1、外文翻译CAPITALSTRUCTUREANDPRODUCTMARKETSINTERACTIONSEVIDENCEFROMBUSINESSCYCLESMATERIALSOURCEHTTP/JFEROCHESTEREDU/02096PDFAUTHORMURILLOCAMPELLO1INTRODUCTIONRECENTTHEORETICALWORKONCAPITALSTRUCTUREHASEMPHASIZEDNOTONLYTHECONTRACTINGPROBLEMSAMONGAGENTSWITHINTHEFIRMEG,MANAGERSANDINVESTORS,BUTALSOTHEIMPLICATI
2、ONSOFFINANCINGDECISIONSFORAGENTSOUTSIDETHEFIRMEG,COMPETITORSANDCONSUMERSTHISLITERATURESTRESSESTHATAFIRMSMODEOFFINANCINGINFLUENCESBOTHTHEFIRMSCONDUCTINITSPRODUCTMARKETASWELLASTHECONDUCTOFOTHERMARKETPARTICIPANTS,THEREBYINFLUENCINGCOMPETITIVEOUTCOMES1ALTHOUGHTHESETHEORIESHAVERECEIVEDMUCHATTENTION,ONLYA
3、FEWOFTHEIRIMPLICATIONSHAVEBEENEMPIRICALLYEXAMINEDDIRECTLYTESTINGTHOSEIDEASISACHALLENGINGTASKSINCEITISOFTENDIFFICULTTOESTABLISHWHETHERORNOTTHECOMPETITIVEOUTCOMESASSOCIATEDWITHAFIRMSFINANCINGDECISIONSWEREALREADYANTICIPATEDBYTHEFIRMSMANAGERSANOTHERCONCERNWITHTHEINTERPRETATIONOFTHEEMPIRICALRELATIONBETWE
4、ENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDPRODUCTMARKETBEHAVIORISTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATBOTHAFIRMSFINANCIALSTRUCTUREANDITSCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCEMAYBEJOINTLYINFLUENCEDBYUNOBSERVEDORUNMODELEDFACTORSARISINGFROMTHEMARKETENVIRONMENTASTUDYOFCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCEFOLLOWINGCAPITALSTRUCTURECHANGES,FORINSTANCE,MAYASSIGNASPURIOUSCAUSAL
5、ITYTOCAPITALSTRUCTUREIFBOTHPERFORMANCEANDRECAPITALIZATIONSAREINFLUENCEDBYUNDERLYINGTRENDSININDUSTRYCONCENTRATION,EXCESSCAPACITY,ANDGROWTHSEEKOVENOCKANDPHILLIPS,1997,ANDZINGALES,1998ONEWAYTOMITIGATECONCERNSABOUTTHEENDOGENOUSNATUREOFTHERELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCEISTOLOOKAT
6、PERFORMANCEFOLLOWINGEVENTSAFFECTINGPRODUCTMARKETPARTICIPANTSINCENTIVESORABILITYTOCOMPETEUNDEREXISTINGFINANCINGARRANGEMENTSTHISPAPERUSESSUCHANAPPROACHTOESTABLISHALINKBETWEENFIRMFINANCINGANDPRODUCTMARKETOUTCOMESASSUMINGTHATTHETIMING,MAGNITUDE,ANDCONSEQUENCESOFMACROECONOMICSHOCKSARENOTFULLYANTICIPATEDB
