1、原文PAYENOUGH,DONTPAYTOOMUCHORDONTPAYATALLTHEIMPACTOFBONUSINTENSITYONJOBSATISFACTIONKONSTANTINOSPOULIAKASTHEPRINCIPALAGENTMODEL,WITHITSCONVINCINGILLUSTRATIONOFTHETRADEOFFTHATARISESBETWEENRISKANDINCENTIVEPROVISIONWHENATTEMPTINGTOALIGNTHECONFLICTINGINTERESTSOFTWOCONTRACTINGPARTIES,REMAINSCENTRALFOROURUN
2、DERSTANDINGOFTHECOMPENSATIONSTRATEGIESEMPLOYEDBYFIRMSMIRLEES,1976HOLMSTROM,1979ACCORDINGTOTHESTANDARDMODELOFAGENCYTHEORY,THEINTRODUCTIONOFFINANCIALINCENTIVESASPARTOFANAGENTSREMUNERATIONPACKAGEWILLINCREASEHIS/HERPRODUCTIVITY,ASITISASSUMEDTHATINDIVIDUALSDERIVEUTILITYFROMINCOMEWHILSTTHEEXERTIONOFEFFORT
3、ENTAILSAUTILITYCOSTIMPORTANTLY,IFTHEADDITIONALDISUTILITYOFHIGHEREORTISCOMPENSATEDBYANADEQUATEWAGEPREMIUM,ANIMPLACATIONOFTHETHEORYISTHATTHEMARGINALUTILITIESOFWORKERSUNDERFIXEDANDVARIABLECOMPENSATIONSCHEMESSHOULDBEEQUALIZEDINTHELONGRUNWHATTHISIMPLIESISTHATTHERESHOULDBENODIERENCEBETWEENTHEJOBSATISFACTI
4、ONOFEMPLOYEESRECEIVINGMONETARYINCENTIVESANDTHOSEONNONCONTINGENTPAYMENTARRANGEMENTS,OTHERTHINGSEQUALTHEABOVECONCLUSIONHASBEENDISPUTEDBYAPSYCHOLOGICALAND,INCREASINGLY,ECONOMICSLITERATURE,WHICHHASSTRESSEDTHATTHEINCORPORATIONOFNONPECUNIARYMOTIVESINTOTHEECONOMICPARADIGM,SUCHASTHEDESIREFORRECIPROCATIONORF
5、ORENGAGINGININTERESTINGTASKS,HASIMPORTANTIMPLICATIONSFORANINDIVIDUALSMOTIVATIONANDJOBSATISFACTIONDECI,1971LEPPERETAL1973DECIANDRYAN,1985FREY,1986,1997KREPS,1997FREYANDJEGEN,2001INADDITION,ITHASBEENARGUEDTHATWRONGMONETARYINCENTIVESMAYNCITEDYSFUNCTIONALBEHAVIOURALRESPONSESBYEMPLOYEESHOLMSTROMANDMILGRO
6、M,1991BAKER,1992PRENDERGAST,1999,ORHAVEADETRIMENTALEFFECTONEMPLOYEEMORALEANDJOBSECURITYVIATHEINEQUITABLEANDRISKYPAYDISTRIBUTIONSTHATARISEASACONSEQUENCEBAKERETAL,1988ONCETHESEMECHANISMSARETAKENINTOCONSIDERATION,ITBECOMESCLEARTHATTHETHEORETICALIMPACTOFMONETARYINCENTIVESONWORKEREFFORTANDJOBSATISFACTION
