1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译译文标题公司现金持有资料来自瑞士资料来源投资组合管理作者沃尔夫冈在存在交易成本时，一个公司的评估价值最大化的边际成本和边际收益来确定最佳现金持有量（EG,KEYNES，1936）。一方面，经济规模筹集外部资金，鼓励企业持有的现金作为缓冲，避免频繁的外部筹资（LEEETAL1996KIMETAL1998）。另一方面，持有成本的流动性是其较低金钱上的回报。在存在交易成本的一部分，持有流动资产的一个好处是他们能更容易地转换成现金，即应该有一个流动性溢价，定义为持有流动资产的机会成本。此外，从股东的角度有税务缺点。如果一个企业持有的流动资产，应计利息收入征税两次股东能直接从从持有
2、的证券赚取较高税前收益（MASULISCOLLINSETAL1981）。小企业也比大公司面临更高外部融资成本，因为他们更可能面临借贷限制（WHITED1992FAZZARIHARRISSHLEIFERSTULZ1988）。经理人不多样，因为他们不愿分散个人资本，因此更多根深蒂固的经理人持有超额现金避免市场纪律。JENSEN（1986）认为，在存在的自由裁量权，管理者激励持有大量现金，以便有更多的灵活性，追求自己的目标。允许管理现金进行投资，资本市场不愿意融资。由于超额现金持有允许自我服务经理避免资本市场的规则，进行对公司不利的投资。为了研究管理者代理成本与现金持有量的关系，实证研究必须使用能表
3、示在何种程度上表明一个公司的管理是被纪律处分（或不）的变量。例如，企业规模通常被视为收购威慑，因此大公司往往拥有更多的现金。OPLERETAL1999表明，公司债务水平低往往持有更多现金，因为低杠杆率的公司少受市场监测。同样，STIGLITZ1985认为，小股东有没有动力去监督管理者，因为监督的费用可能超过收益。因此，我们可以推测，公司股东分散，持有大量现金。与此相反，存在一个大股东通过收购或代理权争夺一个可信的威胁（SHLEIFERDYCKKIMETAL1998ONTHEOTHERHAND,THECOSTOFHOLDINGLIQUIDITYISITSLOWERPECUNIARYRETURNI
4、NTHEPRESENCEOFTRANSACTIONCOSTS,ONEPARTOFTHEBENEFITSOFHOLDINGLIQUIDASSETSISTHATTHEYCANMOREEASILYBECONVERTEDINTOCASH,IE,THERESHOULDBEALIQUIDITYPREMIUM,DEFINEDASTHEOPPORTUNITYCOSTFORHOLDINGLIQUIDASSETSMOREOVER,THEREISATAXDISADVANTAGEFROMASHAREHOLDERSPOINTOFVIEWIFAFIRMHOLDSLIQUIDASSETS,THEACCRUEDINTERES
5、TINCOMEISTAXEDTWICEANDSHAREHOLDERSCOULDEARNAHIGHERPRETAXRETURNFROMHOLDINGTHESESECURITIESDIRECTLYMASULISANDTRUEMAN1988THETRANSACTIONCOSTSMOTIVELEADSTOSEVERALPREDICTIONSABOUTAFIRMSCASHHOLDINGSFOREXAMPLE,THEEXISTENCEOFECONOMIESOFSCALESUGGESTSTHATSMALLERFIRMSHOLDRELATIVELYMORELIQUIDITYTHANLARGERFIRMSANO
6、THERHYPOTHESISBUILDSONTHENOTIONTHATONEWAYTORAISECASHISTHROUGHLIQUIDATIONOFASSETSSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1992AFIRMWHOSEASSETSCANBECHEAPLYCONVERTEDINTOCASHCANRAISEFUNDSATLOWCOSTBYSELLINGTHESEASSETSTHEREFORE,FIRMSWITHAHIGHDEGREEOFASSETSPECIFICITYTENDTOHAVEHIGHERCASHHOLDINGSARELATEDHYPOTHESISISTHATLARGERFIRMSA
7、REGENERALLYMOREDIVERSIFIEDANDCANLIQUIDATEASSETSINNONCORESEGMENTS,ALLOWINGTHEMTOHOLDLESSLIQUIDITYOPLERETAL1999FINALLY,ASHORTERCASHCONVERSIONCYCLEIMPLIESBETTERTIMINGOFINCOMINGANDOUTGOINGPAYMENTS,REQUIRINGSMALLERCASHPOSITIONSINCONTRAST,HOWEVER,DELOOF2001ARGUESTHATALONGERCASHCONVERSIONCYCLEREDUCESTHENEE
8、DTOHOLDLIQUIDITYBECAUSEMORE6RECEIVABLESANDINVENTORIESCANQUICKLYBECONVERTEDINTOCASHMYERSANDMAJLUF1984SUGGESTTHATASYMMETRICINFORMATIONBETWEENMANAGERSANDINVESTORSMAKESEXTERNALFINANCINGCOSTLYINTHEPRESENCEOFADVERSESELECTIONCOSTS,SECURITIESMAYBEMISPRICED,ANDFIRMSPREFERINTERNALOVERINFORMATIONALLYSENSITIVEE
