1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译外文文献译文标题我们所知道的审计质量资料来源英国会计评论2004年，第34期，第345368页作者JERERFRANCIS本文评价了在过去的25年里的审计质量的研究，用实证研究的方法来关注美国审计质量这个问题。在2001年安然事件的发生和2002年有关破产崩溃的ARTHURANDERSEN,它们已经成为了对会计师事务所对审计质量问题批评的一种潮流，尤其是国际四大会计师事务所（普华永道、安永、德勤、毕马威，以下简称国际四大）。近来都在批评美国的期权激励制所带来的负面影响，特别是在2002年萨班斯奥克斯利法案公法，第107204条中提出会计行业的直接管制需要独立机构,类似于美
2、国上市公司会计监管委员会。这篇文章的重点是在上市公司由于所有权与管理控制权分离使独立的外部审计对公司治理和公司的监管更为重要。这样的评价注定不是综合和渊博的，但是从学术研究的角度对审计质量来讲代替更多选择的调查的目的是确定并且要有广泛的证据进行评估。在原来我们已经知道了不少关于质量的问题,尽管有安然以及其他举世瞩目的失败案例,但证据显示,审计质量的总体水平很少完全满意,尽管有证据表明在上个世纪90年代收益质量的下降有可能和审计质量减少有关。1什么是彻底的审计失败率审计质量在理论研究上从最低到最高的审计质量将被概念化。审计失败显然发生在底层的审计质量的连续介质,所以一个好的起点在考虑审计质量是在
3、追问彻底的审计失败的速度审计失败的发生在两种情况当公认会计原则不能被审计人员实施（GAAP失效当一个审计师未能在适当的情况下出具修改或合格审计报告审计报告失败。在这两种情况下,审计人员审计过的财务报表可能会潜在误导用户。作为审计质量的第一个近似值,我们可以审计会议或者达到最低的法律2和专业需求。审计质量与审计失败呈负相关关系失败的比率越高,审计质量越低。那我们如何了解审计失败的比率呢彻底的审计失败难以确定但可以推断出来几个来源包括审计师诉讼和企业倒闭,调查的证券交易委员会SEC和收入重述。这些都是我们现在所研究的问题。可以说关于彻底审计失败的发生最令人信服的证据是在有审计师诉讼的情况下（PAL
4、MROSE,1988。结果表明,在美国审计人员被起诉的数量是非常小的,尽管声称经常听到有许多诉讼ANDERSENETAL,1992使用综合数据集,PALMROSE2000记载在19601995期间大约有1000件被起诉的全国性的大会计师事务所的案件，即平均每年只有28个诉讼案件。给定一个数量，在美国大约有10000上市公司,每年28个诉讼案件表明年度审计失败率达到028。成功的诉讼数量甚至更小的,通常估计大约为总数的50诉讼案件被法院排除，成功的保卫了会计师事务所和没有功绩的案件PALMROSE,1997。底线是,数量已被证实的审计失败太少，比率达到零,而且它是如此难以想象,人们可以做些什么来
5、改变审计实务或法规环境,会导致审计失败的比率显著降低。更广泛定义的审计失败可能会基于审计业务的失败率。结果在美国失败的上市公司也都是小数目,每年平均约40件FRANCISANDKRAISHNAN,2002。然而,它也可能是错的假设,一个审计失败仅仅因为一个业务发生故障的发生,这证明了一个事实审计师对破产企业只有25PALMROSE,1987。不管怎样,审计失败比率暗示了破产率较小与低故障率是基于审计师诉讼。自1982年以来,美国证券交易委员会颁布会计、审计执法公告AAERS的报告用来处罚违反的公司和审计师。AAERS的结果是公司及/或其审计人员对于罪行非正式的服罪的和解协议,而是代替接受行政诉
6、讼等,或其他谴责,并在AAERS描述中同意他们将不会参加各种在SEC中不能接受的行为FEROZETAL,1991。有争议的是,这些和解协议可以解释为“审计失败”的证据虽然他们是不被法律描述等。DECHOWETAL1996检查AAERS第436条第一条从1982年到1993年。在这12年期间有165个行动描述审计不足每年大约占14个行动。美国大约拥有10000家受SEC支配的上市公司，从1982年到1993年14年的行动违反中,审计人员是每年的审计失败率为014。最近,有1485个新AAERS发出了从1994年到2003年,即平均每年149个,这可能反映了在上个世纪九十年代增加可疑的财务报表。虽
