1、0外文文献翻译原文ENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUREWITHINLEGALANDACCOUNTINGCONTEXTSANINTERNATIONALPERSPECTIVEINDUSTRIALACTIVITYHASALARGEIMPACTONTHEENVIRONMENTRECENTCONCERNSABOUTGLOBALWARMINGANDEMERGINGEMISSIONSTRADINGMARKETSFORGREENHOUSEGASESHAVEINTENSIFIEDSTAKEHOLDERINTERESTINCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALACTIVITIESANDIMPACT
2、SRESPONSETOTHISINCREASEININTERESTHASVARIEDACROSSCORPORATIONSANDACROSSCOUNTRIESWHILEFORMOSTOFTHEWORLD,ENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGHASDEVELOPEDVOLUNTARILYEG,THROUGHVOLUNTARYSTANDARDSSUCHASTHE,SOMECOUNTRIESHAVEPASSEDLEGISLATIONMANDATINGCORPORATEENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGEG,DENMARKS“GREENACCOUNTS,”THATDETAILRAWMA
3、TERIALSUSEDANDWASTEPRODUCEDTHEFIRSTPURPOSEOFTHISPAPERISTODOCUMENTDIVERSITYININTERNATIONALENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESWEDOCUMENTTHATLEGALORIGINORPOSSIBLY,WHICHCOLONIALPOWERRULEDHISTORICALLYISASSOCIATEDWITHTHEDEGREEOFCROSSCOUNTRYVARIATIONINMANAGERSREPORTSOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESWEALSOEXPLORETHERELATIONB
4、ETWEENREPORTEDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESANDTHEGENERALLEVELOFENVIRONMENTALREGULATIONWEFINDTHATMORESTRINGENTENVIRONMENTALLAWSAREASSOCIATEDWITHHIGHERLEVELSOFREPORTEDDISCLOSUREFINALLY,WERELATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESTOANOTHERCOMMONTYPEOFCORPORATEDISCLOSUREDISCLOSUREOFACCOUNTINGINFORMATIONACCOUNTINGDISCLOS
5、URESPROVIDEANINTERESTINGCONTRASTTOENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESBECAUSEWHILETHEPRECISERULESASSOCIATEDWITHACCOUNTINGDISCLOSUREVARYFROMCOUNTRYTOCOUNTRY,THEREISAMUCHLONGERTRADITIONOFACCOUNTINGDISCLOSUREANDMOSTCOUNTRIESHAVESOMEFORMOFMANDATEDACCOUNTINGDISCLOSUREWEFINDASTRONGRELATIONBETWEENTHELEVELOFREPORTEDENV
6、IRONMENTALDISCLOSUREANDTHELEVELOFREPORTEDACCOUNTINGDISCLOSUREREGULATIONPRIORPAPERSINVESTIGATEENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESININDIVIDUALCOUNTRIESINCLUDINGAUSTRALIATILT,2001,CANADALI,RICHARDSON,ANDTHORNTON,1997ANDMCCONOMYANDLI1999,FINLANDNISKANENANDNIERMINEN,2001,GERMANYCORMIER,MAGNANANDVELTHOVEN,2005,SPAIN
7、LARRINAGA,CARRASCO,CORREA,LLENAANDMONEVA,2002,UKCAMPBELL,2004,ANDUSAPATTEN,2002FOREXAMPLE,1MCCONOMYANDLI1999INVESTIGATEEARLYADOPTIONOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESASANEXAMPLEOFVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURETHEYFINDTHATMARKETVALUATIONOFREMOVALANDSITERESTORATIONCOSTSFOROILANDGASANDMININGCOMPANIESINCLUDESESTIMATESOFFU
