破产成本与融资租赁决策[文献翻译].doc

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1、外文题目BANKRUPTCYCOSTSANDTHEFINANCIALLEASINGDECISION出处FINANCIALMANAGEMENT作者SIVARAMAKRISHNANANDCHARLESMOYER原文ABSTRACTTHETHEORYOFFINANCIALLEASINGVIEWSFINANCIALLEASESASSUBSTITUTESFORSECUREDDEBTEMPIRICALSTUDIESHAVEREPORTEDAHIGHPOSITIVECORRELATIONBETWEENLEASERATIOSANDDEBTRATIOSANDTHATLESSORSEARNHIGHERRATESO

2、FRETURNTHANLENDERSTHESERESULTSCONTRADICTTRADITIONALLEASINGTHEORYTHEYAREEXPLAINEDINTHISPAPERBYRECOGNIZINGTHEROLEBANKRUPTCYCOSTSPLAYINTHELEASE/BORROWDECISIONANDTHENATUREOFTHEASSETSTOBEACQUIREDBYAFIRMLEASINGISSHOWNTOINVOLVELOWERBANKRUPTCYCOSTSTHANBORROWINGOUREMPIRICALANALYSISSHOWSTHATLESSEEFIRMSHAVELOW

3、ERRETAINEDEARNINGSRELATIVETOTOTALASSETS,HIGHERGROWTHRATES,LOWERCOVERAGERATIOS,HIGHERDEBTRATIOS,ANDHIGHEROPERATINGRISKTHANNONLESSEEFIRMSLESSEEFIRMSALSOHAVESIGNIFICANTLYLOWERALTMANZSCORES,AMEASUREOFBANKRUPTCYPOTENTIALOVERALL,OURRESULTSINDICATETHATASBANKRUPTCYPOTENTIALINCREASES,LEASEFINANCINGBECOMESANI

4、NCREASINGLYATTRACTIVEFINANCINGOPTIONWEALSOFINDEVIDENCETOSUPPORTANINDUSTRYCLIENTELEEFFECTINFINANCIALLEASINGTHISPAPERREEXAMINESTHELEASE/BORROWDECISION,GIVINGEXPLICITRECOGNITIONTOTHEROLEBANKRUPTCYCOSTSPLAYANDTOTHERELATIVETRANSACTIONSCOSTSOFLEASINGANDBORROWINGOURFOCUSISONNONCANCELLABLE,LONGTERMFINANCIAL

5、LEASESBECAUSETHEYAREMOSTNEARLYTHEEQUIVALENTOFDEBTFINANCINGWELIMITOURCONSIDERATIONOFFINANCIALLEASINGTOCAPITALLEASES,ASDEFINEDINFASBSTATEMENT13BECAUSECAPITALLEASESGENERALLYDONOTMEETTHELEASEDEFINITIONREQUIREMENTSOFTHEINTERNALREVENUESERVICEREVENUEPROCEDURE7521,THEYPROVIDEAUNIQUEOPPORTUNITYTOTESTNONTAXTH

6、EORIESOFLEASINGTHEPAPEREMPHASIZESLESSEEFIRMCHARACTERISTICSTHATINDUCESIGNIFICANTLEASINGBEHAVIOR,RATHERTHANTHECHARACTERISTICSOFSPECIFICLEASECONTRACTSLEASINGISSHOWNTOHAVELOWEREXPECTEDBANKRUPTCYCOSTSTOTHELESSORTHANBORROWINGHASTOTHELENDER,RESULTINGINLOWERFINANCINGCOSTSFORTHELESSEETHANTHEBORROWER,CETERISP

7、ARIBUSOFFSETTINGTHELOWERBANKRUPTCYCOSTSASSOCIATEDWITHLEASINGARETHEGENERALLYHIGHERTRANSACTIONSCOSTSOFLEASINGRELATIVETOBORROWINGTHETRADEOFFBETWEENBANKRUPTCYCOSTSANDTRANSACTIONSCOSTSMAYEXPLAINTHEPREFERENCEFORBORROWINGBYMORECREDITWORTHYFIRMSANDFORLEASINGBYLESSCREDITWORTHYFIRMSWEFINDSUPPORTFORTHEBANKRUPT

