1、本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目HOWTOTACKLEDEBTRESTRUCTURINGINEMERGINGMARKETS/MAPPINGTHEDANGERSOFDEBTRESTRUCTURING外文出处国际金融法律评论/国际税务回顾外文作者卡格曼史蒂文/克隆普赫仑纳原文HOWTOTACKLEDEBTRESTRUCTURINGINEMERGINGMARKETSTHEPRESENTSLOWDOWNINTHEGLOBALECONOMYHASFOCUSEDRENEWEDATTENTIONONTHEISSUEOFRESTRUCTURINGTROUBLEDLOANSINEMERGINGMARKETS
2、DEBTRESTRUCTURINGSINTHESEMARKETSOFTENREPRESENTAUNIQUEAMALGAMOFLEGAL,BUSINESS,FINANCIALANDSTRATEGICISSUESTRYINGTOMAKETIMELYINTHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESSMANYEMERGINGMARKETRESTRUCTURINGSCAN,FORVARIOUSREASONS,EASILYTAKEAFEWYEARSTOCOMPLETE,ANDTHECREDITORSANDDEBTORMAYHAVESHARPLYDIVERGENTPERSPECTIVESONWHETHERI
3、TISINTHEIRFUNDAMENTALINTERESTTOACHIEVEARELATIVELYQUICKSOLUTIONITISNOTUNCOMMONINRESTRUCTURINGSITUATIONSFORDEBTORSTOBELIEVETHATTIMEISONTHEIRSIDE,ANDTHISPERCEPTIONONTHEPARTOFDEBTORSISOFTENGROUNDEDINREALITYBYCONTRAST,THECREDITORSMAYGENERALLYVIEWTIMEASTHEIRENEMYSINCEMANYRESTRUCTURINGSINVOLVESOMEFORMOFDEB
4、TSERVICEMORATORIUMORDEBTSTANDSTILL,THECREDITORSWILLBEANXIOUSTOREACHARESTRUCTURINGSOLUTIONASPROMPTLYASPOSSIBLETHECREDITORSOBVIOUSLYWILLWANTTHEIRDEBTSERVICEPAYMENTSTORESUMEATTHEEARLIESTPOSSIBLEDATETHEDEBTOR,ONTHEOTHERHAND,MAYBELESSMOTIVATEDTOKEEPTHEPROCESSMOVINGFORWARDWITHANYTYPEOFALACRITYASSUMINGTHAT
5、ITCANCONTINUETOMEETITSWORKINGCAPITALANDOTHERBASICNEEDSANDOTHERWISECONTINUETOFUNCTIONASAGOINGCONCERN,SOMEDEBTORSMAYBEPERFECTLYCONTENTTOMAINTAINADEBTSERVICEMORATORIUMORDEBTSTANDSTILLBYFOREGOINGDEBTSERVICEPAYMENTS,THEDEBTORMAYBEABLETOACCUMULATESOMECASHONHAND,WHICHMAYWELLBEBEYONDTHEREACHORCONTROLOFTHECR
6、EDITORSUNDERSUCHCIRCUMSTANCES,ITISNOTINCONCEIVABLETHATCERTAINDEBTORSMAYTHEREFOREBERELATIVELYUNINTERESTEDINACTIVELYPURSUINGANDREACHINGARESTRUCTURINGSOLUTIONWITHTHEIRCREDITORSHOWEVER,ITSHOULDBENOTEDTHATCERTAINLYNOTALLDEBTORSWILLBEHAVETHISWAYDEBTORS,FOREXAMPLE,THATAREGENUINELYCONCERNEDABOUTTHEIRLONGTER
7、MREPUTATIONALINTERESTSAND,INPARTICULAR,THEIRABILITYTOTAPTHECAPITALANDCREDITMARKETSINTHEFUTUREMAYTAKEALESSCAVALIERATTITUDETOWARDSADVANCINGTHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESSTIMETABLESINLIGHTOFTHESEPOSSIBLYDIVERGENTPERSPECTIVESBETWEENTHECREDITORSANDDEBTORONTHEURGENCYOFTHERESTRUCTURINGTASK,CREDITORSMAYSEEKTOESTABL