8、TUREASWELLASCURRENTLIABILITIESPATTEN2002DOCUMENTSANEGATIVERELATIONBETWEENENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCEANDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESOTHERSTUDIESCOMPAREENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESINASMALLCROSSSECTIONOFCOUNTRIES,SUCHASNYQUIST2003,WHOEXAMINESSCANDINAVIANCOUNTRIES,ANDISRAEL2004,WHOSESAMPLEINCLUDES12COUNTRIESWHILEM
9、ANYIMPORTANTINSIGHTSHAVEALREADYBEENGAINEDFROMTHISLITERATURE,NONEOFTHEPAPERSTAKEINTOCONSIDERATIONTHERELATION,IFANY,BETWEENENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESANDOTHERDISCLOSUREPRACTICESANDGENERALLEGALINSTITUTIONSTHUS,INCONTRASTTOPRIORRESEARCH,WEPROVIDEPRELIMINARYEVIDENCEONTHESERELATIONS,USINGALARGECROSSSECTIONOF
10、COUNTRIESANOTHERSTRENGTHOFOURSTUDYISTHATWHILEPRIORLITERATUREHASFOCUSEDONDEVELOPEDCOUNTRIES,OURSAMPLEINCLUDESBOTHDEVELOPINGANDEMERGINGMARKETSTHESEMARKETSCONSTITUTEALARGEPROPORTIONOFWORLDPOPULATIONANDARERESPONSIBLEFORANINCREASINGAMOUNTOFWORLDWIDEPOLLUTIONTHEREMAINDEROFTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSSECTI
11、ON2PROVIDESAREVIEWOFTHELITERATUREANDOURTHEORETICALDEVELOPMENTSECTION3DESCRIBESOURDATASECTION4DETAILSOURRESULTSSECTION5CONCLUDES2LITERATUREREVIEWANDTHEORETICALDEVELOPMENTTHEPUBLICRECEIVESINFORMATIONABOUTFIRMSENVIRONMENTALEXPOSURESFROMMANYSOURCES,INCLUDINGTHEMEDIA,REGULATORSANDMANAGEMENTWHENMANAGERSMA
12、KEDISCLOSURES,SOMEAREMANDATED,WHILEOTHERDISCLOSURESAREVOLUNTARY,ORATTHEDISCRETIONOFMANAGEMENTINTHEUS,FEWFINANCIALACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSADDRESSDISCLOSUREOFENVIRONMENTALACTIVITIES/LIABILITIESDURINGTHE1990S,THEPRIMARYACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSADDRESSINGENVIRONMENTALISSUESINCLUDEDSTATEMENTOFFINANCIALACCOUNTINGSTA
13、NDARDSSFASNO5,“ACCOUNTINGFORCONTINGENCIES”ANDREQUIREMENTSASSOCIATEDWITHDISCLOSUREOFASBESTOSREMEDIATIONCOSTSEMERGINGISSUESTASKFORCEEITF8913ACCOUNTINGFORTHECOSTOFASBESTOSREMOVALANDOTHERREMEDIATIONEXPENDITURESEITF908CAPITALIZATIONOFCOSTSTOTREATENVIRONMENTALCONTAMINATIONINTHEEARLY1990S,THEUSSECURITIESAN
14、DEXCHANGECOMMISSIONSECBECAMECONCERNEDABOUTTHELACKOFDISCLOSUREOFENVIRONMENTALISSUESINFINANCIALSTATEMENTSTHESECISSUEDSTAFFACCOUNTINGBULLETINSAB92,2WHICHINCREASEDTHEDISCLOSURESREQUIREDINTHEMANAGEMENTDISCUSSIONANDANALYSISSECTIONOFFINANCIALREPORTSSUBMITTEDTOTHESEC,IE,FORPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESTHEADDITION
15、ALDISCLOSURESREQUIREDUNDERSAB92INCLUDEENHANCEMENTSTOITEM103,WHICHREQUIRESTHECORPORATIONTODESCRIBEITSLEGALPROCEEDINGSTHISINCLUDESADMINISTRATIVEANDLEGALACTIVITIES,PENDINGANDCONTEMPLATED,THATCOULDAFFECTTHECORPORATIONORSUBSIDIARIESITEM303,WHICHREQUIRESADISCUSSIONOFANYKNOWNTRENDSORANYKNOWNDEMANDS,COMMITM
16、ENTS,EVENTS,ORUNCERTAINTIESTHATARELIKELYTOAFFECTTHEREGISTRANTSLIQUIDITYINAMATERIALWAYANDFINANCIALREPORTINGRELEASE36,WHICHREQUIRESDISCLOSUREWHENMANAGEMENTISUNABLETODETERMINETHATAMATERIALEFFECTIS“NOTREASONABLYLIKELY“TOOCCURANEXTENSIVELITERATUREDOCUMENTSTHEVALUERELEVANCEOFCORPORATEREPORTINGRELATEDTOTHE
17、ENVIRONMENT,INTHESENSETHATSTOCKPRICEMOVEMENTSAREASSOCIATEDWITHFIRMSDISCLOSURESABOUTENVIRONMENTALEXPOSURESSTUDIESHAVEEXAMINEDTHERELATIONBETWEENSTOCKMARKETVALUATIONANDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESWHETHERDISCLOSEDINSEPARATEREPORTSEG,HUGHES2000,INNOTESTOTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSEG,CLARKSON,LIANDRICHARDSON2004,O
18、RASENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESINTHEBALANCESHEETSOFPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESEG,BARTHANDMCNICHOLS1994MCCONOMYANDLI1999ANDBEWLEY2005ITISNOTSURPRISINGTHATREPORTEDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESAREVALUERELEVANT,GIVENTHATENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESCANBELARGEINMAGNITUDECONSIDER,FOREXAMPLE,THECOSTSASSOCIATEDWITHNUCLEARDEC
19、OMMISSIONINGCOSTSFORANUCLEARPOWERPLANTTHATISOPERATINGTODAY,FUTURECOSTSOFCLEANUPAREFORESEEABLEANDESTIMABLEDSOUZA,JACOBANDSODERSTROM2000REPORTAMEANPROJECTEDCLEANUPCOSTOFOVER300MILLIONPERPLANTEVENTHOUGHCURRENTCASHFLOWSAREUNAFFECTED,SFAS143,“ACCOUNTINGFORASSETRETIREMENTOBLIGATIONS”REQUIRESTHATALIABILITY
20、BERECORDEDASTHELIABILITYISINCURRED,WHICHINTHISCASE,ISUPONINITIALOPERATIONOFTHEPLANTSEEDSOUZA,JACOBANDSODERSTROM2000REQUIREDDISCLOSUREOFENVIRONMENTALISSUESINFINANCIALSTATEMENTSVARIESFROMCOUNTRYTOCOUNTRYFOREXAMPLE,WHILEUSGAAPISSILENTWITHRESPECTTODISCLOSUREOFEMISSIONSTRADINGALLOWANCES,UNDERINTERNATIONA
21、LFINANCIALREPORTINGSTANDARDSIFRS,INTERNATIONALACCOUNTINGSTANDARDIAS20REQUIRESRECOGNITIONOFTHEALLOWANCESASGRANTSFROMTHEGOVERNMENTACCOUNTINGREGULATIONISNOTTHESOLESOURCEOFENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONVARIOUSLAWSANDREGULATIONSIMPOSEREPORTINGREQUIREMENTSONCORPORATIONSAND3MUCHOFTHISINFORMATIONISAVAILABLETOTHEP
