1、外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文原文DOESEARNINGSMANAGEMENTAFFECTFIRMSINVESTMENTDECISIONSIINTRODUCTIONTHISPAPEREXAMINESWHETHEREARNINGSMANAGEMENTAFFECTSRESOURCEALLOCATIONBYSTUDYINGWHETHERFIRMSMANIPULATINGEARNINGSMAKESUBOPTIMALINVESTMENTDECISIONSWEAIMTOPROVIDEEVIDENCEONWHETHERACCOUNTINGMISSTATEMENTS,POTENTIALLYMOTIVATEDBY
2、COMPENSATIONTARGETSORCAPITALMARKETEXPECTATIONS,CAUSEDISTORTIONSINTHEINVESTMENTDECISIONSMADEWITHINFIRMSENGAGINGINTHEMISSTATEMENTADIRECTCOSTTOINVESTORSTHECONSEQUENCESOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTARERELEVANTTOTHEDECISIONSMADEBYINVESTORS,MANAGERS,DIRECTORS,ANDREGULATORS,ANDTODATETHEREISLITTLERESEARCHTHATADDRESSE
3、STHERELATIONBETWEENEARNINGSMANAGEMENTINEXTERNALREPORTINGANDITSEFFECTONINTERNALDECISIONSINVESTMENTDECISIONSDEPENDONEXPECTATIONSOFTHEBENEFITSOFTHEINVESTMENT,WHICHINTURNDEPENDONEXPECTATIONSOFFUTUREGROWTHANDPRODUCTDEMANDEXPECTATIONSOFFUTUREGROWTHAREBASEDONINFORMATIONTHATINCLUDESREVENUESANDEARNINGSINADDI
4、TIONTOMERELYCONCEALINGTHEACTUALPERFORMANCEDURINGTHEPERIOD,MISSTATEDFINANCIALRESULTSCANMASKUNDERLYINGTRENDSINREVENUEANDEARNINGSGROWTHTHUS,OVERSTATEMENTSOFREVENUESANDEARNINGSARELIKELYTODISTORTEXPECTATIONSOFGROWTHBYTHOSEUNAWAREOFTHEMISSTATEMENTONEMIGHTCONJECTURETHATIFMANAGEMENTCHOOSESTOPAINTAROSIERVIEW
5、FORINVESTORSINTHENUMBERSTHEYREPORTEXTERNALLY,THENTHEYWOULDNOTALLOWTHISTOINFLUENCEINTERNALINVESTMENTDECISIONSHOWEVER,ITISPOSSIBLETHATINVESTMENTDECISIONMAKERSWITHINTHEFIRMBELIEVETHEMISREPORTEDGROWTHTRENDBECAUSETHEYAREEITHEROVEROPTIMISTICORUNAWAREOFTHEMISSTATEMENTANDINVESTACCORDINGLYALTERNATIVELY,INVES
6、TMENTDECISIONMAKERSMIGHTUNDERSTANDTHETRUESTATEOFTHEFIRMBUTCHOOSETOOVERINVESTINAHIGHRISKAPPROACHTOTURNAROUNDPERFORMANCEREGARDLESSOFTHEREASONFORTHEOVERINVESTMENT,TRUTHFULREPORTINGMIGHTHAVEPREVENTEDITSEVERALPARTIESARETYPICALLYINVOLVEDININVESTMENTDECISIONS,INCLUDINGMANAGERSWHOMAKETHEDECISIONTOINVEST,BOA
7、RDSWHOREVIEWTHECAPITALBUDGET,ANDEXTERNALSUPPLIERSOFCAPITALIFFINANCIALRESULTSAREREPORTEDTRUTHFULLY,THENOTHERPARTIESCOULDSTEPINTOCURTAILTHEINVESTMENTASARESULT,FIRMSINVESTMORETHANTHEYOTHERWISEWOULDHAVE,ANDATTEMPTSTOMEETCAPITALMARKETEXPECTATIONSORMEETBONUSTARGETS,FOREXAMPLE,COULDAFFECTINVESTORS,EMPLOYEE