7、CANBEAMBIGUOUSASCORROBORATEDINANUMBEROFECONOMICEXPERIMENTSFALKANDKOSFELD,2006ERIKSSONANDVILLEVAL,2008,THEINCENTIVEEFFECTSOFMONETARYREWARDSARELIKELYTOBECOMPROMISEDINAWORLDOFIMPERFECTLABOURMOBILITYPOPULATEDBYHETEROGENEOUSAGENTSWITHVARYINGPSYCHOLOGICALDISPOSITIONSTOTHEEXTENTTHATINCENTIVESCHEMESALLOWFOR
8、OPTIMIZATIONOFEFFORT,FACILITATEWORKERAUTONOMYANDENHANCESELFDETERMINATIONTHEYSHOULDINCREASEJOBSATISFACTION,OTHERTHINGSEQUALYETINCREASINGEARNINGSRISK,CROWDINGOUTOFTHEINHERENTPLEASANTNESSINPERFORMINGONESJOBANDLOWERMORALECANLEADTODISGRUNTLEDEMPLOYEESTHESTUDYOFTHEEFFECTOFMONETARYREWARDSONJOBSATISFACTIONI
9、STHEREFOREANEMPIRICALISSUE,WHICHHASONLYUNTILRECENTLYRECEIVEDANYATTENTIONINPARTICULAR,ANUMBEROFSTUDIESHAVESHOWNTHATINBRITAINBONUSESRESULTINHIGHERJOBSATISFACTION,ALTHOUGHTHEEFFECTOFINDIVIDUALBASEDPERFORMANCERELATEDPAYPRPSYSTEMSISNOTASCLEARCUTONCEUNOBSERVEDHETEROGENEITYISTAKENINTOACCOUNTDRAGOETAL,1992M
10、CCAUSLANDETAL,2005,ARTZ,2008,GREENANDHEYWOOD,2008POULIAKASANDTHEODOSSIOU,2009USINGUSDATA,HEYWOODANDWEI2006HAVEALSOCONFIRMEDTHATALLTYPESOFPRPBARPIECERATESYIELDGREATERJOBSATISFACTIONRELATIVETOTIMERATESAPOTENTIALDEFICIENCYOFTHEABOVEMENTIONEDSTUDIESISTHATTHEYONLYFOCUSONTHEDISCRETEDIFFERENCEINJOBSATISFAC
11、TIONBETWEENWORKERSRECEIVINGPRPANDTHOSEONALTERNATIVESCHEMESTHUS,THEYIGNORETHEFACTTHATWORKERPERFORMANCEANDSATISFACTIONMAYVARYACCORDINGTOTHEMAGNITUDEOFINCENTIVESASSUGGESTEDBYASERIESOFFIELDEXPERIMENTSPERFORMEDBYGNEEZYANDRUSTICHINI2000A,P802,FORALLPOSITIVEBUTSMALLENOUGHCOMPENSAIONS,THEREISAREDUCTIONINPER
12、FORMANCEASCOMPAREDWITHTHEZEROCOMPENSATION,OR,BETTER,WITHTHELACKOFANYMENTIONOFCOMPENSATIONNEVERTHELESS,ONCETHEEXTRINSICMOTIVATIONISLARGEENOUGH,ITRESULTSINBETTERPERFORMANCETHANINTHENOINCENTIVECASETHISNONMONOTONICITYINTHEREACTIONOFWORKEREFFORTTOBOTHPOSITIVEANDNEGATIVEINCENTIVESEGBONUSESORFINES,RESPECTI
13、VELYHASCONSEQUENTLYBEENTERMEDTHEWEFFECTOFINCENTIVESGNEEZY,2004BYCONTRAST,THERECENTEXPERIMENTALSTUDYOFPOKORNY2008FINDSANINVERSEUSHAPEDRELATIONSHIPBETWEENEFFORTLEVELSANDINCENTIVEINTENSITYTHISPAPERATTEMPTSTOTESTTHEABOVECONTRASTINGHYPOTHESESBYLOOKINGBEYONDTHEMEREINCIDENCEOFINCENTIVEPAYANDEXAMININGTHEIMP
