1、1本科毕业论文外文翻译译文标题萨班斯奥克斯利法案和审计失败资料来源管理审计杂志作者詹姆斯弗兰狼格雷戈里摘要最近公布的会计丑闻,严重损害了会计界的信誉。为了恢复公众的信心,在资本市场,美国国会在2002年通过了萨班斯奥克斯利法案。这个新法律的一个中心主题是试图通过会计专业执行严格的政府监管从而减少重大审计失败,并建立上市公司监督委员会。四大审计失败的根源是确定的,萨班斯奥克斯利法案对审计失败的影响进行了讨论,对能进一步减少审计失败的可能性的建议作了改进。审计失败的原因这种情况在美国司空见惯一个大型的上市公司接收到无保留意见的审计报告,并在此后不久因财务报表的严重错报而倒塌。这种事怎么会是一次又一
2、次地发生,难道与这些公司的审计方法是错误的有关这个问题引起了公众和监管社会的思考。审计师在审计中犯了严重的错误,没有将财务报表的严重失真在审计报告中反映,于是审计失败就产生了。如果审计师遵循一般公认的审计准则,保证财务报表的公正性和准确性,审计失败就不会发生(阿伦斯,2002年)。虽然正确的审计,并不能保证所有的财务报表都没有错报产生,但也不可能严重扭曲事实。因此,除非有严重的审计师的错误或误判,才有可能产生审计失败。关于审计师的错误有四个原因。首先,审计师因疏忽误用或误解而产生差错,这种错误是无意的,比如说审计师在某公司由于疲劳或人为错误造成的差错安永会计师事务所WHINEY(AKST,19
3、90年)。第二,审计人员可以进行欺诈,故意发布一个更有利的审计报告。审计人员在接受贿赂或面对客户的压力或威胁时就可能发生这种情况亚历山大格兰特(MAGGIN,1989年)。第三,审计人员会被有直接或间接经济利益关系的客户影响。例如,在安然事件中,安然公司不愿意会计调整,而安达信因为害怕失去这个重大客户而造假(国,2002年)。另一个例子也是因利益关系审计人员不执行任何咨询,但仍不愿意站起来,生怕被客户解雇。第四,审计人员因为和以前雇主的个人关系而受到不适2当的影响。例如,他原本是公司负责审计的会计师事务所的工作人员,后来离职就任于先前的被审计公司。由于这名工作人员已经倒戈,它有可能利用与他们以
4、前雇主的个人关系,对当前审计产生不利影响普华永道会计师事务所(SEC,1992年)。另一个更微妙的因素是审计师的无意识偏见(BASEMAN,2002年)。审计人员在一般情况下往往会不加批判地接受模棱两可的信息与他们联营公司由他人行使的判断和解释。尤其是在一个典型的审计环境中,审计人员可以下意识地觉察到客户的立场是与自身利益相一致的情况。因此,我们可以将审计失败的根源归纳为以下四种类型1无意的人为错误造成的审计失误,2审计师的欺诈行为,3经济利益造成的不当影响,4审计师与客户的个人关系的不当影响。萨班斯法案此法案将极大地影响公共会计行业,并改变会计师事务所做业务的方式。毫无疑问,萨班斯法案在提升
5、投资者对公布的财务报表的信心上将会有一个良好的影响。然而,法案能将上市公司审计失败减少到什么程度呢把法案中有可能减少审计失败的关键条款概括如下1在PCAOB(上市公司监管委员会)的活动,2审计委员会的新规则,3新的刑事处罚,保护举报人,4审计师咨询的限制,5新的财务报告和审计程序。以在PCAOB(上市公司监管委员会)的活动为例展开委员会规则的制定和监管的力量。它可以建立或更改任何上市公司的审计标准、程序、规则。此外,PCAOB还可以对进行年检的会计师事务所进行质量审查,并有权对侵犯审计规则或专业标准的会计师事务所施加纪律和补救措施。但这种权力只被称为新成立的董事会实施议程的一个重要部分。不过,
6、我们可以使用演绎推理,评估董事会的潜力,以减少审计失败的可能性。委员会的权力可以归纳为它能够制定审计规则并实施制裁。委员会设置新的规则和审计准则是推进一般公认审计标准的一个重要步3骤。然而这个制定规则的权力将减少审计失败,这一点似乎不大可能。据一项调查美国的过去30年的重大审计失败发生情况显示,失败的原因不是因为缺乏必要的审计规则或技术。在绝大多数情况下,这些审计失败是由于审计师忽视运用已经存在的审计规则和技术。简单地制定更多的规则和审核标准,似乎在减少审计失败的可能性方面不太有意义。委员会以质量控制为目的的审查注册会计师事务所运作的能力可能减少审计失败。根据现行标准,会计师事务所审计的上市公
7、司要求他们的工作由其他会计师事务所的同行评审。然而,从最近的一系列重大审计失败案例判断,这些同行评审似乎没有有效地防止审计失败。此问题的产生是因为同行业评审过程由同行业中的工作人员进行,事务所可能与同行私下商议使需要审查的公司获得良好的同行评审。这符合无意识的审计偏见理论(BAZERMAN,2002年)。如果会计师事务所的审计是由一个以质量控制为目的的独立的机构(如PCAOB)执行,则会计师事务所将会显著加强自己的质量控制审核程序。这就会使审计失败的可能性显著减少。然而,在那个时期,PCAOB不具备进行深入审查审计业务范围的工作人员。专业的审计师都由PCAOB雇用和训练去审计上市公司,甚至是那