7、YPRODUCTMARKETPARTICIPANTSANDTHEIRFINANCIERS,IEXAMINETHESENSITIVITYOFMARKUPSANDSALESGROWTHTOFINANCIALLEVERAGEFOLLOWINGSHOCKSTOAGGREGATEDEMAND2MYMAINFOCUS,HOWEVER,ISONTHEDIFFERENCESINTHESESENSITIVITIESACROSSINDUSTRIESWHERERIVALSAREMOREDEBTFINANCEDANDINDUSTRIESWHERERIVALSARELESSDEBTFINANCEDSUCHINTERTE
8、MPORALANDCROSSSECTIONALCONTRASTSHELPSIDESTEPTHEPROBLEMSTHATUSUALLYAFFECTTHEINTERPRETATIONOFTHEEMPIRICALRELATIONBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCEINPARTICULAR,MYTESTSSHOWTHATAFTERCONDITIONINGONTHEPHASEOFTHEBUSINESSCYCLEANDONCOMPETITORSLEVERAGE,FIRMDEBTLEADSTOSALESUNDERPERFORMANCEINSOMEI
9、NDUSTRIESINCERTAINSTATESOFDEMANDREALIZATION,WHEREASUNDEROTHERSETSOFCIRCUMSTANCESSUCHDEBTLEDLOSSESAREEITHERNONEXISTENTORREVERSEDWHILESUCHFINDINGSARECONSISTENTWITHEXTANTTHEORIESONTHEEFFECTSOFCAPITALSTRUCTUREONCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCE,THECONTRASTSIUSEMAKEITDIFFICULTTOIDENTIFYALTERNATIVESTORIESORBIASESCAP
10、ABLEOFEXPLAININGHOWDEBTFINANCINGCOULDLEADTOPOORPERFORMANCEINSOMESPECIFICINDUSTRIES/PERIODSPRECISELYALONGTHELINESOFTHERESULTSIREPORTIPRESENTTWOSETSOFRESULTSCHARACTERIZINGTHEDYNAMICSOFTHEINTERACTIONSBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDPRODUCTMARKETSFIRST,IUSEINDUSTRYLEVELDATATOCONDUCTADIRECTTESTOFCHEVALIERANDSC
11、HARFSTEINS1996THEORYOFMARKUPCYCLICALITYCONSISTENTWITHTHEIMPLICATIONSOFTHEIRMODEL,IFINDTHATMARKUPSAREMORECOUNTERCYCLICALININDUSTRIESWHEREFIRMSUSEMOREEXTERNALFINANCINGMYESTIMATESSUGGESTTHATTHEMARKUPOFAHYPOTHETICAL“ALLDEBT”INDUSTRYINCREASESBYAPPROXIMATELY42MORETHANTHATOFA“ZERODEBT”INDUSTRYINRESPONSETOA
12、1DECLINEINGDPITHENUSEAPANELDATASETCONTAININGQUARTERLYINFORMATIONFROMFIRMSIN71INDUSTRIESCOVERINGMORETHANTWODECADESTOSTUDYTHEIMPACTOFDEBTFINANCINGONSALESPERFORMANCEATTHEFIRMLEVELMYEMPIRICALSTRATEGYFOCUSESONTHEDIFFERENCESINRESPONSESOFFIRMSALESLEVERAGESENSITIVITYTOMACROECONOMICSHOCKSACROSSLOWDEBTANDHIGH
13、DEBTINDUSTRIESTHERESULTSSHOWTHATRELIANCEONDEBTFINANCINGCANSIGNIFICANTLYDEPRESSAFIRMSRELATIVETOINDUSTRYSALESGROWTHININDUSTRIESWHERERIVALSARELESSLEVERAGEDASECONOMICCONDITIONSWORSENCOMPARINGTHEPERFORMANCEOFTWOFIRMSINALOWDEBTINDUSTRY,ONEFIRMWITHADEBTTOASSETRATIO10ABOVETHEINDUSTRYAVERAGEANDTHEOTHERWITHAD