14、ACTOFTHEINTENSITYOFINCENTIVESIETHEPROPORTIONOFWORKERSSALARYTHATISTIEDTOBONUSESONJOBSATISFACTIONINSTEADSPECIFICALLY,10WAVES19982007OFTHEBRITISHHOUSEHOLDPANELSURVEYBHPSAREUSEDTOINVESTIGATETHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENTHEPOWEROFBONUSPAYMENTSANDTHEUTILITYDERIVEDFROMWORK,HOLDINGTHEINCIDENCEOFINDIVIDUALBASEDPRPAN
15、DOTHERIMPORTANTDETERMINANTSCONSTANTAFTERCONTROLLINGFORINDIVIDUALFIXEDEFFECTSSUCHASABILITYORMOTIVATIONTHATMAYBIASTHEINFLUENCEOFPAYMENTSCHEMESONJOBSATISFACTION,JOBUTILITYISFOUNDTORISEONLYINRESPONSETOLARGEBONUSPAYMENTSEVIDENCEISALSOPRESENTEDTHATREVOKINGABONUSFROMONEYEARTOTHENEXTISLIKELYTOHAVEADETRIMENT
16、ALEFFECTONEMPLOYEEUTILITY,ANDTHATOVERTIMEJOBSATISFACTIONTENDSTODIMINISHASEMPLOYEESPOTENTIALLYADAPTTOTHEPAYMENTOFBONUSESTHEEMPIRICALEVIDENCEOFTHEPAPERISTHEREFORECONSISTENTWITHGNEEZYANDRUSTICHINIS2000AASSERTIONTHATEMPLOYERSWISHINGTOMOTIVATETHEIRSTAFFSHOULDINDEEDPAYENOUGHORDONTPAYATALLTHESTRUCTUREOFTHE
17、PAPERISASFOLLOWSSECTION2ENGAGESINAREVIEWOFTHEAVAILABLELITERATUREONTHEEFFECTOFFINANCIALINCENTIVESONJOBSATISFACTIONINSECTION3THEDATAUSEDINTHESTUDYAREDESCRIBEDANDPRELIMINARYSTATISTICALCORRELATIONSAREOUTLINEDSECTION4DESCRIBESTHEBASICECONOMETRICMETHODOLOGYUSEDINTHEPAPERSECTION5OUTLINESTHEMAINEMPIRICALRES
18、ULTSOFTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENINCENTIVEINTENSITYANDTHEUTILITYDERIVEDFROMEMPLOYMENTSECTION6EXAMINESTHEHETEROGENEITYINTHESAMPLEFURTHERFINALLY,SECTION7CONCLUDESTHEGROWINGECONOMICSLITERATUREONSUBJECTIVEWELLBEINGFREYANDSTUTZER,2002BLANCHFLOWERANDOSWALD,2004VANPRAAGANDFERRERICARBONELL,2004EPICURUS,2007FREY,
19、2008HASEMPHASIZEDTHATMEASURESOFJOBSATISFACTIONARESIGNIFICANTPREDICTORSOFEMPLOYEEBEHAVIOUREGQUITSFREEMAN,1978,ABSENTEEISMCLEGG,1983ORWORKERPRODUCTIVITYJUDGEETAL,2001ITFOLLOWSTHATUNDERSTANDINGTHEINFLUENCEOFMONETARYINCENTIVESONJOBSATISFACTIONISIMPORTANTGIVENTHATTHECOMPOSITIONOFANEMPLOYEESREMUNERATIONPA