8、S,CUSTOMERS,ANDABROADSETOFRELATEDPARTIESOURSTUDYPROVIDESEVIDENCEONWHETHEREARNINGSMANAGEMENTAFFECTSRESOURCEALLOCATIONBYEXAMININGTHECAPITALEXPENDITUREDECISIONSOFTHREEGROUPSOFFIRMSALLEGEDTOHAVEMANIPULATEDEARNINGSFIRMSINVESTIGATEDBYTHESECFORACCOUNTINGIRREGULARITIES,FIRMSSUEDBYTHEIRSHAREHOLDERSFORIMPROPE
9、RACCOUNTING,ANDFIRMSTHATRESTATEDFINANCIALSTATEMENTSTHESESAMPLESCOMPRISEFIRMSTHATHAVEOVERSTATEDEARNINGSSUBSTANTIALLY,WHICHGIVESUSGREATERCONFIDENCETHATWEHAVEIDENTIFIEDEARNINGSMANIPULATORSANDTHATTHEMAGNITUDEOFTHEIREARNINGSMANIPULATIONCOULDSIGNIFICANTLYAFFECTINVESTMENTDECISIONSBOTHOFTHESEFACTORSARECRUCI
10、ALTOTHEPOWEROFOURTESTSHOWEVER,BECAUSEOFCONCERNSABOUTPOTENTIALSELECTIONBIASANDTOTESTWHETHERTHEEFFECTWEFINDGENERALIZESBEYONDTHEMOSTSEVERECASESOFEARNINGSMANIPULATION,WEALSOUSEDISCRETIONARYREVENUESTOIDENTIFYFIRMSTHATMANIPULATEDEARNINGSOURDATAIDENTIFIESTHEPERIODFORWHICHMANIPULATIONISALLEGED,ANDPERMITSUST
11、OEXAMINETHEINVESTMENTDECISIONSINTHEYEARSBEFORE,DURING,ANDSUBSEQUENTTOTHEMANIPULATIONUNDERTHENULLHYPOTHESISTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTDOESNOTRESULTINRESOURCEMISALLOCATION,FIRMSSHOULDEXHIBITINVESTMENTLEVELSCONSISTENTWITHTHEIRFUNDAMENTALSOURSTUDYFOLLOWSANEXTENSIVELITERATURETHATMODELSINVESTMENTDECISIONSUSING
12、ALINEARMODELRELATINGCAPITALEXPENDITURESTOINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESSPECIFICALLY,THESEMODELSCONTROLFORINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESUSINGTOBINSQANDCASHFROMOPERATIONSOURTESTSEXAMINETHEINVESTMENTDECISIONSINTHEMANIPULATIONANDPOSTMANIPULATIONPERIODSFIRST,WETESTWHETHERFIRMSOVERSTATINGEARNINGSOVERINVESTDURINGTHEMANI
13、PULATIONPERIODSECOND,WEEXAMINEWHETHEROVERINVESTMENTISELIMINATEDONCEEARNINGSARENOLONGERMANIPULATEDIFFIRMSOVERINVESTDURINGTHEMANIPULATIONPERIODFORAREASONOTHERTHANTHEEFFECTOFMISLEADINGINFORMATION,THENWEWOULDNOTEXPECTADECLINEININVESTMENTAFTERCONTROLLINGFORDECLININGINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESWHENEARNINGSAREN
14、OLONGERMANIPULATEDTHEFINDINGSINDICATETHATFIRMSMANIPULATINGEARNINGSDOOVERINVESTINTHEMISREPORTINGPERIODWEFINDSIGNIFICANTLYGREATERINVESTMENTTHANWOULDBEEXPECTEDBASEDONINVESTMENTFUNDAMENTALSADDITIONALTESTSUSINGMATCHEDCONTROLFIRMSSUGGESTTHATSAMPLEFIRMSINVESTMORETHANTHEYWOULDHAVEHADTHEYNOTOVERSTATEDTHEIREA