7、然有，没有正式的研究到目前为止AAERS3的法令，我的非正式的评论基于随机抽样调查表明,大多数这些AAERS不是导向审计人员。底线是,年度审计失败率所暗示AAERS自从上个世纪九十年代中期以来当AAERS开始增加的时候甚至低于1。另一个潜在的源数据资料来源于收入的重述归档与SEC和最近综述在一份报告中在政府会计机构GAO,2003。ARTHURLEVITT，前SEC主席,所关注的是增加收入的重述，在上个世纪90年代末期，并深信他们暗示过去会计和审计失败由于各种侵略性收入,他警告说,一个名为“数字游戏”的1998年的演讲中LEVITT,1998。GAO2003包括收入重述从19972002,重述
8、增加在921997到2502002的单调周期,用一把锋利的增加在1999巧合的，主席LEVITT担忧。然而,我的非正式评论这些大多数的重述表明笔直的调整会计“估计”在上年度的财务报表中和因此（可论证的）非审计失误。的确在四分之一的案例中有审计员鉴别问题和开始重述，在大多数情况下,在违反SEC的公司和审违反诉讼审计人员，那就代表着作为审计失败的大多数的收入重述是可说明的。总之,事后审计失败的证据来自美国证券交易委员会SEC制裁,诉讼率,企业倒闭和盈利的重述都指向一个非常低的故障率，每年少于百分之一。如果有不被对方发现审计失败这可能低估了真实故障率。然而,如果一个审计失败趋向与不被发现,大多是被指
9、公司和它的相关利益者不利的经济影响并未受到损失等如破产或财务危机而产生的审计失败。我们可以更恰当地说结论是已知的审计失败的后果是相对罕见的材料。虽然可能还有其他的审计失败的较小得出后果,我们在数据上没有证据证实这些事件的发生。4外文文献原文TITLEWHATDOWEKNOWABOUTAUDITQUALITYMATERIALSOURCETHEBRITISHACCOUNTINGREVIEW362004345368AUTHORJERERFRANCISTHISPAPERREVIEWSRESEARCHONAUDITQUALITYFROMTHEPAST25YEARS,WITHAPARTICULARFOCU
10、SONEMPIRICALRESEARCHFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESINTHEAFTERMATHOFTHEENRONBANKRUPTCYIN2001ANDTHERELATEDCOLLAPSEOFARTHURANDERSENIN2002,ITHASBECOMEFASHIONABLETOCRITICIZEAUDITINGANDTOQUESTIONTHEQUALITYOFAUDITSBEINGPERFORMEDBYACCOUNTINGFIRMS,ESPECIALLYTHELARGEINTERNATIONALBIG4ACCOUNTINGFIRMS1INDEEDTHISCRITICISMMOT
11、IVATEDRECENTREGULATORYCHANGESINTHEUNITEDSTATESBROUGHTABOUTBYTHESARBANESOXLEYACTOF2002PUBLICLAWNO107204INWHICHSELFREGULATIONBYTHEACCOUNTINGPROFESSIONHASBEENREPLACEDWITHDIRECTREGULATIONBYANEWINDEPENDENTAGENCY,THEPUBLICCOMPANYACCOUNTINGOVERSIGHTBOARDMYEMPHASISISONPUBLICLYLISTEDCOMPANIESBECAUSETHESEPARA
12、TIONOFOWNERSHIPANDMANAGEMENTCONTROLINLISTEDCOMPANIESMAKESTHEINDEPENDENTEXTERNALAUDITESPECIALLYIMPORTANTWITHRESPECTTOCORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDTHEOVERSIGHTOFSUCHCOMPANIESTHEREVIEWISNOTMEANTTOBECOMPREHENSIVEANDENCYCLOPEDICBUTISINSTEADAMORESELECTIVESURVEYWHOSEPURPOSEISTOIDENTIFYANDASSESSAWIDERANGEOFEVIDENC
