1、巴菲特最著名的演讲价值投资为什么能够持续战胜市场每个人都期望自己能成功，但是我们后来者的成功建立在大师的肩膀上才能少走弯路，才能有所突破。自然科学的发展也证明了这一点，就像爱因斯坦不可能出现在 原始社会的部落中一样，原始社会没有发现相对论的基础，也不会出现这么伟大的科学家了。人类发展的历史永远是螺旋式的上升，可以有反复、甚至有倒退，向上 的趋势将永远不变，直到最后的崩溃，崩溃的结果是另一个智慧生命的开始，宇宙间的一切都是周而复始。有些朋友会说，前人的东西往往是不对的，是应该批判的。但是我们能够批判的依据和思想从哪里来，不要告诉我，你从没受过人类的教育，就能够批判，其实也是来自于前人思想的积累。
2、希望朋友们能认真的读，如果能有所收获也就达到目的了，能够突破的话就要恭喜你了！巴菲特最著名的演讲：价值投资为什么能够持续战胜市场每个价值投资人的投资业绩都来自于利用企业股票市场价格与其内在价值之间的差异。巴菲特价值投资策略最终要归根于本杰明格雷厄姆（Benjamin Graham）的思想。1934 年年底，他与戴维多德（David Dodd）合作完成了他酝酿已久的证券分析（Security Analysis）。这部划时代的著作标志着证券分析业和价值投资思想的诞生。这本巨著在过去 70 年间共发行了五版，被誉为投资者的“圣经”。纽约证券分析协会强调，格雷厄姆“对于投资的意义就像欧几里得对于几何学
3、、达尔文对于生物进化论一样重要“。格雷厄姆“给这座令人惊叹而为之却步的城市 股票市场绘制了第一张可以依赖的地图，他为价值投资奠定了方 XX 的基础，而在此之前，股票投资与赌博几乎毫无差别。价值投资没有格雷厄姆，就如同共产 主义没有马克思原则性将不复存在。”人们通常认为是格雷厄姆确立了证券分析的原则，所以格雷厄姆被尊称为“现代证券分析之父“。1984 年，在哥伦比亚大学纪念格雷厄姆与多德合著的证券分析出版 50 周年的庆祝活动中，巴菲特这位格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学的投资课上唯一给了 “A”的最优秀的学生进行了一次演讲，他在演讲中回顾了 50 年来格雷厄姆的追随者们采用价值投资策略持续战胜市场的无可
4、争议的事实，总结归纳出价值投资 策略的精髓，在投资界具有非常大的影响力.编者：“格雷厄姆多德都市的超级投资者们”作为巴菲特最著名的演讲名留青史，广为流传。巴菲特在中国十周年纪念八，从英文原版入手，尽可能罗列相关资料推出此次中英文对照的饕餮盛宴。敬请各位入席。格雷厄姆-多德都市的超级投资者们THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLE巴菲特 1984 年在哥伦比亚大学的著名演讲 年在庆祝格雷罕姆与多德合著的证券分析发行周年大会上，巴菲特这位格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学的投资课上唯一给了“A”的最优秀的学生进行了一次 题为“格雷厄姆-多德都市的超级投资者们” (
5、The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville)”的演讲，在他演讲中回顾了 50 年来格雷厄姆的追随者们采用价值投资策略持续战胜市场的无可争议的事实，总结归纳出价值投资策略的精髓，在投资界具有非常大的影响力。THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLETilsonfunds EDITORS NOTE: This article is an edited transcript of a talk given at Columbia University in 1984 commemorating the fifti
6、eth anniversary of Security Analysis , written by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. This specialized volume first introduced the ideas later popularized in The Intelligent Investor . Buffetts essay offers a fascinating study of how Grahams disciples have used Grahams value investing approach to rea
7、lize phenomenal success in the stock market.Is the Graham and Dodd “look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices“ approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes. They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, tha
8、t stock prices reflect everything that is known about a companys prospects and about the state of the economy. There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors w
9、ho seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. “If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out,“ writes one of todays textbook authors.格雷厄姆与多德追求“价值远超过价格的安全保障”，这种证券分析方法是否已经过时?目前许多撰写教科书的教授认为如此。他们认为，股票市场是有效率的市场； 换言之，股票价格已经充分反应了公司一切己知的事实以及整体经济情况
10、：这些理论家认为，市场上没有价格偏低的股票，因为聪明的证券分析师将运用全部的既有 资讯，以确保适当的价格。投资者能经年累月地击败市场，纯粹是运气使然。“如果价格完全反应既有的资讯，则这类的投资技巧将不存在。”一位现今教科书的作 者如此与写道。Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found
11、 that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what hes feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraor
12、dinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.然而，我必须说明，前述事例和我即将提出 的案例，两者之间存在着若干重大差异。旨先，如果(a)你所选择的 225 亿只猩猩的分布状况大致上和美国的人口分布相同；如果(b)经过 20 天的竞赛， 只剩下 215 只赢家；如果(c)你发现其中有 40 只猩猩来自于奥玛哈的某个动物园，则其中必有蹊跷。于是，你
13、会询问猩猩管理员各种问题，它们吃什么饲料、是否做特殊的运动、阅读什么书籍换言之，如果你发现成功案例有非比寻常的集中现象，则你希望判定此异常的特色是否是成功的原因。Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer - with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States - and you found that 400 of them occurred
14、in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know its not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.科学的