9、XTERNALFINANCEPECKINGORDERTHEORYIFADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSBECOMEEXTREME,AFIRMMAYFINDITMOREPROFITABLENOTTOSELLSECURITIESTOEXTERNALINVESTORSANDEVENTOFOREGOINVESTMENTSTHEREFORE,ITISVALUABLETOBUILDUPFINANCIALSLACKMYERS1984THISMOTIVEFORHOLDINGCASHCANBESUBSUMEDUNDERTHEPRECAUTIONARYMOTIVEOPLERETAL1999ORTHEFIN
10、ANCINGMOTIVEDELOOF2001THEREARETWOPOTENTIALIMPLICATIONSOFTHEEXISTENCEOFADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSIFTHEYAREINTERPRETEDASADDITIONALCOSTSOFRAISINGCAPITAL,THENAFIRMSTILLFACESATRADEOFFBETWEENTHECOSTSANDTHEBENEFITSOFHOLDINGCASHINCONTRAST,IFONEASSUMESTHATTHECOSTSOFEXTERNALFINANCINGAREPROHIBITIVE,AFIRMWILLGENERAL
11、LYAVOIDFINANCINGINVESTMENTSWITHEXTERNALCAPITALANDINSTEADACCUMULATECASHINTHISCASE,HOWEVER,THEREISNOTARGETCASHLEVELIFTHECOSTSOFHOLDINGCASHAREINCORPORATEDIE,THELOWRETURNEARNEDONLIQUIDASSETSANDINCREASINGAGENCYCOSTS,THEREISONLYANUPPERBOUNDFROMWHICHPOINTONWARDITISTOOCOSTLYTOHOLDMORECASHTOAVOIDEXCESSIVEADV
12、ERSESELECTIONCOSTSANDBEINGFORCEDNOTTOINVEST,FIRMSWITHHIGHERINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESHOLDMORECASHMOSTIMPORTANT,FIRMSWHOSEVALUESAREMAINLYDETERMINEDBYGROWTHOPTIONSSHOULDHAVELARGERCASHRESERVESTOAVOIDFOREGOINGSOMEPROFITABLEINVESTMENTOPPORTUNITIESINADDITION,TRANSACTIONCOSTSARELOWERFORFIRMSTHATAREMORECLOSELYM
13、ONITOREDANDHAVEBETTERACCESSTOTHECAPITALMARKETSEXTERNALMONITORINGISPOSSIBLYSTRONGERFORDIVIDENDPAYINGFIRMS,ANDITMIGHTTHUSBEEASIERFORTHEMTORAISEEXTERNALFUNDSALTERNATIVELY,THEYCOULDCUTDIVIDENDSTOABSORBALIQUIDITYSHORTAGE,IMPLYINGLOWERCASHHOLDINGSACOMPETINGHYPOTHESIS,HOWEVER,HOLDSTHATDIVIDENDPAYERSHAVEANI
14、NCENTIVETOAVOIDACASHSQUEEZEBECAUSETHEYAREPARTICULARLYRELUCTANTTOCUTDIVIDENDSBRAVETAL2005MOREOVER,LARGERFIRMSEXHIBITLESSPRONOUNCEDINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESAND,THEREFORE,LOWERADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSTHANSMALLERFIRMSDOBRENNANANDHUGHES1991COLLINSETAL71981SMALLERFIRMSALSOFACEHIGHERCOSTSOFEXTERNALFINANCINGTHANL
15、ARGERONESBECAUSETHEYAREMORELIKELYTOFACEBORROWINGCONSTRAINTSWHITED1992FAZZARIANDPETERSEN1993ASSUMINGTHATFIRMSIZEISANINVERSEPROXYFORBOTHTHEDEGREEOFINFORMATIONASYMMETRIESANDTHECOSTOFEXTERNALFINANCING,SMALLERFIRMSCANBEEXPECTEDTOHOLDAGREATERAMOUNTOFCASHTHANLARGERFIRMSTHISNOTIONISALSOJUSTIFIEDBYTHEASSUMPT
