1、外文题目OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCEINTHEJORDANIANMANUFACTURINGCOMPANIES出处JORDANJOURNALOFBUSINESSADMINISTRATION作者JAMALABUSERDANEH,MAJDYIZURIEKAT,IMADALSHEIKH原文DATAANDMETHODOLOGYSAMPLETHISSTUDYREPRESENTSASAMPLECONSISTINGOFALLJORDANIANMANUFACTURINGCOMPANIESTRADEDINAMMANSTOCKEXCHANGEASEAFIVEYE
2、ARPANELDATAARECOMPILEDOUTOFOWNERSHIPINFORMATIONANDFINANCIALSTATEMENTSOFTHESECOMPANIESBETWEEN2002AND2006HOWEVER，THEDATAFROMSOMECOMPANIESWEREUNAVAILABLEINSOMEYEARSBECAUSEOFLIQUIDATION，MERGER,ORTHEESTABLISHMENTOFNEWCOMPANIESSUCHCOMPANIESHAVEBEENELIMINATEDFROMTHESAMPLESETTHETOTALNUMBEROFCOMPANIESANALYZE
3、DIS56ANDTHETOTALNUMBEROFOBSERVATIONSADDEDUPTO280THISSTUDYUSESANAVERAGEFOREACHCOMPANYOVERFIVEYEARS20022006INORDERTOREDUCETHEEFFECTSOFTEMPORARYSHOCKSONTHEMEASUREMENTOFPERFORMANCEANDTOEXAMINETHEEQUILIBRIUMRELATIONSHIPINTHEDATAVARIABLESANDMEASUREMENTSTOEXAMINETHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONTHEPERFORMANC
4、EOFJORDANIANMANUFACTURINGCOMPANIES，ITISASSUMEDTHATFIRMSPERFORMANCEDEPENDSONANUMBEROFEXPLANATORYVARIABLES，OWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE，DIMENSIONS，ANDOTHERFIRMCHARACTERISTICSPERFORMANCEVARIABLETHEMAINOBJECTIVEOFTHISSTUDYISTOINVESTIGATETHEIMPACTOFOWNERSHIPANDOTHERCONTROLVARIABLESONTHEJORDANIANMANUFACTURINGCOMPAN
5、IES，WHICHMEANSCONSIDERINGCOMPANYSPERFORMANCEASTHEDEPENDENTVARIABLETHELITERATUREEMPLOYSANUMBEROFDIFFERENTMEASURESOFFIRMPERFORMANCETHESEMEASURESINCLUDE1FINANCIALRATIOFROMBALANCESHEETANDINCOMESTATEMENT；2TOBINSQ；3FINANCIALRATIOSANDTOBINSQOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREVARIABLESMOSTOFTHEPRIOREMPIRICALSTUDIESUSEDONLYO
6、NEDIMENSIONOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE，WHICHISPROPOSEDTOBEONEOFTHEREASONSFORPRODUCINGCONFLICTINGRESULTSTHISSTUDYDRAWSAPICTUREOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINJORDANACROSSTHETIMEUSINGMULTIPLEDIMENSIONSTHEFOLLOWINGARETHEDIMENSIONSOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURETHATAREUSEDINTHISSTUDY1CONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIPOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONMEA
7、SURESDISPERSIONOFOWNERSHIPAMONGALLORCERTAINSHAREHOLDERSTHEPROBLEMWITHDILUTEDOWNERSHIPINPUBLICHELDCORPORATIONSISTHATOWNERSHIPISDISTRIBUTEDAMONGANEXTREMELYLARGENUMBEROFSHAREHOLDERS，NONEOFWHOMHASINCENTIVESTOMONITORMANAGEMENTTHEADVANTAGEOUSFEATUREOFDIFFUSENESSISPRODUCINGOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREWHERESHAREHOLDE
8、RSARELARGEENOUGHTONOTSURRENDERCONTROLTOMANAGEMENTANDCANNOTCONTROLTHEFIRM，WHICHLEADSTOEXTRACTTHEIRPRIVATEBENEFITSORABUSESMINORITYSHAREHOLDERBUTTHISSITUATIONMAYMAKETHESHAREHOLDERUNABLETOEFFECTIVELYCONTROLTHEDECISIONSOFTHEMANAGEMENTTEAM，ANDTHUSENCOURAGESMANAGEMENTTOEXPLOITTHEFIRMSRESOURCESTOSERVEITSOWN
9、INTERESTSEMPIRICALPRIORSTUDIESWHICHARERELATEDTOTHEEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONONCORPORATEPERFORMANCEFOUNDCONTRADICTEDRESULTSFOREXAMPLE，SOMESTUDIESFOUNDTHATCONCENTRATEDSTRUCTUREFIRMSHAVESIGNIFICANTBETTERPERFORMANCE,OTHERSTUDIESDIDNOTFINDSUCHARELATIONSHIPINTHISSTUDY，CONCENTRATION/DISPERSIONISTHEFIRS
10、TDIMENSIONOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE，WHICHREQUIRESTODETERMINEIFOWNERSHIPOFJORDANIANCOMPANIESISDIFFUSEDORCONCENTRATEDANDTODETERMINEIFSUCHOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREAFFECTSPERFORMANCETOMEASURETHISDIMENSION，THESAMEMEASURETHATWASUSEDINPRIORSIMILARSTUDIESISUSED，THERATIOOFTOTALPERCENTAGEOFSHAREHOLDINGSBYPERSONSWHOHAVE5，
11、10，15OR20OFISSUEDCOMPANYSSHARESTHEREFORE,HYPOTHESIS1ISSTATEDASFOLLOWSH1THEREISASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPCONCENTRATIONANDPERFORMANCEAMONGTHEJORDANIANCOMPANIES2FOREIGNOWNERSHIPFOREIGNERSUSUALLYINVESTINPROFITABLECOMPANIES，BECAUSETHEYDOSOPHISTICATEDANALYSISPRIORTOINVESTMENTSO,ASTHEPROPORTI
12、ONOFSTOCKOWNEDBYFOREIGNINVESTORSINCREASES，PERFORMANCEISEXPECTEDTOINCREASEASWELLSARAC，2002INCREASEDFOREIGNINVESTORSPROVIDEADVANTAGESFORUSINGTECHNOLOGYANDKNOWHOW，WHICHALLOWSTHEFIRMTOBEMOREPRODUCTIVEANDEFFICIENTTHANDOMESTICFIRMSCAVES，1996；KUMAR，2003THEPRIORLITERATURETHATEXAMINEDTHEIMPACTOFFOREIGNOWNERS
13、HIPONPERFORMANCEFOUNDDIFFERENTRESULTS；SARAC2002ANDKUMAR2003DIDNOTFINDANYRELATIONSHIPBETWEENOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDPERFORMANCEBUTARELATIONSHIPWASFOUNDINOTHERSTUDIESSUCHASSARKARANDSARKAR2000ANDPATIBANDLE2002THEREFORE，HYPOTHESIS2ISSTATEDASFOLLOWSH2THEREISASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEFOREIGNOWNERSHIP
14、ANDPERFORMANCEAMONGTHEJORDANIANCOMPANIES3INSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPINSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPDIMENSIONISRELATEDTOAPORTIONOFEQUITYOWNEDBYINSTITUTIONALINVESTORSTHECHOICEOFTHISDIMENSIONISLINEDWITHFAMA1980，SEVERIN2001ANDSARAC2002THEYINDICATEDTHATITMUSTHAVEABENEFICIALINFLUENCEONPERFORMANCESHLEIFERANDVISHNY1986AN
