1、INVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITSDIRECTORSPOCKETFATPAYPACKETSBYBASSON,DEONFINANCEWEEK,BUTPOLICYHOLDERSDEFICITSNOTYETMADEUPDISCUSSESTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSOFINVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITSIEBINTHESOUTHAFRICATOTALPROFITFOR2003AND2004COMPARISONOFTHETOTALEMOLUMENTSEARNEDBYTHEEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSCONFLICTOFINTERESTBETWEENSH
2、AREHOLDERSANDPOLICYHOLDERSTWOEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSOFINVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITSIEBCIARANWHELANANDADEMDAANUMASHAHUNPURPORTEDLYEARNEDDIRECTORSEMOLUMENTSTOTALLINGR18MINTHEFINANCIALYEARTOMARCH2004IEBWASFORMERLYKNOWNASFEDSURELIFEANDWASAWHOLLYOWNEDSUBSIDIARYOFTHETHENLISTEDFEDSUREIN2001,THISASSURERWASTAKENOVERBY
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5、OTALEMOLUMENTSFOREXECUTIVEDIRECTORSOFR18MWITHWHELANANDANUMASHAHUNSTATEDINTHEDIRECTORSREPORTASTHEONLYEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSIFTHATINFORMATIONISCORRECT,THENEACHEARNSANAVERAGEOFR9M/YEARIEBISACLASSICCASEOFACONFLICTOFINTERESTBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDPOLICYHOLDERSTHECAUSEOFTHEPROBLEMWASINFACTTHETAKEOVER,WITHINVES
6、TECPAYINGTOOMUCHFORIEBTHEACQUISITIONPRICEWASR4,5BN,OFWHICHR250MWASPAIDINCASHANDTHEREMAINDERBYISSUING19,2MINVESTECSHARESCOMPARETHATWITHTHEREMUNERATIONEARNEDBYTHEEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSOFOLDMUTUALPICSWHOLLYOWNEDUNLISTEDSUBSIDIARYOLDMUTUALLIFESATHETHREEEXECUTIVEDIRECTORSRODDYSPARKS,PETERDEBEYERANDMPMOYOTOGE
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8、Y,NORWICHHOLDINGS,WASTAKENOVERBYFEDSUREIN1998,ITWASCLEARTHATNORWICHLIFEHADTOOLITTLECAPITALFINANCEWEEK,24MARCH2000AND1DECEMBER2000THEREMUNERATIONOFIEBSDIRECTORSISRELEVCINTASMANYPOLICYHOLDERSINTHISCOMPANYHAVEHISTORICALLYBEENDISSATISFIEDWITHTHEPOORRETURNSMADEONTHEIRINVESTMENTS，EVENBEFORETHEIEBTAKEOVERW
9、ASFINALISED,INVESTECHADPOUREDR500MOFNEWCAPITALINTOTHECOMPANYAFTERTHEOFFICIALTAKEOVER,ANOTHERR600MFOLLOWEDTHEPOLICYDEBATETHATSTARTEDATEND2004FOCUSEDTHEATTENTIONONSASTHREELARGESTINSURERSALMOSTFORGOTTENINTHISDEBATEISINVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITS,WHICHRANINTOTROUBLEOVERTHEPASTFEWYEARSANDWHOSEPOLICYHOLDERSHAV
