1、外文翻译OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDFIRMPERFORMANCEEVIDENCEFROMISRAELMATERIALSOURCEJOURNALOFMANAGEMENTANDGOVERNANCEAUTHORBENILAUTERBACHANDALEXANDERVANINSKY1INTRODUCTIONFORMANYYEARSANDINMANYECONOMIES,MOSTOFTHEBUSINESSACTIVITYWASCONDUCTEDBYPROPRIETORSHIPS,PARTNERSHIPSORCLOSEDCORPORATIONSINTHESEFORMSOFBUSINESSORG
2、ANIZATION,ASMALLANDCLOSELYRELATEDGROUPOFINDIVIDUALSBELONGINGTOTHESAMEFAMILYORCOOPERATINGINBUSINESSFORLENGTHYPERIODSRUNSTHEFIRMANDSHARESITSPROFITSHOWEVER,OVERTHERECENTCENTURY,ANEWFORMOFBUSINESSORGANIZATIONFLOURISHEDASNONCONCENTRATEDOWNERSHIPCORPORATIONSEMERGEDTHEMODERNDIVERSEOWNERSHIPCORPORATIONHASBR
3、OKENTHELINKBETWEENTHEOWNERSHIPANDACTIVEMANAGEMENTOFTHEFIRMMODERNCORPORATIONSARERUNBYPROFESSIONALMANAGERSWHOTYPICALLYOWNONLYAVERYSMALLFRACTIONOFTHESHARESINADDITION,OWNERSHIPISDISPERSE,THATISTHECORPORATIONISOWNEDBYANDITSPROFITSAREDISTRIBUTEDAMONGMANYSTOCKHOLDERSTHEADVANTAGESOFTHEMODERNCORPORATIONARENU
4、MEROUSITRELIEVESFINANCINGPROBLEMS,WHICHENABLESTHEFIRMTOASSUMELARGERSCALEOPERATIONSANDUTILIZEECONOMIESOFSCALEITALSOFACILITATESCOMPLEXOPERATIONSALLOWINGTHEMOSTSKILLEDOREXPERTMANAGERSTOCONTROLBUSINESSEVENWHENTHEYTHEPROFESSIONALMANGERSDONOTHAVEENOUGHFUNDSTOOWNTHEFIRMMODERNCORPORATIONSRAISEMONEYSELLCOMMO
5、NSTOCKSINTHECAPITALMARKETSANDASSIGNITTOTHEPRODUCTIVEACTIVITIESOFPROFESSIONALMANAGERSTHISISWHYITISPLAUSIBLETOHYPOTHESIZETHATTHEMODERNDIVERSEOWNERSHIPCORPORATIONSPERFORMBETTERTHANTHETRADITIONALCLOSELYHELDBUSINESSFORMSMODERATINGFACTORSEXISTFOREXAMPLE,CLOSELYHELDFIRMSMAYISSUEMINORITYSHARESTORAISECAPITAL
6、ANDEXPANDOPERATIONSMOREIMPORTANTLY,MODERNCORPORATIONSFACEASEVERENEWPROBLEMCALLEDTHEAGENCYPROBLEMTHEREISACHANCETHATTHEPROFESSIONALMANGERSGOVERNINGTHEDAILYOPERATIONSOFTHEFIRMWOULDTAKEACTIONSAGAINSTTHEBESTINTERESTSOFTHESHAREHOLDERSTHISAGENCYPROBLEMSTEMSFROMTHESEPARATIONOFOWNERSHIPANDCONTROLINTHEMODERNC
