1、1外文题目OWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,CORPORATEPERFORMANCEANDFAILUREEVIDENCEFROMPANELDATAOFEMERGINGMARKETTHECASEOFJORDAN出处CORPORATEOWNERSHIPCONTROL作者RAMIZEITUN原文2OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDFIRMPERFORMANCEADESCRIPTIVEDISCUSSION21OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREMIXANDFIRMPERFORMANCESINCETHEESTABLISHMENTOFTHEASEINTHE1970S，THENUMBEROFLI
2、STEDCOMPANIES，TRADINGVOLUME，ANDTOTALMARKETCAPITALISATIONHAVEINCREASEDDRASTICALLYTABLE1REPORTSTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREOFLISTEDCOMPANIESBYSECTORSDESPITEITSPRIVATISATIONPROGRAM，THEGOVERNMENTSTILLHOLDSALARGESTAKEINMEDIA，UTILITYANDENERGY，ANDSTEEL，MININGANDHEAVYENGINEERINGCOMPANIES4320，3370，AND2204，RESPECTIV
3、ELYBECAUSETHEYARECONSIDEREDSTRATEGICINDUSTRIESINSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPISVERYHIGHINTRANSPORTATION，REALESTATE，ANDTRADEANDCOMMERCIALSERVICESANDRENTAL，ANDCOMMUNICATION4480，4400，AND3689，RESPECTIVELYINDIVIDUALCITIZENSASAGROUPARETHELARGESTSHAREHOLDEROFEDUCATIONALSERVICES，MEDICALPHARMACIES，TEXTILESANDCLOTHING
4、，ANDCONSTRUCTIONANDENGINEERINGTHELARGESTFOREIGNOWNERSHIPSTAKESAREINSTEEL，MININGANDHEAVYENGINEERING，FOLLOWEDBYTOBACCO1605AND1341，RESPECTIVELY，FOREIGNOWNERSHIPISALSOHIGHINTHEINSURANCESECTORTABLE2PRESENTSTHEBASICSTATISTICSOFTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREFORDEFAULTEDANDNONDEFAULTEDFIRMSTHEINDIVIDUALCITIZENOWNSAN
5、AVERAGEOF5142PERCENTOFDEFAULTEDFIRMS，AFIGUREWHICHISLARGERTHAN4536PERCENTINNONDEFAULTEDFIRMSTHEFRACTIONSOFGOVERNMENTANDFOREIGNEROWNERSHIPHAVETHEIRLOWESTMEDIANINTHEDEFAULTEDFIRMS，058AND121PERCENTRESPECTIVELY，COMPAREDWITH237AND420PERCENTINNONDEFAULTEDFIRMSFORGOVERNMENTANDFOREIGNERRESPECTIVELY2THEREARES
6、EVERALNOTABLEDIFFERENCESFIRSTOFALL，DEFAULTEDFIRMSHAVEALOWERMEDIANOFGOVERNMENTOWNERSHIPALSO，THEMEDIANOFINSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPISLOWER，ASISTHEMEDIANOFFOREIGNEROWNERSHIPTABLE2SUGGESTSTHATJORDANIANFIRMSWITHGOVERNMENT，INSTITUTIONAL，ANDFOREIGNOWNERSHIPHAVEALOWERRISKOFFAILUREDEFAULTINTHISANALYSIS，WEWILLCONC
7、ENTRATEONTHEJOINTFACTOROFARABANDFOREIGNOWNERSHIPRATHERTHANTAKINGEACHONESEPARATELYASBOTHOFTHEMARECONSIDEREDFOREIGNOWNERSTHENEXTSECTIONDISCUSSESTHECHARACTERISTICSOFDEFAULTEDFIRMSINTERMSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTABLE1OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREBYSECTORCITIZENSECTORNOOFFIRMSGOVERNMENTCOMPANIESINDIVIDUALFOREIGNFOO
8、DS19106729084783879（2125）（1991）（265）（1676）PAPER,GLASS,AND1275823725481122PACKAGING（1315）（1229）（1992）（1003）STEEL,MININGAND20210420136421605HEAVYENGINEERING（2515）（1798）（2625）（1711）MEDICALPHARMACY11745160765271136（1489）（1256）（1901）（146）CHEMICALAND11278252251631206PETROLEUM（376）（1309）（1606）（2127）TEXTILE