22、UBLICFOREXAMPLE,INTHEUS,THEEMERGENCYPLANNINGANDCOMMUNITYRIGHTTOKNOWACTEPCRAOF1986CREATEDTHETOXICRELEASEINVENTORY,WHICHREQUIREDTHATEACHMANUFACTURINGFACILITYPREPAREANNUALPUBLICREPORTSOFTHERELEASEOFSPECIFICTOXICSINDENMARK,SOMEINDUSTRIESFACEMANDATORYENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGREQUIRINGUNAUDITEDDISCLOSURESOFR
23、AWMATERIALSUSEDANDWASTEPRODUCEDTOASSESSTHEIMPACTOFREGULATIONTHATMANDATESENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURE,ONESHOULDCONSIDERWHATREPORTEDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESWOULDHAVEARISENVOLUNTARILYINTHEABSENCEOFREGULATIONLI,RICHARDSON,ANDTHORNTON1997MODELTHEINCENTIVESFORVOLUNTARYDISCLOSUREOFENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONBYMAKI
24、NGTWOASSUMPTIONSFROMDYE1985FIRST,INVESTORSASSIGNSOMEPROBABILITYTHATAFIRMSMANAGERISUNINFORMEDABOUTENVIRONMENTALEXPOSURESSECOND,AMANAGERCANCREDIBLYDISCLOSEENVIRONMENTALEXPOSURES,BUTCANNOTCREDIBLYDISCLOSETHATS/HEISUNINFORMEDEVENIFTRUETHEPREDICTIONFOLLOWINGFROMTHESETWOASSUMPTIONSISTHATINFORMEDMANAGERSWI
25、LLTRUTHFULLYDISCLOSETHEIRENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESWHENEXPOSURESARESMALL,BUTTHEYHAVEANINCENTIVENOTTODISCLOSETHEIRENVIRONMENTALLIABILITIESWHENEXPOSURESARELARGEALACKOFREPORTEDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURECANTHEREFOREMEANTHATTHEFIRMHASNOENVIRONMENTALEXPOSURES,THATTHEMANAGERHASNOINFORMATIONABOUTSUCHENVIRONMENTA
26、LEXPOSURES,ORTHATTHEMANAGERISSELECTIVELYWITHHOLDINGUNFAVORABLENEWSINEQUILIBRIUM,INVESTORSCORRECTLYANTICIPATEMANAGERSINCENTIVESFORVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURESANDPRICESTOCKACCORDINGLYCONSEQUENTLY,THEPREDICTEDEFFECTOFREGULATIONMANDATINGDISCLOSUREISTHATFIRMSINCREASETHEIRREPORTEDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESBYMAKINGP
27、UBLICMOREENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONTHATWOULDOTHERWISEHAVEBEENUNDISCLOSEDWHILETHEABOVEMODELPRESUMESPERFECTCREDIBILITYOFDISCLOSURES,THATIS,MANAGERSCANNOTMAKEUNTRUTHFULDISCLOSURES,CREDIBILITYMAYARISEENDOGENOUSLYASACONSEQUENCEOFTHEPENALTIESFROMDEVIATINGANDNOTTELLINGTHETRUTHTHREEINSTITUTIONSTHATAREINPLACEA