15、DBERGER2003JUSTIFYTHEEXPECTEDRELATIONSHIPBETWEENINSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPANDPERFORMANCEINTWODIRECTIONSFIRSTLY，OUTSIDEBLOCKOWNERSAREABLETOHELPMITIGATEPROBLEMSOFCONTROLLINGMANAGERSSECONDLY，LARGEBLOCKSHAREHOLDERSMAYALSOIMPROVETHEEFFECTIVENESSOFTAKEOVERMECHANISMBYMITIGATINGTHEFREERIDERPROBLEMFREERIDERPROBL
16、EMISRELATEDTOTHELACKOFCONTROLBYSHAREHOLDERSWAN1999FOUNDTHATINSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPISPOSITIVELY，STATISTICALLY，ANDSIGNIFICANTLYCORRELATEDWITHFIRMPERFORMANCEALSO，ARELATIONSHIPEXISTEDINBERGER2003ANDSARAC2002STUDIESBUTINAMODERATESTATISTICEFFECTTHUS，HYPOTHESIS3ISSTATEDASFOLLOWSH3THEREISASIGNIFICANTRELATION
17、SHIPBETWEENTHEINSTITUTIONALOWNERSHIPANDPERFORMANCEAMONGTHEJORDANIANCOMPANIES4MANAGEMENTOWNERSHIPTHEFOURTHOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREDIMENSIONINTHISSTUDYISMANAGEMENTOWNERSHIPTHISDIMENSIONANDTHECONCENTRATIONDIMENSIONARERELATEDTOTHEAGENCYSPROBLEM，WHICHCREATESADEBATEINTHELITERATUREONTHEIMPACTANDMERITOFSEPARATION
18、OFOWNERSHIPANDCONTROLINANENVIRONMENTWHEREMANAGEMENTISINCONTROL，MANAGERSCANBEEXPECTEDTOOPERATETHEFIRMINTHEIROWNINTEREST，WHILEINANOWNERCONTROLLEDENVIRONMENTMANAGERSAREEXPECTEDTOACTINTHEINTERESTOFTHEFIRMSEXTERNALOWNERSPRIORSTUDIESTHATCONSIDEREDTHEEFFECTOFNONOWNERMANAGEDANDOWNERMANAGEDFIRMSONPERFORMANCE
19、FOUNDCONFUSINGRESULTSWHILEMANYSTUDIESFOUNDARELATIONSHIPBETWEENPERFORMANCEANDMANAGEMENTOWNERSHIP，OTHERSTUDIESFOUNDTHATMANAGEMENTOWNERSHIPDOESNOTPROMOTEPERFORMANCESOHYPOTHESIS4ISSTATEDASFOLLOWSH4THEREISASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEMANAGEMENTOWNERSHIPANDPERFORMANCEAMONGTHEJORDANIANCOMPANIESCONTROL
20、VARIABLESTOEXAMINETHEIMPACTOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONPERFORMANCE，ITISASSUMEDTHATTHECOMPANYSPERFORMANCEDEPENDSONANUMBEROFEXPLANATORYVARIABLES，ASWELLASOTHEROWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREDIMENSIONSTHEREFORE,THEESTIMATEDSTUDYMODELSCONTROLLEDANUMBEROFCOMPANYCHARACTERISTICSTHATAFFECTSTHECOMPANYSPERFORMANCETHECONTROLVARIA
21、BLESUSEDINTHISSTUDYARESELECTEDWITHREFERENCETOTHEMOSTREPEATEDINEARLIEREMPIRICALSTUDIESEGKUMAR，2003；BERGER，2003；NADIA，2004THEFOLLOWINGPROVIDESABRIEFJUSTIFICATIONFORCONTROLVARIABLESUSEDINTHISSTUDYSIZEFIRMSIZEUSEDEXTENSIVELYINPRIORLITERATUREASONEOFTHEEXPLANATORYVARIABLESFORTHEFACTTHATLARGEFIRMSMAYEXHIBI