14、EBTTOASSETRATIO10BELOWTHATAVERAGE,IFINDTHATTHEINDUSTRYADJUSTEDQUARTERLYSALESGROWTHOFTHEMOREINDEBTEDFIRMIS13LOWERTHANTHATOFITSUNLEVEREDRIVALFOLLOWINGA1DECLINEINGDPINCONTRAST,NOSUCHEFFECTSAREOBSERVEDININDUSTRIESWHERERIVALSARERELATIVELYMOREINDEBTEDJUSTPRIORTOASIMILARMACROECONOMICSHOCKIINTERPRETMYFINDIN
15、GSONCROSSINDUSTRYDIFFERENCESINCYCLICALMOVEMENTSINMARKUPSANDINSALESDEBTSENSITIVITIESASCONSISTENTWITHTHETHEORYOFCHEVALIERANDSCHARFSTEIN1996SPECIFICALLY,MYFINDINGSAGREEWITHTHEPREDICTIONTHATFIRMSWHICHRELYMOREHEAVILYONEXTERNALFINANCINGAREMORELIKELYTOREDUCETHEIRINVESTMENTINMARKETSHAREBUILDINGDURINGDOWNTUR
16、NS,ANDTHATTHECOMPETITIVEOUTCOMESRESULTINGFROMSUCHACTIONSAREJOINTLYDETERMINEDBYTHEFIRMSANDBYITSRIVALSCAPITALSTRUCTURESMYFIRMLEVELRESULTS,HOWEVER,CANNOTDISMISSASTATECONTINGENTFORMOFTELSERS1966“LONGPURSE”ARGUMENTASTHEYSUGGESTTHAT,CONDITIONALONALOWDEMANDREALIZATION,INDEBTEDFIRMSLOSEMORELESSMARKETSHAREWH
17、ENRIVALSARERELATIVELYUNLEVEREDLEVERAGEDTHISSTUDYADDSTOTHEEVIDENCEONINTERACTIONSBETWEENFINANCIALSTRUCTUREANDPRODUCTMARKETSPRESENTEDINTHEPIONEERINGWORKOFCHEVALIER1995A,1995B,PHILLIPS1995,ANDKOVENOCKANDPHILLIPS1997THEPAPERSEMPIRICALSTRATEGYISMOSTSIMILARTOTHATOFCHEVALIERANDSCHARFSTEIN1996ANDZINGALES1998
18、,WHOLOOKATTHESEINTERACTIONSDURINGPERIODSWHENTHECOMPETITIVEENVIRONMENTISAFFECTEDBYEXOGENOUSEVENTSEG,OILSHOCKSANDDEREGULATIONWHILETHOSESTUDIESREPORTTIMEANDINDUSTRYSPECIFICRESULTS,THECURRENTPAPERSHOWSTHATTHEARGUMENTTHATAFIRMSFINANCIALSTRUCTUREINFLUENCESITSCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCEISCONSIDERABLYMOREPERVASI
19、VEANDOVERALLECONOMICALLYSIGNIFICANTTHANPREVIOUSLYTHOUGHTTOMYKNOWLEDGE,THISISTHEFIRSTSTUDYTOPRESENTEVIDENCEOFALINKBETWEENCAPITALSTRUCTURE,PRODUCTMARKETS,ANDBUSINESSCYCLES,ALLOWINGFORBOTHFIRMLEVELANDMACROECONOMICINFERENCESTHERESTOFTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSSECTION2,PROVIDESANOVERVIEWOFSOMEOFTHEMAINA
20、RGUMENTSRELATINGCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDPRODUCTMARKETS,ANDDISCUSSESTESTABLEHYPOTHESESINSECTION3,IEXAMINEWHETHERINDUSTRYWIDEUSEOFDEBTFINANCINGINFLUENCESTHEBEHAVIOROFMARKUPSOVERTHEBUSINESSCYCLEINSECTION4,IUSEFIRMLEVELDATATOEXAMINETHERELATIONBETWEENFIRMCAPITALSTRUCTUREANDPERFORMANCEVIAATESTINGSTRATEGYTHATEM
21、PHASIZESCHANGESINTHESENSITIVITYOFSALESPERFORMANCETODEBTFINANCINGFOLLOWINGMACROECONOMICSHOCKSSECTION5CONCLUDESTHEPAPER2FINANCIALSTRUCTUREANDPRODUCTMARKETSSOMETHEORIESANDHYPOTHESESTHEGOALOFTHISPAPERISEMPIRICALLYEXAMINETHEARGUMENTTHATCAPITALSTRUCTUREINFLUENCESAFIRMSASWELLASITSRIVALSINCENTIVESTOCOMPETEI
22、NTHEPRODUCTMARKET,THEREBYINFLUENCINGCOMPETITIVEOUTCOMESUNFORTUNATELY,FEWOFTHETHEORETICALSTUDIESPROPOSINGTHISARGUMENTMAKECLEARPREDICTIONSABOUTHOWTHEIRRESULTSWOULDMANIFESTINTHEDATAMOREOVER,ONLYSOMEOFTHOSEPREDICTIONSCANBESIMULTANEOUSLYTESTEDUNDERASINGLEEMPIRICALFRAMEWORK,MAKINGITDIFFICULTTODISMISSONEAR
23、GUMENTINFAVOROFANOTHERINTHESUBSEQUENTANALYSIS,ISTUDYWHETHERTHEIDEASPRESENTEDINTHISREVIEWSECTIONAREECONOMICALLYSIGNIFICANTANDPERVASIVEUSINGFAIRLYGENERALEMPIRICALMODELSRELATINGDEBTFINANCINGTOPRODUCTMARKETOUTCOMESONEOFTHETHEORIESEXAMINEDINTHELITERATUREISTHE“LONGPURSE”OR“PREDATION”ARGUMENTTHEBASICSTORY,
24、PUTFORTHBYTELSER1966ANDFORMALIZEDBYBOLTONANDSCHARFSTEIN1990,STRESSESTHATDEPENDENCEONOUTSIDEFINANCINGCANHINDERAFIRMSABILITYTOFIGHTCOMPETITION,WHICHINTURNPROMPTSFINANCIALLYUNCONSTRAINEDRIVALSTOPURSUEPREDATORYMARKETSTRATEGIESINEXAMININGTHISARGUMENT,RESEARCHERSOFTENTAKESOMEMEASUREOFDEBTFINANCINGASAPROXY
25、FORFINANCIALFRAGILITYANDSTUDYWHETHERTHATMEASUREISASSOCIATEDWITHCOMPETITIVEOUTCOMESSUCHASDIMINISHEDPROFITSANDMARKETSHARELOSSESSEE,EG,PHILLIPS,1995THETESTINGSTRATEGYUSEDINTHISPAPERGOESASTEPFURTHERINTHATITONLYTAKESINDEBTEDNESSTOBEAMEASUREOFFINANCIALFRAGILITYUNDERASETOFSPECIFICCONDITIONSATHEFIRMISHIGHLY
26、LEVERAGEDINRELATIONTOITSINDUSTRYRIVALS,BTHEFIRMOPERATESINAMARKETWHERETHEUSEOFDEBTFINANCINGISGENERALLYLOW,ANDCTHEREISANEGATIVESHOCKTODEMANDFINANCIALFRAGILITYMAYALSOHINDERCOMPETITIVENESSINMODELSWHEREFIRMSUSEPRICINGASAMEANSOFINVESTINGINMARKETSHAREBUILDINGRATHERTHANASAMEANSOFMAXIMIZINGSINGLEPERIODPROFIT