15、调查也遵循此一形态。如果你试图分析某种罕见的癌症原因例如，美国每年只有 1500 个病例而你发现蒙大拿州的某个矿区小镇便产生 400 个病例，则你必然对当地的饮水、病患的职业或其他种种变数产生兴趣。你知道，在个小镇中发生 400 个病例，绝不是随机因素所造成。虽然你未必了解病因，但你知道从哪里着手调查。I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an int
16、ellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to thi
17、s particular intellectual village.除了地理国家，还有其他方式可以界定起源。除了地理的起源，还有我所谓“智力的起源”。我认为各位将在投资领域发现，不 成比例的铜板投掷赢家来自于一个极小的智力村庄它可以称为“格雷厄姆多德都市”。这个特殊智力村存在着许多赢家这种集中现象绝非巧合所能够解释。Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call o
18、f some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing. You would simply be identifying one case as a hundr
19、ed cases. Similarly, lets assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the famil
20、y identified with the fathers call. Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21.5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course,
21、 it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didnt have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.在某些情况下，即使非比寻常的集中现象也可能不重要。或许有 100 个只是模仿某一位极具说服力的领导者，而依其主张来猜测铜板的投掷结果。当他猜正面， 100 个追随者也会自动地做相同的猜测。如果这一位领导者是属于最后 215 位赢家之一，则这 100 也
22、便属于同一个智力起源，这项事实便不具有任何意义，因 为 100 个案例实际上只代表一个案例。同理，假定你生活在一个父权结构极为严密的社会，而美国每一个家庭都恰好以父亲马首是瞻。20 天之后，你将发现 215 位赢家是来自于 215 个家庭。若干天真的分析师可能因此而认为，成功地猜测钢板投掷的结果，其中具有高度的遗传因素。当然，这实际上不具有任何意 义，因为你所拥有的不是 215 位个别赢家，而只是 215 个随机分布的家庭。In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common
23、 intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their “flips“ in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be e
24、xplained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.我所要考虑的这一群成功投资
25、者，共有一位共同的智力族长本杰明格雷 厄姆。但是，这些离开此智力家族的孩童，都是依据非常不同的方法猜测他们自己的“铜板”。他们各自前往不同的地方，买卖不同的股票和企业，但他们的综合绩 效绝对无法用随机因素加以解释。他们做相同的猜测，并不是因为领导者下达某一项指令，因此也无法用这种方式解释他们的表现。族知只提供了猜测铜板的智力理 论，每位学生都必须自行决定如何运用这项理论。The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies
26、between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorists concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, w
27、hen businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham its simply that the data are there and academicians have worked hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative
28、 utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.面对图形分 析师所研究的价量行为，我始终感觉惊讶。你是否会仅仅因为某家公司的市场价格在本周或前一周剧扬便决定购买该企业呢?在日前电脑化的时代，人们之所以会 大量研究价格与成交量的行为，理由是这两项变数拥有了无数的资料。研究未必是因为其具任何功用；而只是因为资料既然存在，学术界人士便必须努力学习操作这 些资料所需要的数学技巧。旦拥有这些技巧，不去运用它们便会带来罪恶感，即使这些技巧的运用没有任何功用，或只会带来负面功用也在所不惜。如同一
29、位朋 友所说的，对一位持铁锤的人来说，每样事看起来都像是钉子。I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest h
30、as been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.我认为，这一群具有共同智力起源的投资者非常值得我们研究。虽然学术界不断地对价格、成交量、季节性、资本规模以及其他变数，研究它们对股票绩效的影响，但这群以价值为导向赢家的方法却毫不受人关心。I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation
31、 from 1954 through 1956. There were only four - I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Grahams class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously! After much pestering he finally hir
32、ed me. There were three partners and four of us as the “peasant“ level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and its possible to trace the record of three.关于这一项绩效的研究，我首先要追溯到从 1954 年到 1956 年间，工作于 GrehamNewman 公司的四位伙伴。我们总共四个人我并不是从数以千计的对象中挑选这四个人。在我选修本杰 明格雷厄姆的课程之后，我要求进人 Graham
33、Newman 公司担任无给职的工作，但格雷厄姆却以价值高估而拒绝了我的要求。他对价值看得非常严重！ 经我不断地恳求，他最后答应雇我。当时公司有三位合伙股东，以及我们四位“学徒”。公司结束经营之后，我们四个人陆续在 1955 年到 1957 年间离开公 司，目前只能够追踪其中三个人的投资记录。The first example (see Table 1*正文不附表格，可参考查询文末所附的英文 PDF 文件) is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at n
34、ight at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what “Adam Smith“ - after I told him about Walter - wrote about him in Supermoney (1972):第一个案例（*正文不附表格，可参考查询文末所附的英文 PDF 文件）是华特史洛斯。华特从来没有念过大学，但他 在纽约金融协会参加了本杰明葛雷厄姆的夜间课