16、IONTHATLARGERFIRMSTENDTOBEMOREDIVERSIFIED,IMPLYINGTHATTHEYARELESSLIKELYTOEXPERIENCEFINANCIALDISTRESSTITMANANDWESSELS1988ADVERSESELECTIONCOSTSLEADTOAPECKINGORDEROFFINANCIALINSTRUMENTS,WHICHALSOPROVIDESAHYPOTHESISFORTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCASHHOLDINGSANDLEVERAGEINAPECKINGORDERWORLD,DEBTTENDSTOGROWWHENI
17、NVESTMENTEXCEEDSRETAINEDEARNINGSANDTOFALLWHENINVESTMENTISLESSTHANRETAINEDEARNINGSCASHHOLDINGSFOLLOWANINVERSEPATTERNOVERTIME,IE,CASHDECREASESWHENINVESTMENTSEXCEEDRETAINEDEARNINGS,ANDVICEVERSATHEREFORE,THERELATIONSHIPBETWEENCASHHOLDINGS,DEBT,ANDINVESTMENTSUGGESTSANEGATIVELINKAGEBETWEENLEVERAGEANDCASHH
18、OLDINGSAGENCYCOSTSOFDEBTARISEWHENTHEINTERESTSOFSHAREHOLDERSDIFFERFROMTHOSEOFDEBTHOLDERSAND/ORWHENDIVERGINGINTERESTSEXISTBETWEENVARIOUSCLASSESOFDEBTHOLDERSMORALHAZARDPROBLEMSMAKEITDIFFICULTANDEXPENSIVEFORHIGHLYLEVERAGEDFIRMSTORAISEADDITIONALDEBTAND/ORRENEGOTIATEEXISTINGDEBTCONTRACTSTOPREVENTBANKRUPTC
19、YJENSENANDMECKLING1976ARGUETHATTHESEFIRMSHAVESTRONGINCENTIVESTOENGAGEINASSETSUBSTITUTION,MAKINGDEBTMOREEXPENSIVEBOTHINTERMSOFTHEREQUIREDYIELDANDINTERMSOFTHECOVENANTSATTACHEDTOTHEDEBTMOREOVER,HIGHLYLEVERAGEDFIRMSWILLLIKELYSUFFERFROMMYERS1977UNDERINVESTMENTPROBLEM,WHERETHEOLDSHAREHOLDERSHAVELITTLEINCE
20、NTIVETOPROVIDEADDITIONALEQUITYCAPITALEVENWHENAFIRMHASPROFITABLEINVESTMENTPROJECTSBECAUSETHECASHFLOWSFROMTHESEINVESTMENTSDISPROPORTIONATELYACCRUETOTHECREDITORSINBOTHCASESTHEAGENCYCOSTSOFDEBTCANBESOHIGHTHATFIRMSCANNOTRAISEFUNDSANDFOREGOPROFITABLEINVESTMENTPROJECTSASIMPLEREMEDYTOAVOIDAGENCYCOSTSOFDEBTA
21、NDTOREDUCETHEPROBABILITYOFFINANCIALDISTRESSISTOCHOOSEALOWLEVELOFLEVERAGEPARRINOANDWEISBACH19998ANOTHERPOSSIBILITYISTOHOLDMORECASH,THEREBYREDUCINGAFIRMSNETDEBTOZKANANDOZKAN2004MOREOVER,GIVENTHATGROWTHOPPORTUNITIESREPRESENTINTANGIBLEASSETS,GROWTHFIRMSINCURHIGHERBANKRUPTCYCOSTSANDTHEIRVALUEDECREASESSHA
22、RPLYIFFINANCIALDISTRESSORBANKRUPTCYOCCURSEG,WILLIAMSON1988HARRISANDRAVIV1991SHLEIFERANDVISHNY1992THISNOTIONALSOSUPPORTSTHEHYPOTHESISTHATFIRMSWITHHIGHRESEARCHANDDEVELOPMENTEXPENSESHAVEMOREINCENTIVESTOAVOIDFINANCIALDISTRESSAND,THEREFORE,TENDTOHOLDLARGERAMOUNTSOFCASHINADDITIONTOSHAREHOLDERBONDHOLDERCON
23、FLICTS,CONFLICTSOFINTERESTBETWEENSHAREHOLDERSANDMANAGERSCANALSOBERELATEDTOAFIRMSCASHHOLDINGSONEREASONFORMANAGERSTOHOLDEXCESSCASHISTHATTHEYARERISKAVERSEFAMAANDJENSEN1983STULZ1988MANAGERSARENOTFULLYDIVERSIFIEDBECAUSETHEYCANNOTDIVIDETHEIRHUMANCAPITAL,ANDTHEREFOREMOREENTRENCHEDMANAGERSHOLDEXCESSCASHTOAV