27、SEG,GOTTFRIES,1991,ANDCHEVALIERANDSCHARFSTEIN,1996CHEVALIERANDSCHARFSTEINARGUETHATLIQUIDITYCONSTRAINEDFIRMSARELESSINCLINEDTOINVESTINMARKETSHAREWHENTHELIQUIDATIONPROBABILITYISHIGHINRECESSIONS,EXTERNALLYFINANCEDFIRMSAREMORELIKELYTOBOOSTPRICECOSTMARGINSATTHEEXPENSEOFFUTURESALES4SINCEPRICESARESTRATEGICC
28、OMPLEMENTS,THEIRRIVALSWILLALSOINFLATEPRICES,BUTBYANEXTENTGIVENBYTHEIROWNFINANCESASTHOSERIVALSRAISETHEIRPRICES,THEMARKETSHARELOSSESOFTHEMORECONSTRAINEDFIRMSAREREDUCEDITFOLLOWSTHATTHEDEGREEOFFIRMMARKUPCYCLICALITYSHOULDDEPENDBOTHONTHEFIRMSOWNFINANCIALCONSTRAINTSASWELLASONTHEFINANCIALSTATUSOFITSRIVALSAT
29、THEINDUSTRYLEVEL,MARKUPSSHOULDBELESSCYCLICALIFFIRMSUSEMOREEXTERNALFINANCINGTHESEIDEASAREEXAMINEDBELOWANALTERNATIVELINEOFARGUMENTSUGGESTSTHATDEBTMAYINFACTCONTRIBUTETOFIRMCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCEACCORDINGTOTHE“STRATEGICCOMMITMENT”THEORYOFBRANDERANDLEWIS1986,AFIRMSDECISIONTOUSEDEBTWORKSASACOMMITMENTTOMOR
30、EAGGRESSIVEBEHAVIORINTHEPRODUCTMARKETTHISTHREATISCREDIBLEDUETOTHEOPTIONLIKEPAYOFFSASSOCIATEDWITHDEBTUNDERLIMITEDLIABILITY,ANDINDUCESTHEFIRMSUNLEVEREDRIVALSTOACCOMMODATEBYREDUCINGTHEIROUTPUTIFEXPOSTTHISDYNAMICISFOUNDTOWORKINTHEDATA,THENONESHOULDOBSERVEMARKETSHAREGAINSFORTHEMORELEVERAGEDFIRMSHOWEVER,O
31、NEDIFFICULTYINTESTINGTHISIDEAISTHATTHEAVAILABILITYOFSUCHGAINSSHOULDEXANTELEADTOAPRISONERSDILEMMALIKEBEHAVIORINWHICHRIVALFIRMSWOULDUSEMOREDEBTFINALLY,DEBTMAYBERELATEDTOPERFORMANCEINANONCAUSALSENSEINTHE“INDUSTRYEQUILIBRIUM”MODELSOFMAKSIMOVICANDZECHNER1991ANDWILLIAMS1995,THEOPTIMALSETOFFINANCIALCONTRAC
32、TSFOREACHFIRMINAINDUSTRYISJOINTLYDETERMINEDWITHOTHERINDUSTRYCHARACTERISTICS,SUCHASTHENUMBEROFFIRMS,RISKINESSOFPROJECTS,ANDTECHNOLOGIESWILLIAMSPROPOSESASTABLEINDUSTRYEQUILIBRIUMSUPPORTINGTHECOEXISTENCEOFPROFITABLEFIRMSTHATARELARGE,MAKEMOREFIXEDCAPITALINVESTMENTS,ANDUSEMOREDEBT,WITHSMALLERFIRMSTHATARE