15、RNINGSWHILESAMPLEANDCONTROLFIRMSEXHIBITSOMEOVERINVESTMENTBEFORETHEMANIPULATIONPERIOD,CONTROLFIRMSREDUCETHELEVELOFINVESTMENT,WHEREASSAMPLEFIRMSCONTINUEOVERINVESTINGDURINGTHEMANIPULATIONPERIODFINALLY,THEEVIDENCEINDICATESTHATSAMPLEFIRMSCURBOVERINVESTMENTFOLLOWINGTHEMISREPORTINGPERIODTHESEFINDINGSSUGGES
16、TTHATANIMPORTANTCONSEQUENCEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTISITSEFFECTONFIRMSINVESTMENTDECISIONSOURTESTSUSINGMEASURESOFDISCRETIONARYREVENUESALLOWUSTOCONFIRMTHEMAINFINDINGSANDALSOTOINVESTIGATEFURTHERTHETIMINGOFTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDEXCESSINVESTMENTGRANGERCAUSALITYTESTSARECONSISTENTWITHEARNINGSMANAGEMENTLEADING
17、EXCESSINVESTMENTRATHERTHANEARNINGSMANAGEMENTOCCURRINGINRESPONSETOEG,TOCOVERUPPASTSUBOPTIMALINVESTMENTTAKENTOGETHER,OURFINDINGSACROSSSEVERALAPPROACHESUSINGMULTIPLEMEASURESOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDEXCESSINVESTMENTSUPPORTOURHYPOTHESISTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTAFFECTSFIRMSINVESTMENTDECISIONSWESEEKTOPROVIDEADD
18、ITIONALSUPPORTFORTHISHYPOTHESISBYRULINGOUTALTERNATIVEEXPLANATIONSFOROURRESULTSOUREVIDENCEDOESNOTINDICATETHATOVERINVESTMENTISSOLELYARESULTOFFIRMSOBTAININGRELATIVELYINEXPENSIVEEXTERNALFINANCINGBECAUSEWESEESIMILARPATTERNSOFOVERINVESTMENTINFIRMSWITHLOWANDHIGHLEVELSOFEXTERNALFINANCINGOUREVIDENCEDOESNOTSU
19、PPORTTHEHYPOTHESISTHATFIRMSMANIPULATINGEARNINGSOVERINVESTTOPOOLWITHMORESUCCESSFULFIRMSTOTHEREBYAVOIDDETECTIONWEFINDTHATSAMPLEFIRMSINVESTMORETHANCONTROLFIRMS,WHICHISINCONSISTENTWITHAPOOLINGARGUMENTFINALLY,OUREVIDENCEISNOTCONSISTENTWITHTHENOTIONTHATFIRMSFACINGPOORRETURNSTOPASTOVERINVESTMENTOVERSTATEEA
20、RNINGSTOMASKTHEPOORFINANCIALRESULTSFIRST,WEFINDTHATFIRMSCONTINUETOOVERINVESTWHILETHEYMANIPULATEEARNINGS,WHICHISUNEXPECTEDFORAFIRMALREADYFACINGPOORINVESTMENTRETURNSINADDITION,USINGGRANGERCAUSALITYTESTSWEFINDTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTLEADSEXCESSINVESTMENTWHILEOURFINDINGSARESUBJECTTOTHECAVEATTHATWEDONOTOBS
21、ERVETHEINVESTMENTDECISIONPROCESSDIRECTLY,WECONCLUDETHATTHEMOSTPLAUSIBLEEXPLANATIONISTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTDISTORTSINFORMATIONUSEDBYTHOSEINVOLVEDINFIRMSINVESTMENTDECISIONSTHESEFINDINGSCONTRIBUTETOTHEEMERGINGLITERATUREONTHEROLEFINANCIALSTATEMENTINFORMATIONPLAYSININVESTINGDECISIONSRECENTSTUDIESSUCHASBI