9、SANDCLOTHING8149519375931317（1281）（1493）（2154）（424）UTILITIESANDENERGY11337186341174（3933）（1953）（3145）（1342）TOBACCO3721232853241341（1067）（1464）（1744）（2689）CONSTRUCTIONAND1080623825683102ENGINEERING（1261）（1014）（1945）（943）HOTELSANDTOURISM111802328734711089（2836）（2265）（2441）（1754）TRANSPORTATION101596448
10、3085643（2124）（1717）（2211）（1245）REALESTATE10257443944701（436）（205）（2103）（555）MEDIA54321862332106（2022）（1319）（144）（074）3MEDICALSERVICES502139561912580（3325）（3724）（1959）TRADEANDCOMMERCIALSERVICESAND1587336894583746RENTAL,COMMUNICATION（1794）（2603）（2741）（1089）EDUCATIONALSERVICES313694813509（177）（732）（105
11、8）（34）TABLE2OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONFORDEFAULTEDANDNONDEFAULTEDFIRMSNONDEFAULTEDFIRMS120DEFAULTEDFIRMS47MEANMEDSTDMAXMINMEANMEDSTDMAXMINGOVERNMENT1388237228410001017058191896480COMPANIES262323441872842640264217792467990INDIVIDUALCITIZEN45364673255998776051425394270599870FOREIGN993421404990170754121146
12、28102022OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONITWASESTABLISHEDINTHATTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINTHEASEISHIGHLYCONCENTRATEDTHEMEDIANLARGESTSHAREHOLDERINJORDANISLARGEBYANGLOAMERICANSTANDARDSBUTWITHINTHERANGEOFTHOSEINFRANCEANDSPAIN，20AND34PERCENTRESPECTIVELYTABLE3SHEDSMORELIGHTONTHEOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONFORJORDANIANCOMPANI
13、ESBYSECTORSUSINGFIVEMEASURESOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONACROSSALLFIRMYEARSTHELARGESTSHAREHOLDERC1OWNSTHEHIGHESTPERCENTAGEINTHEHOTELANDTOURISMSECTORANDMEDIASECTOR3532PERCENTAND3550PERCENTRESPECTIVELYTHELARGESTSHAREHOLDERC1OWNSTHELOWESTPERCENTAGEINTHEEDUCATIONALSECTOR786PERCENTTHEDATAALSOREVEALSTHATTHEREI
14、SASUBSTANTIALVARIATIONACROSSFIRMSANDSECTORSINOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONGIVENTHATTHEHOLDINGOFTHELARGESTSHAREHOLDERC1ISSOLARGE，THEOTHERSHAREHOLDERSARESMALLASSHOWNINTABLE3，THECUMULATIVEPERCENTAGEOFOWNERSHIPTAPERSRAPIDLY，ANDTHEREISLITTLEDIFFERENCEBETWEENC3ANDC5INALLSECTORSTHEAVERAGEOFC3ISHIGHESTINTHEMEDIASE
15、CTORFOLLOWEDBYTHE4TRANSPORTATIONSECTORWITH4953PERCENTAND4594PERCENTINEACHSECTORRESPECTIVELYTHEEDUCATIONAL,MEDICALPHARMACY，TOBACCO，ANDPAPER，GLASS，ANDPACKAGINGSECTORSHAVETHELOWESTOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONINTERMSOFTHELARGESTFIVESHAREHOLDERSC5，COMPAREDWITHHIGHESTSTAKEINTRANSPORTATION，MEDIA，ANDTRADE，COMMERC
16、IALSERVICES，RENTALANDCOMMUNICATIONTHEVARIATIONCOULDRELATETOTHECAPITALREQUIREDINTHESESECTORS，ANDALSOTHEIMPORTANCEOFTHESECTOR，OFTENTHEREISHIGHSTATEOWNERSHIPINSECTORSREGARDEDASSTRATEGICTABLE4PRESENTSTHEBASICSTATISTICSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONFORDEFAULTEDANDNONDEFAULTEDFIRMSCONSIDERINGTHEMEDIAN，THELARGES
