1、外文翻译AGENCYCOSTSANDOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREMATERIALSOURCETHEJOURNALOFFINANCEVOLLV,NO1FEBRUARY2000PAGE8387AUTHORJAMESSANG,REBELACOLE,ANDJAMESWUHLINIAGENCYCOSTSAMONGSMALLBUSINESSESWHENCOMPAREDTOPUBLICLYTRADEDFIRMS,SMALLBUSINESSESCOMECLOSESTTOTHETYPEOFFIRMSDEPICTEDINTHESTYLIZEDTHEORETICALMODELOFAGENCYCOSTSDEV
2、ELOPEDBYJENSENANDMECKLING1976ATONEEXTREMEOFOWNERSHIPANDMANAGEMENTSTRUCTURESAREFIRMSWHOSEMANAGERSOWN100PERCENTOFTHEFIRMTHESEFIRMS,BYTHEIRDEFINITION,HAVENOAGENCYCOSTSATTHEOTHEREXTREMEAREFIRMSWHOSEMANAGERSAREPAIDEMPLOYEESWITHNOEQUITYINTHEFIRMINBETWEENAREFIRMSWHERETHEMANAGERSOWNSOME,BUTNOTALL,OFTHEIRFIR
3、MSEQUITYAGENCYCOSTSARISEWHENTHEINTERESTSOFTHEFIRMSMANAGERSARENOTALIGNEDWITHTHOSEOFTHEFIRMSOWNERS,ANDTAKETHEFORMOFPREFERENCEFORONTHEJOBPERKS,SHIRKING,ANDMAKINGSELFINTERESTEDANDENTRENCHEDDECISIONSTHATREDUCESHAREHOLDERWEALTHTHEMAGNITUDEOFTHESECOSTSISLIMITEDBYHOWWELLTHEOWNERSANDDELEGATEDTHIRDPARTIES,SUC
4、HASBANKS,MONITORTHEACTIONSOFTHEOUTSIDEMANAGERSTOILLUSTRATE,CONSIDERTHOSEFIRMSWHEREASINGLEOWNERCONTROLS100PERCENTOFTHESTOCKBUTHIRESANOUTSIDERTOMANAGETHEBUSINESSONTHEONEHAND,AGENCYCOSTSMAYBESMALLBECAUSETHESOLEOWNERCANINTERNALIZEALLMONITORINGCOSTSANDHASTHERIGHTTOHIREANDFIRETHEMANAGERMORESPECIFICALLY,SU
5、CHANOWNERINCURS100PERCENTOFTHEMONITORINGCOSTSANDRECEIVES100PERCENTOFTHERESULTINGBENEFITSONTHEOTHERHAND,THESOLEOWNERMAYNOTBEABLETOMONITORPERFECTLYFORTHESAMEREASONSTHATHEORSHEHIREDANOUTSIDEMANAGER,SUCHASLACKOFTIMEORABILITYOWNERSOFSMALLFIRMSTYPICALLYLACKFINANCIALSOPHISTICATION,ANDMAYNOTBECAPABLEOFPERFO
6、RMINGRANDOMAUDITSORFULLYUNDERSTANDINGTHEOPERATINGORFINANCIALRESULTSCONSEQUENTLY,THESEFIRMSINCURRESIDUALAGENCYCOSTSIFTHESECOSTSARESIGNIFICANT,THEYMUSTREFLECTAFAILUREOFTHEOWNERSMONITORINGACTIVITIESPOTENTIALEXPLANATIONSFORTHISFAILUREARELAXMONITORINGBYTHEOWNERSANDTHELACKOFANADEQUATEMONITORINGTECHNOLOGYA
7、VAILABLEFORTHEOWNERSINTHISCASE,THESEPARATIONOFTHEMANAGEMENTFUNCTIONINITIATIONANDIMPLEMENTATIONVERSUSTHECONTROLFUNCTIONBYNONMANAGINGOWNERS/SHAREHOLDERSRATIFICATIONANDMONITORING,ASSUGGESTEDBYFAMAANDJENSEN1983A,1983B,MAYNOTBECOMPLETEOREFFECTIVETHUS,RESIDUALAGENCYCOSTSARESTILLEXPECTEDINASOLEOWNERFIRMWHE