22、THIGHERPERFORMANCETHISCOULDBEDUETOTHEIRHIGHERABILITYTOTURNOUTTOBEMOREEFFICIENTASTHEYARELIKELYTOEXPLOITECONOMIESOFSCALES，EMPLOYMORESKILLEDMANAGERS，ABILITYTODIVERSIFYTHEIROPERATIONANDTARGETINGALARGENUMBEROFCUSTOMERSSIZEVARIABLEISMEASUREDINTHISSTUDYBYTHENATURALLOGARITHMOFTOTALASSETTHEN,THEFOLLOWINGHYPO
23、THESISCANBEFORMULATEDH5THEREISASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEFIRMSIZEANDPERFORMANCEAMONGTHEJORDANIANCOMPANIESLEVERAGERATIOCAPITALSTRUCTUREISALSOABLETOIMPACTPERFORMANCETHROUGHREDUCINGFREECASHFLOWJENSEN，1986；SEVERIN，2001AFIRMSDEBTTOEQUITYRATIOORLEVERAGERATIOAFFECTSCORPORATIONABILITYTOBORROWANDTHECO
24、STOFBORROWING，WHICHAFFECTSPROFITABILITYASARESULTOFINCREASINGTHEINTERESTANDFINANCIALOBLIGATIONSTHEREFORE，THEFOLLOWINGHYPOTHESISISFORMULATEDASFOLLOWSH6THEREISASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEFIRMLEVERAGERATIOANDPERFORMANCEAMONGTHEJORDANIANCOMPANIESRETAINEDEARNINGFIRMSWITHHIGHERCONCENTRATIONONEQUITYCA
25、PITALANDRETAINEDEARNINGINTHEIRINPUTSWILLHAVEBETTERPERFORMANCERETAINEDEARNINGINTENSITYPROVIDESAUTONOMYFORCORPORATEMANAGEMENTFROMDEPENDENCEONEXTERNALCAPITALANDEQUITYMARKET，WHICHENHANCESCORPORATEPERFORMANCETHEREFORE,HYPOTHESIS7ISSTATEDASFOLLOWSH7THEREISASIGNIFICANTRELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEFIRMRETAINEDEARN
26、INGANDPERFORMANCEAMONGTHEJORDANIANCOMPANIESREGRESSIONMODELSALINEARMULTIPLEREGRESSIONANALYSISISUSEDTOTESTTHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENTHEDEPENDENTVARIABLEOFPERFORMANCEANDTHEINDEPENDENTVARIABLESOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDOTHERCONTROLVARIABLESTHEREARETHREEREASONSFORUSINGLINEARMULTIPLEREGRESSIONINTHISSTUDYFIRST，ITI
27、SONEOFTHEMOSTPOWERFULSTATISTICALTECHNIQUESINPARAMETRICTESTSSECOND，THENATUREANDMEASURESOFDEPENDENTANDINDEPENDENTVARIABLESMAKESUCHTECHNIQUEASTHEAPPROPRIATEONETHIRD，SIMILARPRIORLITERATUREUSEDTHISSTATISTICALTECHNIQUETHEFOLLOWINGGENERALMODELISESTIMATEDPERFORIOWNERI，ZEI1WHEREPERFORISTHECOMPANYPERFORMANCE，
28、OWNERAREVARIABLESOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE，ZARECOMPANYCHARACTERISTICS，ANDEISTHEERRORTERMINTHISSTUDY，THEERRORTERMISIGNOREDSINCEITISNOTUSEDFORMAKINGPREDICTIONSTHEGENERALMODELINEQUATION1ISIMPLEMENTEDBYDIVIDINGTHEREGRESSIONMODELINTOTWODETAILEDMODELSASARESULTOFUSINGTWODIFFERENTMEASURESFORPERFORMANCEVARIABLESR