10、EGOODREASONTOFEELDISSATISFIEDSOTHETOTALCOSTOFTHEINVESTMENTWASAMASSIVER5,6BNWITHSOMUCHCAPITALINVESTEDINIEB,ITSUNDERSTANDABLEWHYINVESTECWOULDWANTTOGETITSCAPITALBACKASSOONASPOSSIBLEINTHEBANKINGSECTOR,ABANKINGGROUPSRETURNONEQUITYISLOOKEDATVERYCRITICALLYINDECEMBER2000,IEBSEMBEDDEDVALUEWASR2,6BN,WHICHALRE
11、ADYINCLUDEDTHEFIRSTR500MOFNEWCAPITALSOITSACASEOFANASSURERACQUIREDATANALMOSTUNHEARDOFPREMIUMABOVEITSEMBEDDEDVALUETHEOTHERSIDEOFTHECOINISPOLICYHOLDERSINTERESTSTHEYINFACTLOSTOUTSPECTACULARLY,BECAUSEOFTHEDRAMATHATOCCURREDAFTERTHETWOTAKEOVERSINANINSPECTIONIN2003,ADVOCATEFLIPSTANDERANDPROFESSORGEORGEMARXC
12、ONCLUDEDTHATTHEREASONABLEEXPECTATIONSOFPOLICYHOLDERSWERENTMETBETWEEN1999AND2002OFCOURSE,THATINCLUDEDTHEPERIODBEFOREANDAFTERTHETAKEOVERBYINVESTECTHEYALSOSAIDTHATNOTALLPOLICYHOLDERSWEREAFFECTEDEQUALLYATTHETIMEOFTHEIRINSPECTIONTHEYWERESATISFIEDTHATIEBHADTAKENSUFFICIENTPRECAUTIONSTOCOMPENSATEPOLICYHOLDE
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14、ELANSVIEWWASTHATTHELARGEOPERATINGPROFITSEETABLE1ANDTHESUBSEQUENTINCREASEINIEBSNETASSETVALUEWEREVIRTUALLYNEUTRALISEDBYALOSSINEMBEDDEDVALUEASSURERSEMBEDDEDVALUECONSISTSOFNAVANDTHEVALUEOFTHEINFORCEBOOKTHELATTERISTHEDISCOUNTEDVCILUEOFFUTUREPROFITSFROMINSURANCESINCE2001,IEBHASSOLDASIGNIFICANTSHAREOFITSBO
15、OKTOCAPITALALLIANCEANDALSOREINSUREDACONSIDERABLEPORTIONOFITSRISKWITHTHESAMEINSURERTHELOSSINTHEVALUEOFTHEINFORCEBOOKISLARGELYTHERESULTOFTHATITWASCLEARATTHETIMETHATIEBDIDNTWANTTHEPERCEPTIONCREATEDTHATINVESTECWASEARNINGLARGEPROFITSASASHAREHOLDERWHILEPOLICYHOLDERSWEREBEINGHARDDONEBYITNOWAPPEARSFROMTHEFI
16、NANCIALSTATEMENTSFOR2004THATINTHISFINANCIALYEARPOLICYHOLDERSDIDSIGNIFICANTLYBETTERTHANINEITHEROFTHETWOPRECEDINGFINANCIALYEARSSEEALSOTABLE2HOWEVER,ITSDOUBTFULTHATTHEYREDOINGWELLENOUGHTOMAKEUPFORTHEPOORRETURNSINPRECEDINGYEARSTHERETURNSSHOWNTABLE2MUSTBEEXPLAINEDTHEYARENTTHERETURNSEARNEDBYINDIVIDUEILPOR
17、TFOLIOSORTHEBONUSESDECLAREDTHEYRESIMPLYTHERETURNSEARNEDBYIEBINTOTALONEWOULD,OFCOURSE,EXPECTSOMEKINDOFCORRELATIONBETWEENTHESERETURNSANDTHEBONUSRATESFROMTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTS,THEFOLLOWINGCANBEDEDUCEDSHAREHOLDERSEARNBETTERRETURNSONTHEIRCAPITALTHANPOLICYHOLDERSEARNONTHEIRINVESTMENTSTABLES2AND3SINCE2000