17、TSHAREHOLDERC1OWNS20PERCENTINTHEDEFAULTEDFIRMS,AFIGUREWHICHISLARGERTHANTHE1886PERCENTINTHENONDEFAULTEDFIRMSTHELARGESTTWOSHAREHOLDERSC2OWN2909PERCENTINTHEDEFAULTEDFIRMS，AFIGUREWHICHISONLYMARGINALLYLARGERTHAN2860PERCENTINTHENONDEFAULTEDFIRMSTHEOTHERMEASURESOFCONCENTRATIONC3，C5，ANDHERFAREALLLARGERINDEF
18、AULTEDTHANNONDEFAULTEDFIRMSTHEDATAALSOREVEALSTHATTHEREISASUBSTANTIALVARIATIONACROSSFIRMSINOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONDESPITETHEHIGHAVERAGE,THELARGESTOWNERSVALUEVARIESBETWEEN0AND100PERCENTINTHISSTUDY，WEUSEDC5ANDHERFINDEXESASINDICTORSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONTOINVESTIGATEWHETHEROWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONINCREAS
19、EDTHEFIRMSPERFORMANCEANDCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEFIRMSDEFAULTTABLE3OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONBYSECTORCUMULATIVEPERCENTAGEOFSHARESCONTROLLEDBYDIFFERENTTYPESOFSHAREHOLDERSSECTORDEFINITIONC1C2C3C5HERF277738064041419113281FOODS（135969）（53521）（55961）（81971）（159966）PAPER,GLASS,18532538270928247112ANDPACKAGING（1453）（20
20、35）（2136）（2255）（1103）STEEL,MININGAND280537434195445714093HEAVYENGINEERING（1872）（249）（2795）（2985）（1295）1108147415641593014MEDICALPHARMACY（1118）（1456）（1547）（1589）（401）5CHEMICALAND17972591289629486915PETROLEUM（1502）（1739）（2014）（2054）（1176）TEXTILESAND15832438398932085396CLOTHING（1005）（1427）（1796）（2035）（
21、491）UTILITIESAND342241894321434923227ENERGY（3153）（3734）（3706）（3736）（3101）12411806203921442928TOBACCO（615）（1015）（1339）（1572）（227）CONSTRUCTIONAND1693249289531486149ENGINEERING（126）（1641）（179）（2064）（75）HOTELSAND3532409143114524196610TOURISM（2447）（2598）（2638）（2709）（2279）240137245945359124911TRANSPORTATI
22、ON（1618）（1995）（2258）（2624）（1379）3094389242714598156812REALESTATE（2147）（2036）（2045）（1984）（1966）35544874853506115513MEDIA（1357）（1629）（1973）（2091）（872）211823223572357138914MEDICALSERVICES（3085）（3055）（3059）（3059）（3293）TRADE，COMMERCIAL3104402142374472162515SERVICES，ETC（2105）（2454）（2556）（2613）（1683）EDUCAT
23、IONAL78611281171117119316SERVICES（945）（136）（1449）（1449）（29）TABLE4OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONFORDEFAULTEDANDNONDEFAULTEDFIRMSNONDEFAULTEDFIRMS120DEFAULTEDFIRMS47MEANMEDSTDMAXMINMEANMEDSTDMAXMINC1240318861973100025942021929906C2321728624211000338429092333990C335323338257610003699362472990C53755357273510003
24、767362531990HERF1162546161810001316561904980104EMPIRICALRESULTSTHEANALYSISOFTHERESULTSISPRESENTEDHEREINSEPARATESUBSECTIONSITBEGINSWITHANANALYSISOFTHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONCORPORATEPERFORMANCE，WHEREOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDMIXAREUSEDINTHEANALYSISTHEANALYSISTHENMOVESTOEXAMININGTHEEFFECTOFOWNERSH