7、ORPORATION,ANDITTROUBLEDMANYECONOMISTSBEFOREEG,BERLEANDMEANS,1932JENSENANDMECKLING,1976FAMAANDJENSEN1983THECONCLUSIONWASTHATTHERENEEDSTOEXISTAMONITORINGSYSTEMORCONTRACT,ALIGNINGTHEMANAGERINTERESTSANDACTIONSWITHTHEWEALTHANDWELFAREOFTHEOWNERSSTOCKHOLDERSAGENCYTYPEPROBLEMSEXISTALSOINCLOSELYHELDFIRMSBEC
8、AUSETHEREAREALWAYSONLYAFEWDECISIONMAKERSHOWEVER,GIVENTHEPERSONALTIESBETWEENTHEOWNERSANDMANGERSINTHESEFIRMS,ANDGIVENTHEMUCHCLOSERMONITORING,AGENCYPROBLEMSINCLOSELYHELDFIRMSSEEMINGENERALLESSSEVERETHEPRESENCEOFAGENCYPROBLEMSWEAKENSTHECENTRALTHESISTHATMODERNOPENOWNERSHIPCORPORATIONSAREMOREEFFICIENTITISP
9、OSSIBLETHATINSOMEBUSINESSSECTORSTHECOSTSOFMONITORINGANDBONDINGTHEMANAGERWOULDBEEXCESSIVEITISALSOPROBABLETHATINSOMECASESTHEADVANTAGESOFLARGESCALEOPERATIONSANDPROFESSIONALMANAGEMENTWOULDBEMINORANDINSUFFICIENTTOOUTWEIGHTHEEXPECTEDAGENCYCOSTSNEVERTHELESS,GIVENTHEHISTORICALTRENDTOWARDSDIVERSEOWNERSHIPCOR
10、PORATIONS,WEMAINTAINTHEHYPOTHESISTHATDIVERSEOWNERSHIPFIRMSPERFORMBETTERTHANCLOSELYHELDFIRMSINOURVIEW,THETRENDTOWARDSDIVERSEOWNERSHIPCORPORATIONSISRATIONALANDCANBEEXPLAINEDBYPERFORMANCEGAINS2OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDFIRMPERFORMANCEONEOFTHEMOSTIMPORTANTTRADEMARKSOFTHEMODERNCORPORATIONISTHESEPARATIONOFOWNE
11、RSHIPANDCONTROLMODERNCORPORATIONSARETYPICALLYRUNBYPROFESSIONALEXECUTIVESWHOOWNONLYASMALLFRACTIONOFTHESHARESTHEREISANONGOINGDEBATEINTHELITERATUREONTHEIMPACTANDMERITOFTHESEPARATIONOFOWNERSHIPANDCONTROLEARLYTHEORISTSSUCHASWILLIAMSON1964PROPOSETHATNONOWNERMANAGERSPREFERTHEIROWNINTERESTSOVERTHATOFTHESHAR
12、EHOLDERSCONSEQUENTLY,NONOWNERMANAGEDFIRMSBECOMELESSEFFICIENTTHANOWNERMANAGEDFIRMSTHEMORERECENTLITERATUREREEXAMINESTHISISSUEANDPREDICTIONITPOINTSOUTTHEEXISTENCEOFMECHANISMSTHATMODERATETHEPROSPECTSOFNONOPTIMALANDSELFISHBEHAVIORBYTHEMANAGERFAMA1980,FOREXAMPLE,ARGUESTHATTHEAVAILABILITYANDCOMPETITIONINTH
13、EMANAGERIALLABORMARKETSREDUCETHEPROSPECTSTHATMANAGERSWOULDACTIRRESPONSIBLYINADDITION,THEPRESENCEOFOUTSIDEDIRECTORSONTHEBOARDCONSTRAINSMANAGEMENTBEHAVIOROTHERS,LIKEMURPHY1985,SUGGESTTHATEXECUTIVECOMPENSATIONPACKAGESHELPALIGNMANAGEMENTINTERESTSWITHTHOSEOFTHESHAREHOLDERSBYGENERATINGALINKBETWEENMANAGEME