8、CYCOSTARGUMENTASANEXPLANATIONFORTHELEASEVERSUSBORROWDECISIONOURRESULTSARECONSISTENTWITHAPECKINGORDERTHEORYOFFINANCINGWHEREFIRMSWITHGREATERFINANCIALDISTRESSPOTENTIALANDHIGHDEBTLEVERAGE,CETERISPARIBUS,MAYFINDFINANCINGALTERNATIVESTOLEASINGUNAVAILABLEALSO,WEFINDTHATLEASINGISASIGNIFICANTLYLESSCOMMONMETHO

9、DOFFINANCINGFORFIRMSINMANUFACTURINGINDUSTRIES,WHEREASSETSPECIFICITYISGREATER,THANFORFIRMSINMOSTOTHERMAJORINDUSTRYGROUPINGS1LITERATUREREVIEWTHETHEORYOFFINANCIALLEASINGEGBOWER1973,BREALEYANDYOUNG1980,BRICK,FUNG,ANDSUBRAHMANYAM1987,LEWELLEN,LONG,ANDMCCONNELL1976,MILLERANDUPTON1976,ANDMYERS,DILL,ANDBAUT

10、ISTA1976TRADITIONALLYHASFOCUSEDONTHEDIFFERENTIALTAXPOSITIONOFTHELESSEEANDTHELESSORASTHEPRIMARYRATIONALEFORLEASINGBRICK,FUNG,ANDSUBRAHMANYAM1987EXTENDEDTHETAXBASEDANALYSISTOCONSIDERECONOMIESOFSCALEINSTRUCTURINGLEASECONTRACTSANDTHECOSTOFMANAGINGCASHFLOWSINTHEPRESENCEOFDEFAULTRISKANDINTERESTRATEUNCERTA

11、INTYDELATORREANDBENJAMIN1991,KRAHANANDMERAN1987,ANDLEASE,MCCONNELL,ANDSCHALLHEIM1990CONSIDERTHEROLEOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESBETWEENTHELESSEEANDTHELESSORREGARDINGTHERESIDUALVALUEOFTHELEASEDASSETASAFURTHEREXPLANATIONFORLEASEFINANCINGEMPIRICALSTUDIESOFLEASING,INCLUDINGCRAWFORD,HARPER,ANDMCCONNELLCHM1981

12、,GUDIKUNSTANDROBERTS1978,ROENFELDTANDHENRY1979,SCHALLHEIM,JOHNSON,LEASE,ANDMCCONNELL1987,ANDSORENSENANDJOHNSON1977HAVEREPORTEDHIGHEXANTERETURNSFORLESSORS,ANDBYIMPLICATION,HIGHLEASERATESPAIDBYLESSEESFOREXAMPLE,CRAWFORD,HARPER,ANDMCCONNELLFOUNDTHATLESSORSEXANTERATESOFRETURNWERESIGNIFICANTLYHIGHERTHANT

13、HEYIELDONBBBRATEDBONDSDURINGTHESAMETIMEPERIODLEASE,MCCONNELL,ANDSCHALLHEIM1990DOCUMENTEDHIGHREALIZEDRETURNSONFINANCIALLEASINGCONTRACTS,ALTHOUGHTHEREALIZEDRETURNSWERELESSTHANTHEEXPECTEDRETURNSFURTHER,THEYFOUNDTHATREALIZEDSALVAGEVALUESTENDEDTOEXCEEDGREATLYTHEACTUALSALVAGEVALUESONWHICHTHELEASECONTRACTW

14、ASBASEDINADDITION,ANGANDPETERSON1984ANDBOWMAN1980FOUNDTHATDEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGWERESIGNIFICANTLY,POSITIVELYCORRELATED,IMPLYINGTHATDEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGARECOMPLEMENTSNOTSUBSTITUTESANGANDPETERSONFOUNDTHATTAXRATEDIFFERENCESBETWEENLEASINGANDNONLEASINGFIRMSCANNOTEXPLAINTHECOMPLEMENTARYRELATIONSHIPBETWEEN