8、ISHTIMETABLESFORACCOMPLISHINGKEYMILESTONESINTHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESSIFPOSSIBLE,SUCHTIMETABLESMAYBEDISCUSSEDWITHANDAGREEDUPONWITHTHEDEBTORTHISPROCESSCOULDINVOLVESOMENEGOTIATIONBETWEENTHETWOSIDESONWHATAREREALISTICDEADLINESANDWHATARETHEIMPORTANTMILESTONESINTHEPROCESSEACHOFTHEMAJORPHASESOFTHERESTRUCTURIN
9、GPROCESSSUCHASTHECREDITORSDUEDILIGENCEINVESTIGATIONOFTHEDEBTOR,NEGOTIATIONOFATERMSHEET,DOCUMENTATIONOFTHERESTRUCTURINGDEALAND,FINALLY,CLOSINGTHEDEALWILLHAVEITSOWNMAJORMILESTONESFORINSTANCE,INTHEDUEDILIGENCEPHASEOFTHEPROCESS,SOMEOFTHERELEVANTMILESTONESMAYINCLUDE,AMONGOTHERTHINGS,THEFOLLOWINGITEMS1NEG
10、OTIATINGANDSIGNINGCONFIDENTIALITYAGREEMENTSBETWEENSTEERINGCOMMITTEEMEMBERSANDTHEIROUTSIDEADVISERS,ONTHEONEHAND,ANDTHEDEBTOR,ONTHEOTHERHAND2AGREEINGONANAPPROPRIATESCOPEOFWORKFORTHEDUEDILIGENCEINVESTIGATIONWHICHWILLLIKELYBEUNDERTAKENBYAFINANCIALADVISERTOTHESTEERINGCOMMITTEEAND3RECEIVINGSPECIFIEDFINANC
11、IALANDBUSINESSINFORMATIONFROMTHEDEBTOR,SUCHASBUSINESSPLANS,CASHFLOWPROJECTIONS,SALESANDPRICINGINFORMATIONHISTORICALANDPROJECTED,ANDSOFORTHTHEPRESENCEOFAFAIRLYSPECIFICANDDETAILEDTIMETABLEMAYHELPBRINGDISCIPLINETOTHEPROCESSSOTHATITDOESNOTPROCEEDINAHAPHAZARDORDESULTORYFASHIONINADDITION,ATIMELINEMAYHELPT
12、HECREDITORSDETERMINEWHETHERORNOTTHEDEBTORISTRYINGTOADVANCETHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESSORISINSTEADATTEMPTINGTODELIBERATELYDELAYTHEPROCESSINCERTAINRESTRUCTURINGS,CREDITORSWILLNEEDTOASKTHEMSELVESWHETHERTHELACKOFPROGRESSISBASEDONJUSTIFIABLEREASONS,SUCHASTHECOMPLEXITYOFDOCUMENTINGAGIVENRESTRUCTURINGDEALORTHEI
13、NTRICACYOFTHEDEBTORSBUSINESSORGANIZATIONANDSTRUCTURE,ORWHETHERTHEDELAYISANINDICATIONTHATFUNDAMENTALLYTHEDEBTORISNOTNEGOTIATINGINGOODFAITHINTHELATTERCASE,THECREDITORSMAYBEFORCEDTOCOMETOTHECONCLUSIONTHATACONSENSUALRESTRUCTURINGWITHSUCHADEBTORMAYNOTBEAREALISTICORVIABLEOPTIONDETERMININGTHEROLEOFTHECONTR
14、OLLINGSHAREHOLDERINTHERESTRUCTUREDCOMPANYMANYEMERGINGMARKETRESTRUCTURINGSINVOLVETHEPHENOMENONOFTHESOCALLEDCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDER,MEANINGTHESHAREHOLDERTHATHOLDSACONTROLLINGINTERESTINTHEDEBTORCOMPANYTHESECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSMAYREPRESENTINFLUENTIALFAMILYINTERESTSINTHEHOSTCOUNTRYSUCHSHAREHOLDERSMAYNO