14、NTPAYANDFIRMPERFORMANCEHENCE,NONOWNERMANAGERFIRMSARENOTLESSEFFICIENTTHANOWNERMANAGEDFIRMSMOSTINTERESTINGLY,DEMSETZANDLEHN1985CONCLUDETHATTHESTRUCTUREOFOWNERSHIPVARIESINWAYSTHATARECONSISTENTWITHVALUEMAXIMIZATIONTHATIS,DIVERSEOWNERSHIPANDNONOWNERMANAGEDFIRMSEMERGEWHENTHEYAREMOREWORTHWHILETHEEMPIRICALE
15、VIDENCEONTHEISSUEISMIXEDSEESHORT1994FORASUMMARYPARTOFTHEDIVERSERESULTSCANBEATTRIBUTEDTOTHEDIFFERENCEACROSSTHESTUDIESINTHECRITERIAFORDIFFERENTIATIONBETWEENOWNERANDNONOWNERMANAGERCONTROLLEDFIRMSTHESECRITERIA,TYPICALLYBASEDONPERCENTAGEOWNERSHIPBYLARGESTOCKHOLDERS,ARELESSINNOCUOUSANDMOREPROBLEMATICTHANI
16、NITIALLYBELIEVEDBECAUSE,ASDEMONSTRATEDBYMORCK,SHLEIFERANDVISHNY1988ANDMCCONNELLANDSERVAES1990,THERELATIONBETWEENPERCENTAGEOWNERSHIPANDFIRMPERFORMANCEISNONLINEARFURTHER,PERCENTOWNERSHIPAPPEARSINSUFFICIENTFORDESCRIBINGTHECONTROLSTRUCTURETWOFIRMSWITHIDENTICALOVERALLPERCENTAGEOWNERSHIPBYLARGEBLOCKHOLDER
17、SARELIKELYTOHAVEDIFFERENTCONTROLORGANIZATIONS,DEPENDINGONTHEIDENTITYOFTHELARGESTOCKHOLDERSINTHISSTUDY,WEUTILIZETHEOWNERSHIPCLASSIFICATIONSCHEMEPROPOSEDBYANG,HAUSERANDLAUTERBACH1997THISSCHEMEDISTINGUISHESBETWEENNONOWNERMANAGEDFIRMS,FIRMSCONTROLLEDBYCONCERNS,FIRMSCONTROLLEDBYAFAMILY,ANDFIRMSCONTROLLED
18、BYAGROUPOFINDIVIDUALSPARTNERSOBVIOUSLY,THECONTROLSTRUCTUREINEACHOFTHESEFIRMTYPESISDIFFERENTTHUS,SOMENEWPERSPECTIVESONTHERELATIONBETWEENOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDFIRMPERFORMANCEMIGHTEMERGE3DATAWEEMPLOYDATAFROMADEVELOPINGECONOMY,ISRAEL,WHEREMANYFORMSOFBUSINESSORGANIZATIONCOEXISTTHESAMPLEINCLUDES280PUBLICCO
19、MPANIESTRADEDONTHETELAVIVSTOCKEXCHANGETASEDURING1994FOREACHCOMPANYWECOLLECTDATAONTHE19921994NETINCOMEPROFITSAFTERTAX,1994TOTALASSETS,1994EQUITY,1994TOPMANAGEMENTREMUNERATION,AND1994OWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREALLDATAISEXTRACTEDFROMTHECOMPANIESFINANCIALREPORTSEXCEPTFORTHECLASSIFICATIONOFFIRMSACCORDINGTOTHEIROW