28、NDENFORCETRUTHFULREPORTINGBYMANAGERSAREDISCLOSURERULES,AUDITS,ANDTHELEGALSYSTEMFIRST,IFDISCLOSURERULESANDPRINCIPLESSUCHAS,USGAAPORENVIRONMENTALREPORTINGREQUIREMENTSALLOWEXCESSIVEFLEXIBILITYINREPORTINGOFINFORMATIONTHEFIRM,MANAGERSHAVELEEWAYTOREPORTAWIDERANGEOFOUTCOMESFORAGIVENSETOFTRANSACTIONSSECOND,
29、AUDITORSROLE,AMONGOTHERS,ISTOREVIEWTHATTHEREPORTSPREPAREDBYMANAGEMENTAREPREPAREDINAMANNERCONSISTENTWITHTHEREPORTINGRULESALOWQUALITYAUDITFROMANAUDITOR,WHOISNOTINDEPENDENT4FROMTHECLIENTFIRMSMANAGEMENT,ISNOTLIKELYTOSAFEGUARDTHEOWNERSOFTHEFIRMAGAINSTMISREPORTINGFORTUNATELY,AMPLEEMPIRICALEVIDENCESUGGESTS
30、THATDISCLOSURESAREMORECREDIBLEDUETOAUDITINGEG,MCCONOMY1998INASTRONGFINANCIALREPORTINGENVIRONMENT,THERESHOULDBEANOVERLAPBETWEENHIGHQUALITYDISCLOSUREOFFINANCIALINFORMATIONANDHIGHQUALITYDISCLOSUREOFENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONSTRONGERACCOUNTINGRULESWILLRESULTINMORETRUTHFULANDCOMPLETEREPORTINGSUCHREPORTINGW
31、ILLINCLUDEWHEREAPPROPRIATE,DISCLOSUREOFRELEVANTENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONIFITIMPACTSHOWINVESTORSSHOULDVIEWFINANCIALRESULTSWHILEACCOUNTINGDISCLOSURERULESMAYAFFECTTHEREQUIREDAMOUNTOFENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURES,THENATUREOFTHEACCOUNTINGDISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTSWILLIMPACTTHEAMOUNTOFENVIRONMENTALINFORMATIONACTUAL
32、LYDISCLOSEDFOREXAMPLE,WHILETHEUSISVIEWEDASHAVINGHIGHQUALITYRULESGOVERNINGAUDITINGANDACCOUNTING,ITISNOTAPRIORICLEARWHETHERENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESSHOULDBEHIGHERORLOWERINTHEUSTHANINOTHERCOUNTRIESONTHEONEHAND,ACCOUNTINGRULESCANMAKEADIFFERENCETHESECHASDELEGATEDTHEAUTHORITYTOMAKEACCOUNTINGRULESTOAPRIVATE
33、STANDARDSETTER,CURRENTLYTHEFINANCIALACCOUNTINGSTANDARDSBOARDFASBUNDERSFASNO5,ACCOUNTINGFORCONTINGENCIES,THEFASBREQUIRESTHATPUBLICFIRMSRECORDACONTINGENTLIABILITYONTHEIRBALANCESHEETSFORENVIRONMENTALEXPOSUREIFTHEEVENTIS“PROBABLEANDREASONABLYESTIMABLE”INCONTRAST,PUBLICFIRMSINTHEEUROPEANUNIONPREPARETHEIR
34、FINANCIALSTATEMENTSUSINGINTERNATIONALFINANCIALREPORTINGSTANDARDSIFRSUNDERIFRS,FIRMSREPORTACONTINGENTLIABILITYONTHEIRBALANCESHEETSIFTHEEVENTIS“MORELIKELYTHANNOTANDESTIMABLE”THEINTERPRETATIONOFTHETERM“PROBABLE”USEDINTHEUSACCOUNTINGRULESUSGAAPISTHATTHEPROBABILITYISMORETHAN80OR90PERCENT,WHILE“MORELIKELY
35、THANNOT”ISINTERPRETEDTOBEMORETHAN50PERCENTCONSEQUENTLY,EUROPEANFIRMSAREREQUIREDTOESTIMATETHECOSTOUTFLOWSANUNCERTAINEVENTTHATISESTIMATEDTOOCCURWITHINA50TO70PERCENTPROBABILITYRANGEEVENTHOUGHTHESAMEEVENTWOULDNOTREQUIRERECORDINGINTHEBALANCESHEETFORAUSCOMPANYONTHEOTHERHAND,USREGULATORSMAYENFORCETHERULESM