15、TONLYHOLDALARGEANDCONTROLLINGEQUITYSTAKEINTHEDEBTORCOMPANY,BUTVARIOUSMEMBERSOFTHEFAMILYOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERMAYALSOOCCUPYANUMBEROFTHEKEYMANAGEMENTPOSITIONSWITHTHEDEBTORINSHORT,INANUMBEROFEMERGINGMARKETJURISDICTIONS,THEREMAYBENOCLEARDEMARCATIONBETWEENOWNERSHIPANDMANAGEMENTOFCERTAINDEBTORSGIVENT
16、HEUNIQUEROLEOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSINCERTAINRESTRUCTURINGS,THECREDITORSMAYBELIEVE,CORRECTLYOROTHERWISE,THATAFAIRAMOUNTOFTHEDEBTORSFINANCIALTRAVAILSCANBEATTRIBUTEDTOTHEMISMANAGEMENTOFTHECOMPANYSAFFAIRSBYTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERASARESULT,INTHERESTRUCTURINGPROCESS,THECREDITORSMAYINITIALLYBEINTERE
17、STEDINGRAFTINGARESTRUCTURINGPLANTHATINVOLVESTHEREMOVALOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERFROMANYCONTINUINGROLEINMANAGEMENTFUNDAMENTALLY,THECREDITORSMAYBELIEVETHATTHEYAREFACEDWITHASIMPLEBINARYCHOICENAMELY,TOKEEPEXISTINGMANAGEMENTORTOHAVEEXISTINGMANAGEMENTFORCEDOUTOFTHECOMPANYYET,INREALITYANDTOTHEIRPOSSIBLEDI
18、SMAY,THECREDITORSMAYBECONFRONTEDWITHMUCHLESSOFACLEARCUTCHOICETHANAPPEARSATFIRSTBLUSHCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSINMANYINSTANCES,THECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSMAYBEDEEPLYENTRENCHEDANDHENCEVERYDIFFICULTTOREMOVEFROMTHEIRDOMINANTPOSITIONATTHEDEBTORCOMPANYASTHEASIANDEVELOPMENTBANKNOTEDINA1999REPORTONINSOLVENCYLAW
19、ISSUESINTHEASIANPACIFICREGION,THEOWNERSOFFINANCIALLYDISTRESSEDCORPORATIONSAREOFTENDRIVENBYAFEAROFLOSSOFCONTROLOFTHECORPORATIONTHESAMEOBSERVATIONCOULDBEAPPLIEDWITHEQUALFORCETOCERTAINEMERGINGMARKETSINOTHERPARTSOFTHEWORLDASIMILARPOINTRELATINGTOINSOLVENCYPROCEEDINGSWASMADERECENTLYBYSAMUELTOBING,CHIEFOPE
20、RATINGOFFICEROFTHEINDONESIANBASEDJAKARTAINITIATIVETASKFORCE,INJULY2002PRESENTATIONTOANASIAPACIFICECONOMICCONFERENCESYMPOSIUMHESAID“ITSHOULDBENOTEDTHATINCERTAINEMERGINGECONOMIES,CORPORATEASSETSARECONCENTRATEDINTHEHANDSOFASMALLNUMBEROFWELLCONNECTEDINDIVIDUALSORFAMILIESWHENFACEDWITHTHELOSSOFOWNERSHIP,T
21、HESEGROUPSMAYSEEKTOEXERTTHEIRINFLUENCETOFRUSTRATETHEOPERATIONOFTHEINSOLVENCYSYSTEM”GIVENTHEATTITUDESDESCRIBEDABOVE,CERTAINCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSINVOLVEDINRESTRUCTURINGSITUATIONSMAYBEUNWILLINGTOAGREETOANDINDEEDMAYPOSSIBLYEVENTRYTOSCUTTLEANYRESTRUCTURINGPLANTHATWOULDHAVETHEEFFECTOFREMOVINGTHEMFROMPOW