15、DEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGMARSTONANDHARRIS1988PROVIDEONEPOSSIBLEEXPLANATIONFORTHISAPPARENTANOMALYTHEYSTUDIEDCHANGESINTHEDEBTRATIOANDLEASERATIOFORINDIVIDUALFIRMSOVERTIMEANDFOUNDTHEMTOBEINVERSELYRELATEDCONFIRMINGTHATDEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGARESUBSTITUTESTHATIS,FOREACHFIRM,DEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGARESUBSTITUTES,B

16、UTFIRMSEMPLOYINGLEASEFINANCINGTYPICALLYUSEHIGHERLEVELSOFDEBTCOMPAREDTOFIRMSTHATDONOTUSELEASEFINANCINGFINUCANE1988ALSOFOUNDEVIDENCEOFAPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENDEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGFINUCANESHOWSTHATFIRMSINCERTAININDUSTRIES,INCLUDINGAIRTRANSPORTANDRETAILING,RELYMOREHEAVILYONLEASEFINANCINGTHANOTHERSAC

17、ROSSSECTIONALANALYSISREVEALEDTHATTHELEASERATIOCAPITALIZEDLEASESTOTOTALASSETSISRELATEDTOSEVERALVARIABLES,INCLUDINGTHELEVELOFMORTGAGEDEBTANDTHEBONDRATINGFORTHEFIRMFIRMSWITHLOWERBONDRATINGSWEREFOUNDTOLEASEMOREFREQUENTLYARESULTTHATISCONSISTENTWITHOUREXPECTEDBANKRUPTCYCOSTHYPOTHESISTAXRELATEDFACTORSWEREN

18、OTFOUNDTOBEIMPORTANTINEXPLAININGTHELEVELOFLEASINGBYAFIRMVORAANDEZZELL1991FOUNDSIGNIFICANTTAXRATEDIFFERENCESBETWEENLESSEESANDLESSORS,ALTHOUGHTHEYFOUNDTHATTHELESSEESTAXRATEISNOTNECESSARILYLOWERTHANTHERESPECTIVELESSORSSMITHANDWAKEMAN1985OFFERACOMPREHENSIVEANALYSISOFTHERATIONALEFORLEASINGTHATHELPSTOEXPL

19、AINMANYOFTHESESEEMINGLYANOMALOUSEMPIRICALFINDINGSFOREXAMPLE,THEHIGHRATESOFRETURNEXPECTEDANDACTUALLYEARNEDBYLESSORSMAYBEATTRIBUTEDTOEITHERACOMPARATIVEADVANTAGEOFTHELESSORINDISPOSINGOFASSETSATTHETERMINATIONOFALEASEORTHEABILITYOFTHELESSORTOEXERCISEMARKETPOWERANDTOPRICEDISCRIMINATEAMONGVARIOUSASSETUSERG

20、ROUPSSMITHANDWAKEMANARGUEFURTHERTHATTHEANGANDPETERSONFINDINGTHATLEASINGANDBORROWINGARECOMPLEMENTARYCANBEEXPLAINEDACROSSFIRMSBYEXAMININGTHECHARACTERISTICSOFFIRMSINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITYSETSLEWISANDSCHALLHEIM1992MODELTHEDEBT/LEASEFINANCINGDECISIONASASUBSTITUTIONBETWEENDEBTANDNONDEBTTAXSHIELDSINTHEIRMODEL

21、,NONDEBTTAXSHIELDSARESOLD,VIALEASING,THEREBYREDUCINGTHEPOTENTIALREDUNDANCYWITHINTERESTDEDUCTIONSANDMAKINGTHEMARGINALVALUEOFDEBTPOSITIVETHELESSEERESPONDSBYISSUINGADDITIONALDEBT,WHICHACCOUNTSFORTHEPOSITIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENDEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGTHEBENEFITFROMLEASINGINTHISMODELISREALIZEDEVENIFTHEMARGIN