8、NTHEMANAGERISANOUTSIDERAGENCYCOSTSATTRIBUTABLETOTHEDIVERGENCEOFINTERESTSVARYINVERSELYWITHTHEMANAGERSOWNERSHIPSTAKEASTHENUMBEROFSHAREHOLDERSINCREASESFROMONE,THEOWNERSHIPOFTHEOWNER/MANAGERFALLSTO,WHERE01BECAUSETHEMANAGERGAINS100PERCENTOFEACHDOLLARSPENTONPERKS,BUTONLYPERCENTOFEACHDOLLARINFIRMPROFIT,THE
9、MANAGERWHOOWNSLESSTHAN100PERCENTOFTHEFIRMHASTHEINCENTIVETOCONSUMEPERKSRATHERTHANTOMAXIMIZETHEVALUEOFTHEFIRMTOALLSHAREHOLDERSATTHEEXTREMEISTHEMANAGERWITHZEROOWNERSHIP0,WHOGAINS100PERCENTOFPERQUISITECONSUMPTION,BUTZEROPERCENTOFFIRMPROFITSINTHECASEWHENSALARYISINDEPENDENTOFFIRMPERFORMANCEAGGREGATEEXPEND
10、ITUREONMONITORINGBYTHENONMANAGINGSHAREHOLDERSDECREASESASTHEIRINDIVIDUALOWNERSHIPSHARESDECLINETHISISDUETOTHEWELLKNOWNFREERIDERPROBLEMINSPENDINGFORQUASIPUBLICGOODS,SUCHASMONITORINGEFFORTEACHMONITORINGSHAREHOLDER,WITHOWNERSHIPIMUSTINCUR100PERCENTOFTHEMONITORINGCOSTS,BUTREALIZESONLYIPERCENTOFTHEMONITORI
11、NGBENEFITS（INTHEFORMOFREDUCEDAGENCYCOSTS）ANONMONITORINGSHAREHOLDER,HOWEVER,ENJOYSTHEFULLBENEFITSOFAMONITORINGSHAREHOLDERSACTIVITYWITHOUTINCURRINGANYMONITORINGCOSTTHUS,ASTHENUMBEROFNONMANAGERSHAREHOLDERSINCREASES,AGGREGATEEXPENDITUREONMONITORINGDECLINES,ANDTHEMAGNITUDEOFOWNERMANAGERAGENCYCOSTPROBLEMS
12、INCREASESOFFSETTINGTHISRELATIONSHIPARECONCERNSAMONGSHAREHOLDERSABOUTANINCREASEINTHEPROBABILITYTHATTHEFIRMWILLBEUNABLETOPAYOFFBANKDEBTORSECUREFUTUREFINANCINGFROMTHESAMEORNEWINVESTORS,WHICHMAYPRODUCESOMERESTRAINTINAGENCYBEHAVIORHOWEVER,ASNOTEDBYWILLIAMS1987,THESECOUNTERVAILINGFORCESTOAGENCYBEHAVIORARE
13、EXPECTEDTODECLINEINEFFECTIVENESSWHENTHEFIRMISNOTINIMMINENTDANGEROFINSOLVENCYTOSUMMARIZE,AGAINSTTHENULLHYPOTHESISTHATAGENCYCOSTSAREINDEPENDENTOFTHEOWNERSHIPANDCONTROLSTRUCTURE,1WEPOSTULATETHEFOLLOWINGHYPOTHESESDERIVEDFROMAGENCYTHEORYWHENCOMPAREDTOTHEBASECASEIAGENCYCOSTSAREHIGHERATFIRMSWHOSEMANAGERSOW