20、CKAGEISANINTEGRALELEMENTOFHIS/HEROVERALLWORKINGCONDITIONSTHEFACTTHATFIRMSTYPICALLYEMPLOYAWIDEARRAYOFINCENTIVEINSTRUMENTSHASBEENATTRIBUTEDTOTHEFUNDAMENTALAGENCYPROBLEMTHATPLAGUESTHEEMPLOYMENTRELATIONSHIPGIBBONSANDWALDMAN,1999INORDERTOCOMBATTHEPROBLEMOFMORALHAZARD,FIRMSDESIGNINCENTIVECONTRACTSTHATSEEK
21、TOACHIEVEGOALCONGRUENCEWITHTHEIREMPLOYEESMIRLEES,1976HOLMSTROM,1979FURTHERMORE,ASSHOWNBYLAZEAR1986,2000,THEINTRODUCTIONOFFINANCIALREWARDSSHOULDINDUCEMOREHIGHLYGEAREDWORKERSTOPUTFORTHEXTRAEFFORTTOTHEPOINTWHERETHEMARGINALVALUEADDEDEQUATESTHEMARGINALCOSTOFTHEADDITIONALLABOURINLONGRUNEQUILIBRIUM,HOWEVER
22、,ONEWOULDNOTEXPECTTOOBSERVEANYDIFFERENCESINTHEMARGINALUTILITIESOFCOMPARABLEWORKERSUNDERFIXEDORVARIABLEPAYMENTSCHEMES,ASTHEEXPECTEDVALUEOFTHEHIGHERWAGESPAIDUNDERPRPSHOULDBEJUSTSUFFCIENTTOCOMPENSATEFORTHEADDITIONALEARNINGSRISKANDTHEDISUTILITYOFEXTRAEFFORTMASCOLELLETAL,1995ONCETHESTANDARDASSUMPTIONSOFT
23、HEAGENCYMODELARERELAXED,THOUGH,THEREAREMANYREASONSTOEXPECTTHATPRPISLIKELYTOHAVEANONNEGLIGIBLEIMPACTONJOBSATISFACTIONEXPECTANCYBASEDTHEORIESOFORGANIZATIONALPSYCHOLOGYHAVEASSERTEDTHATATTITUDESABOUTWORKARESHAPEDFROMTHEREWARDSPRODUCEDBYPERFORMANCE,WHICHAREVALUEDOUTCOMESINTHEMSELVESLAWLERANDPORTER,1967FU
24、RTHERMORE,ITHASBEENARGUEDTHATPRPISANINTEGRALELEMENTOFSOCALLEDHIGHPERFORMANCEWORKPLACEPRACTICES,WHICHHAVEBEENFOUNDTOBEPOSITIVELYRELATEDTOJOBSATISFACTIONBAUER,2004OTHERASPECTSOFPRPMAY,NONETHELESS,DIMINISHPRODUCTIVITYANDWORKERSATISFACTIONITHASBEENILLUSTRATEDTHATWRONGLYDEVISEDCOMPENSATIONSCHEMESCANHAVEC
25、OUNTERPRODUCTIVECONSEQUENCES,ASTHEYMAYENCOURAGEWORKERSTOGAMETHECOMPENSATIONSYSTEMTOTHEIRADVANTAGEBYMULTITASKINGBAKER1992ORBYENGAGINGINRENTSEEKINGBEHAVIOURAIMEDATINFLUENCINGTHESUBJECTIVEEVALUATIONSOFLINEMANAGERSPRENDERGAST,1999HOLMSTROMS1982SEMINALPAPERHASALSOSHOWEDTHATUTILIZINGTEAMPRODUCTIONINCENTIV