22、DDLEANDHILARY2006,VERDI2006,ANDBUSHMANETAL2006FINDRELATIONSHIPSBETWEENPROPERTIESOFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONANDINVESTMENTDECISIONSHOWEVER,THESESTUDIESDONOTADDRESSWHETHERINTENTIONALDISTORTIONSINACCOUNTINGNUMBERSAFFECTINVESTMENTOURSTUDYALSOCONTRIBUTESTOTHELITERATURERELATINGEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDRESOURCEALLO
23、CATIONOURFINDINGSSUGGESTTHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTCANLEADTOADIRECTCOSTTOINVESTORSINTHEFORMOFINEFFICIENTINVESTMENTSTHELAYOUTOFTHEPAPERISASFOLLOWSSECTIONIIDISCUSSESRELATEDLITERATURE,SECTIONIIIDESCRIBESOURHYPOTHESES,SECTIONIVDESCRIBESOURRESEARCHDESIGN,SECTIONVPRESENTSOUREMPIRICALFINDINGS,ANDSECTIONVICONCLU
24、DESIIRELATEDLITERATUREINCENTIVESTOMANAGEEARNINGSPRIORLITERATUREONEARNINGSMANAGEMENTEXAMINESVARIOUSALTERNATIVEHYPOTHESESABOUTWHYFIRMSMANIPULATEEARNINGSMOTIVATIONSFOREARNINGSMANAGEMENTINTHESESTUDIESINCLUDEINFLUENCINGTHETERMSOFCOMPENSATIONANDDEBTCONTRACTS,INFLUENCINGREGULATORS,ANDINFLUENCINGEQUITYPRICE
25、SCOLLECTIVELY,THISLITERATURESUGGESTSTHATTHEINCENTIVESTOMANIPULATEEARNINGSARISEINANUMBEROFCONTEXTSINTHISSTUDY,WEEXAMINEAPOTENTIALCONSEQUENCEOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENT,REGARDLESSOFMANAGERSMOTIVATIONSTODATE,THEREHASBEENLITTLEFOCUSONHOWEARNINGSMANAGEMENTAFFECTSINTERNALDECISIONS,SUCHASCAPITALINVESTMENTEARNINGS
26、MANAGEMENTANDRESOURCEALLOCATIONTHEPRIORLITERATUREONEARNINGSMANAGEMENTPROVIDESLIMITEDEVIDENCEONWHETHERMISREPORTINGTOINVESTORSRESULTSINRESOURCEMISALLOCATIONASHEALYANDWAHLEN1999NOTE,ONLYASMALLPARTOFTHEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTLITERATUREADDRESSESTHECONSEQUENCESOFEARNINGSMANAGEMENTONRESOURCEALLOCATION,ANDTHEFIN
27、DINGSOFTHISLITERATUREAREMIXEDONESTREAMOFTHISLITERATUREEXAMINESWHETHEREARNINGSMANAGEMENTCONTRIBUTESTOIPOMISPRICINGFOREXAMPLE,TEOHETAL1998CONCLUDETHATEARNINGSMANAGEMENTCONTRIBUTESTOIPOMISPRICINGHOWEVER,BRAVETAL2000FINDTHATTHELONGRUNRETURNSOFIPOSARESIMILARTOTHOSEOFSEASONEDFIRMSWITHSIMILARMARKETCAPITALI
28、ZATION,SUGGESTINGTHEFINDINGSMAYBEDUETOAMOREPERVASIVERETURNPATTERNINTHEBROADERSAMPLEOFPUBLICCOMPANIESASECONDSTREAMOFLITERATURE,INCLUDINGFOSTER1979,DECHOWETAL1996,BENEISH1997,ANDPALMROSEETAL2004,FINDSTHATTHEMARKETREACTIONTODISCLOSUREOFMISLEADINGREPORTINGISSIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVE,INDICATINGTHATINVESTORSW