25、IPSTRUCTUREMIXANDCONCENTRATIONONCORPORATEFAILURETHISINCLUDESANANALYSISOFTHESTATISTICALSIGNIFICANCEOFEACHVARIABLETHERANDOMEFFECTSMODELISUSEDTOEXAMINETHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDCONTROLFORTHEEFFECTOFINDUSTRIALSECTORSONCORPORATEPERFORMANCE41OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCEINORDERTOEXPLORET
26、HEAPPROPRIATENESSOFARANDOMEFFECTSMODEL，ABREUSCHPAGANLAGRANGEMULTIPLIERTESTISCONDUCTEDTODETERMINETHEOVERALLSIGNIFICANCEOFTHESEEFFECTSACCORDINGTOTHEBREUSCHPAGANTESTTHENULLHYPOTHESISISTHATRANDOMCOMPONENTSAREEQUALTOZEROTHISTESTALSOPROVIDEDSUPPORTFORTHEGENERALIZEDLEASTSQUARESGLSOVERAPOOLEDORDINARYLEASTSQ
27、UARESOLSREGRESSIONINALLMODELS，THEBREUSCHPAGANLAGRANGEMULTIPLIERTESTSUPPORTEDTHEUSEOFTHERANDOMEFFECTSMODELALSO，THEHAUSMANTESTFAILEDTOREJECTTHENULLHYPOTHESISOFNODIFFERENCEBETWEENTHECOEFFICIENTSOFTHERANDOMANDTHEFIXEDEFFECTSMODELSFOREXAMPLE，THECHI24036，P098ANDCHI2434，P049FORTOBINSQANDMBVR，RESPECTIVELYOU
28、RMODELALSOCONTAINSTIMEINVARIANTVARIABLESWHICHCANNOTBEESTIMATEDUSINGTHEFIXEDEFFECTSMODELTHEOVERALLGOODNESSOFFITR2FORTHERANDOMEFFECTSMODEL，USINGBOTHOWNERSHIPMIXANDCONCENTRATIONANDINDUSTRIALSECTORVARIABLES，ISGREATERTHANTHEGOODNESSOFFITFORTHERANDOMEFFECTSMODELUSINGONLYOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONAGENERALTESTF
29、ORSERIALAUTOCORRELATIONINPANELDATAHASBEENCONDUCTEDUSINGTHETEST7DEVELOPEDBYWOOLDRIDGE2002THENULLHYPOTHESISISTHATTHEREISNOSERIALAUTOCORRELATIONFORTHEDATAEXAMINEDTHEHYPOTHESISISSTRONGLYACCEPTEDASF1，1340847，P03591THEREFORE，OURMODELSDONOTHAVEASERIALAUTOCORRELATIONTHEOVERALLSIGNIFICANCEOFTHEMODELSWASTESTE
30、DUSINGTHEWALDTEST，WHICHHASACHISQUAREDISTRIBUTIONUNDERTHENULLHYPOTHESISTHATALLTHE2EXOGENOUSVARIABLESAREEQUALTOZEROFORALLMODELS，THEVALUEOFTHESTATISTIC2ISSIGNIFICANTATLEASTATTHE1LEVELOFSIGNIFICANCEUSINGROATHEESTIMATIONRESULTSOFEQUATION1AREPRESENTEDINTABLE5ANDTABLE6USINGTHERANDOMEFFECTSMODELTABLE7ANDTAB
31、LE8REPORTTHERESULTSFORTHEESTIMATIONOFEQUATION2TOEXAMINETHEROBUSTNESSOFOURRESULTS，THEMODELINCLUDEDDUMMYVARIABLESTOCONTROLFORINDUSTRYEFFECTS，ANDTHERESULTSAREREPORTEDINAPPENDIX1APPENDIX2ANDAPPENDIX3REPORTTHERESULTOFTHECROSSSECTIONALANALYSISFORTHEMATCHEDSAMPLETOPROVIDEMOREEVIDENCEONTHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPS
32、TRUCTUREONCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHEREGRESSIONMODELUSINGPRICEPERSHARETOEARNINGSPERSHARE，ROE，ISNOTSIGNIFICANTAND，HENCE，ISNOTREPORTEDUSINGTHEPANELDATAANALYSIS411OWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONRESULTSFROMHYPOTHESIS1，THEVARIABLESREPRESENTINGOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONAREEXPECTEDNOTTOHAVEANYSIGNIFICANTIMPACTONCORPORATEPE