26、ESCHEMESSUCHASPROFITSHARINGMAYDILUTEINDIVIDUALPERFORMANCEASARESULTOFFREERIDINGINTHEFACEOFEVIDENCESUGGESTINGTHATTHEJOBSATISFACTIONOFEMPLOYEESISINTRINSICALLYLINKEDTOTHEIRRELATIVEPAYSTATUSCLARKANDOSWALD,1996CLARK,1999FERRERICARBONELL,2005CLARKETAL,2008A,THEDEMORALISINGDISPERSIONANDVARIABILITYINWAGESTHA
27、TENSUESFROMPRPSCHEMESISALSOLIKELYTOAFFECTATTITUDESTOWORKINANEGATIVEFASHIONFURTHERMORE,ITHASOFTENBEENCLAIMEDTHATFINANCIALINCENTIVESUNDERMINECOLLABORATIONANDTEAMWORK,EMPHASIZETHEPOWERASYMMETRYBETWEENMANAGEMENTANDTHEWORKFORCE,ANDREDUCEEMPLOYEERISKTAKINGANDINNOVATIONKOHN,1993ADDEDTOTHEABOVEISAPROMINENTN
28、ONECONOMICCRITICISMOFPRPWHICHISBASEDONTHESOCALLEDCOGNITIVEEVALUATIONORMOTIVATIONCROWDINGOUTHYPOTHESISDECIANDRYAN,1985FREYANDJEGEN,2001ACCORDINGTOTHISTHEORYOFSOCIALPSYCHOLOGYONCEITISACKNOWLEDGEDTHATINDIVIDUALSMAYDERIVEINTRINSICSATISFACTIONFROMTHEIRJOBS,EXPLICITREWARDSTHATAREPERCEIVEDASCONTROLLINGDEVI
29、CES,ORASINDICATORSTHATTHEEMPLOYMENTRELATIONSHIPISAPUREMARKETEXCHANGE,ARELIKELYTOCOMPROMISEJOBSATISFACTIONANDPERFORMANCEFREY,1992KREPS,1997LINDENBERG,2001BOLLEANDOTTO,2010FURTHERMORE,THEREARENOWANUMBEROFEXPERIMENTALSTUDIESINDICATINGTHATFINANCIALNCENTIVESMAYBACKFIREBYACTINGASASIGNALOFEMPLOYERDISTRUSTF
30、ALKANDKOSFELD,2006ORBYUNDERMININGRECIPROCITYBASEDVOLUNTARYCOOPERATIONFEHRANDGACHTER,1998ONLYUNTILRECENTLYDIDTHEECONOMICSLITERATUREPAYANYATTENTIONTOWHICHOFTHEAFOREMENTIONEDEFFECTSOFPRPONJOBUTILITYPREDOMINATEDRAGOETAL1992ANDMCCAUSLANDETAL2005WEREAMONGTHEFIRSTTOCONTRASTTHESATISFACTIONOFEMPLOYEESRECEIVI
31、NGPRPWITHTHOSEONALTERNATIVEARRANGEMENTSTHELATTERFINDTHATPRPMAYHAVEDEMOTIVATINGCONSEQUENCESFORTHELOWERPAIDSEGMENTOFTHEPOPULATIONAFTERCORRECTINGFORPOTENTIALSELECTIVITYBIASHEYWOODANDWEIS2006ANALYSISSHOWSTHATPROFITSHARINGANDPRPAREASSOCIATEDWITHHIGHEROVERALLJOBSATISFACTIONINTHEUS,THOUGHTHEYFINDEVIDENCETH