22、ERINTHEMANAGEMENTSTRUCTUREOFTHEDEBTORCOMPANYHOWEVER,IFITISCLEARTHATTHECREDITORSWILLBEUNABLETOREMOVETHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSFROMMANAGEMENT,THECREDITORSASPARTOFTHERESTRUCTURINGPLANMAYNEVERTHELESSTRYTOINSTITUTEARANGEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSSUCHREFORMSMAYBEDESIGNEDTOLIMITANDCONTROLTHEPOWERANDINFLU
23、ENCEOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSINTHERESTRUCTUREDCOMPANYCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSSPECIFICALLY,AMONGARANGEOFSUCHPOSSIBLECORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMS,THECREDITORSMAYTRYTORECONFIGURETHECOMPANYSBOARDOFDIRECTORSANDITSCOMMITTEESTRUCTUREFOREXAMPLE,THECREDITORSMAYSEEKTOHAVEINDEPENDENTDIRECTORSPLAYAGREATERROL
24、E,ANDTHEYMAYSEEKTOHAVECERTAINBOARDCOMMITTEES,SUCHASTHEAUDITCOMMITTEE,HAVEDIRECTOVERSIGHTOVERCERTAINMANAGEMENTFUNCTIONSTHECREDITORSMAYBEAIDEDINTHEIREFFORTSATSUCHCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMBYCHANGESINTHELOCALCORPORATEANDSECURITIESLAWFORINSTANCE,INMEXICO,RECENTCHANGESTOTHESECURITIESLAWSREQUIRETHEESTABLIS
25、HMENTOFINDEPENDENTAUDITCOMMITTEESFORPUBLICCOMPANIESINADDITION,THECREDITORSMAYSEEKGREATERINTERNALMANAGEMENTANDAUDITCONTROLSINCERTAINKEYAREASOFTHEDEBTORSOPERATIONSSUCHASINTHEFINANCEFUNCTIONSOFTHEDEBTORBYWAYOFEXAMPLE,THECREDITORSMAYATTEMPTTOIMPOSEGREATERCONTROLOVERTHEPROCESSBYWHICHCOMPANYOFFICIALSCANAP
26、PROVEDISBURSEMENTSANDSIGNCHEQUES,PARTICULARLYFORDISBURSEMENTSOVERSPECIFIEDDOLLARTHRESHOLDSTHECREDITORSMAYALSOSEEKTOSUBJECTCERTAINTYPESOFTRANSACTIONS,SUCHASRELATEDPARTYTRANSACTIONSORMAJORCORPORATETRANSACTIONSINCLUDINGPROPOSEDMERGERS,ACQUISITIONSORASSETDISPOSITIONS,TOSUPERMAJORITYAPPROVALREQUIREMENTSB
27、YTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSORTHESHAREHOLDERS,ASTHECASEMAYBESUCHPROPOSEDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSSHOULDBECAREFULLYANALYZEDBYLOCALCOUNSELTOENSURETHATTHEYARECONSISTENTWITHTHELOCALCORPORATEANDSECURITIESLAWSINSUM,INANUMBEROFEMERGINGMARKETRESTRUCTURINGS,THECREDITORSMAYBEFACEDWITHTHEUNPLEASANTBUTSTUBBORNREALITYT
28、HATTHEYWILLNOTBEABLETOREMOVETHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERFROMMANAGEMENTORELIMINATETHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSCONTINUEDEQUITYCONTROLOFTHEDEBTORTHECREDITORSMAYTHEREFOREHAVETOSHIFTTHEIRFOCUSTODEVELOPINGANAPPROACHFORARESTRUCTURINGPLANTHATSEEKSTOCONTAINANDCIRCUMSCRIBETHEPOWERANDINFLUENCEOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREH
29、OLDERSINTHERESTRUCTUREDCOMPANYASDISCUSSEDABOVE,THEYMAYTRYTOACCOMPLISHTHISOBJECTIVEBYATTEMPTINGTOINSTITUTEVARIOUSCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSASPARTOFTHEOVERALLRESTRUCTURINGPLANYET,INPURSUINGCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMS,THECREDITORSMAYENCOUNTERSTRONGRESISTANCEIFTHEPROPOSEDREFORMSWOULDHAVETHEEFFECTOFSTRIPP
30、INGTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSOFMOREPOWERTHANTHEYAREWILLINGTOGIVEUPCONSEQUENTLY,THEREMAYBECONSIDERABLETENSIONBETWEENTHECORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSTHATTHECREDITORSMAYBESEEKING,ONTHEONEHAND,ANDTHELIMITEDAMOUNTOFPOWERTHATTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSMAYBEWILLINGTOGIVEUP,ONTHEOTHERHANDTHISTENSIONISANIMPORTAN
31、TSUBSTANTIVEMATTERTHATWILLHAVETOBEADDRESSEDINTHECONTEXTOFTHEOVERALLRESTRUCTURINGDISCUSSIONSANDNEGOTIATIONSBETWEENTHECREDITORSANDTHEDEBTORITSHOULDBENOTED,HOWEVER,THATTHEMANNERINWHICHTHISTENSIONISADDRESSEDANDRESOLVEDCOULDHAVEASPILLOVEREFFECTONHOWTHERESTOFTHERESTRUCTURINGNEGOTIATIONPROGRESSESTHEBREADTH
32、ANDSCOPEOFPROPOSEDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSMAYPOSSIBLYAFFECTHOWTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERVIEWSTHERESTOFTHERESTRUCTURINGPACKAGE,INCLUDINGTHEPROPOSEDECONOMICTERMSOFANYRESTRUCTURINGDEALIFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERVIEWSTHEPROPOSEDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSASBEINGOVERLYRESTRICTIVE,THISCOULDPOSSIBLYHAVEADA
33、MPENINGEFFECTONTHEEAGERNESSANDWILLINGNESSOFTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERTOCLOSEARESTRUCTURINGDEALITSELFINSUCHCIRCUMSTANCES,THECREDITORSMAYBEFORCEDTOCONSIDERHOWINTEGRALTHEPROPOSEDCORPORATEGOVERNANCEREFORMSARETOTHEOVERALLRESTRUCTURINGDEALTHECREDITORSMAYTHEREFOREBEFACEDWITHADIFFICULTCHOICEONEPOSSIBILITYIST
34、HATTHECREDITORSMAYBEWILLINGTOWALKAWAYFROMTHEPROPOSEDOVERALLRESTRUCTURINGDEALORCONSIDERTHEPOSSIBILITYOFDOINGSOIF,INTHECOURSEOFTHENEGOTIATIONS,THEYCANNOTACHIEVEALLOREVENMOSTOFTHEIRIMPORTANTCORPORATEGOVERNANCEOBJECTIVESANOTHERPOSSIBILITYISTHATTHECREDITORSMAYBEWILLINGTOMAKECERTAINCOMPROMISESONCORPORATEG