22、ALTAXRATEISTHESAMEFORTHELESSEEANDLESSORINTHENEXTSECTIONWEPRESENTANONTAXRATIONALEFORFINANCIALCAPITALLEASINGTHATOFFERSADDITIONALINSIGHTREGARDINGTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENDEBTANDLEASEFINANCINGIIANONTAXRATIONALEFORLEASINGBARRO1976,BENJAMIN1978,JACKSONANDKRONMAN1979,SCOTT1977,ANDSMITHANDWARNER1979SUGGESTTHAT

23、SECUREDDEBTISAFINANCIALCONTRACTINGMECHANISMAIMEDATREDUCINGTHEPOTENTIALAGENCYCOSTSOFDEBTSTULZANDJOHNSON1985FORMALIZETHEEARLIERANALYSISANDSHOWTHATSECUREDDEBTREDUCESPOTENTIALRISKTAKINGBEHAVIOROFTHEBORROWERANDTHUSREDUCESMONITORINGCOSTSTOTHELENDERLEETHANDSCOTT1989FOUNDTHATSECUREDDEBTISPOSITIVELYASSOCIATE

24、DWITHLOANDEFAULTPROBABILITY,ASSETMARKETABILITY,ANDLOANSIZERETAININGTHEOPTIONTOISSUESECUREDDEBTALSOCONTROLSTHEUNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEMSIDENTIFIEDBYMYERS1977MANYOFTHEPROPERTIESOFSECUREDDEBTCANBEEXTENDEDTOFINANCIALCAPITALLEASING,BECAUSECAPITALLEASESIMPOSECONSEQUENCESONAFIRMTHATARESIMILARTOSECUREDDEBTFINA

25、NCINGFOLLOWINGLEETHANDSCOTT1989ANDSCOTT1977,ITCANBEARGUEDTHATLEASESHAVELOWEREXPECTEDBANKRUPTCYCOSTSFORTHELESSORTHANSECUREDDEBTHASFORTHELENDER,THEREBYMAKINGLEASINGAPREFERREDFINANCINGALTERNATIVEFORFIRMSWITHAHIGHERPOTENTIALFORFINANCIALDISTRESSTHELEGALTREATMENTOFTHECLAIMSOFLESSORSISDIFFERENTFROMTHETREAT

26、MENTOFTHECLAIMSOFSECUREDLENDERSINBANKRUPTCYTHECLAIMSOFSECUREDCREDITORSAREDILUTEDCONSIDERABLYMORETHANCOMPARABLECLAIMSOFLESSORSINBANKRUPTCIESFOLLOWEDBYREORGANIZATIONADEBTORMAYFILEAPETITIONFORRELIEFEITHERUNDERCHAPTER11OFTHEBANKRUPTCYCODEFORTHEPURPOSEOFREORGANIZATIONORUNDERCHAPTER7FORLIQUIDATIONUPONFILI

27、NGTHEPETITION,THEDEBTOROBTAINSIMMEDIATERELIEFINTHEFORMOFANAUTOMATICSTAYTHATPREVENTSCREDITORACTIONSORENFORCEMENTSAGAINSTTHEDEBTORWHILETHESTAYISINFORCE,CREDITORSANDLESSORSARENOTABLETOENFORCELIENSTHESTAYALSOPREVENTSANYACTTOOBTAINPOSSESSIONOFANYPROPERTY,REGARDLESSOFWHOHOLDSTHETITLETHESTAYISTERMINATEDATT

28、HEENDOF30DAYSUNLESSTHEBANKRUPTCYCOURTORDERSITSCONTINUANCETHETREATMENTOFLESSORSANDSECUREDCREDITORSAPPEARSTOBEIDENTICALATTHISSTAGEINSUBSEQUENTSTATESOFTHEREORGANIZATIONPROCEEDINGSHOWEVER,THEREARESIGNIFICANTDIFFERENCESTHECLAIMSOFTHESECUREDLENDERENJOYPRIORITYINTHEDISTRIBUTIONOFTHEPROCEEDSOFTHECOLLATERALI