29、ETURNONASSETANDTOBINSQASFOLLOWSROAICONCIFOREIINSTIMANGISIZEILEVRIREIEI2TOBINSQICONCIFOREIINSTIMANGISIZEILEVRIREIEI3WHEREROAIISRETURNONASSETRATIO，TOBINSQIISTOBINSQRATIO，CONCIISCONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIP，FOREIISFOREIGNOWNERSHIP，INSTIISINSTITUTIONSOWNERSHIP，MANGIISMANAGEMENTOWNERSHIP，SIZEIISTHECOMPANYSIZE，
30、LEVRIISTHELEVERAGERATIO，REIISRETAINEDEARNING，ANDEIISTHEERRORTERMFINDINGSTHISSECTIONISDIVIDEDINTOTHREESUBSECTIONSSUBSECTION1TESTSTHEEMPIRICALMODELASSUMPTIONSTHEDESCRIPTIVESTATISTICSAREPRESENTEDINSUBSECTION2，WHILESUBSECTION3DEALSWITHMULTIPLEREGRESSIONRESULTS1TESTINGEMPIRICALMODELSAPPLYINGAMULTIPLEREGR
31、ESSIONMODELREQUIRESMEETINGSPECIFICCONDITIONSANDASSUMPTIONSRELATEDTOMULTICOLLINEARITY，LINEARITY,INDEPENDENTERROR,SAMPLESIZE，ANDNORMALITYTABLES4TO7INAPPENDIX2SHOWALLTHEINFORMATIONRELATEDTOMULTIPLEREGRESSIONASSUMPTIONSTHEVIFANDTOLERANCEVALUESPRESENTEDINTABLE4INDICATETHATTHEREISNOMULTICOLLINEARITYPROBLE
32、MSINCETHEREISNOVIF，VALUESMORETHAN10ANDTOLERANCEVALUESBELOW01ACCORDINGTOTHECASEWISEDIAGNOSTICINTABLE5，THEREISONLYONECASE，MORETHAN2INTOBINSQMODELANDNOOTHERCASEEXCEEDTHISLIMITINROAMODEL，WHICHMEANSTHATTHEREISNOLINEARITYPROBLEMWITHTHETWOMODELSTHEACCEPTABLENUMBEROFCASESTHATMAYEXCEEDLIMIT2ISAROUND3NUMBEROF
33、CASESMULTIPLIEDBY5INTERMSOFTESTINGTHEINDEPENDENTERRORASSUMPTION，TABLE6SHOWSTHATTHEDURBINWATSONTESTSFORTWOMODELSAREAROUND2，WHICHMEANSTHATTHERESIDUALSARENOTCORRELATEDTOTESTTHESAMPLESIZEASSUMPTION，SEVERALRULESOFTHUMBHAVEBEENPROPOSEDRANGINGFROM4TO15OBSERVATIONSPERINDEPENDENTVARIABLEINTHISSTUDY，BASEDONTH
34、ENUMBEROFINDEPENDENTVARIABLES，THEREAREAPPROXIMATELY8OBSERVATIONSCASESFOREACHINDEPENDENTVARIABLEKURTOSISTESTISCONSIDEREDTOBEAPROMINENTMEASUREOFNORMALITYACCORDINGTOHAIRETAL2003，P244THEACCEPTABLERANGEOFKURTOSISFORDATADISTRIBUTEDNORMALLYIS3TO3TABLE7SHOWSKURTOSISSMEASUREFORDEPENDENTANDINDEPENDENTVARIABLE
35、S，WHICHINDICATESTHATALLTHESEVARIABLESAREWITHINTHEACCEPTABLERANGEEXCEPTRETAINEARNINGVARIABLEAT33EDGELIMIT2DESCRIPTIVESTATISTICSONEOFTHEOBJECTIVESOFTHISSTUDYISTOEXPLORETHEPATTERNSOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREINTHEJORDANIANMANUFACTURINGCOMPANIESTABLE2SUMMARIZESALLOWNERSHIPDIMENSIONSTHATARECONSIDEREDINTHISSTUDYC