20、NERSHIPSTRUCTURE,WHICHISBASEDONTHEPUBLICATIONS,HOLDINGSOFINTERESTEDPARTIESISSUEDBYTHEISRAELSECURITIESAUTHORITY,MEITAVSTOCKGUIDE,ANDGLOBESSTOCKEXCHANGEYEARBOOKTHEINITIALSAMPLEINCLUDEDALLFIRMSTRADEDONTHETASEABOUT560ATTHETIMEHOWEVER,SAMPLESIZESHRUNKBYHALFBECAUSE1ACCORDINGTOTHEISRAELISECURITYAUTHORITYTH
21、EISRAELICOUNTERPARTOFTHEUSSECONLY434COMPANIESPROVIDEDRELIABLECOMPENSATIONREPORTS2147COMPANIESHAVEANEGATIVE199294AVERAGENETINCOME,WHICHMAKESTHEMUNSUITABLEFORTHEMETHODOLOGYWEEMPLOYAND3FOR7FIRMSWECOULDNOTDETERMINETHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURETHECOMPANIESINTHESAMPLEREPRESENTARICHVARIETYOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURES,ASI
22、LLUSTRATEDINFIGURE1NINEPERCENTOFTHEFIRMSDONOTHAVEANYMAJORITYOWNERAMONGMAJORITYOWNEDFIRMS,INDIVIDUALSFAMILYFIRMSORPARTNERSHIPSOFINDIVIDUALSOWN72ANDTHERESTARECONTROLLEDBYCONCERNSABOUTHALF49OFTHEINDIVIDUALLYCONTROLLEDFIRMSAREDOMINATEDBYAPARTNERSHIPOFINDIVIDUALSANDTHEREST51AREDOMINATEDBYFAMILIESPROFESSI
23、ONALNONOWNERCEOSAREFOUNDINABOUT15OFTHEINDIVIDUALLYCONTROLLEDFIRMS4METHODOLOGYDATAENVELOPMENTANALYSISINTHISSTUDY,WEMEASURERELATIVEPERFORMANCEUSINGDATAENVELOPMENTANALYSISDEADATAENVELOPMENTANALYSISISCURRENTLYALEADINGMETHODOLOGYINOPERATIONSRESEARCHFORPERFORMANCEEVALUATIONSSEESEIFORDANDTHRALL,1990,ANDPRE
24、VIOUSVERSIONSOFITHAVEBEENUSEDINFINANCEBYELYASIANIANDMEHDIAN,1992,FOREXAMPLETHEMAINADVANTAGEOFDATAENVELOPMENTANALYSISISTHATITISAPARAMETERFREEAPPROACHFOREACHANALYZEDFIRM,DEACONSTRUCTSATWINCOMPARABLEVIRTUALFIRMCONSISTINGOFAPORTFOLIOOFOTHERSAMPLEFIRMSTHEN,THERELATIVEPERFORMANCEOFTHEFIRMCANBEDETERMINEDOT
25、HERQUANTITATIVETECHNIQUESSUCHASREGRESSIONANALYSISAREPARAMETRIC,THATISITESTIMATESAPRODUCTIONFUNCTIONANDASSESSESEACHFIRMPERFORMANCEACCORDINGTOITSRESIDUALRELATIVETOTHEFITTEDFIXEDPARAMETERSECONOMYWIDEPRODUCTIONFUNCTIONWEARENOTCLAIMINGTHATPARAMETRICMETHODSAREINADEQUATERATHER,WEATTEMPTADIFFERENTANDPERHAPS