29、ERENOTCOMPLETELYAWAREOFTHEMANIPULATIONNEVERTHELESS,TOTHEEXTENTEQUITYINVESTORSHAVERATIONALEXPECTATIONSOFTHEAMOUNTOFMANIPULATIONOCCURRING,EVENIFTHEYCANNOTIDENTIFYTHEMAGNITUDEFORSPECIFICCOMPANIES,ONECOULDOBSERVENEGATIVERETURNSTOANNOUNCEMENTSEXPOSTTHATWOULDNOTNECESSARILYIMPLYRESOURCESWEREMISALLOCATEDEXA
30、NTEATHIRDSTREAMOFLITERATUREEXAMINESWHETHERFIRMSMANIPULATEREALDECISIONSTOMANAGEEARNINGSFOREXAMPLE,BUSHEE1998EXAMINESHOWRESEARCHANDDEVELOPMENTRDSPENDINGISAFFECTEDBYINCENTIVESTOMEETEARNINGSTARGETS,ANDWHETHERTHISISINFLUENCEDBYTHECOMPOSITIONOFTHEFIRMSINSTITUTIONALINVESTORSANOTHEREXAMPLEISTHEOPPORTUNISTIC
31、TIMINGBYBANKSOFSALESOFHELDFORSALESECURITIESBARTHETAL1990WHILETHISSTREAMOFLITERATUREEXAMINESTHERELATIONBETWEENEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDREALDECISIONS,THEFOCUSISONDISTORTINGREALDECISIONSTOACHIEVEANEARNINGSTARGETOURSTUDY,INCONTRAST,ASKSWHETHERREALDECISIONSAREDISTORTEDBECAUSEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTRESULTSINDISTOR
32、TEDINFORMATIONFORINTERNALDECISIONMAKERSEARNINGSMANAGEMENTANDINVESTMENTDECISIONSTHOUGHOURSTUDYISTHEFIRSTWEAREAWAREOFTOTESTWHETHEREARNINGSMANAGEMENTLEADSTOINEFFICIENTINVESTMENTDECISIONSBYPROVIDINGDISTORTEDINFORMATIONTODECISIONMAKERS,OTHERSTUDIESHAVEPOSITEDANDTESTEDTHEORIESRELATINGTOTHELINKBETWEENEARNI
33、NGSMANAGEMENTANDFIRMSINVESTMENTDECISIONSDECHOWETAL1996STUDYFIRMSTARGETEDBYSECENFORCEMENTACTIONSANDCONCLUDESTHATADESIRETOATTRACTEXTERNALFINANCINGATLOWCOSTISANIMPORTANTMOTIVATIONFOREARNINGSMANIPULATIONPRESUMABLY,THESEFUNDSARETHENUSEDFORCAPITALINVESTMENTMANAGERSCONSIDERINGPROFITABLEINVESTMENTPROJECTSBU
34、TFACINGFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSMIGHTMANIPULATEEARNINGSINORDERTOOBTAINFINANCINGFORINVESTMENTHOWEVER,ITISNOTCLEARWHYTHESEMANAGERSWOULDOVERINVESTRATHERTHANINVESTOPTIMALLYWITHTHEFUNDSOBTAINEDOURPREDICTIONOFOVERINVESTMENTRELIESONDISTORTEDINFORMATIONBEINGUSEDBYINVESTMENTDECISIONMAKERS,RATHERTHANJUSTADESIRETOR
35、AISEADDITIONALCAPITALATHEORETICALPAPERBYBARGILLANDBEBCHUK2003PREDICTSTHATINEFFICIENTINVESTMENTPROJECTSWILLMORELIKELYBEUNDERTAKENBYCOMPANIESTHATMISREPORTEDPRIORTOUNDERTAKINGTHEPROJECTBECAUSEFIRMSOVERSTATINGTHEIRFINANCIALRESULTSWILLBEABLETOOBTAINCHEAPERFINANCINGEVIDENCEINSUPPORTOFTHISHYPOTHESISISFOUND
36、BYWANG2006WANG2006FINDSTHATMISREPORTINGFIRMSAREMORELIKELYTOOVERINVESTINRDANDSTOCKFINANCEDMERGERSANDACQUISITIONSOURHYPOTHESISDOESNOTPRECLUDECHEAPFINANCINGHAVINGANEFFECTONINVESTMENTSWETESTWHETHEROVERINVESTMENTOCCURSREGARDLESSOFEXTERNALFINANCINGACONCURRENTSTUDYBYKEDIAANDPHILIPPON2009PREDICTSTHATFIRMSOV