18、,IEBSEMBEDDEDVALUEHASINCREASEDFROMR2,6BNTOR4,3BNIFTHER600MNEWCAPITALADDEDDURINGTHE2002FINANCIALYEARISTAKENINTOCONSIDHAVELITTLECAUSEFORCOMPLAINTPOLICYHOLDERSEARNINGSARESUBSTANTIALLYDILUTEDBECAUSEOFIEBSCOSTSTRUCTUREANDPROFITMARGINSTABLE2FOREXAMPLE,IN2004THEGROSSINVESTMENTRETURNWAS14,5BUTTHENETINVESTME
19、NTRETUMWASONLY9IN2004,THEOPERATINGPROFITOFR168MTABLE1EARNEDFORSHAREHOLDERSCONTRIBUTED1,1PERCENTAGEPOINTSTOTHEDILUTIONOFPOLICYHOLDERSINVESTMENTRETURNTABLE2IN2003,THECORRESPONDINGFIGUREWASANASTONISHING4,2PERCENTAGEPOINTSITSSTRIKINGTHATTHEHUGEDECLINEINOPERATINGPROFITOCCURREDDESPITESUBSTANTIALLYHIGHERRE
20、TURNSEARNEDFORPOLICYHOLDERSTHOUGHSHAREHOLDERSSTIUDIDVERYWELL,THEREAREINDICATIONSOFGREATERSENSITIVITYFORTHEINTERESTSOFPOLICYHOLDERSTHANIN2003ADMINISTRATIONCOSTSREMAINHIGHATR176M,ESPECIALLYCONSIDERINGTHATPOLICYLIABILITIESFELLBYAROUNDRLBNTHATALSOCONTRIBUTESABOUT1,1PERCENTAGEPOINTSTOTHEDILUTIONOFPOLICYH
21、OLDERSINVESTMENTRETURNTABLE2THEDIRECTORSREMUNERATIONFORWHELANANDANUMASHAHUNMAKEUPMORETHAN10OFTHEADMINEXPENSESWHELANANDANUMASHAHUNAREAPPOINTEDBYABOARD,WHICHISCONTROLLEDBYINVESTECASINANYCAPITALISTENVIRONMENTITSPROBABLYFAIRTOASSUMETHATADDINGVALUEFORSHAREHOLDERSISANIMPORTANTFACTORINDETERMININGREMUNERATI
22、ONSTRUCTURESWHATISMORECERTAIN,HOWEVER,ISTHATBANKPAYWILLCONTINUETOBETHESUBJECTOFCONSIDERABLEPUBLICANDPRIVATEATTENTIONFORASLONGASTHEMEDIAARECONVINCEDOFTHEPUBLICAPPETITEFORTALESOFBANKERSRECEIVINGMULTIMILLIONDOLLARPAYOUTSWHICHISLIKELYTOBETHECASEFORASLONGASTHEECONOMICRECESSIONPERSISTSFINANCIALINSTITUTION
23、COMPENSATIONPRACTICESWILLMAKEHEADLINES,ANDCLAMORSFORREFORMWILLCONTINUEUNFORTUNATELYFORFINANCIALINSTITUTIONS,WHOWILLCONTINUETOWORRYABOUTTHEIRABILITYTOCOMPETEFORTALENTINTHEFACEOFPOTENTIALLIMITATIONSONHOWMUCHANDWHATKINDSOFPAYTHEYCANOFFER,ANDFORWHOMTHEBURDENSOFCOMPLIANCEANDDISCLOSUREWITHINCREASEDREGULAT
24、IONWILLNOTBEINCONSIDERABLE,GOVERNMENTALOVERSIGHTOFPAYWILLBEAROUNDFORALONGTIMETOCOMEALTHOUGHTHEFULLIMPACTOFTHEFINALGUIDANCEWOULDNOTBEKNOWNFORSOMETIME,THEFEDHASALREADYTAKENSTEPSTOREVIEWINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONPROGRAMSFORDEFICIENCIESINTHEANNOUNCEMENTOFTHEADOPTIONOFTHEFINALGUIDANCE,THEFEDINDICATEDITHADCOMP
25、LETEDTHEFIRSTROUNDOFANINDEPTHANALYSISOFINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONPRACTICESATLARGE,COMPLEXBANKINGORGANIZATIONS,WHICHWASPARTOFTHEFEDSFORMAL“HORIZONTALREVIEW”OFINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONPRACTICESANNOUNCEDINTHEPROPOSEDGUIDANCETHEPURPOSEOFTHISINITIATIVE,THEFEDSTATED,TOBECARRIEDOUTBYAMULTIDISCIPLINARYGROUPOFSTAFFCO