33、RFORMANCETWOVARIABLESAREUSED，C5ANDHERFFROMTHEREGRESSIONRESULTSINTABLE5，THEVARIABLEC5WASFOUNDTOHAVEANEGATIVEANDSIGNIFICANTIMPACTONROAATTHE10LEVELOFSIGNIFICANCE，WHILEITHASAPOSITIVEANDSIGNIFICANTIMPACTONMBVRTHEESTIMATEDCOEFFICIENTOFTHEHERFINDICATESTHATITDOESNOTHAVEASIGNIFICANTIMPACTONANYMEASUREOFFIRMPE
34、RFORMANCEORVALUENEITHERTHEHERFNORTHEC5HAVEANYSIGNIFICANTIMPACTONTOBINSQALTHOUGHTHESIGNOFTHECOEFFICIENTWASPOSITIVEINBOTHEQUATIONSTHERESULTFORTOBINSQANDMBVRAREMOREROBUSTASPROVEDBYTHERSQUAREANDWALEDTESTHYPOTHESIS1ISTHUSREJECTEDASC5ISSIGNIFICANTLYDIFFERENTFROMZEROINREGRESSIONSOFROAANDMBVRASCONCENTRATION
35、ISIMMENSELYDIFFERENTFROMINDUSTRYTOINDUSTRY，THISGIVESRISETOTHEPOTENTIALFORINDUSTRYEFFECTSOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONONAFIRMSVALUESEETABLE4ITCANBEARGUEDTHATTHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONMAYBEDIFFERENTFROMONEINDUSTRY8TOANOTHERTOCONTROLFORPOTENTIALINDUSTRYEFFECTS，15INDUSTRIALDUMMYVARIABLESWERETAKENANDEQ
36、UATION1WASREESTIMATEDTHERESULTS，REPORTEDINTABLE6，ALMOSTCHANGEDTHESIGNIFICANCEOFC5THELARGESTFIVESHAREHOLDERS，C5，BECAMEINSIGNIFICANTINROA，WHILETHESIGNIFICANCEOFC5INCREASEDINMBVRFURTHERMORE，OFTHE15INDUSTRIALDUMMYVARIABLES，ONLYTHATFORSECTOR8WASFOUNDTOHAVEAPOSITIVEIMPACTONAFIRMSPERFORMANCEROAALSO，ALLTHEC
37、OEFFICIENTSOFTHEINDUSTRIALVARIABLESWEREFOUNDTOHAVEANEGATIVEANDSIGNIFICANTIMPACTONAFIRMSVALUEMEASUREDBYTOBINSQITSHOULDBENOTEDTHATTHESIGNIFICANCEOFTHESEINDUSTRIALSECTORSMAYIMPLYPRESENCEOFINDUSTRYSECTORTHESIGNIFICANTIMPACTOFCONCENTRATIONRATIOSONMBVRSUPPORTSTHESHLEIFERANDVISHNYHYPOTHESIS1986THATLARGESHA
38、REHOLDERSMAYREDUCETHEPROBLEMOFSMALLINVESTORSAND，HENCE，INCREASETHEFIRMSPERFORMANCETHEFINDINGOFAPOSITIVEANDSIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCEISCONSISTENTWITHPRIORRESEARCHBASEDONADVANCEDCAPITALMARKETSINCLUDINGHILLANDSNELL1988，1989，KAPLANANDMINTON1994，ANDMORCK，NA
39、KAMURAANDSHIVDASANI2000，AMONGOTHERSHOWEVER，THISFINDINGISINCONSISTENTWITHTHERESULTOFWUANDCUI2002THATTHEREISAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDACCOUNTINGPROFITSINDICATEDBYROA，BUTCONSISTENTWITHTHERESULTOFLEECHANDLEAHY1991ANDMUDAMBIANDNICOSIA1998THEINSIGNIFICANTRESULTFORCONCENTRATIONVA
40、RIABLEINTHETOBINSQEQUATIONCOULDSUGGESTTHATTHEJORDANIANEQUITYMARKETISINEFFICIENTORTHERECOULDBEOTHERFACTORSTHATAFFECTTHEMARKETPERFORMANCEMEASURE，WHICHWEREMISSEDINOURMODELSTHESERESULTSARECONSISTENTWITHABDELSHAHID2003，THATROAISTHEMOSTIMPORTANTFACTORUSEDBYINVESTORSRATHERTHANTHEMARKETMEASUREOFPERFORMANCE9
41、外文题目OWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,CORPORATEPERFORMANCEANDFAILUREEVIDENCEFROMPANELDATAOFEMERGINGMARKETTHECASEOFJORDAN出处CORPORATEOWNERSHIPCONTROL作者RAMIZEITUN译文2股权结果与公司绩效一个描述性探讨21股权结构组合和公司绩效美国证券交易所自二十世纪70年代建立以来,在其交易所上市的公司的交易量及市值大幅增加。表1列出了不同行业上市公司的股权结构。尽管公司已进行私有化，但是政府在传媒中介行业，能源部门，钢铁、采掘业部门持有大量股份（分别为432，337，2204），因为