8、些小样本审核也都是由PCAOB掌管。如果没有大型的、经验丰富的专业审计人员在PCAOB的检查注册会计师事务所的业务能力,那么审计工作在很大程度上是象征性的,是不可能对减少审计失败产生任何意义的。因此,委员会在质量控制方面的权利可能使促进先进审计受到限制,对发生审计失败无显著影响。上市公司监管委员会实施制裁的能力不减少审计失败的可能性。证券交易委员会一直有相同的权限。这个权力将限制个人或公司从证券交易委员会的文件管理器被禁的时间内执行审计。但迄今为止没有证据表明,上市公司监管委员会将制裁任何不同的证券交易委员会。总结萨班斯法案是试图恢复由于安然公司等主要审计失败案件的发生使投资者对上市公司财务报
9、表丧失的信心。法案的一些规定,如限制审计师的客户咨询和增加财务报表舞弊的刑事处罚等都可能使重大审计失败产生实质性的减少。另外的一些规定,如对PCAOB的建立和强制使用审计委员会等有巨大的潜力,但由于操作上的缺陷或隐藏的偏见,它们不大可能使审计失败显著减4少。法案的规定是单维的,它仅考虑审计人员故意的不当行为作为发生审计失败的重要因素。环境因素包括审计人员的工作环境和有权解雇审计人员的上级压力困难等,这些可能占了当代审计失败的重要部分。然而,萨班斯法案未能解决这些审计失败的环境原因。作者主张政府机关修改萨班斯法案的有关规章,以确定年终财报的申报,消除审计师的旺季。如果审计人员在全年审计工作中执行
10、统一的步伐,疲劳或与疲劳相关的审计错误将会消除。作者还主张在四年审计合同期内强制轮换审计人员。最后,作者主张建立一个独立的机制来选举公营机构的董事成员,这将阻止管理层滥用关系和权利。4外文文献原文TITLESARBANESOXLEYANDAUDITFAILUREMATERIALSOURCEMANAGERIALAUDITINGJOURNALAUTHORJAMESTACKETT,FRANWOLF,ANDGREGORYCLAYPOOLABSTRACTTHEHIGHLYPUBLICIZEDACCOUNTINGSCANDALSOFTHERECENTPASTSERIOUSLYDAMAGEDTHECREDI
11、BILITYOFTHEACCOUNTINGPROFESSIONINANEFFORTTORESTOREPUBLICCONFIDENCEINTHECAPITALMARKETS,THEUSCONGRESSPASSEDTHESARBANESOXLEYACTOF2002ACENTRALTHEMEOFTHISNEWLAWISTHEATTEMPTEDREDUCTIONOFMAJORAUDITFAILUREBYSTRICTERGOVERNMENTALREGULATIONOFTHEACCOUNTINGPROFESSIONANDTHECREATIONOFTHEPUBLICCOMPANYACCOUNTINGOVER
12、SIGHTBOARDTHISPAPERDISCUSSESTHELIKELYEFFECTIVENESSOFTHESARBANESOXLEYACTINTHEREDUCTIONOFMAJORAUDITFAILURESFOURROOTCAUSESOFAUDITFAILUREAREIDENTIFIED,ANDISSUESNOTADDRESSEDBYTHESARBANESOXLEYACTTHATMAYHAVEAUDITFAILUREIMPLICATIONSAREDISCUSSEDRECOMMENDATIONSFORIMPROVEMENTSTHATPOTENTIALLYFURTHERREDUCETHELIK
13、ELIHOODOFAUDITFAILUREAREPRESENTEDTHECAUSESOFAUDITFAILURETHESCENARIOHASBECOMEALLTOOCOMMONINCORPORATEAMERICAALARGE,PUBLICLYTRADEDCORPORATIONRECEIVESANUNQUALIFIEDAUDITREPORT,ANDSHORTLYTHEREAFTERCOLLAPSESWITHTHENEWSTHATTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSAREGROSSLYMISSTATEDHOWCANTHISOCCURTIMEANDAGAINUNLESSTHEREISSOME
14、THINGWRONGWITHTHEWAYTHESECOMPANIESAREAUDITEDSUCHISTHEQUESTIONGOINGTHROUGHTHEMINDSOFTHEPUBLICANDREGULATORYCOMMUNITYAUDITFAILUREOCCURSWHENTHEREISASERIOUSDISTORTIONOFTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSTHATISNOTREFLECTEDINTHEAUDITREPORT,ANDTHEAUDITORHASMADEASERIOUSERRORINTHECONDUCTOFTHEAUDITARENS,2002AUDITFAILUREDOE