26、MOREFLEXIBLEMETHODOLOGY,ANDCOMPAREITSRESULTSTOTHESTANDARDREGRESSIONMETHODOLOGYFINDINGSTHEEQUITYRATIOVARIABLEREPRESENTSEXPECTATIONTHATGIVENTHEFIRMSIZE,THEHIGHERTHEINVESTMENTSOFSTOCKHOLDERSEQUITY,THEHIGHERTHEIRRETURNNETINCOMEFINALLY,THECEOANDTOPMANAGEMENTCOMPENSATIONVARIABLESARECONTROLLINGFORTHEMANAGE
27、RSINPUTONEOFOURCENTRALPOINTSISTHATTOPMANAGERSACTIONSANDSKILLSAFFECTFIRMOUTPUTHENCE,HIGHERPAYMANGERSWHOPRESUMABLYAREALSOHIGHERSKILLAREEXPECTEDTOYIELDSUPERIORPROFITSROSEN1982RELATESEXECUTIVESPAYANDRANKINTHEORGANIZATIONTOTHEIRSKILLSANDABILITIES,ANDMURPHY1998DISCUSSESINDETAILTHESTRUCTUREOFEXECUTIVEPAYAN
28、DITSRELATIONTOFIRMSPERFORMANCETHEDEAANALYSISANDTHEEMPIRICALESTIMATIONOFTHERELATIVEPERFORMANCEOFDIFFERENTORGANIZATIONALFORMSAREREPEATEDINFOURSEPARATESUBSETSOFFIRMSINVESTMENTCOMPANIES,INDUSTRIALCOMPANIES,REALESTATECOMPANIES,ANDTRADEANDSERVICESCOMPANIESTHISSECTORANALYSISCONTROLSFORTHESPECIALBUSINESSENV
29、IRONMENTOFTHEFIRMSANDFACILITATESFURTHEREXAMINATIONOFTHENETEFFECTOFOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREONFIRMPERFORMANCE5EMPIRICALRESULTSTHEMAINRESULTSOFTHEEMPIRICALFINDINGSREVIEWEDABOVEARETHATMAJORITYCONTROLBYAFEWINDIVIDUALSDIMINISHESFIRMPERFORMANCE,ANDTHATPROFESSIONALNONOWNERMANAGERSPROMOTEPERFORMANCETHECONCLUSIONSA
30、BOUTINDIVIDUALCONTROLANDPROFESSIONALMANAGEMENTAREREINFORCEDBYTWOOTHERFINDINGSFIRST,ITAPPEARSTHATFIRMSWITHOUTPROFESSIONALMANAGERSANDFIRMSCONTROLLEDBYINDIVIDUALSAREMORELIKELYTOEXHIBITNEGATIVENETINCOMESECOND,TABLEIVALSOPRESENTSRESULTSOFREGRESSIONSOFNETINCOME,NETINC,ONLEVERAGE,SIZE,PROFESSIONALMANAGERDU
31、MMY,ANDINDIVIDUALCONTROLDUMMY6CONCLUSIONSTHEEMPIRICALANALYSISOF280FIRMSINISRAELREVEALSTHATOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREIMPACTSFIRMPERFORMANCE,WHEREPERFORMANCEISESTIMATEDASTHEACTUALNETINCOMEOFTHEFIRMDIVIDEDBYTHEOPTIMALNETINCOMEGIVENTHEFIRMSINPUTSWEFINDTHAT1OUTOFALLORGANIZATIONALFORMS,FAMILYOWNERMANAGEDFIRMSAPPE