13、EONAUDITQUALITYFROMACADEMICRESEARCHITTURNSOUTTHATWEKNOWQUITEABIT,ANDDESPITEENRONANDOTHERHIGHPROFILEFAILURES,THEEVIDENCEINDICATESTHATTHEGENERALLEVELOFAUDITQUALITYISSATISFACTORYWITHVERYFEWOUTRIGHTAUDITFAILURES,ALTHOUGHTHEREISSOMEEVIDENCETHATBOTHEARNINGSQUALITYANDAUDITQUALITYMAYHAVEDECLINEDDURINGTHE199
14、0S1WHATAREOUTRIGHTAUDITFAILURERATESAUDITQUALITYCANBECONCEPTUALIZEDASATHEORETICALCONTINUUMRANGINGFROMVERYLOWTOVERYHIGHAUDITQUALITYAUDITFAILURESOBVIOUSLYOCCURONTHELOWERENDOFTHEQUALITYCONTINUUM,ANDSOAGOODSTARTINGPOINTINTHINKINGABOUTAUDITQUALITYISTOASKWHATTHERATEOFOUTRIGHTAUDITFAILUREISANAUDITFAILUREOCC
15、URS5INTWOCIRCUMSTANCESWHENGENERALLYACCEPTEDACCOUNTINGPRINCIPLESARENOTENFORCEDBYTHEAUDITORGAAPFAILUREANDWHENANAUDITORFAILSTOISSUEAMODIFIEDORQUALIFIEDAUDITREPORTINTHEAPPROPRIATECIRCUMSTANCESAUDITREPORTFAILUREINBOTHCASES,THEAUDITEDFINANCIALSTATEMENTSAREPOTENTIALLYMISLEADINGTOUSERSASAFIRSTAPPROXIMATIONO
16、FAUDITQUALITY,WECANTHINKOFAUDITSASEITHERMEETINGORNOTMEETINGMINIMUMLEGALANDPROFESSIONALREQUIREMENTSAUDITQUALITYISINVERSELYRELATEDTOAUDITFAILURESTHEHIGHERTHEFAILURERATE,THELOWERTHEQUALITYOFAUDITINGWHATDOWEKNOWABOUTAUDITFAILURERATESOUTRIGHTAUDITFAILURESAREDIFFICULTTODETERMINEWITHCERTAINTYBUTCANBEINFERR
17、EDFROMSEVERALSOURCESINCLUDINGAUDITORLITIGATIONANDBUSINESSFAILURES,INVESTIGATIONSBYTHESECURITIESANDEXCHANGECOMMISSIONSEC,ANDEARNINGSRESTATEMENTSEACHOFTHESEISNOWREVIEWEDARGUABLYTHEMOSTCONVINCINGEVIDENCEOFANOUTRIGHTAUDITFAILUREOCCURSWHENTHEREISLITIGATIONAGAINSTAUDITORSPALMROSE,1988ITTURNSOUTTHATTHENUMB
18、EROFLAWSUITSAGAINSTAUDITORSINTHEUNITEDSTATESISSMALL,DESPITETHEOFTENHEARDCLAIMABOUTRAMPANTLITIGATIONANDERSENETAL,19922USINGACOMPREHENSIVEDATASET,PALMROSE2000DOCUMENTSAROUND1000LAWSUITSAGAINSTTHELARGENATIONALACCOUNTINGFIRMSOVERTHEPERIOD19601995,ORANAVERAGEOFONLY28LAWSUITSPERYEARGIVENAPOPULATIONOFAROUN
19、D10,000PUBLICLYLISTEDCOMPANIESINTHEUNITEDSTATES,28LAWSUITSPERYEARIMPLYANANNUALAUDITFAILURERATEOF028,IE28HUNDREDTHSOFONEPERCENTTHENUMBEROFSUCCESSFULLAWSUITSISEVENSMALLERANDISGENERALLYESTIMATEDTOBEAROUND50OFTOTALLAWSUITSAFTEREXCLUDINGCASESSUCCESSFULLYDEFENDEDBYACCOUNTINGFIRMSANDNONMERITORIOUSCASESDISM