36、ONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIPDIMENSIONTHATMEASURESTHEDEGREEOFDISPERSIONAMONGSHAREHOLDERSISMEASUREDBYTHERATIOOFTOTALPERCENTAGEOFSHAREHOLDINGSOWNEDBYTHEPERSONSWHOHAVE10ORMOREOFTHEISSUEDSHARESOFTHECOMPANYTHEDIRECTIONOFCONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIPOVERFIVEYEARSWASAROUND40AVERAGEWHICHREFLECTSRELATIVELYHIGHCONCENTRATION
37、OWNERSHIPCOMPAREDWITHSOMEWESTERNECONOMIESEGUSANDUNITEDKINGDOMTHEFOREIGNOWNERSHIPDIMENSIONISALSONEARLYCONSTANTATAMODERATELEVELOF14AVERAGETHISCANBEJUSTIFIEDBYTHERELATIVELYSMALLSIZEANDMODESTPERFORMANCETHISCONCLUSIONCANBEESTIMATEDFROMTHEPRIMARYEXPLORATIONOFTHEDATACOLLECTED，THATSHOWEDTHAT19OFTHE56MANUFAC
38、TURINGCOMPANIESHASNEGATIVEAVERAGERETAINEDEARNINGTHISPICTUREISDIFFERENTINTHEBANKINGSECTORWHICHHASBETTERPERFORMANCEANDFOREIGNINVESTMENTTHATEXCEEDED50THEPERCENTAGEOFEQUITYBENEFICIALLYOWNEDBYTHEINSTITUTIONALINVESTORSINTHISSTUDYWASAROUND28OVERFIVEYEARSANDTHENUMBERSOFCOMPANIESINWHICHTHEGENERALMANAGERISAME
39、MBERONTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSISRANGEDBETWEEN52AND63WITHANAVERAGEOF56TOJUSTIFYWHYTHEREISALARGEPERCENTAGEOFCOMPANIESTHATDONOTHAVEANINDEPENDENTBOARDFROMDIRECTORSGENERALMANAGER，FURTHERDATAISCOLLECTEDABOUTTHEPERCENTAGEOFEQUITYOWNEDBYTHOSEMANAGERSTHERESULTSSHOWTHATONLY8OF56COMPANIESHAVEMANAGERSWHOOWNEDARELATI
40、VELYSIGNIFICANTPERCENTAGEOFEQUITYRANGEDBETWEEN6AND30INTHELASTTHREEYEARS，WHICHINDICATESTHATTHEMANAGERISNOTAMEMBEROFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSBECAUSEHEOWNSAHIGHEQUITYPERCENTAGETHISRESULTAGREESWITHDEMSETZANDVILLALONGA1999ARGUMENT；THEYPROVEDTHATAPERSONWHOISAPROFESSIONALMEMBEROFTHEMANAGEMENTTEAMHARDLYHOLDSENOUG
41、HSHARESTOMAKEHIMONEOFTHEMOSTIMPORTANTSHAREHOLDERSOFACORPORATIONTHEREFORE,SUCHMANAGERSAREMOSTLYDERIVEDFROMHIGHBULKOWNERSTABLE2OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREDIMENSIONSINTHEJORDANIANMANUFACTURINGCOMPANIESFORTHEPERIOD2002TO2006YEAR20062005200420032002AVERAGECONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIP423939404040FOREIGNOWNERSHIP18131314
42、1414INSTITUTIONSOWNERSHIP292828282928MANAGEMENTOWNERSHIP525254636156外文题目OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDCORPORATEPERFORMANCEINTHEJORDANIANMANUFACTURINGCOMPANIES出处JORDANJOURNALOFBUSINESSADMINISTRATION作者JAMALABUSERDANEH,MAJDYIZURIEKAT,IMADALSHEIKH译文数据和处理方法样本这项研究代表了所有在安曼证券交易所ASE交易的约旦制造公司。一份为期五年面板数据被编译的所有权信息以及这些公司