29、FTHEVALUEOFTHECOLLATERALISLESSTHANTHEAMOUNTOFTHEDEBT,THESECUREDLENDERISENTITLEDTOTHEVALUEOFTHECOLLATERAL,ANDTHEDIFFERENCEISTREATEDASANUNSECUREDCLAIMTHESECUREDCREDITORMAYSUFFERWHENTHEASSETISRETAINEDINREORGANIZATIONINMOSTREORGANIZATIONS,THESECUREDCREDITORMUSTSETTLEFORANEXCHANGEOFSECURITIESTHATERODESTH

30、EVALUEOFTHESECUREDCREDITORSCLAIMSWARNER1977DISCUSSESTHEIMPLICATIONSOFTHISTREATMENTFORTHEPERIODPRIORTOTHEPASSAGEOFTHEBANKRUPTCYREFORMACTOF1978THE”1978”ACTTHE1978ACTHASIMPROVEDTHEPROTECTIONAVAILABLETOSECUREDCREDITORS,BUTPROTECTIONOFSECUREDCREDITORSISSUBSTANTIALLYLESSTHANTHATAFFORDEDLESSORSINSIMILARCIR

31、CUMSTANCESALESSORALSOSUFFERSANEROSIONOFRIGHTSINTHEEVENTOFBANKRUPTCYBYTHELESSEENORMALLY,ITISNOTPOSSIBLETOTAKEENFORCEMENTACTIONDURINGTHEPERIODOFTHEAUTOMATICSTAYFURTHERMORE,THEEVENTOFBANKRUPTCYITSELFDOESNOTREPRESENTADEFAULTONTHETERMSOFTHELEASE,PERSETHE1978ACTPROVIDESTHATTHEDEBTORORTHEBANKRUPTCYCOURTCAN

32、ENFORCECONTINUANCEOFALEASEWHILEADEBTORISINREORGANIZATION,THEDEBTORMUSTAGREETOASSUMETHELEASE,SUBJECTTOBANKRUPTCYCOURTAPPROVAL,WITHIN60DAYSOFTHEDATETHEBANKRUPTCYPETITIONISFILED,ALTHOUGHTHISPERIODMAYBEEXTENDEDBYTHECOURTHOWEVER,THEDEBTORMAYNOTASSUMETHELEASEIFTHEREHASBEENANYDEFAULT,UNLESSTHEDEBTOR1CURES,

33、ORPROVIDESADEQUATEASSURANCETHATTHEDEBTORWILLPROMPTLYCURE,THEDEFAULT2COMPENSATES,ORPROVIDESADEQUATEASSURANCETHATTHEDEBTORWILLPROMPTLYCOMPENSATE,THELESSORFORANYACTUALPECUNIARYLOSSARISINGFROMSUCHDEFAULTAND3PROVIDESADEQUATEASSURANCEOFTHEFUTUREPERFORMANCEUNDERTHELEASECONTRACTCURINGTHEDEFAULTREQUIRESPAYME

34、NTTOTHELESSOROFALLPASTDUECLAIMSANDCOMPLIANCEWITHANYOTHEROBLIGATIONSTHEDEBTORMUSTGUARANTEETHATTHELEASEPAYMENTSWILLBEKEPTCURRENTANDTHATTHELESSEESOTHEROBLIGATIONSUNDERTHELEASEWILLBEFULFILLEDMAPOTHER1984ALSO,THEBANKRUPTCYCODEGIVESTHEDEBTORTHERIGHTTOREJECTANYEXECUTORYCONTRACTINCLUDINGLEASESWITHIN60DAYSOF

35、FILING外文题目BANKRUPTCYCOSTSANDTHEFINANCIALLEASINGDECISION出处FINANCIALMANAGEMENT作者SIVARAMAKRISHNANANDCHARLESMOYER译文破产成本与融资租赁决策摘要金融租赁理论观点认为金融租赁是融资租赁担保债务的替代品。实证研究报告指出,租赁比率和债务比率有着一个很高的正相关性,出租人比放款人得到更高的回报。这些结果违背传统的租赁理论。这些都将在,租赁/借进情形中破产成本所扮演的角色被认可和一个公司取得的资产的性质中,被解释。租赁比起借贷来,破产成本有所降低。我们的实证分析表明,有承租人的公司比起无承租人的公司