36、ORESTRICTLYTHANTHEIRFOREIGNCOUNTERPARTSTHETHIRDINSTITUTIONISTHELEGALSYSTEMINPLACETOENFORCEEXISTINGLAWSANDRULESANDDEVELOPNEWLAWSANDRULESASNEEDEDTHESELEGALSYSTEMSAFFECTINCENTIVESFACEDBYBOTHMANAGEMENTANDAUDITORSINRECENTYEARS,CORPORATEGOVERNANCEHASRECEIVEDALOTOFATTENTIONINTHEMEDIAANDINTHEEVOLUTIONOFLAWS
37、FOREXAMPLE,IN5THEUS,THESARBANESOXLEYACTOF2002REQUIRES,AMONGOTHERS,ASECTION404AUDITOFINTERNALCONTROLSANDTHATCHIEFEXECUTIVEOFFICERSANDCHIEFFINANCIALOFFICERSSIGNTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSANDINCREASEDTHEIREXPOSURETOLEGALLIABILITYINADDITION,IFALEGALSYSTEMISAMBIGUOUSINASSIGNINGPENALTIESTOAUDITORS,ITCANAFFECTT
38、HEAUDITORSINCENTIVESTOPROVIDEAHIGHQUALITYAUDITSEESCHWARTZ,1998SIGNIFICANTVARIATIONEXISTSINLEGALSYSTEMSACROSSCOUNTRIESWETHUSARGUETHATACOUNTRYLEVELANALYSISOFVARIATIONINREPORTEDENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESSHOULDCONTROLFORLEGALINSTITUTIONSOURCOUNTRYLEVELAPPROACHISSIMILARTOTHATOFRECENTPAPERSINECONOMICS,FINAN
39、CE,ANDACCOUNTINGINCLUDINGBARRO1991,LAPORTA,LOPEZDESILANES,SHLEIFERANDVISHNY1998,1999,BUSHMANANDSMITH2001,BATTACHARYA,DAOUKANDWELKER2003,ANDCLAYTON,JORGENSENANDKAVAJECZ2006INPARTICULAR,LAPORTAETAL1998DOCUMENTVARIATIONINLEGALTRADITIONSAROUNDTHEWORLDTHEYCLASSIFYCOUNTRIESINTOCOMMONORCIVILLAWANDFURTHERCL
40、ASSIFYCIVILLAWCOUNTRIESBASEDONLEGALORIGINBEINGFRENCH,GERMAN,ANDSCANDINAVIANTHEYFINDTHATFIRMSWITHCOMMONLAWOFFERMOREPROTECTIONTOSHAREHOLDERS,BUTTHATCIVILLAWCOUNTRIESDEVELOPOTHERSUBSTITUTEMECHANISMSCOLLECTIVELY,THESESTUDIESDOCUMENTCROSSCOUNTRYVARIATIONBETWEENINSTITUTIONALCHARACTERISTICSANDFIRMSDECISION
41、SREGARDINGCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,INVESTORSDECISIONSREGARDINGDISPERSIONOFOWNERSHIP,ANDGOVERNMENTSDECISIONSREGARDINGREGULATIONANDTRADINGOFSECURITIESOURCONTRIBUTIONISTOEXAMINEHOWTHESEINSTITUTIONALFACTORSIMPACTENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSURESBJORNNJORGENSEN,NAOMISSODERSTROMENVIRONMENTALDISCLOSUR
42、EWITHINLEGALANDACCOUNTINGCONTEXTSANINTEMATIONALPERSPECTIVEZLEEDSSCHOOLOFBUSINESSRESEARCHPAPERSERIES,JUNE20081296译文在法律和会计范围的环境信息披露国际视野工业活动对环境产生很大的影响。最近有关全球变暖和温室气体排放的新兴贸易市场加强了在企业环境活动和影响中相关利益者的利益。针对这一利益增长情况各个公司和国家各不相同，对世界上大部分而言，环境报告已发展为自愿（例如像全球财报主动一样通过自愿性标准），一些国家已经通过立法强制企业进行环境报告（例如丹麦的绿色账户，要求详述原材料的利用情况和