32、ATPIECERATESINPARTICULARMAYHAVEANEGATIVEEFFECTMORERECENTLY,GREENANDHEYWOOD2008ANDPOULIAKASANDTHEODOSSIOU2009USETHEBHPSTOINVESTIGATETHEIMPACTOFPRPONAFULLERSETOFFACETSOFJOBSATISFACTIONTHEYSHOWTHATALTHOUGHBONUSESANDPROFITSHARINGSCHEMESRESULTINHIGHERMEANJOBSATISFACTION,THEEFFECTOFINDIVIDUALSPECIFICPRPDI
33、MINISHESONCEUNOBSERVEDHETEROGENEITYISTAKENINTOACCOUNTTHEYALSOFAILTOFINDANYSUPPORTINGEVIDENCEINFAVOUROFARGUMENTSTHATPRPCROWDSOUTTHEINTRINSICSATISFACTIONOFJOBSORHASANADVERSEIMPACTONJOBSECURITYARTZ2008,ONTHEOTHERHAND,ARGUESTHAT,ONTHENET,PRPINCREASESJOBSATISFACTIONBUTDOESSOLARGELYAMONGUNIONWORKERSANDMAL
34、ESINLARGERFIRMSTHEABOVESTUDIESFOCUSMERELYONTHEIMPACTOFTHEINCIDENCEOFPRPONJOBSATISFACTIONTHISMASKSTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATTHEUTILITYOFWORKERSMAYVARYACCORDINGTOTHEMAGNITUDEANDINTENSITYOFINCENTIVES,ASSUGGESTEDBYTHEEXPERIMENTSOFGNEEZYANDRUSTICHINI2000ABINTHESEEXPERIMENTS,THEEFFECTOFTHEINTRODUCTIONOFAMONETARYR
35、EWARDANDTHEDIFFERENTIALIMPACTOFSMALLANDLARGEPAYOFFSISTESTEDONTHEPERFORMANCEOFSTUDENTSFROMISRAELTHEEVIDENCEINDICATESTHATTHEEFFECTOFMONETARYINCENTIVESCANBE,INSMALLAMOUNTS,DETRIMENTALTOPERFORMANCEANDTHATTHEREISADISCONTINUITYATTHEZEROPAYMENTOFTHEEFFECTOFMONETARYINCENTIVESIBIDA,P801802ANIMPORTANTCOMMONEL
36、EMENTOFTHEABOVEABOUTEXPERIMENTSISTHATSMALLINCENTIVESARELIKELYTOEXERTANEGATIVEEFFECTONBEHAVIOURWITHDISCONTINUITYCLOSETOZERO,WHILEFORHIGHPOWEREDREWARDSORPUNISHMENTSTHESTANDARDPRICEEFFECTISEXPECTEDTOPREVAILTHISPREDICTIONHASBEENCORROBORATEDINTHEPROPOSERRESPONDENTGAMEEXPERIMENTOFGNEEZY2004,WHICHULTIMATEL
37、YGIVESRISETOAVWSHAPEDRELATIONSHIPBETWEENEFFORTANDTHEINTENSITYOFPOSITIVEINCENTIVESINCONTRAST,THEIQANDCOUNTINGTASKSEXPERIMENTSPERFORMEDBYPOKORNY2008ONUNDERGRADUATEGERMANSTUDENTSINDICATEANINVERSEUSHAPEDRELATIONSHIPBETWEENEFFORTLEVELSANDTHESTRENGTHOFMONETARYPAYOFFSTHEAUTHORATTRIBUTESHERCONTRADICTINGFIND