42、他们被视为战略产业。机构投资者在交通运输行业，房地产行业，商业服务行业持有很高的股份（分别为448，44，3689）。在教育部门、医疗行业、纺织业、建筑业，个体市民是其最大的股东。在钢铁、采掘业部门，烟草业，国外投资者是其最大的股东（分别为1605，1341），当然在保险业外资持股也很高。表2列出了非违约公司和违约公司股权结构的基本统计值。个体（市民）在违约公司的平均值为5142，高于非违约公司的平均值4536。政府和国外投资者在违约公司的中位数最低分别为058和121，而在非违约公司的中位数为237和42。几个值得注意的差异。首先，违约公司政府所有权的中位数较低。其次，机构投资者和国外投资者
43、所有权的中位数也较低。表2表明了约旦公司与政府、机构和国外投资者所有权的违约风险很低（在此分析中，我们将阿拉伯作为国外投资者来考虑，而非将其独立开来）。接下来将讨论违约公司股权集中度的特点。10表1不同行业的股权结构市民行业企业数政府企业个体国外投资者19106729084783879副食品（2125）（1991）26516761275823725481122纸、玻璃包装业（1315）（1229）（1992）100320210420136421605钢铁、采掘重工业（2515）（1798）（2625）171111745160765271136医疗制药业（1489）（1256）（1901）（14
44、6）11278252251631206石油化工业（376）（1309）（1606）（2127）8149519375931317纺织业（1281）（1493）（2154）（424）11337186341174能源、公共事业（3933）（1953）（3145）（1342）3721232853241341烟草业（1067）（1464）（1744）（2689）1080623825683102建筑业126110141945）（943）111802328734711089酒店旅游业28362265244117541015964483085643运输业2124171722111245102574439447
45、01房地产业436205210355554321862332106传媒中介2022131914407450213956191258医疗服务业03325372419591587336894583746贸易服务通讯业1794260327411089313694813509教育业177732105834表2非违约公司和违约公司的股权集中度非违约公司120违约公司4711平均值中位数标准差最大值最小值平均值中位数标准差最大值最小值政府1388237228410001017058191896480企业26232344187284260264217792467990个体市民4536467325599878
46、051425394270599870国外投资者9934214049902075412114628102021股权集中度在美国证券交易所上市的公司有较高的股权集中度（英美标准下，在约旦第一大股东的中位数最大，但是在法国和西班牙分别为20和34）。表3更明确的列示了五种方法衡量的不同行业的股权集中度。第一大股东（C1）在酒店旅游业和传媒中介部门拥有最高的持股比例（分别为3532和355），而在教育部门拥有的比例最低（为786）。这些数据还显示，不同公司不同行业的股权集中度存在很大差异。鉴于第一大股东的持股比例如此之大，那么其他股东的持股比例都很小。如表3所示，股权的累计百分比迅速上升，所有部门的前
47、三大股东（C3）的持股比例与前五大股东（C5）的持股比例相差不大。前三大股东的持股比例最高的是传媒领域，紧随其后的是运输业（分别为4953和4594）。前五大股东的持股比例在教育行业，医疗制造业，烟草业，纸、玻璃包装业最低，而最高的是在运输业，传媒领域，贸易服务租赁通讯领域。这一差异，涉及到这些部门的资本需求，并在这领域的重要性，通常这些部门具有高度的国家所有权而被视为战略产业。表4列示了违约公司和非违约公司股权集中度的基本统计值。考虑中位数，第一大股东（C1）在违约公司的持股比例为20高于在非违约公司的持股比例1886。前两大股东（C2）在违约公司的持股比例为2909，也高于在非违约公司的持
48、股比例286。违约公司的前三大股东、前五大股东的持股比例以及赫芬达尔指数（HERF）都较非违约公司高。这些数据还表明公司的股权集中度存在很大的差异尽管最大股东的价值有较高的平均值，但是差异在0到10012之间。在本项研究中，我们使用前五大股东（C5）和赫芬达尔指数（HERF）作为股权集中度指标，以研究股权集中度的增加是否会提高公司绩效和降低公司违约。表3不同行业的股权集中度不同股东持股的累计百分比行业名称C1C2C3C5HERF277738064041419113281副食品（135969）（53521）（55961）（81971）（159966）18532538270928247112纸玻璃
49、包装业（1453）（2035）（2136）（2255）（1103）280537434195445714093钢铁、采掘业（1872）（249）（2795）（2985）（1295）1108147415641593014医疗制药业（1118）（1456）（1547）（1589）（401）17972591289629486915石油化工业（1502）（1739）（2014）（2054）（1176）15832438398932085396纺织业（1005）（1427）（1796）（2035）（491）342241894321434923227能源公共事业（3153）（3734）（3706）（3736）（3101）12411806203921442928烟草业（615）（1015）（1339）（1572）（227）1693249289531486149建筑业（126）（641）（179）（2064）（75）3532409143114524196610酒店旅游业（2447）（2598）（2638）（2709）（2279）240137245945359124911运输业（1618）（1995）（2258）（2624