43、废物的产生）。本文的第一个目的是记录在国际环境信息披露中的多样性。我们记录法律渊源（有可能的话，他的殖民权利统治历史）在管理者的环境信息披露报告中与国家的变异程度相联系。我们也探讨了环境信息披露报告和一般水平的环境规章制度之间的联系。我们发现较严的环境法是和较高水平的环境报告披露相联系的。最后我们把环境信息披露和另一个公司信息披露的普通类型相联系会计信息披露。会计信息披露对于环境信息披露提供了一个有趣的对比，因为跟会计信息披露相联系的精确规则因国家不同而各不相同，有个会计信息披露较长的传统和很多国家有一些规定的会计信息披露形式。我们在环境信息披露报告水平和会计信息披露监管水平之间找到了一个强有
44、力的关系。之前在个别国家的环境信息披露调查包括澳大利亚（泰特，2001），加拿大（李，查理德森和桑顿，1997；麦克诺密和李，1999），芬兰（尼斯克和尼尔迈，2001），德国（考迈，麦格纳和维森文，2005），西班牙（拉瑞纳咖，卡拉斯科，科雷亚，雷纳和莫内瓦，2002），英国（凯贝尔，2004）和美国（派特，2002）。例如麦克诺密和李（1999）调查早期实行环境信息披露作为一个自愿披露的例子。他们发现石油和天然气以及矿业公司包括未来的估计以及流动负债搬迁和现场恢复费用的市场估值。派特2002记录了环境绩效和环境信息披露之间的负相关关系。其他研究比较小的国家截面环境信息披露，例如奈奎斯特（2
45、003）考察斯堪的纳维亚国家和艾瑟瑞（2003），其样本包括12个国家。虽然很多重要简介已经从这文献中得到，但是没有任何一篇文献考虑环境信息披露和其他信息披露以及一般法律机构之间的关系。因此，相对于以前的研究中，我们运用大截面国家提供了这些关系的初步证据。我们另一个研究力量是，先前的文献研究都集中在发达国家，而我们的样本包括发展中国家和新兴的市场。7这些市场构成了世界人口的很大比例同时也对全球范围内的日益增长的污染负有责任。本文的其余部分组织如下第二部分进行文献回顾及我们的理论发展，第三部分描述了我们的数据，第四部分陈述我们的结果，第五部分为总结。2文献回顾及理论发展公众从很多渠道收到有关于企
46、业环境风险的信息，有来自于包括媒体的、监管部门的和管理当局的。管理者所做的披露，有些是强制的，而其他的有些披露是自愿的，抑或是由管理决定的。在美国，很少有财务会计准则处理环境会计信息披露活动/负债。在20世纪90年代，初级会计准则处理环境问题的有包括财务会计准则公告SFAS第五号声明，处理偶然事件的会计和与石棉修复费用相关的披露的要求的修复费用紧急问题工作组EITF）8913石棉清理成本的会计处理和其他补救支出EITF908处理环境污染成本的资本化支出。在20世纪90年代初，美国证券交易委员会SEC开始关注在财务报表中缺乏环境披露的问题。美国证券交易委员会发出的员工会计公告SAB，增加了在提交
47、给美国证券委员会中关于管理层讨论和分析部分的财务报告的披露要求（针对于上市公司）。需要额外披露的包括SAB92下延伸出去的103条目，它要求公司说明其法律事项（这包括行政和法律活动，可能会影响公司或其附属机构的拟待未决诉讼），303条目要求讨论任何已知的趋势或任何已知的要求，承诺，事件或不确定性等可能影响注册人在资产流动性方面；财务报告公布36规定，当管理层无法确定一个重大影响是“不合理可能”发生时要求进行披露。大量的文献记载了企业报告中关于环境的相关价值意义，从某种程度上讲，公司股票价格的变动与公司的环境风险信息披露有关联。研究探讨了股票市场价值与环境披露之间的关系是否要进行单独的报告披露（
48、例如，休斯2000），或在财务报表附注中进行披露（例如，克拉克森,李和查理德森2004），或者作为环境负债在上市公司的资产负债表中进行披露（例如，巴特和麦克尼克罗斯1994麦克诺密和李1999；百利2005）。报告环境披露的有关价值以不足为奇，披露环境负债以越来越重要了。考虑一下，例如与核退役相关的费用，对于现在的核电厂的运行而言，其未来的清理费用是可以预见的，当然也是相当可观的（德苏尔扎,杰克比尔和苏德斯蒂姆2000报告了一个有意义的计划，那就是每个工厂的清理费用超过了300万美元）。尽管当前的现金流量受到影响，8财务会计准则143，即资产报废退休义务的会计要求企业在最初开始进行运作时所招致
49、的负债，在这种情况下要把它记录为一项负债（见德苏尔扎和苏德斯蒂姆2000）。在财务报表中要求披露的环境问题因国家而异。例如，美国通用会计准则在排放量方面的信息披露及交易津贴是没有规定的，按照国际财务报告准则IFRS,国际会计标准IAS20要求从政府部门获得的补贴作为津贴进行确认。会计监管不是环境信息的唯一来源，各种法律报告和法规加强了对企业的要求，而且这之中的很多信息是可被公众所利用的。例如在美国，1986年的紧急规划和社区的权利认识法EPCRA创建的有毒物质清单，它要求每个制造工厂向公众准备详尽的有关有毒物质排放的年度报告。在丹麦，一些行业面临着强制性被要求披露原材料的使用和浪费性的生产的环境报告（未经审计）为了评估调控，任何环境信息披露的影响，有一点该考虑到的是什么样的环境报告披露会主动出现在相关法令法规缺乏的情况下。李，查理德森和斯儿腾1997从黛儿那做了两个假设来刺激自愿的进行环境信息披露。首先，一些投资者在一个企业的管理者对环境风险不了解的情况下指定了几种可能的情况，第二，管理者可以令人信服的披露环境风险，但不能可信的透露她/他是不了解情况的（即使是真的）。该预测来自于一下的两个假设当风险小的时候通知经理将如实的披露他们的环保责任；但是当风险很大的时候，他们却有动力不透露其环境负债。一个缺乏环境信息披露的报告能够因此而意味着该公司没有