26、NSISTINGOFECONOMIC,LEGAL,FINANCIALANDACCOUNTINGEXPERTS,WASTOENHANCETHEFEDSUNDERSTANDINGOFCURRENTPRACTICESANDPROPOSEDCHANGESTOTHOSEPRACTICES,ASSESSTHESTRENGTHOFCURRENTCONTROLS,INFORMITSELFASTOCURRENTCORPORATEGOVERNANCE,ANDIDENTIFYEMERGINGPRACTICESINADDRESSINGTHISISSUE,THEFINALGUIDANCESTATESPLAINLYTHA
27、TBOARDSOFDIRECTORSSHOULDDIRECTLYAPPROVEINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONARRANGEMENTSFORSENIOREXECUTIVESTHEFINALGUIDANCEEMPHASIZESTHATBOARDSOFDIRECTORSHAVEULTIMATERESPONSIBILITYTOENSUREBALANCEINTHEINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONARRANGEMENTSFORALLCOVEREDEMPLOYEES,ANDURGESBOARDSTOBEACTIVEINTHEIROVERSIGHTOFINCENTIVECOMPENSAT
28、IONARRANGEMENTSTOBEEFFECTIVEINTHISROLE,BOARDSMAYNEEDTORETHINKTHEIRSTRUCTURESANDMUSTHAVERESOURCESATTHEIRDISPOSALINTHEFORMOFCOUNSEL,CONSULTANTSANDOTHERADVISERSINADDITION,IFALARGEBANKMAKESSIGNIFICANTUSEOFINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONBUTDOESNOTHAVEASEPARATECOMPENSATIONCOMMITTEEOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSCOMPOSEDENTIR
29、ELYOFNONEMPLOYEEDIRECTORSINPLACE,ITSHOULDSTRONGLYCONSIDERESTABLISHINGONE,WHICHCOMMITTEEWILLTHENINTERACTWITHTHEAUDITCOMMITTEEOROTHERRISKCOMMITTEEASAPPROPRIATETOADDRESSCOMPENSATIONRISKISSUESTHEFINALGUIDANCEURGESTHATBANKSMAKEINFORMATIONABOUTTHEIRINCENTIVECOMPENSATIONARRANGEMENTSFOREMPLOYEESINCLUDINGLOW
30、ERLEVELEMPLOYEESANDRELATEDRISKMANAGEMENTAVAILABLETOSHAREHOLDERSTOENABLETHEMTOSERVEASEFFECTIVE“WATCHDOGS”AGAINSTIMPRUDENTRISKSINTHOSEARRANGEMENTSITSCLEARTHATINVESTECISSATISFIEDTHATWHELANANDANUMASHAHUNAREDOINGTHEIRJOBSWELLHOWEVER,ITSUNLIKELYTHATALLPOLICYHOLDERSWILLSHARETHATVIEWWHELANDECLINEDTOCOMMENTA
31、BLE1INVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITSHYSIMPLELEDGERACCOUNTSRMASSETSPOLICYLIABILITIESCAPITALBALANCESON1JANUARY200129939285821357PREMIUMINCOME52665266REINSURANCEPREMIUMS21387613876NETPOLICYBENEFITS99029902NORWICHTRANSFER1170511705INVESTMENTRETURN33982786612CAPITALRAISED598598OPERATINGPROFIT261261CHANGEINACTUAR