14、NNONEOFTHEFIRMSEQUITY,IIAGENCYCOSTSAREANINVERSEFUNCTIONOFTHEMANAGERSOWNERSHIPSTAKE,ANDIIIAGENCYCOSTSAREANINCREASINGFUNCTIONOFTHENUMBEROFNONMANAGERSHAREHOLDERSIIDATAOUREMPIRICALAPPROACHUTILIZESTWOFUNDAMENTALASSUMPTIONSABOUTAGENCYCOSTS1AFIRMMANAGEDBYA100PERCENTOWNERINCURSZEROAGENCYCOSTSAND,2AGENCYCOST
15、SCANBEMEASUREDASTHEDIFFERENCEINTHEEFFICIENCYOFANIMPERFECTLYALIGNEDFIRMANDTHEEFFICIENCYOFAPERFECTLYALIGNEDFIRMTOOPERATIONALIZETHISAPPROACHFORMEASURINGAGENCYCOSTS,WENEEDCERTAINDATAINPUTSIDATAONFIRMEFFICIENCYMEASURESIIDATAONFIRMOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,INCLUDINGASETOFFIRMSTHATARE100PERCENTOWNEDBYMANAGERSANDI
16、IIDATAONCONTROLVARIABLES,INCLUDINGFIRMSIZE,CHARACTERISTICS,ANDMONITORINGTECHNOLOGYOFTHESEDATAREQUIREMENTS,THEMOSTDEMANDINGINTERMSOFAVAILABILITYISITEMIIBECAUSESOLEOWNERSHIPFIRMSTYPICALLYARENOTPUBLICLYLISTED,ANDBECAUSEFINANCIALINFORMATIONONUSPRIVATEFIRMSUSUALLYISNOTAVAILABLETOTHEPUBLICTHEFEDERALRESERV
17、EBOARDSNATIONALSURVEYOFSMALLBUSINESSFINANCESNSSBF,FORTUNATELY,DOESPROVIDEFINANCIALINFORMATIONABOUTPRIVATELYHELDFIRMS,INCLUDINGTHEIROWNERSHIPSTRUCTURE,ANDDOESINCLUDEASETOFFIRMSENTIRELYOWNEDBYMANAGERSCONSEQUENTLY,WEUSEDATAFROMTHENSSBFTOMEASUREAGENCYCOSTSTHENSSBFISASURVEYCONDUCTEDBYTHEFEDERALRESERVEBOA
18、RDTOGATHERINFORMATIONABOUTSMALLBUSINESSES,WHICHHAVELARGELYBEENIGNOREDINTHEACADEMICLITERATUREBECAUSEOFTHELIMITEDAVAILABILITYOFDATATHESURVEYCOLLECTEDDETAILEDINFORMATIONFROMASAMPLEOF4,637FIRMSTHATISBROADLYREPRESENTATIVEOFAPPROXIMATELY5MILLIONSMALLNONFARM,NONFINANCIALBUSINESSESOPERATINGINTHEUNITEDSTATES
19、ASOFYEAREND1992COLEANDWOLKEN1995PROVIDEDETAILEDINFORMATIONABOUTTHEDATAAVAILABLEFROMNSSBFFORTHISSTUDY,WELIMITOURANALYSISTOSMALLCCORPORATIONS,COLLECTINGINFORMATIONONTHEGOVERNANCESTRUCTURE,MANAGEMENTALIGNMENT,EXTENTOFSHAREHOLDERANDEXTERNALMONITORING,SIZE,ANDFINANCIALINFORMATIONWEFOCUSONCORPORATIONSTOMI
20、NIMIZEPROBLEMSASSOCIATEDWITHTHEFINANCIALSTATEMENTSOFPROPRIETORSHIPS,WHICHTYPICALLYCOMMINGLEPERSONALANDBUSINESSFUNDSWEELIMINATEPARTNERSHIPSANDSCORPORATIONSBECAUSE,UNLIKECCORPORATIONS,THEYARENOTSUBJECTTOCORPORATETAXATION,ANDTHISMAYLEADOWNERMANAGERSTOTAKECOMPENSATIONINTHEFORMOFPARTNERDISTRIBUTIONSORDIV
