODELJENSENANDMECKLING,1976WHENOWNERSHIPISDISPERSED,SHAREHOLDERS,HAVINGLITTLEBYWAYOFDIRECTAUTHORITYOVERMANAGERS,MUSTMONITORTHEIR
26、ACTIVITIESINTHEABSENCEOFANABILITYTOEFFECTIVELYMONITORMANAGEMENT,THECONSEQUENTDEGREEOFINFORMATIONALASYMMETRYBETWEENTHEORGANISATIONANDITSSHAREHOLDERSMAYBRINGANADVERSEINVESTORREACTIONINDEED,THEREISEVIDENCEOFSUCHANEFFECTONENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREACTIVISMULLMANN,1985HENCE,ONEWOULDEXPECTADIFFUSEDOWNERSHIPS
27、TRUCTURETOCARRYWITHITANINCENTIVEFORAFIRMTOVOLUNTARILYPROVIDEINFORMATIONTOSHAREHOLDERSTHROUGHDISCLOSURESCULLENANDCHRISTOPHER,2002INADDITION,FORMALMODESOFCOMMUNICATION,SUCHASDISCLOSURESMADEINANNUALREPORTS,MAYPROVIDEARELATIVELYEFFICIENTMEANSOFPROVIDINGINFORMATIONCONCERNINGTHEFIRMSENVIRONMENTALIMPACTTOA
28、LARGENUMBEROFSMALLSHAREHOLDERSTHEREFORE,WEHYPOTHESISETHATH5ATHELIKELIHOODOFPARTICIPATIONINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOTHEDISPERSIONOFSHAREOWNERSHIPH5BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETENDSTOBEHIGHERTHEMOREDISPERSEDISSHAREOWNERSHIPVFIRMRESOURCESFINANCIALLYHEALTHYOR
29、GANIZATIONSCANMOREEASILYMEETTHEIROBLIGATIONSTOOWNERSTAKEHOLDERSANDARELESSLIKELYTOBESUBJECTTOSIGNIFICANTPRESSUREFROMOTHERFINANCIALSTAKEHOLDERS,SUCHASCREDITORSADEVELOPINGSTRANDOFLITERATUREARGUESTHATTHEPRESENCEOFSURPLUSFINANCIALRESOURCES,ORORGANIZATIONALSLACK,CANPLAYAVARIETYOFROLESINSHAPINGCORPORATESTR
30、ATEGY,ANDTHEMANNEROFITSIMPLEMENTATIONSINGH,1986ANDSHARFMANETAL,1988THEPRESENCEOFSLACKMAYSTIMULATEPROACTIVEANDINNOVATIVESTRATEGICDECISIONMAKINGCYERTANDMARCH,1963,ORBUFFERTHEORGANIZATIONFROMITSOPERATINGENVIRONMENT,ANDSOPERMITSUBOPTIMALBEHAVIOURSTOARISEANDPERSISTTHOMPSON,1967INDEED,INTHECONTEXTOFVOLUNT
31、ARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURES,1SLACKMAYPROMOTEDISCLOSURESIMPLYBYPROVIDINGTHERESOURCESTOMEETTHEACCOMPANYINGADMINISTRATIVECOSTSWEPROPOSETWOMEASURESOFFIRMRESOURCESFORINCLUSIONINTHISSTUDYPROFITABILITYANDLEVERAGEFIRSTLY,PROFITSPROVIDEMANAGERSWITHAPOOLOFRESOURCESFROMWHICHTHECOSTSOFMAKINGENVIRONMENTALDISCLOS
32、URESAREFUNDEDSECONDLY,FIRMSWITHRELATIVELYLOWLEVELSOFLEVERAGEMAYEXPERIENCELESSPRESSUREFROMCREDITORSTAKEHOLDERSANDTHEREFOREFINDITEASIERBOTHTORAISEFUNDSWITHWHICHTHEYCANFUNDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURES,ANDTOHAVETHEDISCRETIONARYABILITYTOFOCUSONORGANIZATIONALACTIVITIES,SUCHASVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURE,THATAREONLYIND
33、IRECTLYLINKEDTOTHEFINANCIALSUCCESSOFTHEFIRMINADDITION,LESSOFTHEIRPROFITSTREAMSWILLBEDEVOTEDTOMEETINGINTERESTPAYMENTSTODEBTHOLDERSH6ATHELIKELIHOODOFPARTICIPATIONINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOAFIRMSPROFITABILITYH6BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETENDSTOBEHIGHERTHEM
34、OREPROFITABLEISTHEFIRMH7ATHELIKELIHOODOFPARTICIPATIONINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISNEGATIVELYRELATEDTOFIRMLEVERAGEH7BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETENDSTOBELOWERTHEHIGHERISTHEDEGREEOFFIRMLEVERAGEVIBOARDCOMPOSITIONHANIFFAANDCOOKE2002ARGUETHATCORPORATEGOVERNANCESHOULDBECONSIDEREDAS
35、ANINFLUENCEONDISCLOSUREBECAUSEITISTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSTHATMANAGESINFORMATIONDISCLOSUREINANNUALREPORTSANDTHEREFOREDISCLOSUREMAYBEAFUNCTIONOFTHECONSTITUENTSOFBOARDSP318THEPREVALENCEOFAGENTS,SUCHASNONEXECUTIVEDIRECTORS,WHOTENDTOBEMORESTRONGLYALIGNEDWITHEXTERNALSTAKEHOLDERINTERESTSTHANMANAGERSWANGANDDEWH
36、IRST,1992MAYPROVIDE,ADDITIONALWINDOWSONTHEWORLDTRICKER,1984,P171BETTERALIGNMENTWITHTHEVIEWSOFEXTERNALGROUPSBRINGSGREATEREXPECTATIONOFVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREACTIVISMH8ATHELIKELIHOODOFPARTICIPATIONINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREISPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOTHENUMBEROFNONEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSH8BTHEQUALITYOFVOLUNTA
37、RYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURETENDSTOBEHIGHERTHEMORENONEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSTHEFIRMHAS3DATAANDMETHODOFESTIMATIONTHESTARTINGPOINTFOROURSAMPLEISTHEFTSEALLSHAREINDEXTHEALLSHAREINDEXISTHEBROADESTINDEXOFUKLISTEDSTOCKS,REPRESENTINGOVER98OFTHEUKMARKETCAPITALISATIONATTHEDATEOFOURSTUDY,2000,THEALLSHAREINDEXCOMPRISED
38、APPROXIMATELY700COMPANIESEXCLUDINGINVESTMENTTRUSTSDRAWNFROMAWIDESPECTRUMOFBUSINESSACTIVITIESFOROURPURPOSES,COMPLETEDATACOULDBEOBTAINEDFOR447COMPANIESORABOUT64OFTHEFTSEALLSHAREFIRMSTHROUGHOUTOURANALYSIS,UNLESSOTHERWISESTATED,WEINTRODUCEAONEYEARLAGBETWEENTHEDEPENDENTANDINDEPENDENTVARIABLES,IEDISCLOSUR
39、EIN2000ISDETERMINEDBYFIRMANDINDUSTRYCHARACTERISTICSIN1999THISHELPSTOCLARIFYANYPOTENTIALLYTROUBLINGISSUESOFCAUSALITYAPPROXIMATELY47OFTHESAMPLEAREMANUFACTURERS,WHILEJUSTOVER33OFTHESAMPLEARESERVICEINDUSTRYCOMPANIESOVER9OFWHICHARERETAILERSWHILEANADDITIONAL7AREALLOCATEDTOTHEFINANCIALSERVICESSECTORALMOST1
40、0OFSAMPLECOMPANIESAREINVOLVEDINCONSTRUCTION,WHILETHEREMAINING3AREUTILITIESTHEDTISSMALLBUSINESSSERVICEDATASUGGESTTHATAPPROXIMATELY56OFTHELARGEFIRMSINTHESECTORSCOVEREDBYOURANALYSISAREMANUFACTURERS,APPROXIMATELYAQUARTEROF1AREUTILITIESORAREINVOLVEDINEXTRACTION,26AREWHOLESALERSORRETAILERS,11AREINVOLVEDWI
41、THTRANSPORT,STORAGEORCOMMUNICATIONAND6AREHOTELSORRESTAURANTSBYTHISYARDSTICK,THESAMPLEANALYZEDHEREISBROADLYREPRESENTATIVEDIFFERENCESARISEBECAUSEOFTHERELATIVELYROUGHINDUSTRIALCLASSIFICATIONEMPLOYEDINTHEDTISTATISTICSANDBECAUSEOURSAMPLEISCOMPOSEDDISPROPORTIONATELYOFVERYLARGEFIRMSTHISLEADSTOTHEOVERSAMPLI