32、IALBASIS305305ADMINEXPENSES574574COMMISSION275275TAX9797OTHERITEMS3323323BALANCESON31MARCH200226053235302523PREMIUMINCOME45514551REINSURANCEPREMIUMS245204520NETPOLICYBENEFITS59595959INVESTMENTRETURN39372321OPERATINGPROFIT843843CHANGEINACTUARIALBASIS1515ADMINEXPENSES206206COMMISSION9393TAX118118OTHER
33、ITEMS37878BALANCESON31MARCH20032002316351REINSURANCEPREMIUMS211891189NETPOLICYBENEFITS50065006INVESTRNENTRETURN26792244435OPERATINGPROFIT168168CHANGEINACTUARIALBASIS3838ADMINEXPENSES176176COMMISSION8383TAX128128OTHERITEMS3179179UTILISATIONOFWARRANTY156156BALANCESON31MARCH2004189141467742371NETOFCURR
34、ENTLIABILITIES2TOCAPITALALLIANCELIFE3GOODWILLAMORTISATIONRESTRUCTURINGCOSTSETCSMITESFMIMALSTATEMENTSIMESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITSMI2200ATABLE2INVESTMENTRETURNSFORPOLICYBOLDERS200220032004GROSSINVESTMENTRETUM8,10,414,5ADMINEXPENSES1,8101,1COMMISSION0,80505TAX0,30608OPERATINGPROFIT0,84211OTHERITEMS1,00412WA
35、RRANTYPROVISION1,0CHANGEINACTUARIALBASE1,00,10,2NETINVESTMENTRETUM4,46,29,01PERIODOF15MONTHSANNUALISED,SOURCESFMNCIALSTATEMENTSINVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITS20022004COMPILEDBYDEONBASSONRESEARTABLE3RETURNSFORSHAREHOLDERS200220032004INVESTMENTRETURN25,210,411,0OPERATINGPROFIT,13,527,24,2CHANGEINACTUARIALBAS
36、IS15,70,51,0RETURNONCAPITALLEVEL123,037,114,2MOVEMENTOFINFORCEBUSINESS35,3210,80,2RETURNONCAPITALLEVEL212,3OR32,1226,314,41PERIODOF15MONTHSANNUALISED2THEMOVEMENTINTHEVALUEOFINFORCEBUSINESSINCLUDESANEGATIVECONTRIBUTIONOF44,4PERCENTAGEPOINTSFORTHE5MONTHSTO31MAY2001INVESTECONLYTOOKCONTROLOFIEBON1JUNE20
37、01SOURCESFINANCIALSTATEMENTSINVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITS20022004COMPILEDBYDEONBASSONRESEARCHTABLE4EMBEDDEDVALUESANDRATINGSRM2000200220032004NETASSETVALUE1357235836724237VALUEOFINFORCEBUSINESS128534289892EMBEDDEDVALUE2642278637904329OPERATINGPROFIT240261843168HISTORICPERATIO45,4200,120,55FORWARDPERATIO66
38、,20,510,581DECEMBER20002MARCH20023R207MON1JUNE2001WHENINVESTECTOOKTHEHELM4VALUEOFINFORCEBUSINESSDIVDEDBYHISTORICOPERATINGPROFIT5ANNUALISED6VALUEOFINFORCEBUSINESSDIVIDEDBYFOLLOWINGYEARSOPERATINGPROFITSOURTEINVESTECEMPLOYEEBENEFITS,FINANCIALSTATEMENTS20022004COMPILEDBYDEONBASSONR天达雇员的福利董事的高薪酬但保单持有人尚未弥
39、补赤字此文章讨论天达雇员福利（IEB在南非的财务报表。以及天达保险公司在2003年和2004年的利润总额的比较，执行董事所赚取的总薪酬，执行董事与股东之间的冲突以及投保人的利益问题天达（IEB）的2名执行董事CIARANWHELAN和ADEMDAANUMASHAHUN据称执行董事在2004年3月财政年度的薪酬总额人民币1800万IEB是的前身是当时上市公司FEDSURE全资子公司，它是从事人寿保险业的。在2001年这个保险公司在有2个完全不同的意见分歧下被天达公司给收购了这种片断信息是载于IEB最近提交至财经事务局财务的报表上显示出来的，IEB是天达未上市的子公司，因此其中的董事酬金不必一定要