21、IDENDSRATHERTHANSALARYEXPENSEBECAUSETHEREISNODOUBLETAXATIONOFSUCHEARNINGSATTHEFIRMLEVELBYFOCUSINGSOLELYONCCORPORATIONS,WEAVOIDTHECOMPLICATIONSOFCOMPARINGOPERATINGEXPENSESACROSSORGANIZATIONALFORMSTHISRESTRICTIONONTHENSSBFDATABASEYIELDSANANALYSISSAMPLEOF1,708FIRMSAAGENCYCOSTSTOMEASUREAGENCYCOSTSOFTHEF
22、IRM,WEUSETWOALTERNATIVEEFFICIENCYRATIOSTHATFREQUENTLYAPPEARINTHEACCOUNTINGANDFINANCIALECONOMICSLITERATURETHEEXPENSERATIO,WHICHISOPERATINGEXPENSESCALEDBYANNUALSALES,ANDTHEASSETUTILIZATIONRATIO,WHICHISANNUALSALESDIVIDEDBYTOTALASSETSTHEFIRSTRATIOISAMEASUREOFHOWEFFECTIVELYTHEFIRMSMANAGEMENTCONTROLSOPERA
23、TINGCOSTS,INCLUDINGEXCESSIVEPERQUISITECONSUMPTION,ANDOTHERDIRECTAGENCYCOSTSMOREPRECISELY,THEDIFFERENCEINTHERATIOSOFAFIRMWITHACERTAINOWNERSHIPANDMANAGEMENTSTRUCTUREANDTHENOAGENCYCOSTBASECASEFIRM,MULTIPLIEDBYTHEASSETSOFTHEFORMER,GIVESTHEEXCESSAGENCYCOSTRELATEDEXPENSEINDOLLARSTHESECONDRATIOISAMEASUREOF
24、HOWEFFECTIVELYTHEFIRMSMANAGEMENTDEPLOYSITSASSETSINCONTRASTTOTHEEXPENSERATIO,AGENCYCOSTSAREINVERSELYRELATEDTOTHESALESTOASSETRATIOAFIRMWHOSESALESTOASSETRATIOISLOWERTHANTHEBASECASEFIRMEXPERIENCESPOSITIVEAGENCYCOSTTHESECOSTSARISEBECAUSETHEMANAGERACTSINSOMEORALLOFTHEFOLLOWINGWAYSMAKESPOORINVESTMENTDECISI
25、ONS,EXERTSINSUFFICIENTEFFORT,RESULTINGINLOWERREVENUESCONSUMESEXECUTIVEPERQUISITES,SOTHATTHEFIRMPURCHASESUNPRODUCTIVEASSETS,SUCHASEXCESSIVELYFANCYOFFICESPACE,OFFICEFURNISHING,AUTOMOBILES,ANDRESORTPROPERTIESTHESEEFFICIENCYRATIOSARENOTMEASUREDWITHOUTERRORSOURCESOFMEASUREMENTERRORINCLUDEDIFFERENCESINTHE
26、ACCOUNTINGMETHODSCHOSENWITHRESPECTTOTHERECOGNITIONANDTIMINGOFREVENUESANDCOSTS,POORRECORDKEEPINGTYPICALOFSMALLBUSINESSES,ANDTHETENDENCYOFSMALLBUSINESSOWNERSTOEXERCISEFLEXIBILITYWITHRESPECTTOCERTAINCOSTITEMSFOREXAMPLE,OWNERSMAYRAISE/LOWEREXPENSES,INCLUDINGTHEIROWNPAY,WHENPROFITSAREHIGH/LOWFORTUNATELY,
27、THESEITEMSARESOURCESOFRANDOMMEASUREMENTERRORSTHATMAYBEREDUCEDWITHALARGERSAMPLEACROSSFIRMSINDIFFERENTINDUSTRIESANDAGEBOWNERSHIPSTRUCTURETHECORPORATEFORMOFORGANIZATION,WITHTHELIMITEDLIABILITYPROVISIONTHATMAKESITMOREEFFICIENTFORRISKSHARINGTHANPROPRIETORSHIPSORPARTNERSHIPS,ALLOWSTHEFIRMTOEXPANDANDRAISEF