36、,总资产方面有较低的留存收益,较高的成长率,较低的覆盖率,和较高的经营风险。总的来说,我们的结果表明,随着破产潜力的增加,融资租赁变得越来越有吸引力。我们也找到证据来支持产业顾问在金融租赁业的影响。本文重新审视如何做租赁/借用的决定,对破产成本和相对交易租赁及借贷成本所发挥的作用,给予了明确承认。我们的重点是不可撤销的长期的金融租赁,因为它们和金融债务最相像。我们限制金融租赁中资产租赁需要考虑的因素,如财务会计准则委员会的第13号声明。由于融资租赁一般不符合美国国税局租赁定义的要求,他们提供了一个独特的机会来检验租赁的非税收理论。该文件强调了承租人公司的特征,包括具体的租赁合同和重大的租赁行为

37、的特征,而不是具体租赁合同的特点。租赁的定义证明,其它条件不变,承租人向出租人借款比借款人向贷款人借款,有较低的预期破产成本,这便造成了降低融资成本的结果。相对借款,租赁抵消了较低的破产与租赁相关的费用,有普遍较高的交易成本。破产成本和交易成本之间的权衡可以为越来越有信誉的企业接待和租赁公司的资信较差的偏好作解释。我们发现破产成本参数被作为解释借用和租赁决定的一个依据。我们的研究结果符合融资顺位理论,其他条件不变,企业会发现融资租赁的替代品无法一致则有更大的潜在的财务危机和高负债的杠杆作用。此外,我们发现,金融租赁在资产专用性比其他主要行业更大的制造企业来说,是不普遍但作用显著的一个办法。1文

38、献回顾金融租赁理论(如鲍尔1973,巴里和约昂1980,贝利克,凡和苏伯拉曼1987,拉威力,隆,和麦克奈尔1976,米勒和阿普顿1976,和马耶尔,迪尔,和巴蒂斯塔1976),传统上侧重在赋税低位不同的承租人和出租人的不同租赁的主要理由上。贝利克,凡,和苏伯拉曼1987扩大了税收基础的分析,考虑规模在构建租赁合同和管理中的违约风险和利率的不确定性存在的现金流量的成本效益。达拉托里和本杰明1991,卡拉汉和马拉1987,和里斯,麦克奈尔,和斯科菲1990考虑进一步解释承租人与出租人之间的信息不对称给租赁资产的残值租赁融资带来的作用。实证租赁的研究,包括克拉夫特,哈勃,和麦克奈尔CHM1981,

39、古蒂卡斯特和罗伯特1978,罗菲特和亨利1979,斯科菲,约翰,里斯和麦克奈尔1987,塞拉森和约翰森1977,报告了出租人事前的高回报,并暗示了由承租人支付的高利率租金。例如,克拉夫特,哈勃,和麦克奈尔发现出租人事前的回报率在同一时间段上明显高于BBB级债券的收益率。里斯,麦克奈尔和斯科菲1990记录实现金融租赁合同的高回报,尽管现实收益均高于预期回报。此外,他们还发现,可实现的残值往往大大超过以租赁合同为基础实际残值。此外,昂、皮特森1984和鲍曼1980发现,债务和融资租赁成正相关,这意味着债务和融资租赁是互补的,而不是替代的。昂和皮特森发现,在租赁和非租赁公司税率差异不能解释债务和融资

40、租赁之间的互补关系。玛斯顿和哈里斯1988提供了一个关于研究负债率和出租率随着时间的推移的可能解释,个别公司改变了这种明显的差异,并发现它们可能是负相关,这就确认了债务和融资租赁的替代品的观点。也就是说,对于每个企业来说,债务是融资租赁的替代品,而采用租赁融资公司的债务通常要比不使用融资租赁的公司的债务高。菲努克1988也发现了债务与融资租赁正相关的证据,他指出,在某些行业包括航空运输和零售业的公司,比其他行业更多地依靠租赁。一个横断面分析显示,租赁比率(总资产资本租赁),是与包括抵押贷款债务水平和公司债券评级几个变量有关的。债券评级较低的企业被发现租赁更加频繁,这一结果与我们预期的破产成本假