32、ARLEASTEFFICIENTINGENERATINGPROFITSWHENALLFIRMSARECONSIDERED,ONLYFAMILYFIRMSWITHOWNERMANAGERSHAVEANAVERAGEPERFORMANCESCOREOFLESSTHAN30,ANDWHENPERFORMANCEISMEASUREDRELATIVETOTHEBUSINESSSECTOR,ONLYFAMILYFIRMSWITHOWNERMANAGERSHAVEANAVERAGESCOREOFLESSTHAN502NONOWNERMANAGEDFIRMSPERFORMBETTERTHANOWNERMANA
33、GEDFIRMSTHESEFINDINGSSUGGESTTHATTHEMODERNFORMOFBUSINESSORGANIZATION,NAMELYTHEOPENCORPORATIONWITHDISPERSEOWNERSHIPANDNONOWNERMANAGERS,PROMOTESPERFORMANCECRITICALREADERSMAYWONDERHOWCOMEEFFICIENTANDLESSEFFICIENTORGANIZATIONALSTRUCTURESCOEXISTTHEANSWERISTHATWEPROBABLYDONOTDOCUMENTALONGTERMEQUILIBRIUMSIT
34、UATIONTHELOWERPERFORMINGFAMILYANDPARTNERSHIPCONTROLLEDFIRMSARELIKELY,ASTIMEPROGRESSES,TOTRANSFORMINTOPUBLICCONTROLLEDNONMAJORITYOWNEDCORPORATIONSAFEWRESERVATIONSAREINORDERFIRST,WEDONOTCONTENDTHATEVERYCOMPANYWOULDGAINBYTRANSFORMINGINTOADISPERSEOWNERSHIPPUBLICFIRMFOREXAMPLE,ITISCLEARTHATSTARTUPCOMPANI
35、ESAREUSUALLYBETTEROFFWHENTHEYARECLOSELYHELDSECOND,THEREREMAINQUESTIONSABOUTTHEMETHODOLOGYANDITSAPPLICATIONDATAENVELOPMENTANALYSISISNOTSTANDARDINFINANCELAST,WEDIDNOTSHOWDIRECTLYTHATTRANSFORMINGINTOADISPERSEOWNERSHIPPUBLICFIRMIMPROVESPERFORMANCESFUTURERESEARCHSHOULDFURTHEREXPLOREANYPERFORMANCEGAINSFRO
36、MTHESEPARATIONOFOWNERSHIPANDCONTROL译文股权结构与公司业绩资料来源管理治理杂志作者贝尼劳特巴赫和亚历山大范尼斯基多年来，在许多经济体中的大多数商业活动是由独资企业、合伙企业或者非公开企业操作管理的。在这些企业组织形式中，有一种小型的与个人密切相关的属于同一家庭或有长期业务合作的团体经营公司并分享公司的利润。然而，在最近的世纪，一种新的企业组织以非集中所有制的企业结构应运而生并蓬勃发展。现代多种所有制企业已经打破了所有权和公司积极管理之间的环节。现代企业通常都是由职业经理人管理运行，他们仅代表性地拥有很少一部分的股份份额。此外，所有权分散，就是说公司由股东拥有并
37、且其利润在所有股东间进行派发。现代公司的优势是多方面的。它可以缓解融资难问题，使公司能够承担较大规模的经营和利用规模经济。它还有助于复合式运营，使得最有技能的管理者或专家来控制交易，即使他们（职业经理）没有足够的资金来拥有自己的公司。现代企业在资本市场中筹集资金（出售普通股），并将它们分配给职业经理的生产活动。这就是为什么现代多种所有制企业比传统封闭型的经营形式要运行得好的假设是合理的。干扰现代企业运营的因素依然存在。例如，少数人持股公司可发出少数股票筹集资金，扩大业务。更重要的是，现代企业面临一个严峻的新问题代理问题管理企业日常经营活动的职业代理人有参与股东的最佳利益分配问题的一个机会。该代
38、理问题源于现代企业所有权和控制权的分离，在这之前它困扰许多经济学家（例如，伯利和手段，1932年；詹森和麦克林，1976年法玛和詹森1983）。结论是企业需要有建立一个监控系统或合同，随着财富和所有者（股东）福利的变动来调整管理者的利益和行为。代理型问题也存在与封闭型企业，因为总是有少数决策者存在。不过，在这些企业的所有者和管理者之间建立个人关系，并给予更密切的监督，封闭型企业的代理问题一般来说也不太严重。代理问题的存在削弱了中心论点现代企业所有权开放更有效。这可能是一些业务部门的监控和管理者交涉合作的成本会过高。这也可能在某些情况下，规模化经营和专业管理的优势将是轻微的，而其不足超过了预期的