35、程。华特在 1955 年离开 GrehamNewman 公司。以下是“亚当史密斯”在我和他谈论有关华 特的事迹之后在超级金钱(Supermoney，1972 年) 一书中对他所做的描述：He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and th
36、ats about it.他从来不运用或接触有用的资讯。在华尔街几乎没有人认识他，所以没有人提供他有关投资的观念。他只参考手册上的数字，并要求企业寄年报给他，情况便是如此。In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. “He never forgets that he is handling other peoples money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.“ He has total integr
37、ity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real - and from this flows an attraction to the “margin of safety“ principle.当华特介绍我们认识时，他曾经描述“他从来没有忘记自己是在管理别人的资金，这进一步强化了他对于风险的厌恶。”他有高尚的品格并以务实的态度自持。对他来说金钱是真实的，股票也真实的并从此而接受了“安全边际”的原则。Walter has diversified enormously, owning w
38、ell over 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And thats all he does. He doesnt worry about whether it its January, he doesnt worry about whether its Monday, he doesnt worry about whether its an election year. He
39、 simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do - and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I dont seem to have very much influence
40、 on Walter. Thats one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.华特的投资组合极为分散，目前拥有的股票远越过 100 支。他了解如何选股，将价格远低于其价值者出售给私人投资者。这便是他所做的一切。他不担心目前是不是一月份，不在乎今天是不是星期一，也不关心今 年是不是大选年。他的想法非常单纯，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能够以 40 美分买进，我迟早会获利。他便是如此不断地行动：他所持有的股票种类远比我的多 而且比我更不关心企业的本质；我对华特似乎没有太大的影响力。这是他的长处之，没有人能够对他产生足够的影响力。Th
41、e second case is Tom Knapp, who also worked at Graham-Newman with me. Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a noncredit ba
42、sis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree. He took Dodds course again, and took Ben Grahams course. Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here
43、and I found him on the beach again. The only difference is that now he owns the beach!第二个案例是汤姆 科纳普，他曾经和我一起在 GrehamNewman 公司工作。汤姆于大战之前曾在普林斯顿大学主修化学，大战结束之后，他经常在海滩游荡。某一天，他得 知大卫多德将在可伦比亚大学开夜间投资课程。汤姆以旁听方式选修该课程，之后他对投资学科产生了浓厚的兴趣，于是正式注册进入哥伦比亚大学商学院，并且 获得了 MBA 学位。35 年之后，我拨电话给汤姆，确定某些有关此一主题的事，我发现他仍然在海滩游荡。惟的差别是他目前
44、拥有一片海滩！In 1968, Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2. Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide diversification. They occasionally bought cont
45、rol of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.在 1968 年，汤姆与艾德安德生也是葛拉汉的信徒以及其他一、两位有共同信念的人，组成了帝地布朗合伙公司。帝地布朗合伙公司的投资高度分散。他们偶尔会从事控制股权的投资，但其被动式的投资绩效约略等于控权式投资的表现。Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in
46、1957. The best thing he did was to quit in 1969. Since then, in a sense, Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects. There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire. But I think that any way you
47、figure it, it has been satisfactory.表 3 是格雷厄姆纽曼公司第三位员工的投资业绩记录。他在 1957 年成立巴菲特合伙公司。他做出的最明智的决策是 在 1969 年结束合伙公司。从此之后，伯克夏.哈撒韦公司在某种程度上成为合伙公司的延续。我无法给各位单一的指数，用以合理地测试伯克夏公司的投资管 理。但是，我认为各位不论如何考验它，它的表现一直都令人满意。Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund, which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graha
48、ms class, Bill Ruane. After getting out of Harvard Business School, he went to Wall Street. Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Bens course at Columbia, where we met in early 1951. Bills record from 1951 to 1970, working with relatively small sums,
49、was far better than average. When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners, so he set up the Sequoia Fund. He set it up at a terrible time, just when I was quitting. He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors. I am happy to say that my partners, to an amazing degree, not only stayed with him but added money, with the happy result