33、LESSPROFITABLEANDUSELOWDEBTWHILEMYEXPERIMENTSARENOTDESIGNEDTOFORMALLYTESTTHISTHEORY,ICHECKWHETHERMYRESULTSCOULDBEASCRIBEDTOSUCHANEQUILIBRIUMTYPESTORY3CONCLUDINGREMARKSRECENTTHEORETICALRESEARCHHASPROPOSEDTHATCAPITALSTRUCTURECANAFFECTFIRMPERFORMANCEINTHEPRODUCTMARKETSBECAUSEFINANCINGARRANGEMENTSCANALT
34、ERAFIRMSINCENTIVESORABILITYTOCOMPETEINTHISPAPER,IINVESTIGATETHISCLAIMBYEXAMININGTHEIMPACTOFDEBTFINANCINGONINDUSTRYMARKUPSANDONFIRMSALESGROWTHUSINGDATAFROMALARGECROSSSECTIONOFINDUSTRIESOVERANUMBEROFYEARSMYTESTSSHOWTHATDEBTHASANEGATIVEIMPACTONRELATIVETOINDUSTRYFIRMSALESGROWTHININDUSTRIESWHERERIVALSARE
35、RELATIVELYUNLEVEREDDURINGRECESSIONS,BUTNOTDURINGBOOMSATTHEINDUSTRYLEVEL,IFINDTHATMARKUPSAREMORECOUNTERCYCLICALIE,THEYINCREASEMOREINRECESSIONSWHENINDUSTRYDEBTISHIGHTHESERESULTSSEEMCONSISTENTWITHCHEVALIERANDSCHARFSTEINS1996PREDICTIONTHATFINANCIALLYCONSTRAINEDFIRMSHAVEGREATERINCENTIVESTOBOOSTSHORTTERMP
36、ROFITSATTHEEXPENSEOFFUTURESALESINRESPONSETONEGATIVESHOCKSTODEMANDWHILERESULTSFROMINTERINDUSTRYSTUDIESAREINHERENTLYDIFFICULTTOINTERPRET,THEYCANPROVIDEVALUABLEINSIGHTSITAKEMYFINDINGSASEVIDENCETHATCAPITALSTRUCTUREINFLUENCESCOMPETITIVEPERFORMANCEINASYSTEMATICWAYOVERALL,MYRESULTSSUGGESTTHATFIRMSFINANCING
37、CHOICESHAVEIMPLICATIONSFORCYCLICALDYNAMICSINGENERAL,ANDFORTHEDYNAMICSOFSTRATEGICINTERACTIONSINPRODUCTMARKETSINPARTICULARTHESEDYNAMICSSHOULDBECAREFULLYACCOUNTEDFORINFUTUREWORKBYBOTHMACROANDFINANCIALECONOMISTS译文资本结构和产品市场的相互作用以经济周期为证据资料来源HTTP/JFEROCHESTEREDU/02096PDF作者MURILLOCAMPELLO1、介绍最近对资本结构理论强调的不仅是
38、公司代理人之间的签约问题（例如经理和投资者），还有融资决策的问题（例如竞争对手和消费者）。这种文献强调了公司的融资方式影响着公司在其产品市场以及其他市场参与者的行为，从而影响竞争的结果。但是其中只有几个理论已经进行了实证研究。直接测试那些猜想是很有挑战性的，因为很难确定竞争的结果是否和企业管理者所做的融资决策有关联。另一个需要关注的是资本结构和产品市场行为之间的关系，公司的财务结构和绩效可能都受不确定的市场环境的影响。研究竞争状况随资本结构的改变而改变，例如，可以假设如果竞争状况和资本结构改变都受潜在的工业集中度，过剩设备，和成长性影响，例如KOVENOCK和PHILLIPS（1997），ZI
39、NGALES（1998）。一种办法，用以减轻资本结构和产品市场竞争之间的内在关系就是根据现行融资安排下市场参与者的竞争机制来进行竞争。本文运用这种方法建立公司融资和产品市场结果之间的联系。假设产品市场参与者和他们的融资人的时间、规模，和宏观因素影响的冲击是完全没有预想的，我检查利润的敏感性和销售增长对财务杠杆作用和总需求的冲击，然而，我的主要工作是检测债务融资频繁和债务融资贫乏的行业之间的敏感性差异。这样的对比可以回避资本结构和竞争状况经常影响经验解释的问题。我的检验表明以商业周期的调节和竞争对手的杠杆作用为条件的，公司债务导致销售业绩不佳的部分行业在某些需求实现的国家，而在其它的情况下，这样