35、OVERNANCEISSUESTHATAREDEMANDEDBYTHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERANDACCEPTWHATMAYBEA“LESSTHANPERFECT”CORPORATEGOVERNANCESTRUCTUREINTHEINTERESTOFREACHINGAGREEMENTON,ANDTHENULTIMATELYCLOSING,ANOVERALLRESTRUCTURINGDEALHOWEVER,WHETHERCOMPROMISEONSUCHISSUESISANACCEPTABLECOURSEOFACTIONMAYBEVIEWEDDIFFERENTLYBYVARI
36、OUSCREDITORSWITHINTHECREDITORBODYFORCERTAINCREDITORS,CORPORATEGOVERNANCEISSUESMAYINVOLVEIMPORTANTISSUESOFPRINCIPLEANDPHILOSOPHY,ANDTHISMAYAFFECTTHEIRWILLINGNESSTOCOMPROMISEONTHESEISSUESMOREOVER,SOMECREDITORSMAYVIEWCERTAINCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISSUES,SUCHASHAVINGINPLACEANEFFECTIVESYSTEMOFCASHCONTROLS,AS
37、HAVINGACRITICALIMPACTONWHETHERTHEECONOMICSOFTHERESTRUCTURINGDEALCANBEACHIEVEDOVERTIMETHIS,TOO,MAYAFFECTHOWWILLINGSUCHCREDITORSARETOCOMPROMISEONTHEOTHERHAND,THEREMAYBECERTAINCREDITORSWHO,FORVARIOUSREASONS,PLACERELATIVELYLESSIMPORTANCEONCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISSUESINSHORT,THEPOSSIBILITYOFDIVERGENTVIEWSWI
38、THINTHECREDITORBODYONTHERELATIVEIMPORTANCEOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCEISSUESTOTHEATTRACTIVENESSANDACCEPTABILITYOFTHEOVERALLRESTRUCTURINGDEALISAMATTERTHATWILLNEEDTOBEADDRESSEDANDDISCUSSEDWITHINTHECREDITORBODYINGENERALANDTHESTEERINGCOMMITTEEINPARTICULARINANUMBEROFEMERGINGMARKETJURISDICTIONS,CREDITORSMAYPREFE
39、RTOPURSUEANOUTOFCOURTRESTRUCTURINGSOLUTIONPRECISELYBECAUSETHELOCALINSOLVENCYLAWREGIMEMAYBEUNFAVORABLETOCREDITORSTHECREDITORSMAYBEFACEDWITHTHEUNPLEASANTBUTSTUBBORNREALITYTHATTHEYCANNOTREMOVETHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERFROMMANAGEMENTORELIMINATETHECONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSCONTINUEDEQUITYCONTROLOFTHEDEBTOR资料
40、来源KARGMANSTEVENINTERNATIONALFINANCIALLAWREVIEW,2002P4145译文在新兴市场如何处理债务重组目前全球经济增长放缓，人们将注意力重新集中在新兴市场的结构调整贷款。债务重组在这些市场往往是一个独特的混合法律、商业、金融和战略问题。要及时调整过程许多新兴市场重组，由于种种原因，很容易数年才能完成，而债权人和债务人在是否符合他们的根本利益上可能有不同的观点，实现相对快速的解决方案。这是常见的结构调整情况，债务人相信时间是在他们一边的，这种认识，债务人往往是基于现实。相比之下，债权人一般视时间为他们的敌人。由于许多债务重组涉及到一些服务暂停或暂停偿债的形
41、式，债权人会急着尽快达成一项重组方案。债权人显然希望债务人能在尽可能早的日期还本付息。债务人，另一方面，可能不会想去尽快的还本付息。假设它能够继续满足其营运资金及其他基本需要，否则继续作为一个持续经营，有些债务人可以完全满足于维持暂停偿债或债务停顿。通过上述偿还债务的，债务人可以积累一些现金，这很可能达到或超出了债权人的控制。在这种情况下，不难想象，有些债务人，因此可能对积极寻求和达成与债权人的重组方案比较感兴趣。然而，应该注意到，并非所有债务人都是这样的。例如，债务人是真正关心他们的长远利益和声誉，尤其是他们能够利用资本和信贷市场在未来可能采取较少傲慢的态度来推进结构调整过程。时间表鉴于这些