38、INGSTOTHEEXISTENCEOFREFERENCEDEPENDENTPREFERENCESAMONGSUBJECTS,WHICHIMPLYDECREASINGEFFORTCHOICESWITHSTRONGERINCENTIVESONCEAREFERENCEINCOMELEVELISEXCEEDEDANOTHEREXAMPLEOFTHENONMONOTONICMOTIVATIONEFFECTOFINCENTIVESCANBEFOUNDINTHEFIELDSTUDYOFMARSDENETAL2001,WHOHIGHLIGHTTHATALTHOUGHALARGENUMBEROFWORKERS
39、INTHEIRSAMPLEEXPERIENCEDADETERIORATIONOFWORKPLACERELATIONSANDCOOPERATIONFOLLOWINGTHEINTRODUCTIONOFINCENTIVEPAY,PRPMOTIVATEDTHOSEWHORECEIVEDABOVEAVERAGEOFPAYMENTSTHEREMAINDEROFTHEPAPERNOWTURNSTOANINVESTIGATIONOFWHICHOFTHEAFOREMENTIONEDCONTRASTINGPATTERNS,ASDEPICTEDINFIGURE1,DESCRIBETHEASSOCIATIONBETW
40、EENJOBSATISFACTIONANDTHEINTENSITYOFMONETARYREWARDSRECEIVEDBYBRITISHEMPLOYEESSOURCEKYKLOS,VOL63NOVEMBER2010NO4,597626译文奖金强度的影响工作的满意KONSTANTINOSPOULIAKAS至委托代理模型,以其令人信服的阐述,而平衡风险与激励条款时,试图把承包双方之间的利益冲突,依然是中央为我们的欠站补偿策略MIRLEES公司1976年HOLMSTROM,1979年。根据委托代理理论的标准模型,引入财政刺激作为代理人的薪酬将增加他/她的生产力,因为它是假定个人获得收入而发挥效用的努力
41、包括公用事业的成本。重要的是,如果额外的无用支持高等吗拜恩补偿保险费,理性足够的工资的以下的工人,他们是较为固定和可变补偿然后应该平等和拓展双方的长期合作这意味着什么,这提醒,都不应该有任何差异生效的工作接受现金激励员工满意,N付款安排,其他的东西平等。上述结论一直有争议的,由一种心理上的并且,越来越多的经济学文献强调在实际工作中,动机进入经济学范式,如渴望互惠或从事有趣的任务,具有重要意义,为个人的动机与工作满意度DECI,1971年,LEPPERETAL。1973年,DECI和瑞恩,1989弗雷,1986年,1997,1997弗雷和JEGEN,2001。此外,它已经认为的错的货币报酬激励可
42、能NCITE不正常的行为反应员工HOLMSTROM和尔格若姆,1991年成立贝克,1992PRENDERGAST,1999、或产生负面影响员工士气和工作安全通过不公正不危险的支付分布BAKERETAL后果出现,1988。一旦这些机制是考虑在内,很清楚地表明的是理论的影响在职工的金钱刺激的努力和工作满意度可以含糊不清。为证实了许多经济实验2006福克和KOSFELD埃里克森和VILLEVAL,2008,激励效应的货币报酬很可能会受损的世界里充满了陈腐的不完美的劳动力流动人口异构代理商与不同心理部署。在某种程度上,激励方案允许优化的努力,促进职工自治,提高自主他们应该增加工作满意度,其他条件相等平
43、等然而增收节支的风险,占用了她们固有的执行一个人的工作和较低的公司的士气会导致不满的雇员。究金钱奖励的影响,因此,对工作满意感的实证问题,只有直到最近收到任何的注意。特别是,许多研究表明,英国奖金导致更高的工作满意度的影响,虽然INDIVIDUALBASED支付性能相关PRP系统不明确的一次考虑储层非均质性的时候“龙之心”等1992套2005年,迈考斯兰德等,年绿色和海沃德的,2008年和2009THEODOSSIOUPOULIAKAS型,美国的数据,海沃德和卫2006也证实了所有类型的PRP酒吧的是计件工资产量获得更大的工作满意度相对于时间的利率。一个潜在的缺乏上述研究,他们只专注在工作满意
44、度的离散差异接受工人之间PRP和方案。因此,他们忽略了一个事实的工作效率和满足可以依照不同的激励的重要性提出的一系列的田间试验GNEEZY和RUSTICHINI进行2000A,P802“为一切积极也足够小,COMPENSAIONS降低性能比零赔偿,或、更好、缺乏任何提到补偿”。不过,一旦以为外在动机够大的,它带来更好的表NOINCENTIVE情况。这职工在反应中努力积极和消极刺激EGBONUSES和罚款,分别被称为“W因而效应”刺GNEEZY,2004。相反,在最近的实验研究POKORNY2008找到了反向U形关系和奖励努力水准的强度。文通过对比测试上述假说仅仅是在展望的发生率和检验奖金的影响