39、代理成本。然而，对多种所有制企业的历史潮流的分析，我们坚持多种所有制企业比封闭型所有制企业运行得更好的这一假设。我们认为，对多种所有制企业的趋势分析是合理的，并可以通过绩效的增加来解释。现代企业最重要的标志之一是所有权和控制权的分离。现代企业通常是由只拥有一小部分股份份额的职业经理人来运行的。关于所有权与控制权分离的影响和价值，在一些专著中一直都是一个的争论。早期的理论家如威廉姆森（1964），提出非所有者的经营者相对于成为股东来说宁愿选择他们自己的兴趣。因此，非所有者经营的企业比所有者经营的企业的效率变小了。较近期的文献重新审视这一问题和预测结果。它指出存在一类机构，来减缓非最优预期和经营者
40、的自私行为。例如，法玛（1980）认为，管理劳动力市场的有效性和竞争，能减少管理人员作出一些不负责行为的可能性。此外，外部董事在董事会的存在约束管理行为。其他，像墨菲（1985）建议生成薪酬管理与企业绩效挂钩的行政补偿方案，帮助企业分配经营者利益。因此，非所有者经理的企业的效率才会不低于所有者经营的企业。最有趣的是，德姆塞茨和莱恩（1985）的结论是，股权结构方式的变化与价值最大化一致。也就是说，当多种所有制和非所有制管理的企业变得更有价值时，他们就会出现。关于这一问题的实证是复杂的（见SHORT（1994）摘要）。各种不同的结果的一部分可以归因于之前的研究显示在所有者和非所有者管理控制公司区
41、别的标准差。这些标准，通常以大股东所有权的百分比为基础，比最初认为的更成问题，因为正如MORCK，SHLEIFER和VISHNY（1988）和MCCONNELL和SERVAES（1990）证明的那样，所有权比例和公司绩效的关系是非线性的。此外，为描述控制结构，仅出现所有权比例是不充分的。大股东总持股比率相同的两个公司很可能有不同的控制机构，这取决于大股东的特性。在这项研究中，我们利用昂，豪瑟和LAUTERBACH（1997）提出所有权分级方案。这项计划区分非所有者经营的企业，由家族控制的企业和以个人（合作伙伴）集团控制的企业。显然，控制结构在每种公司类型下是不同的。因此，在股权结构与公司绩效的
42、关系可能会出现一些新的观点。我们从一个发展中的经济体以色列中采用数据，因为以色列有不少的企业组织形式能够并存。样本选取了1994年间在特拉维夫证券交易所（特拉维夫）上市交易的280家上市公司。对于每一个公司，我们收集的数据包括1992年到1994年的3年净收入（税后收入），1994年的总资产，1994年的股票，1994年高层管理人员的薪酬和1994年股权结构。除了按照股权结构分类的企业数据外，所有数据均摘自出版在由以色列证券管理局颁发的利益方控股、MEITAV股票指南和金球奖财务报告联交所年鉴上的企业财务报告。样品中的公司代表了丰富多样的股权结构。简单来说，9的公司没有任何大股东。在大多数国有
43、企业中，个人（家族或合伙企业）拥有72的所有权，其余是由控制问题。约一半（49）的单独控制的公司是由个人合伙的，其余（51）是由家族控制为主。发现约15的单独控制企业聘请了专业（非所有者）的首席执行官。因此以色列的数据样本能较为全面的分析股权结构与公司绩效的关系。以色列的280家公司的实证分析表明，股权结构影响公司业绩，其中表现为该公司的实际净收益除以该公司投入的最佳净收益的估计比值。我们发现（1）剔除所有的组织形式，家族所有者经营企业在创造利润方面的效率最低。当涉及到所有的企业时，只有所有者经营的家族企业有一个不到30的平均绩效分数；而当绩效测量涉及到业务部门时，只有所有者经营的家族企业有不
44、到50的平均得分。（2）非所有者经营企业的表现比所有者经营的企业更好。这些发现表明，现代企业的组织形式，即伴随着分散所有权和非所有者经营的开放型企业，能够提高绩效。批判性的读者可能想知道有效率的和低效率的的组织结构是怎么并存的。答案是，我们也许不能用文件证明一个长期得的均衡情况。较低绩效的家族企业（合伙企业）很可能随着时间的推移，转变成受控制的非多数人拥有的上市公司。一些保留意见有序排列。首先，我们不认为每一家企业转变成所有权分散的上市公司都能获益。例如，很显然的，发展初期的企业通常所有权集中密切发展时经济状况最好。其次，方法论及其应用的问题（数据包络分析在金融方面不是标准）仍然存在。最后，我们没有直接说明的是转变成一个所有权分散的上市公司通常将提高公司绩效。未来的研究应进一步探讨从所有权和控制权分离而得的绩效提升问题。