42、可能存在不同观点的债权人和债务人对时间的紧迫性，在重组过程中债权人可以要求建立关键的还债时间表。如果可能的话，债权人会跟债务人讨论并确定这个时间表。这个过程可能涉及到双方之间的一些现实的还债截止日期是什么，以及对于确定时间表的谈判。每个改组过程中的主要阶段如债权人对债务人的尽职调查，谈判的投资条件清单，处理文档的结构调整，并最终完成交易将有它自己的时间表。例如，在尽职调查阶段的过程中，有关的时间表可能包括，除其他外，下列各项（1）谈判和签署的指导委员会成员和他们的外部顾问的保密协议（2）达成尽职调查工作的适当范围（这将有可能是由一个财务顾问的指导委员会）（3）从债务人那接受特定的金融和商业信息
43、，如商业计划、现金流量预测、销售和价格信息历史和预测等等。一个非常具体和详细的时间表可能给重组进程带来极大的帮助。此外，时间表可以帮助债权人了解债务人是在努力推动重组进程，还是企图故意拖延这一进程。在某些重组中，债权人需要问自己缺乏进展是否有正当理由，如记录某一重组交易的复杂性或债务人的企业组织结构，复杂或者是否延迟，基于迹象显示债务人没有谈判的诚意。在后一种情况下，债权人可能被迫得出结论，一个拥有这样一个共识性重组债务人可能不是一个现实的或可行的选择。确定重组公司的控股股东的作用许多新兴市场重组涉及到所谓的控股股东的现象，股东持有该债务人公司的控股权。这些控股股东不仅持有该公司的大量控股权，
44、同时也可能占据了很多主要的管理职位。总之，在很多新兴市场地区，某些债务人没有考虑到控股股东的独特作用。在某些重组中，债权人可以相信，一个债务人的财务困难时期可以归因于该公司的事务由控股股东的管理不善所致。因此，在重组过程中，债权人最初可能有兴趣嫁接重组计划，包括取消任何控股股东的继续管理职能。从根本上讲，债权人可以相信他们面对的是一个简单的二元选择，即保持现有的管理或为了现有的管理被迫离开公司。然而，现实可能会让他失望，债权人在现实中往往面临很明确的选择。控股股东在许多情况下，控股股东可能是根深蒂固的，因此很难要求他们除去在债务人公司的主导地位。在1999年，亚洲及太平洋地区的一份报告中指出了
45、亚洲开发银行破产法的问题，那就是陷入财务困境的公司的业主往往带动了该公司失去控制的恐惧。然而，很明显，如果债权人不能取消控股股东的管理，债权人的重组计划中可尝试建立一系列的公司治理改革。这些改革可能是旨在限制和控制股权重组的力量和有影响力的控股股东。公司治理改革具体来说，其中一个可能的公司治理改革方案，债权人可以尝试重新配置公司的董事会和其委员会结构。例如，债权人可以要求有独立董事发挥更大的作用，它们可能寻求有一定的董事会委员会，如审计委员会，拥有一定的管理职能的直接监督。在当地公司和证券法律的帮助下，债权人可以通过他们的努力改变公司的治理改革。例如，在墨西哥，证券法要求为公司建立独立的审计委
46、员会。此外,债权人可以寻求更大的内部管理和审计控制。债权人也可以寻求到某些类型的交易主体，如关联交易或重大交易，包括提出企业兼并，收购或资产处置，由董事会或股东会以绝对多数批准的规定，视情况而定。这样的公司治理改革建议应认真分析，以确保他们与当地公司和证券法是一致的。总之，在一些新兴的市场结构调整，债权人可能会面对不愉快的现实，他们将无法取消控股股东的管理控制职能。因此，债权人可以向他们的重点转移到发展一个重组计划，旨在遏制和限定控股股东在该公司的权力和影响力。如上所述,他们可以尝试为完成这一目标而建立公司治理改革的整体重组计划。然而，在推行公司治理改革，债权人可能会遇到强大的阻力，如果改革的
47、建议将会剥夺控股股东权力，他们更愿意放弃。因此，公司治理改革有可能会弄的相当紧张，债权人可能会寻求一方面，而权力有限的控股股东可能愿意放弃另一方面。这种紧张关系是一个重要的实质性问题，将要在债务人和债权人之间整体讨论和谈判。应该指出的是，用这种方式解决问题，这种紧张可能影响重组的谈判进展。拟议的公司治理改革可能会影响到控股股东的其他意见的结构调整方案,包括经济方面的任何调整。如果控股股东提出的公司治理改革意见过于受限制，就有可能带来消极作用，使控股股东关闭交易本身。在这种情况下，债权人可能被迫考虑如何组成的公司治理改革的建议是整体改制协议。因此，债权人可能会面临一个艰难的选择，一种可能性是，债
48、权人可能愿意离开整体重组交易（或考虑这样做）如果在谈判过程中，他们不能实现所有或甚至大部分的公司治理的重要目标。另一种可能性是,债权人可能愿意作出某些妥协的公司治理问题，并接受了可能是一个“低于完美”在利益上达成一致的公司治理结构，然后妥协最终收盘，整体改制协议。然而，对于某些债权人，公司治理问题可能涉及原则和哲学的重要问题，这可能会影响他们愿意在这些问题上作出妥协。此外，一些债权人可以查看某些公司治理问题，例如有一个现金控制的有效制度问题，这也可能影响到这些债权人愿意作出妥协。另一方面，可能有些债权人，由于种种原因，相对不太重视公司的治理问题。总之，持有不同意见的债权人对公司治理问题的观点可能是一个问题，将需要加以处理。在一个司法管辖区的新兴市场，债权人可能更愿意追求一个地地道道的庭外重组解决方案，正是因为当地的破产法制度可能不利于债权人。债权人可能会面对不愉快的现实，他们不能免去控股股东的管理或消除控股股东的股权。资料来源卡格曼史蒂文国际金融法律评论，2002P4145