37、ERSTATINGTHEIRFINANCIALRESULTSPOOLWITHBETTERPERFORMINGFIRMSTOAVOIDDETECTIONTHESEFIRMSOVERINVESTTOMIMICFIRMSTRUTHFULLYREPORTINGSTRONGERRESULTSOURSTUDYTESTSADIFFERENTHYPOTHESISRATHERTHANARGUINGTHATBADTYPEFIRMSKNOWINGLYREPLICATETHEINVESTMENTDECISIONSOFGOODTYPEFIRMS,WECONSIDERTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATATLEASTON
38、EOFTHEPARTIESINVOLVEDINTHEINVESTMENTDECISIONISMISLEDBYTHEMISSTATEDACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONWEFINDTHATSAMPLEFIRMSINVESTMORETHANMATCHEDCONTROLFIRMS,WHICHISINCONSISTENTWITHAPOOLINGARGUMENTEARNINGSQUALITYANDINVESTMENTDECISIONSOURSTUDYRELATESTOTHEEMERGINGLITERATUREONTHEROLEFINANCIALSTATEMENTINFORMATIONPLAYSI
39、NINVESTINGDECISIONSFOREXAMPLE,BIDDLEANDHILARY2006ANDVERDI2006PREDICTANDFINDTHATBETTERACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONREDUCESINFORMATIONASYMMETRYBETWEENMANAGERSANDOUTSIDESUPPLIERSOFCAPITAL,ALLOWINGFORMOREEFFICIENTINVESTMENTBIDDLEANDHILARY2006FINDTHATMEASURESOFACCOUNTINGQUALITYARENEGATIVELYRELATEDTOINVESTMENTCAS
40、HFLOWSENSITIVITIES,INDICATINGTHATTHEEFFECTOFFINANCINGCONSTRAINTSONINVESTMENTISLOWERFORFIRMSWITHHIGHERACCOUNTINGQUALITYVERDI2006FINDSACCRUALSQUALITYISSIGNIFICANTLYNEGATIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHBOTHOVERINVESTMENTANDUNDERINVESTMENTBUSHMANETAL2006ARGUETHATTIMELYACCOUNTINGRECOGNITIONOFECONOMICLOSSESMAKESMANAGE
41、RSLESSLIKELYTOENGAGEINEXANTENEGATIVENETPRESENTVALUEINVESTMENTPROJECTSTHEYFINDTHATMORETIMELYACCOUNTINGRECOGNITIONOFECONOMICLOSSESCURBSOVERINVESTMENTBYMANAGERSFACEDWITHDECLININGINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESTHEINVESTMENTRESPONSETODECLININGINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESDECREASESWHENLOSSRECOGNITIONISMORETIMELYHOWEVER
42、,THESESTUDIESDONOTADDRESSWHETHERINTENTIONALDISTORTIONSINACCOUNTINGNUMBERSAFFECTINVESTMENTSOURCEMAUREENFMCNICHOLS,STEPHENRSTUBBEN2008“DOESEARNINGSMANAGEMENTAFFECTFIRMSINVESTMENTDECISIONS”THEACCOUNTINGREVIEW,VOL83,NO6,二、翻译文章译文盈余管理是否影响公司的投资决策一、导言本文探讨盈余管理是否影响公司资源分配,研究公司是否操纵收入做出最理想的投资决策。我们的目的是为可能出于补偿，资本市