41、说是一致的。未发现与税务有关的因素对一个公司的租赁水平的重要性的依据。维拉和阿泽尔1991发现尽管承租人的税率不一定比各自的出租人的低,但是他们发现了承租人和出租人之间的重大利率差别,斯密斯和维克曼1985提供了租赁存在原因理解性分析,这有助于解释许多看似反常的实证研究结果并进行综合分析。例如,出租人预期的高回报率和实际获得的回报,将归因于出租人的比较优势在租赁资产处置的终止,或出租人行使市场权利的能力在各种资产之间的用户群体的价格歧视。斯密斯和维克曼他们进一步论证了昂和皮特森租赁和借贷是互补的发现,可以依据公司在审核企业的投资机会的特征来解释。里维斯和斯科菲1992把债务/租赁的融资决策作为

42、一种债务与非常债务税盾的替代品的模型。在他们的模型中,非债务税盾通过租赁进行销售,从而减少冗余与利息扣除额,使潜在的债务积极的实现它的边际价值。承租人通过增发债券的响应,使债务和融资租赁之间成正相关。在这个模型中,租赁的好处是实现了承租人与出租人相同的边际税率相同。在下一节中,我们提出一个金融(资本)租赁关于债务和融资租赁关系的非税的理由的额外了解。2租赁的非税原理巴罗1976,本杰明1978,杰克森和克拉曼1979,斯科特1977,斯密斯和维纳1979提出,金融承包机制的债务担保是以减少潜在的债务代理成本为目的的。斯塔兹和约翰森1985早期的分析表明,担保债务的行为降低了借款人承担的潜在的风

43、险,从而也降低了贷款人的成本监控。李斯和斯科特1989发现,有担保的债务正与贷款违约概率、资产市场化、和贷款规模有关。迈尔斯1977提出了有保留的选择发行有担保债务也控制了投资不足的问题。有担保债务的许多属性可以扩展到金融(资本)租赁,融资租赁的范围,因为担保债务需要强加给一个公司,所以类似的担保债务融资有不好的后果。继李斯1989和斯科特1977之后,它可以说,租赁期限为贷款人的担保债务出租人比预期破产成本的有所降低,从而使融资公司中找到一个替代更高的潜在财务危机的首选的苦恼问题。对出租人索赔的法律待遇是与破产的有担保放款债券的处理不同的。对有担保债权人的债权被淡化的程度大大超过遵循出租人可

44、索赔破产重组的比较条款。债务人可以根据破产法第11条的救济申请或清算法第七章规定的以重组为目的,提交请愿书申请后,债务人便获得了一个自动中止的时间,防止债务人对债权人的行为或执法行动的形式的即时援助。而在措施生效时,债权人(或出租人)不能执行留置权。中止还可以防止取得任何不管是谁拥有占有财产的行为。中止命令会在法院破产命令的30天之后终止,除非破产法庭裁决继续执行。对出租人和担保债券人的待遇似乎是与这个阶段相同。可是,在重组程序之后的国家,有着显著的差异。有担保贷款人享有优先分配的抵押品债权收益的权利。如果抵押品的价值低于债务金额,担保放款人有权对抵押物的价值及其差额作为无担保债权处理。在担保

45、债权人可能蒙受资产损失时,在重组中保留。在大多数重组中,有担保债权人必须解决的一个问题是,证券交易侵犯了有担保债权人的债权价值。华纳(1997)讨论了之前的通过的1978年的破产改革法(“1978年法案”)处理方法的影响。1978年的破产法,提高了保护债权人提供的担保,但担保债权人的保护在类似情况下大大低于出租人给予的。出租人还遭受了在破产事件中承租人的权利受侵犯的行为。通常情况下,它不可能在执法行动期间自动中止。此外,破产事件本身并不代表对租赁的条款的默认。1978年的法令规定,债务人或破产法院可以强制执行租约的延续。此外,破产法赋予债务人有权拒绝执行申请之日起60日以后的任何合同(包括租赁)。

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