43、在2002年到2006年的财务报表。但是,这些数据无法使用于一些公司在某些年因为清算、合并或者建立的新公司,因此这些公司被排除在样本之外。分析了公司的总数为56以及观察的公司数增加到280家。本项研究采用了各家公司超过五年（20022006年）平均为减少对暂时冲击影响测量的表现，并探讨平衡关系的数据。变量和测量为了探讨股权结构对约旦制造业公司绩效的影响,假定公司的绩效依赖于大量的解释变量,股权结构,规模及其他厂商的特点。业绩变量本项研究的主要目的是探讨所有权以及其他控制参数对约旦制造公司的影响,也就是要考虑公司的业绩作为因变量。本文采用了多个不同的公司绩效措施，这些措施包括1财务比率,资产负债
44、表和损益表；2托宾Q值；3财务比率和托宾Q值。股权结构变量以前大部分实证研究只用一个变量的股权结构，它所提出的原因之一是生产相互矛盾的结果。本项研究通过多个变量得出约旦公司的股权结构，以下股权结构的变量应用于本项研究。1股权集中度股权集中度所有权分散在所有或特定的股东。该公司在公开进行稀释所有权问题是其中一个股东持有大量股权，但没有激励监控管理权。有利的特征是创造一种有大量股东以致不被控制管理也不能控制公司的股权结构，这使得少数股东谋私利以及滥用职权。但是这种情况可能使股东无法有效地控制管理团队的决策，从而鼓励管理层利用公司资源来为自己谋利。之前有关股权集中度对公司绩效的影响的实证研究发现矛盾
45、的结果。例如，一些研究发现集中的股权结构的公司有更好的公司绩效，当然也有一些研究并没有发现这一关系。在本项研究中，集中或分散股权结构需要确定约旦公司的股权分散或集中,并且确定股权结构会影响公司绩效。为了衡量这一变量，用之前类似研究所应用的措施，那些拥有5，10，15，20股权的股东发行公司股票。因此，假设1可叙述如下H1约旦公司的股权结构和公司绩效之间有很重要的关系。2外资股权外国人通常能投资盈利的公司,因为他们能在投资前做细致的分析，因此，外国投资者所拥有的股票比例增加，则公司绩效预期也会增加。日益增加的外国投资者利用科技和技能提供优势,使公司变得比国内公司更高效。先前有关外资股权对公司绩效
46、影响的研究有不同结果SARAC2002和KUMAR2003没有发现股权结构与公司绩效之间的关系。但是这种关系有被SARKAR与SARKAR2000和PATIBANDLE2002等其他研究发现。因此，假设2可叙述如下H2约旦公司的外资股权和公司绩效之间有很重要的关系。3法人股法人股是指相关的部分股权由机构投资者持有。FAMA1980,SEVERIN2001以及SARAC2002选择这一变量，他们指出这对公司绩效有利好的影响。而SHLEIFER与VISHNY1986和BERGER2003证明了法人股和公司绩效在两个方向的预期关系。首先，外块业主能够帮助减轻管理人员的控制问题。其次，大股东也能有效阻
47、止搭便车问题。搭便车问题关系到股东缺乏控制。WAN1999发现法人股是具有积极意义的，与公司绩效有着显著的正相关，而且这种关系在BERGER2003和SARAC2002的研究中表现为温和的统计效果。因此，假设3可叙述如下H3约旦公司的法人股和公司绩效之间有很重要的关系。4管理所有权第四个股权结构变量是管理所有权。这一变量和集中度变量关系到机构问题，这将造成股权和控制权分离的争论。在一个被管理控制的环境中，管理者被期望采取他们感兴趣方面的措施来经营公司；而在业主控制的环境中，管理者被期望采取有利对外业主权益的行为。先前的研究认为非业主管理和业主管理对公司绩效的影响发现混淆的结果。虽然许多研究发现
48、管理所有权和公司绩效之间存在的关系，但也有其他研究发现管理所有权并不能提高公司绩效。因此，假设4可叙述如下H4约旦公司的管理所有权和公司绩效之间有很重要的关系。控制变量为了探讨股权结构对公司绩效的影响，假设公司绩效依赖于一系列的解释变量，以及股权结构变量。因此,许多研究模型控制公司一些特征来影响公司的绩效。在这项研究中的控制变量是参考先前实证研究应用最多的变量。下面提供了一个对控制变量应用于本项研究的简要理由。规模企业规模在以往的研究中被广泛使用，这一解释变量使大公司可能表现更高的绩效。这可能是由于其较高的能力得到更有效的投票率，因为他们很可能利用规模经济，聘请更有经验的管理者去管理多元化的经
49、营目标和大量的目标顾客。规模变量是本研究用于测量总资产的自然对数。因此，假设5可表述如下H5约旦公司的企业规模和公司绩效之间有很重要的关系。杠杆比率资本结构还能通过减少自由现金流来影响公司绩效。一个公司的资产负债率或杠杆比率影响公司的借款能力和借款成本，从而影响利润（由于利息和负债的增加）。因此，假设6可表述如下H6约旦公司的杠杆比率和公司绩效之间有很重要的关系。留存收益股权集中度较高的公司（资本和留存收益）有更好的绩效。留存收益强度提高的企业管理自主权不依赖于外部资本市场和股票市场，从而提高了公司绩效。因此，假设7可表述如下H7约旦公司的留存收益和公司绩效之间有很重要的关系。回归模型一个线性多元回归分析法是用来检测绩效因变量变量和股权自变量之间以及其他控制变量的关系。本项研究采用多元线性回归有三个理由首先，它在参数检验中拥有最强大的统计技术；其次，因变量和自变量的性质和检验措施使得这一技术更合理恰当；最后，之前类似的研究已应用这项统计技术。一般模型估计如下PERFORIOWNERI，ZEI1其中，PERFOR表示公司绩效，OWNER表示股权结构变量，