43、场的预期目标或企业内部提出的误报所造成的错误的投资决策提供会计虚报证据。由投资者，经理，董事和监管机构作出相关的决定影响盈余结果，并且迄今为止很少有工作研究盈余管理在对外部报告和对内部决策的影响之间的关系。投资决策取决于投资收益，也取决于对未来的期望和产品需求的增长预期。未来的增长预期是收入和收益信息为基础。除了在这期间只隐瞒实际的表现，错报的财务业绩可能掩盖潜在收入和盈利的增长趋势。因此，多报收入和收益那些无意识的错报可能影响预期的经济增长。人们可能会猜想，如果管理层选择在他们众多外部报告对象中投资者的看法，他们不会允许这样的决定影响内部投资。但是它有可能使公司内部投资决策者相信错报的增长趋
44、势，因为他们要过分乐观或浑然不觉相应投资的错报。另外，投资决策者知道该公司的真实状况，而选择了投资于高风险的方法扭转结果。尽管真实的报告能阻止过度投资，通常情况下，几方参与投资决策，包括作出投资决策的管理者、资本预算评审委员会和外部供应商的资本。如果财务业绩报告真实，那么其他各方可以会消减投资。结果企业投资超过他们，企图就会满足资本市场预期目标或达到红利目标。例如，可能会影响投资者，员工，客户和一系列与之相关的人。我们的研究提供了盈余管理是否会影响资源分配的证据，研究了三个企业集团的资本开支决策指控有盈利操纵美国证券交易委员会调查有会计违规行为的公司，公司被股东控告会计行为不当并且重编公司的财
45、务报表。这些样品包括公司的夸大盈利程度，这使我们更有信心，使我们确定收益和他们的其盈余操纵会显着地影响投资决策。这两个因素是我们测试的关键。然而，由于潜在的选择偏见问题，并且我们发现这个测试效果是否超过了盈余操纵的最严重的情况，我们也使用可支配收入识别企业操纵利润。确定我们的数据在哪些期间涉嫌操纵，并允许我们审查前几年和随后在投资决策操作。在零假设情况下盈余管理不会导致资源配置不当，公司应该表现出投资水平与他们的基本面保持一致。根据大量的文献我们采用采用线性投资决策模型来研究资本性支出的投资机会。具体来说，这些模型控制了使用托宾的Q比率的投资机会和业务现金。我们的测试研究的是操纵和操纵后阶段的
46、投资决策。首先，我们测试企业在操做期间是否夸大过度投资收益。第二，我们研究一旦不再操纵收入是否过度投资会消除。如果企业过度投资的操作过程期间有其他原因比误导信息有影响，那么我们就不能指望当投资（减少后的投资机会控制）收益下降时不再操纵。研究结果显示，企业在误报时期进行过度投资盈余操纵。我们发现投资比预期投资意义更大。对照公司使用的附加试验表明，样本公司不得不投入比他们没有夸大的收入更多的投资。当样本和控制的公司在前操作期间出现一些过度投资，控制公司降低一级投资，和样本公司继续在操作期间过度投资。最后，证据表明，样本公司在误后抑制了过度投资后。这些结果表明，盈余管理的一个重要的后果是影响企业的投
47、资决策。我们的测试使用可支配收入措施，使我们能够确定主要结论和进一步调查盈余管理和过剩投资的时间。格兰杰因果关系测试表明盈余管理导致过度投资而不是由过去的最理想的投资导致的。两者合计，我们的调查结果采用多种盈余管理的措施和过度投资的方法来支持我们的假设，即盈余管理影响企业的投资决策。我们的目的是为这一假说提供更多的支持为我们的结果作出不同的解释。我们的证据不能证明过度投资仅是企业获取相对廉价的外部融资的结果，因为我们看到在高、低层次的企业与外部融资中都有类似模式的过度投资。我们的证据不支持这一假设，企业与更多成功企业操纵过度投资盈余从而避免被察觉到；我们发现样本公司的投资比对照公司多，这与大多
48、说法不一致。最后，我们的证据是不符合概念的，企业面对过去的过度投资低回报来夸大收益以掩盖财务业绩不佳。首先，我们发现当企业已经面临低的投资回报时还继续过度投资操纵盈余是很意外的。此外，使用格兰杰因果关系检验，我们发现盈余管理导致过度投资。当我们发现我们的结果受到警告时，我们不能直接观察到投资决策过程，我们的结论合理的解释了，盈余管理被公司的投资决策有关人士用来歪曲信息。这些新文献的发现有助于投资的决策在财务报表信息上的作用。最近的研究如BIDDLE和HILARY（2006），VERDI（2006），BUSHMAN（2006）等人发现会计信息的性质和投资决策的关系。然而，这些研究没有涉及是否故意
49、扭曲会计数字来影响投资。我们的研究也贡献了盈余管理和资源分配的相关文献。我们的研究结果表明，盈余管理会导致投资者在低效率的投资形式下的直接成本。本文的编排如下。第二节讨论了相关文献，第三节说明我们的假设，第四节介绍我们的研究设计，第五节提出了我们的实验结果，第六节结论。二、相关文献盈余管理的激励在此之前的盈余管理的各种替代假说文献都是探讨关于企业为什么操纵盈余。在这些研究中的盈余管理动机包括赔偿条款的影响、债务合同、监管机构的影响、股票价格的影响。总的来说，这些文献表明，盈余操纵的动机出现在上下文中。在这些研究中，我们研究了盈余管理的潜在后果，无论管理者的动机是什么。到目前为止，很少有研究关注盈余管理如何影响内部决策，如资本投资。盈余管理与资源分配之前的盈余管理文献在投资者误报导致资源配置不当上提供了有限的证据。例如HEALY和WAHLEN（1999）认为只有少部分盈余管理学说关注盈余管理在资源分配上的后果，与本文献的研究结果不一。第一种观点探讨盈余管理是否有助于上市定价。例如，TEOH1998等人得出结论，盈余管理有助于上市定价。然而，BRAV（2000）等人发现，首次公开招股的长期收益与的经验丰富的公司在市场资本化上是相似的。这表明，这一发现可能是由于一种比较普遍的回归模式应用在大量上市公司样本上。第二种观点，包括FOSTER1979,DECHOW等1996,