28、UNDSFROMALARGENUMBEROFINVESTORS5THUS,ITHASARICHERSETOFOWNERSHIPANDMANAGEMENTSTRUCTURESTHENSSBFPROVIDESFOURVARIABLESTHATWEUSETOCAPTUREVARIOUSASPECTSOFTHEOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREOFSMALLBUSINESSCORPORATIONSITHEOWNERSHIPSHAREOFTHEPRIMARYOWNER,IIANINDICATORFORFIRMSWHEREASINGLEFAMILYCONTROLSMORETHAN50PERCENTOFT
29、HEFIRMSSHARES,IIITHENUMBEROFNONMANAGERSHAREHOLDERS,AND,IVANINDICATORFORFIRMSMANAGEDBYASHAREHOLDERRATHERTHANANOUTSIDERACCORDINGTOTHEORY,AGENCYCOSTSSHOULDBEINVERSELYRELATEDTOTHEOWNERSHIPSHAREOFTHEPRIMARYOWNERFORAPRIMARYOWNERWHOISALSOTHEFIRMSMANAGER,THEINCENTIVETOCONSUMEPERQUISITESDECLINESASHISOWNERSHI
30、PSHARERISES,BECAUSEHISSHAREOFTHEFIRMSPROFITSRISESWITHOWNERSHIPWHILEHISBENEFITSFROMPERQUISITECONSUMPTIONARECONSTANTFORAPRIMARYOWNERWHOEMPLOYSANOUTSIDEMANAGER,THEGAINSFROMMONITORINGINTHEFORMOFREDUCEDAGENCYCOSTSINCREASEWITHHISOWNERSHIPSTAKEHERE,THEPRIMARYOWNERFULFILLSTHEMONITORINGROLETHATLARGEBLOCKHOLD
31、ERSPERFORMATPUBLICLYTRADEDCORPORATIONSAGENCYCOSTSSHOULDBELOWERATFIRMSWHEREASINGLEFAMILYCONTROLSMORETHAN50PERCENTOFTHEFIRMSEQUITYATASMALL,CLOSELYHELDCORPORATIONWHEREASINGLEFAMILYCONTROLSTHEFIRM,THECONTROLLINGFAMILYALSOFULFILLSTHEMONITORINGROLETHATLARGEBLOCKHOLDERSPERFORMATPUBLICLYTRADEDCORPORATIONSDU
32、ETOMOREDIFFUSEDOWNERSHIPAMONGOLDERBUSINESSESWITHLARGERFAMILIES,HOWEVER,MONITORINGBYFAMILYMEMBERSWHOSEINTERESTSMAYNOTALWAYSBEALIGNEDSHOULDBELESSEFFECTIVETHANMONITORINGBYASOLEOWNERAGENCYCOSTSSHOULDINCREASEWITHTHENUMBEROFNONMANAGERSHAREHOLDERSASTHENUMBEROFSHAREHOLDERSINCREASES,THEFREERIDERPROBLEMREDUCE
33、STHEINCENTIVESFORLIMITEDLIABILITYSHAREHOLDERSTOMONITORWITHLESSMONITORING,AGENCYCOSTSINCREASEHENCE,WEHYPOTHESIZETHATTHEEXPENSEANDASSETUTILIZATIONRATIOSSHOULDBEPOSITIVELYANDNEGATIVELYRELATEDTOTHENATURALLOGARITHMOFONEPLUSTHENUMBEROFNONMANAGINGSHAREHOLDERS,RESPECTIVELYFINALLY,AGENCYCOSTSSHOULDBEHIGHERAT