20、ISSEDBYCOURTSPALMROSE,1997THEBOTTOMLINEISTHATTHENUMBEROFPROVENAUDITFAILURESISSOSMALLASTOAPPROACHARATEOFZERO,ANDSOITISDIFFICULTTOIMAGINEWHATCOULDBEDONETOCHANGEAUDITINGPRACTICESORTHEREGULATORYENVIRONMENTTHATWOULDRESULTINASIGNIFICANTLYLOWERAUDITFAILURERATEABROADERDEFINITIONOFAUDITORFAILURECOULDBEBASEDO
21、NBUSINESSFAILURE6RATESITTURNSOUTTHATFAILURESOFPUBLICLYLISTEDCOMPANIESINTHEUNITEDSTATESAREALSOSMALLINNUMBER,AVERAGINGAROUND40PERYEARFRANCISANDKRISHNAN,2002HOWEVER,ITMAYBEWRONGTOPRESUMEANAUDITFAILUREHASOCCURREDJUSTBECAUSEABUSINESSFAILUREOCCURS,ANDTHISISBORNEOUTBYTHEFACTTHATAUDITORSOFBANKRUPTCOMPANIESA
22、RESUEDONLY25OFTHETIMEPALMROSE,19873REGARDLESS,THEAUDITFAILURERATEIMPLIEDBYBANKRUPTCYRATESISVERYSMALLANDCOMPARABLETOTHELOWFAILURERATEBASEDONAUDITORLITIGATIONSINCE1982,THESECHASISSUEDACCOUNTINGANDAUDITINGENFORCEMENTRELEASESAAERSWHICHREPORTOUTCOMESOFITSINVESTIGATIONSAGAINSTCOMPANIESANDAUDITORSAAERSARET
23、HERESULTOFCONSENTDECREESINWHICHCOMPANIESAND/ORTHEIRAUDITORSDONOTFORMALLYPLEADGUILTYTOMISDEEDS,BUTINSTEADACCEPTANADMINISTRATIVEACTIONSUCHASAFINE,OROTHERREPRIMAND,ANDAGREETHATTHEYWILLNOTENGAGEINTHEKINDOFBEHAVIORDESCRIBEDINTHEAAERSWHICHTHESECDEEMSUNACCEPTABLEFEROZETAL,1991ARGUABLY,THESECONSENTDECREESCO
24、ULDBEINTERPRETEDASEVIDENCEOFAUDITFAILURESEVENTHOUGHTHEYARENOTLEGALLYDESCRIBEDASSUCHDECHOWETAL1996EXAMINETHEFIRST436AAERSISSUEDFROM1982TO1993OVERTHIS12YEARPERIODTHEREWERE165ACTIONSDESCRIBINGAUDITORDEFICIENCIESREPRESENTINGABOUT14ACTIONSPERYEARGIVENTHEUSPOPULATIONOFAPPROXIMATELY10,000PUBLICLYLISTEDCOMP
25、ANIESWHICHARESUBJECTTOSECREGULATIONS,14YEARLYACTIONSAGAINSTAUDITORSISANANNUALAUDITFAILURERATEOF014IE14HUNDREDTHSOFONEPERCENTFROM1982TO1993MORERECENTLY,1485NEWAAERSHAVEBEENISSUEDFROM1994TO2003,ORANAVERAGEOF149PERYEAR,ANDTHISMAYREFLECTANINCREASEINQUESTIONABLEFINANCIALREPORTINGPRACTICESDURINGTHE1990SWH