15、SNOTOCCURIFTHEAUDITORHASFOLLOWEDGENERALLYACCEPTEDAUDITINGSTANDARDS,REGARDLESSOFTHEFAIRNESSANDACCURACYOFTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSAPROPERLYDONEAUDITDOESNOTGUARANTEETHATSERIOUSDISTORTIONSOFTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSHAVENOTOCCURREDHOWEVER,APROPERLYDONEAUDITDOESMAKESERIOUSDISTORTIONSUNLIKELYTHUS,AUDITFAILURECAN
16、NOTOCCURUNLESSTHEREISSERIOUSAUDITOR5ERRORORMISJUDGMENTTHENATUREOFTHISAUDITORERRORHASONLYFOURSYSTEMATICCAUSESFIRST,THEAUDITORCANBLUNDERBYMISAPPLYINGORMISINTERPRETINGGAASSUCHABLUNDERISUNINTENTIONALANDCOULDBECAUSEDBYFATIGUEORHUMANERRORASINTHECASEOFBESTCOMPANYVERNSTWHINEYAKST,1990SECOND,THEAUDITORCANCOM
17、MITFRAUDBYKNOWINGLYISSUINGAMOREFAVORABLEAUDITREPORTTHANISWARRANTEDTHISMAYOCCURWHENTHEAUDITORACCEPTSABRIBEORBOWSTOCLIENTPRESSUREORTHREATSASINTHECASEOFESMSECURITIESVALEXANDERGRANTMAGGIN,1989THIRD,THEAUDITORCANBEUNDULYINFLUENCEDBYHAVINGADIRECTORINDIRECTFINANCIALINTERESTINTHECLIENTFOREXAMPLE,ANAUDITORWH
18、OISPERFORMINGSIGNIFICANTCONSULTINGENGAGEMENTSFORANAUDITCLIENTMAYBERELUCTANTTOINSISTONACCOUNTINGADJUSTMENTSBECAUSEOFTHEFEAROFLOSINGTHECLIENTTOANOTHERCPAFIRMASINTHECASEOFENRONVARTHURANDERSENPOWERS,2002ANOTHEREXAMPLEOFTHISOCCURSINAWEAKERFORMWHENTHEAUDITORISNOTPERFORMINGANYCONSULTINGBUTISSTILLRELUCTANTT
19、OSTANDUPTOTHECLIENTONACCOUNTINGISSUESFORFEAROFBEINGFIREDFOURTH,THEAUDITORCANBEUNDULYINFLUENCEDBECAUSEOFHAVINGSOMEPERSONALRELATIONSHIPWITHTHECLIENTBEYONDWHATISEXPECTEDINANORMALAUDITBETWEENINDEPENDENTPARTIESFOREXAMPLE,ITISCOMMONFORSTAFFMEMBERSOFTHECPAFIRMTOLEAVETHEFIRMFOREMPLOYMENTBYAPREVIOUSLYAUDITED
20、CLIENTSINCETHISSTAFFMEMBERHASSWITCHEDSIDES,ITISPOSSIBLETHATPERSONALRELATIONSHIPSWITHTHEIRPREVIOUSEMPLOYERCOULDHAVEANUNFAVORABLEIMPACTONTHECURRENTAUDITASINTHECASEOFAMREVPRICEWATERHOUSESEC,1992ANOTHERMORESUBTLEFACTORISTHEAUDITORSVULNERABILITYTOUNCONSCIOUSBIASBAZERMAN,2002UNDERTHISTHEORYAUDITORS,ASNORM