42、NGFROMINDUSTRIESWHERETHEAVERAGESIZEOFFIRMSISVERYLARGEANDTHEUNDERSAMPLINGOFFIRMSININDUSTRIESWHERETHEAVERAGESIZEOFFIRMISSMALLHENCEOURSAMPLEINCLUDESAHIGHERTHANEXPECTEDPROPORTIONOFFIRMSFROMTHEUTILITIESANDOIL/GAS/MININGSECTORSANDALOWERTHANEXPECTEDPROPORTIONOFFIRMSFROMTHERETAILSECTORSOURCESTEPHENBRAMMERAN
43、DSTEPHENPAVELINVOLUNTARYENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESBYLARGEUKCOMPANIESJJOURNALOFBUSINESSFINACEANDACCOUNTING,2006,3311681188译文英国大型公司的自愿性环境信息披露2影响自愿性环境会计信息披露的决定因素通过自愿披露信息来努力消除公司和外部代理之间的信息不对称，主要是在投资环境领域的代理。最近发生的企业社会责任事件已经证明，道德，社会和与经营活动相关的环境因素都和重大的财政后果有关。鉴于隐藏企业特性的可能性，投资者可能不愿意投资不主动提供企业环境绩效相关信息的企业。关键是，如果不披露，投
44、资者将假设最坏的情况，减少其股票价格CORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003,P47。从这个意义上说，自愿性环境信息披露可能被看作是公司试图减少企业潜在的和实际的投资者所面临的信息风险（以及与之相关的成本）。然而，并非所有的企业都会选择做出这样的披露，而且那些信息披露的质量是不同的。这是因为披露在两个方面是昂贵的成本计量、审核、整理和出版环境信息；亏损的相关战略决定与公开的承诺，可以被证实的未来的行为和或性能VERRECCHIA,1983LIETAL,1997CORMIERANDMAGNAN,1999ANDSKINNER,1994。企业做出和自愿性环境信息披露质量有关的决定，预计将系于一个公
45、司和行业特点的范围，影响相对成本和效益的信息披露CORMIERANDMAGNAN,1999AND2003ANDLIETAL,1997。现有文献表明，这些成本和收益是与来自外部机构的压力有关的，如立法机构，监管机构，社区和环保游说团体，消费者和社会责任投资者ROBERTS,1992LIETAL,1997SINCLAIRDESGAGNEANDGOZLAN,2003ANDWILLIS,2003，公司受那些压力的程度与其大小和媒体曝光率，其环境绩效PATTEN,2002ANDULLMANN,1985，其所有权和治理结构CORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003ROBERTS,1992ANDCULLEN
46、ANDCHRISTOPHER,2002，以及资源的可用CORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003ANDROBERTS,1992有关。我们将依次讨论这些影响因素。（1）企业经营活动的性质现有的环境会计信息披露文献标示了若干立法权，来源于监督管理和制度的压力使公司做出这样的披露，并指出产业在它们的固有环境影响HALMEANDHUSE,1996，环境问题的能见度以及监管干预的程度和类型方面存在不同。行业的高度环境影响是以其特别明显的环境问题BOWEN,2000为特点的，例如全球变暖和石油泄漏风险。这些行业的公司活动受到来自环境压力团体的严格监视，最近的研究强调环境问题的可见性决定环境反应度BOWEN
47、,2000ANDDUTTONETAL,1990。环境问题组织协会，从外部团体包括投资者和监管机构来看，可能因为紧迫性的增强刺激可见的环境会计信息披露的问题。这个促进是消除公司和外部代理之间信息不对称的一个需要，为了保证后者有关公司的活动DUTTONETAL,1990。实证研究已经将高度环境影响与金属，资源，造纸，发电，水和化工行业联系起来BOWEN,2000SHARMA,1997ANDHOFFMAN,1999。H1A一个公司做出自愿性环境信息披露的可能性在有明显的相关环境问题的公司中更高。我们实证分析的一个独特的方面是涉及了在决定参与任何也许是最低的环境会计信息披露水平和这样的披露对质量的影响
48、之间的明显区分。SINCLAIRDESGAGNE和GOZLAN2003介绍了一种理论模型，允许企业根据他们普遍的利益相关者环境的性质选择环境信息披露的质量。他们得出结论说，自愿公开环境信息的质量主要是由需求驱动的（P380）在某种意义上说，高质量的信息披露被期望与公司面临的环保意识问题利益相关者联系。因此，除了公司做出环境信息披露的可能性在整个行业中的系统变化，我们也假定披露的质量中存在这样的变化。H1B自愿性环境会计信息披露的质量在有明显相关环境问题的公司中更高。（2）企业环境绩效披露满足各种重要功能，包括通知关于公司环境绩效的有关团体，尝试改变对有关组织的性能的认知和改变企业绩效的社会期望
49、值LINDBLOM,1994PATTEN,2002AANDGRAYETAL,1995。与此相一致，信息披露的动机可能是希望创建一个对非市场的重要敏感印象，影响可能存在的投资者的长期利益BELKAOUIANDKARPIK,1989,P39。需要创造，受益于创造，这样的印象，被预期下降到公司一个最严重贫乏的环境绩效记录。此外，业绩不好的管理者信息披露的一个动因是由公司高级管理人员的声誉受到损害的风险驱动的，伴随未能真正披露的不好的消息TRUEMAN,1997HUGHESANDSANKAR,1997ANDSKINNER,1994。因此，我们提出以下假设H2A参与自愿性环境会计信息披露的可能性与一个公司的环境绩效呈负相关。H2B自愿性环境会计信息披露的质量倾向于一个公司的环境绩效越糟，越高。（3）企业规模和组织的能见度组织的规模和能见度通常被作为企业层面环境会计信息披露的驱动程序PATTEN,2002AAND2002BHACKSTONANDMILNE,1996ANDCORMIERANDMAGNAN,2003。大公司往往对有关公众更可见，所以更容易受到来自外部利益的较大的政治和监管压力的支配BELKAOUIANDKARPIK,1989PATTEN2002BANDBROWNANDDEEGAN,1998。正因为如此，大公司可能尤其要做出环境信息披露来证