24、OIDMARKETDISCIPLINEJENSEN1986ARGUESTHATINTHEPRESENCEOFMANAGERIALDISCRETION,MANAGERSHAVEINCENTIVESTOHOLDLARGEAMOUNTSOFCASHINORDERTOHAVEMOREFLEXIBILITYTOPURSUETHEIROWNOBJECTIVESCASHALLOWSMANAGEMENTTOMAKEINVESTMENTSTHATTHECAPITALMARKETWOULDNOTBEWILLINGTOFINANCESINCEEXCESSCASHHOLDINGSALLOWSELFSERVINGMAN
25、AGERSTOAVOIDTHEDISCIPLINEOFTHECAPITALMARKETS,INVESTINGINCASHCANHAVEDETRIMENTALEFFECTSONFIRMVALUETOANALYZETHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENAGENCYCOSTSOFMANAGERIALDISCRETIONANDCASHHOLDINGS,EMPIRICALSTUDIESMUSTUSEVARIABLESTHATINDICATETOWHATEXTENTAFIRMSMANAGEMENTISBEINGDISCIPLINEDORNOTFOREXAMPLE,FIRMSIZEISUSUALLYV
26、IEWEDASATAKEOVERDETERRENT,ANDTHEREFORELARGERFIRMSTENDTOHOLDMORECASHOPLERETAL1999SUGGESTTHATFIRMSWITHLOWDEBTLEVELSTENDTOHOLDMORECASHBECAUSEALOWLEVERAGERATIOMAKESTHEFIRMLESSSUBJECTTOMARKETMONITORINGSIMILARLY,STIGLITZ1985ARGUESTHATTHEREISLITTLEINCENTIVEFORSMALLSHAREHOLDERSTOMONITORMANAGERSBECAUSETHECOS
27、TSOFMONITORINGWILLLIKELYOUTWEIGHTHEBENEFITSTHEREFORE,ONECOULDHYPOTHESIZETHATFIRMSWITHDISPERSEDSHAREHOLDERSHOLDLARGERAMOUNTSOFCASHINCONTRAST,THEEXISTENCEOFALARGESHAREHOLDERMAKESATAKEOVERORAPROXYCONTESTACREDIBLETHREATSHLEIFERANDVISHNY1986WHENAFIRMHASACONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDER,ANOTHERASPECTISTHATTHECONTRO
28、LLINGPARTYCANAPPROPRIATE9PRIVATEBENEFITSNOTSHAREDBYTHEOTHERSHAREHOLDERSBARCLAYANDHOLDERNESS1989DYCKANDZINGALES2004OZKANANDOZKAN2004ARGUETHATLARGESHAREHOLDERSHAVEANINCENTIVETOINCREASETHEFUNDSUNDERTHEIRCONTROLTOCONSUMEPRIVATEBENEFITSATTHEEXPENSEOFMINORITYSHAREHOLDERS,EG,BYHOLDINGLARGECASHRESERVESACLOS
29、ELYRELATEDHYPOTHESISISTHATFIRMSWITHDEVIATIONSFROMTHEONESHAREONEVOTEPRINCIPLEPOTENTIALLYEXPROPRIATEMINORITYSHAREHOLDERS,ANDONEWAYISTOHOLDEXCESSLIQUIDITYJENSENANDMECKLING1976SUGGESTTHATMANAGERIALOWNERSHIPREDUCESTHEINCENTIVESFORVALUEDESTROYINGACTIONS,IMPLYINGANEGATIVERELATIONSHIPBETWEENMANAGERIALSHAREH
30、OLDINGSANDTHEAMOUNTOFCASHRESERVESATTHESAMETIME,HOWEVER,MANAGERSARERISKAVERSEANDLESSTHANFULLYDIVERSIFIED,ANDTHEYPROTECTTHEMSELVESFROMOUTSIDEPRESSUREBYHOLDINGEXCESSCASHINFACT,OZKANANDOZKAN2004DOCUMENTTHATTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEENMANAGERIALOWNERSHIPANDCASHHOLDINGSISUSHAPEDTHEYEXPLAINTHISOBSERVATIONBYTHEOPPOSINGINFLUENCESOFINCENTIVEALIGNMENTANDENTRENCHMENTEFFECTS