21、ALHUMANBEINGS,TENDTOUNCRITICALLYACCEPTTHEJUDGMENTSANDINTERPRETATIONSOFAMBIGUOUSINFORMATIONEXERCISEDBYOTHERSWITHWHOMTHEYASSOCIATETHISISESPECIALLYTHECASEINATYPICALAUDITINGENVIRONMENTWHERETHEAUDITORCANSUBCONSCIOUSLYPERCEIVETHATTHECLIENTSPOSITIONSAREALIGNEDWITHTHEIROWNSELFINTERESTTHUS,WECANSUMMARIZETHER
22、OOTCAUSESOFAUDITFAILUREINTOTHEFOLLOWINGFOURTYPES1AUDITORBLUNDERSCAUSEDBYUNINTENTIONALHUMANERROR62AUDITORFRAUD3UNDUEINFLUENCECAUSEDBYFINANCIALINTERESTS4UNDUEINFLUENCECAUSEDBYPERSONALAUDITORCLIENTRELATIONSHIPSTHESARBANESOXLEYACTTHESOXWILLDRAMATICALLYIMPACTTHEPUBLICACCOUNTINGPROFESSIONANDALTERTHEWAYCPA
23、FIRMSDOBUSINESSTHERECANBELITTLEDOUBTTHATTHESOXWILLHAVEAFAVORABLEPSYCHOLOGICALIMPACTONINVESTORCONFIDENCEINPUBLISHEDFINANCIALSTATEMENTSHOWEVER,TOWHATDEGREEDOTHESOXREDUCETHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILUREINPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESTHEKEYPROVISIONSOFTHESOXTHATHAVETHEPOTENTIALTOREDUCETHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILURECA
24、NBESUMMARIZEDASFOLLOWS1ACTIVITIESOFTHEPCAOB2NEWRULESFORAUDITCOMMITTEES3NEWCRIMINALPENALTIESANDPROTECTIONFORWHISTLEBLOWERS4EMITSONAUDITORCONSULTING5NEWFINANCIALREPORTINGANDAUDITINGPROCEDURESPCAOBTHEPCAOBHASSIGNIFICANTRULEMAKINGANDREGULATORYPOWERITCANESTABLISHORCHANGEANYOFTHESTANDARDS,PROCEDURES,ANDRU
25、LESUSEDTOAUDITPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESMOREOVER,THEPCAOBWILLCONDUCTANNUALINSPECTIONSOFCPAFIRMSFORQUALITYREVIEWPURPOSES,ANDITISEMPOWEREDTOIMPOSEDISCIPLINARYANDREMEDIALACTIONSAGAINSTCPAFIRMSFORVIOLATIONSOFBOARDRULESORANYPROFESSIONALSTANDARDSTHATAPPLYTOAUDITINGTHERESULTOFTHISPOWERWILLONLYBEKNOWNWHENTHENE
26、WLYCREATEDBOARDHASIMPLEMENTEDASIGNIFICANTPORTIONOFITSAGENDAHOWEVER,WECAN,APRIORI,USEDEDUCTIVEREASONINGTOASSESSTHEBOARDSPOTENTIALTOLESSENTHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILURETHECAROBSPOWERCANBESUMMARIZEDINTOITSABILITYTOMAKERULES,AUDITAUDITORS,ANDIMPOSESANCTIONSTHECAROBSCAPACITYTOSETNEWRULESANDAUDITINGSTANDARDS
27、ISASIGNIFICANTANDPOTENTIALLYIMPORTANTSTEPINTHEADVANCEOFGENERALLYACCEPTEDAUDITINGSTANDARDSHOWEVER,ITSEEMSUNLIKELYTHATTHISRULEMAKINGPOWERWILLCAUSEAREDUCTIONINTHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILUREACAREFULEXAMINATIONOFTHEMAJORAUDIT7FAILURESTHATHAVEOCCURREDINTHEUSAINTHEPAST30YEARSSHOWSTHECAUSEOFTHEFAILUREWASNOTBEC