26、ILETHEREHASBEENNOFORMALSTUDYTODATEOFTHESEAAERSACTIONS,MYINFORMALREVIEWBASEDONARANDOMSAMPLEINDICATESTHATAMAJORITYOFTHESEAAERSARENOTDIRECTEDTOWARDAUDITORSTHEBOTTOMLINEISTHATTHEANNUALAUDITFAILURERATEIMPLIEDBYAAERSISWELLUNDER1EVENSINCETHEMID1990SWHENTHENUMBEROFAAERSBEGANTOINCREASEANOTHERPOTENTIALSOURCEO
27、FAUDITFAILUREDATACOMESFROMEARNINGSRESTATEMENTSFILEDWITHTHESECANDRECENTLYSUMMARIZEDINAREPORTBYTHE7GOVERNMENTACCOUNTINGOFFICEGAO,2003ARTHURLEVITT,FORMERSECCHAIRMAN,WASCONCERNEDBYTHEINCREASEINEARNINGSRESTATEMENTSINTHELATE1990S,ANDWASCONVINCEDTHEYINDICATEDPASTACCOUNTINGANDAUDITINGFAILURESDUETOTHEKINDOFA
28、GGRESSIVEEARNINGSMANAGEMENTHEWARNEDOFINA1998SPEECHENTITLEDTHENUMBERSGAMELEVITT,1998GAO2003COVERSEARNINGSRESTATEMENTSFROM19972002,ANDRESTATEMENTSINCREASEDMONOTONICALLYOVERTHEPERIODFROM921997TO2502002,WITHASHARPINCREASEIN1999COINCIDINGWITHCHAIRMANLEVITTSCONCERNSHOWEVER,MYINFORMALREVIEWOFTHESERESTATEME
29、NTSINDICATESAMAJORITYARESTRAIGHTFORWARDADJUSTMENTSOFACCOUNTINGESTIMATIONSINPRIORYEARFINANCIALSTATEMENTSANDTHEREFOREARGUABLYNOTAUDITFAILURESINDEEDINABOUTONEFOURTHOFTHECASESTHEAUDITORIDENTIFIEDTHEPROBLEMANDINITIATEDTHERESTATEMENT,ANDINTHEMAJORITYOFCASESTHEREWASNORELATEDSECACTIONAGAINSTCOMPANIESORLITIG
30、ATIONAGAINSTAUDITORS,WHICHMEANSTHATMOSTEARNINGSRESTATEMENTSARENOTINTERPRETABLEASAUDITFAILURESINSUM,THEEXPOSTEVIDENCEOFAUDITFAILURESFROMSECSANCTIONS,LITIGATIONRATES,BUSINESSFAILURESANDEARNINGSRESTATEMENTSALLPOINTTOAVERYLOWFAILURERATE,MUCHLESSTHANONEPERCENTANNUALLYTHISMAYUNDERSTATETHETRUEFAILURERATEIF
31、THEREAREUNDETECTEDAUDITFAILURESHOWEVER,IFANAUDITFAILUREGOESUNDETECTED,ITMOSTLIKELYMEANSTHATTHECOMPANYANDITSSTAKEHOLDERSHAVENOTSUFFEREDADVERSEECONOMICEFFECTSSUCHASBANKRUPTCYORFINANCIALDISTRESSARISINGFROMTHEAUDITFAILUREWHATWECANMOREPROPERLYCONCLUDEISTHATKNOWNAUDITFAILURESWITHMATERIALCONSEQUENCESARERELATIVELYINFREQUENTWHILETHEREMAYBEOTHERAUDITFAILURESWITHLESSERCONSEQUENCES,WEHAVENOEVIDENCEONTHERATEOFTHESEOCCURRENCES