40、的债务损失不是不存在的就是扭转的。而这样的结果与资本结构对竞争状况的理论一致，我的报告时我用对比很难解释债务融资为何会导致某一特定行业或时期不良的工作表现的情况。我用两种集合表明资本结构和产品市场之间的相互作用。首先，我运用CHEVALIER和SCHARFSTEIN的利润周期性理论用工业数据进行直接测试。我发现在公司运用外部筹资的行业中，利润大多是反周期的。我估计的数据表明，假设在一个下降1的国内生产总值时，全负债的工业比零负债的工业利润增加了42。在之后的20多年里，我运用了包含71家公司的固定样本数据集，来研究债务融资对销售业绩的影响。我的经验战略重点是通过低债务和高债务对宏观经济的冲击，
41、了解企业销售杠杆作用的不同。结果表明，当经济条件恶化，竞争对手的杠杆作用很低时，依靠债务融资能明显抑制公司的销售增长。比较两家公司在低债务产业的业绩，一家公司的资产负债比率比同行业平均水平高10，另一家比同行业平均水平低10，我发现一季度多负债的公司销售增长率是13，低于其竞争对手，国民生产总值就下降1。相比之下，比较负债的高低对宏观经济的影响是不存在的。我认为我研究的利润动态循环和销售负债的敏感性的结果同CHEVALIER和SCHARFSTEIN（1996）的理论是一致的。具体地说，我认为很大程度上依靠外部融资的公司更有可能在经济低迷时会减少为了提高市场占有率的投资，而竞争的结果取决于公司的
42、决策和竞争对手的资本结构这种说法是对的。本研究增加了财务结构和产品市场之间的相互作用。在看相互作用的时候，竞争环境受到外部的因素影响（如石油的冲击及放松管制）。当前的报告显示，财务结构对竞争能力的影响比先前的估计要显著。据我所知，这是第一个研究资本结构、产品市场和经济周期之间的关联，考虑到公司水平和宏观经济的推论。2、财务结构和产品市场理论和假设本文研究的目的是检验资本结构对产品市场竞争能力的影响，从而影响收益的结果。不幸的是，一些理论研究中，他们的预测结果将会在数据中体现。另外，只有其中的一些预测可以在同一经验框架试验，所以很难去支持另外一个论据。在随后的分析中，我的想法是是否研究债务融资对
43、产品市场竞争结果的关系。TELSER（1966）和SCHARFSTEIN（1990）理论强调依赖外部融资会影响公司的竞争能力，从而促使竞争对手在经济上无约束地进行市场策略的掠夺。在验证这个观点时，研究人员往往不大容易衡量债务融资的脆弱性和其是否关系到竞争的结果，例如利润和市场份额的减少。负债在金融市场是不利的具体条件是（1）与竞争对手有关的产业杠杆水平很高，（2）公司所在的市场上，使用债务融资的公司不多，（3）需求的减少。财务的脆弱性往往阻碍模型的竞争力，采用定价的手段增加市场占有率比某一周期内使利润最大化好。CHEVALIER和SCHARFSTEIN争论当公司清算的可能性很高时，偿债能力差的
44、公司不太倾向于为了增加市场份额而去投资。在经济衰退时，外部筹资的公司更喜欢提高价格来获取利润。因为价格是战略，所以他们的竞争对手也会提高价格，而从某种程度上讲是在增加他们自己的财产。竞争对手价格提高，其市场占有率就下降。利润的周期性依赖于公司自己的财务不利因素和竞争对手的财务状况。在工业水平上，如果公司使用更多的外部融资，涨价会减少利润。另一种观点是债务可能有助于公司竞争能力。根据“战略保证”理论和刘易斯、BRANDE（1986），在产品市场上，用债务保证信用度是非常具有进取心的行为。在有限责任条件下，这种行为是可信任的，可提醒合作者容纳其产品的输出量减少。每个人都应该遵守杠杆作用高的公司其市
45、场份额收益增加。然而，有一种难以测试的想法是这种收益的有效性会导致处于困境的公司增加更多的债务。最后，债务和公司绩效可能无因果关系。MAKSIMOVIC和ZECHNER（1991），WILLIAMS（1995）在“工业平衡”模型中指出，每个公司在行业中的最优财务结构由他们共同决定，例如公司的数量，项目的风险性和技术。威廉姆斯提出了一个稳定行业平衡，支持共处的公司其盈利是最大的，有更多的固定资产投资，和使用更多的债务，而规模较小的公司利润少，债务也少。3、结束语最近理论研究提出，资本结构会影响公司在产品市场上的业绩，因为融资方式可以改变公司的竞争能力。本文研究债务融资对产品利润和销售增长率的影响。我的研究表明，在经济衰退期，债务融资对产品市场竞争能力有负面影响。在同行业间，当债务高时，提高价格反而会减少利润。这个结果和CHEVALIER和SCHARFSTEIN（1996）的预测一致，即财务紧缩的公司要提高短期的利润。总的来说，我的结果表明，在产品市场上，企业的融资方式的选择对产品竞争能力有影响。