40、披露，个别条款也不用受约翰内斯堡证券交易所的要求虽然在2004年三月IEB的财务报表表明对投保人更好的回报，但是公司要解决弥补以前所积压的问题还是需要很长的路要走的。天达作为IEB的唯一股东，要做出对于解决IEB的这个问题要相当好的应对方法收益表显示了执行董事薪酬总额为人民币1800万，CIARANWHELAN和ADEMDAANUMASHAHUN在作为董事会上作为唯一的执行董事报告上称如果该信息是正确的，那么每一个执行董事平均每年收入人民币900万IEB是一个股东和投保人之间的利益冲突的经典案例。这个问题的根本原因，只要是天达在收购IEB时支付太多费用。此次收购的价格是45亿，其中25亿用现金
41、支付，其余部分用发售股份为代价这些执行董事报酬同老的PIC的全资附属非上市人寿保险公司董事收入相比，。三名执行董事RODDYSPARKS,PETERDEBEYERANDMPMOYO在2003年12月财政年度一起一共赚了920万。SPARKS的报酬约350万，PETERDEBEYE的报酬大概是340万，MOYOS的报酬大概是230万之后，天达将面临着IEB资本太少这样的令人不愉快的尴尬局面。造成该局面的原因是此次合并与当初诺里奇人寿保险合资的情况是大同小异的，在1998年诺里奇前控股公司诺里奇控股，被FEDSURE所收购（摘自金融周，2000年3月24日和2000年12月1日）IEB公司的董事酬
42、金历来是造成许多投保人对他们的投资的低回报不满意的最主要的原因所在。即使在IEB被天达收购签约后，并且天达给IEB注入了5亿人民币的资本进入公司。随后进行官方声明后又注入了6亿人民币的资金后。这种情况仍然没有起色在2004年年底，开展了一次政策报告辩论会，此次辩论会的焦点在开始时都集中在三个最大的保险公司。在这次辩论中几乎所有人都遗忘了去讨论天达的员工股福利，这个在过去数年的数年里让公司陷入困境，让保单持有人有充分的理由去质疑公司的业绩的最大原因，最重要的困扰因素。因此，随着在给IEB投资总成本达到巨大的56亿人民币后，这是可以理解天达为什么会希望尽快得使其资本回收。在银行这些金融部门，一个银
43、行集团对股本回报率是非常审慎地去进行计算的。在2000年12月结算时，IEB的内含价值为26亿人民币，甚至其中已经包括第一注入的5亿新资本。所以这是一个几乎闻所未闻的收购费远高于其内在价值获的情况从另一个方面来说是投保人的观点。由于发生了前后戏剧性的收购，他们实际上已经迷失在了保险公司外在的那种壮观的形象。在2003年的检查中，倡导翻转机构模型理论的支持者和乔治马克思教授得出的结论是；投保人在1999年和2002年之间没有达到他们预期的或者说投保人人的合理期望。当然，这其中包括天达在接管IEB之前和之后的这段时间他们还表示，并非所有保单持有人即投保人都受到同样影响。在他们检查时IEB期间他们认
44、为IEB已经了采取足够的预防措施以补偿投保人的以前的损失，他们对于这点感觉还是满意的。在倡导翻转机构模型理论的支持者和乔治马克思教授检查结束后。并公布了2003年3月31日截止的本财政年度的结果。由于这年是一个比较特殊的财政年度，IEB公开的宣布了一个特殊的比较有点夸大性质的特大经营利润8亿四千三百万人民币。天达的早期的报告涉及了于此有关的信息在各界引起了愤怒的反应（摘自；星期六，03年12月3日）惠兰的看法是，在IEB的净资产价值增加即获得了大型营业利润这个利润里面几乎包含了大部分都是损失的价值大型营业利润（见表1），ASSURERS的嵌入式值由资产净值和在明面的账面价值。后者是从保险公司未
45、来的利润折现的价值自2001年以来，IEB已销售给资本联盟相当显着的份额，并且其再保险业务是保险公司的避免风险的相当重要的一部分。其中的有效保单账面价值很大程度上的损失在正是由于这一原因。很明显在那时候，IEB不想将那些的收入明确记录下来是想作为天达股东的巨额利润，而让投保人收到了不公平的待遇。现在看来，从在2004年的财政年度的财务报表显示投保人应该比前两个财政年度更应该值得去注意财务报表（详情另见表2）。而且，保险公司在打算正在做的更好去补偿值钱令投保人低收益的所做的措施也是值得去怀疑的。表2所显示的收益必须得给出恰当的解释。这些收益不是返回天达银行证券的投资组合或公开声明的奖金。他们赚取
46、的是IEB的总收益。当然其中他们还是希望这些收益率和奖金的还是有相关的联系的从财务报表，可以得出以下相关结论股东赚取更高的回报超过投保人资本投资上赚取的收益（详见表2和表3）自2000年以来，IEB的内部价值增加了从26亿人民币增加到了43亿人民币。如果在2002年财政年度将6亿人民币的新资本也增加进去可能会减少很多不必要的的抱怨投保人的收入实质上是很无力的，这是因为IEB的成本结构框架和稀少的利润空间（见表2）。比如，在2004年的总投资回报率为145，但是净投资回报率却只有稀少的9在2004年，经营利润是168亿人民币（见表1），为股东赚取利润的贡献点是1,1个百分点。在2003年，相应的数字却是惊人的4,2个百分点。