28、AUSEOFTHEABSENCEOFANEEDEDAUDITINGRULEORTECHNIQUEINTHEOVERWHELMINGMAJORITYOFCASESTHESEAUDITINGFAILURESARECAUSEDBYTHEAUDITORNEGLECTINGTOAPPLYTHEAUDITINGRULESANDTECHNIQUESTHATALREADYEXISTSIMPLYENACTINGMORERULESANDAUDITINGSTANDARDSSEEMSUNLIKELYTOMAKEANYMEANINGFULREDUCTIONINTHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILURETHE
29、CAROBSABILITYTOREVIEWTHEOPERATIONSOFREGISTEREDCPAFIRMSFORQUALITYCONTROLPURPOSESISANINTERESTINGDEVELOPMENTANDHASTHEPOTENTIALTOMAKEASIGNIFICANTREDUCTIONINTHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILUREUNDERTHECURRENTSTANDARDS,CPAFIRMSAUDITINGPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESREQUIREPEERREVIEWSOFTHEIRWORKBYOTHERCPAFIRMSHOWEVER,JUDGI
30、NGBYTHERECENTRASHOFMAJORAUDITFAILURES,THESEREVIEWSDONOTAPPEARTOBEEFFECTIVEATPREVENTINGAUDITFAILURESTHEPROBLEMWITHTHECURRENTPEERREVIEWPROCESSISTHATITISCONDUCTEDBYPERSONSWHOWORKINTHESAMEINDUSTRYANDMAYBESYMPATHETICTOTHENEEDSOFTHEREVIEWEDFIRMFOROBTAININGFAVORABLEPEERREVIEWSTHISISCONSISTENTWITHTHEUNCONSC
31、IOUSAUDITORBIASTHEORYBAZERMAN,2002IFTHEAUDITSOFCPAFIRMSWERESUBJECTTOASUBSTANTIVEREVIEWBYANINDEPENDENTAGENCYSUCHASTHEPCAOBFORQUALITYCONTROLPURPOSES,CPAFIRMSWOULDHAVETOSTRENGTHENTHEIROWNQUALITYCONTROLAUDITPROCEDURESSIGNIFICANTLYTHISWOULDCAUSEASIGNIFICANTREDUCTIONINTHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILUREHOWEVER,AS
32、OFTHISDATE,THEPCAOBDOESNOTHAVETHENECESSARYSTAFFTOCONDUCTINDEPTHREVIEWSOFAUDITINGOPERATIONSONAWIDESCALEALARGESTAFFOFPROFESSIONALAUDITORSWOULDHAVETOBEHIREDANDTRAINEDBYTHEPCAOBTOAUDITEVENASMALLSAMPLEOFTHEAUDITSPERFORMEDONPUBLICLYTRADEDCOMPANIESWITHOUTTHISLARGEPROFESSIONALSTAFFOFSEASONEDAUDITINGPROFESSI
33、ONALSTHECAROBSABILITYTOINSPECTREGISTEREDACCOUNTINGFIRMSOPERATIONSISLARGELYSYMBOLICANDISNOTLIKELYTOYIELDANYMEANINGFULREDUCTIONINTHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILURETHEREFORE,THEQUALITYCONTROLASPECTOFTHECAROBSPOWERMAYBELIMITEDTOCONTRIBUTINGTOREFININGTHESTATEOFTHEARTOFAUDITING,WITHOUTSIGNIFICANTLYIMPACTINGTHEIN