45、激励强度如下。工人的工资的比例相联系,而不是对工作满意感的奖金具体地说,10波19982007的英国家庭面板调查BHPS之间的相关性用于研究的力量所使用的奖金金额和工作的发生率,抱着PRP和其他重要因素入渗不断在控制个人固定效应如能力或动机的影响倾向工作满意但创造付款方式,发现只有在回应上升的奖金给出了证据,撤销从奖金到下一年可能会产生负面影响,员工用途随时间会减少工作满意,员工潜在的适应支付奖金实证结果提出了GNEEZY一致,因此RUSTICHINI2000年J断言雇主希望激发THEIRSTAFF“支付的确应该足够或不付”。摘要的结构是这样的。第二节从事现有文献的回顾的影响对工作满意感的财政
46、补贴。在第3部分,使用的数据进行了描述,并研究了初步统计公式第四节基本计量了本文方法概述了主要SECTION5需要的结果之间的关系所使用的激励强度和就业SECTION6调查了进一步样品最后异质性SECTION7CONCLUDES。越来越多的经济学文献,在主观幸福感弗雷2002年,中,2003以及奥斯瓦尔德的认可布兰迟福拉PRAAG和FERRERICARBONELL货车,20032007年伊壁鸠鲁弗雷,2008强调的是工作满意度的措施是员工的重要预测因子行为EGQUITS1978,自由的人,CLEGG疾患1983年或劳工生产力、苏达权等,2001年法官。因此,理解的金钱刺激的影响对工作满意感的影
47、响是很重要的构成了员工的薪酬是一个完整的星座的他/她所有的工作条件。一般使用了一个事实公司的一个宽数组是归因于激励仪器的基本代理问题折磨就业的关系斯和WALDMAN,1999。为消除存在的道德风险问题,公司设计激励契约寻求达到的目标则是与他们的员工1976MIRLEESHOLMSTROM,1979年。此外,表示LAZEAR1986年,2000,引入金融报酬应引来更多工人疲于奔命,提出点额外努力,当边际增值等同的边际成本。在LONGRUN平衡,不过,一个不希望发现有什么差异类似的边际效用固定或以下的工人,变量付款机制的期望值更高的工资和PRP下应该只是需要求教他人额外收入,以弥补风险和无用额外的
48、努力MASCOLELLETAL,1995。一旦标准的代理模型假设放松时,虽然,有很多理由预期,PRP可能有中不容忽视的影响工作满意度。EXPECTANCYBASED理论的人相信组织心理学对工作的态度形状奖励的性能提供了价值,结果LAWLER其自身和波特,1990。此外,它已被认为PRP是一个完整的星座的所谓“高性能,工作场所的行为被发现受到工作满意度的正向关系鲍尔,2004。其他方面的PRP可能,虽然如此,减少生产力和职工满意度分析了错误的报酬机制,可以有反作用的后果,因为他们会鼓励员工的GAME补偿系统多任务处理他们的优势贝克1992或通过从事寻租行为的主观评价针对影响的一线经理PRENDE
49、RGAST,1999HOLMSTROM的1982年SEMINALPAPER也表明,利用团队生产的激励方案如5月稀释的利润个人绩效由于FREERIDING。面对证据表明工作满意员工支付他们的相对融为一体的状态克拉克和奥斯瓦德,1996,克拉克,1999FERRERICARBONELL,2005克拉克等J2008年,色散与变异重复工资从PRP方案也可能影响工作态度,在一个负面的时尚。此外,人们已声称财政激励团队协作和破坏,强调权力不对称的管理和劳动力,减少员工承担风险和锐意创新孔恩认为,1993。添加到上面是一个突出的非经济的批评是基于PRP所谓的认知评价或激励挪用假设DECI和瑞恩,1989弗雷和JEGEN,2001根据社会心理学理论一旦被承认个人内在满足感能获得奖励工作时,会被看成是控制设备或指标,雇用关系是一个纯粹的市场交换妥协,都可能工作满意度与绩效,2000,弗雷,1997年,LINDENBERG杂志,2001BOLLE,跟着奥托、2010年。此外,现在有大量的实验研究表明金融可能适得其反充当信号和KOSFELD雇主不信任克,2006年或破坏基于互惠的自主合作1998。直到近来才经济学文献的没有注意到,上述影响工作和PRP效用成为主流。“龙之心”孙俐。迈考斯兰德1992和疾病