34、CIDENCESOFAUDITFAILURE8THECAROBSABILITYTOIMPOSESANCTIONSDOESNOTREDUCETHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILURETHESECHASALWAYSHADTHESAMEAUTHORITYTHISAUTHORITYISLIMITEDTOPROHIBITINGINDIVIDUALSORFIRMSFROMPERFORMINGAUDITSONSECFILERSFORAPROSCRIBEDPERIODOFTIMETHEREISNOEVIDENCETODATEWHICHINDICATESTHATTHEPCAOBWILLIMPOSES
35、ANCTIONSIMPOSESANCTIONSANYDIFFERENTLYFROMTHESECSUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONSTHESOXISANATTEMPTTORESTOREINVESTORCONFIDENCEINTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSOFPUBLICCORPORATIONSBYSHARPLYREDUCINGTHEINCIDENCEOFMAJORAUDITFAILURESSUCHASENRONSOMEPROVISIONSOFSOXSUCHASRESTRICTIONSONAUDITORCLIENTCONSULTINGANDINCREASEDCRIMINALPE
36、NALTIESFORFINANCIALSTATEMENTFRAUDARELIKELYTOMAKESUBSTANTIVEREDUCTIONSINTHELIKELIHOODOFMAJORAUDITFAILUREOTHERPROVISIONSSUCHASTHEESTABLISHMENTOFTHEPCAOBANDTHEMANDATORYUSEOFAUDITCOMMITTEESHAVESIGNIFICANTPOTENTIAL,BUTAREHANDICAPPEDBYOPERATIONALSHORTCOMINGSORHIDDENBIASTOTHEPOINTTHATTHEYAREUNLIKELYTOMAKES
37、IGNIFICANTREDUCTIONSINTHELIKELIHOODOFAUDITFAILURETHEAPPROACHOFTHESOXISUNITDIMENSIONALINTHATITONLYCONSIDERSDELIBERATEMISCONDUCTBYAUDITORSASTHECAUSALFACTORINTHEINCIDENCEOFAUDITFAILUREHOWEVER,ENVIRONMENTALFACTORSINCLUDINGTHEAUDITORSWORKINGENVIRONMENTANDTHEDIFFICULTIESASSOCIATEDWITHAUDITINGSOMEONEWHOHAS
38、THERIGHTTOFIREYOUPROBABLYACCOUNTFORASIGNIFICANTPORTIONOFCONTEMPORARYAUDITFAILURESYET,THESOXFAILTOADDRESSTHESEENVIRONMENTALCAUSESOFAUDITFAILURETHEAUTHORSADVOCATEAMENDINGTHESOXREGULATIONSBYREQUIRINGGOVERNMENTALAUTHORITYTOIDENTIFYTHEFISCALYEARENDOFSECFILERSWITHTHEINTENTOFELIMINATINGTHEAUDITORSBUSYSEASO
39、NIFAUDITINGWORKISPERFORMEDATAUNIFORMPACETHROUGHOUTTHEYEAR,AUDITORFATIGUEISELIMINATEDALONGWITHTHEAUDITINGERRORSASSOCIATEDWITHTHATFATIGUETHEAUTHORSALSOADVOCATEMANDATORYAUDITORROTATIONATTHEENDOFEVERYREQUIREDFOURYEARAUDITCONTRACTPERIODFINALLY,THEAUTHORSADVOCATETHECREATIONOFANINDEPENDENTPROCESSFORELECTINGMEMBERSOFTHEBOARDOFDIRECTORSOFPUBLICCORPORATIONSWHICHWILLPREVENTSENIORMANAGEMENTFROM“STACKING”THEBOARDOFDIRECTORSWITHSYMPATHETICFRIENDSANDASSOCIATES