34、FIRMSMANAGEDBYANOUTSIDERTHISRELATIONSHIPFOLLOWSDIRECTLYFROMTHEAGENCYTHEORYOFJENSENANDMECKLING1976ASNOTEDABOVE,THISISTHEEXTREMECASEWHERETHEMANAGERGAINS100PERCENTOFPERQUISITECONSUMPTION,BUTLITTLEOFTHEFIRMSPROFITS译文代理成本和股权结构资料来源财务杂志2000年2月第1期作者JAMESSANG,REBELACOLE,ANDJAMESWUHLIN1、小企业的代理成本与上市公司相比，小企业与代理
35、成本的程式化理论模型描述的公司类型更相近，由JENSEN和MECKLING1976提出。一种极端的股东与管理者结构是公司中管理者拥有100的股权。这些公司，他们的解释是没有代理成本。另外一种极端是管理者作为被支付的受雇者在公司中没有股票。处在公司的两者间的是管理者持有一部分股权，但不是公司的所有。代理成本的产生是当公司管理层与所有者的利益不一致时，采取的以减少股东财富的方式如在职消费的偏好，因懒惰而逃避工作，制定些不可更改的决定以谋取自身的利益。这些成本的巨大受限于所有者是否很好地授权第三方如银行往来监督外部管理者的行为。为了论证这个事实，假设这些公司是由一个所有者持有100的股票，但雇佣一个
36、外人去管理。一方面，代理成本由于独立所有者有权雇佣和解雇管理者使监督成本内在化而可能较小。更具体些，这样的所有者会招致100的监督成本由此收到由这个成本产生的100的收益。另一方面，独立所有者也许不能很好地监督由于相同原因雇佣的外部管理者，如他或她缺乏时间或者动力。小企业的所有者通常缺乏复杂的财务头脑，有可能没有能力执行任意的审计或完全理解经营或财务的结果。因此，这些公司出现了剩余的代理成本。如果这些成本是不可忽略的，他们就必须反映出所有者监督活动的失败之处。这个失败的潜在解释是所有者的不严格的监督以及缺乏可用的能充分监督的技术，在这种情况下，FAMA和JENSEN1983提出，管理者的作用（
37、实施和执行）和不参与管理的股东或所有者的控制作用（批准和监控）之间的分离，也许并不完整或有效的。因此，剩余代理成本在有外部管理者存在的独立所有公司中始终存在着。公司代理成本可归因于有股份的管理所有者存在不相一致的利益的分歧所引起。若股东的数量增加一个，所有权的所有人或管理者降低了，其中01。由于管理者将受益的100美元都用在津贴上，仅有的钱是公司利益上，因此用于少于100公司股权的管理者比起为公司所有股东扩大公司价值更有动机去在职消费。一种极端是管理者无股权（0），他可以获得100除工资以外的额外收入消费，但并不能获得公司收益的部分（假如薪金与公司业绩无关）。不参与管理的股东用于监控上的巨大开
38、支随着他们享有的私人所有权的下降而减少。这是由于在用于私用商品的消费时所产生的众所周知的免费搭车问题，如是否努力监控。每个监督的股东，和所有者I必然会产生100的监控成本，但是仅收到I的监控效益（以代理成本减少的形式）。然而一个不参与监控的股东更喜欢股东的监控活动不产生任何监控成本下所享有的完全收益。因此，当不参与管理的股东数量增加时，监控的总费用会降低，同时巨大的所有管理者的代理成本问题会增加。在股东间考虑这种关于公司将不能支付银行的负债或使来自于同样的或新的投资者其未来的财务安全关系增长的可能性的抵消时，将会产生一些代理行为上的限制。然而，如WILLIAMS（1987）写到，当公司没有面临
39、即将发生的破产危机时这些代理行为的抗衡力量将会有效地下降。总言之，针对这种无效性假设代理成本独立于股权控制结构，当与基础假设比较时，我们假定以下源于代理理论的假设发生过（I）管理者不拥有公司主权的公司代理成本较高，（II）管理者拥有所有者所有权的公司代理成本相反，和（III）代理成本随着不参与管理的股东数量的增加而增加。II数据我们传统的方法是用两个关于代理成本的基本假设（1）一个被拥有100控股的股东管理的公司产生零代理成本，和（2）代理成本能基于公司绩效的不一致和与公司绩效的完全一致的不同之处来衡量。为了用这种方法测量代理成本，我们需要出入必要的数据（I）公司绩效测量的数据；（2）公司所有
40、者结果的数据，包括一些管理者100持股的公司；和（III）可控变量的数据，包括公司规模，特征及监控技术。在这些数据中，最需要的可用项目是（II）因为独立控股公司尤其没有公众列示，是因为美国私有公司的财务数据通常不对外公开。国家小企业财务调查联邦调查局，幸运地提供了私有公司的财务信息，包括他们的股权结构，和一系列完全由管理者拥有的公司。最终，我们用来自于NSSBF的数据来测量代理成本。NSSBF是一个由联邦调查局主导的用于收集关于小企业信息的调查，由于数据有效性的限制，它在学术理论界几乎完全被忽略掉。这个调查从4637个公司样本中收集了详细的信息被广泛地用来代表在1992年末大约500万美国运营的非农业和财务的小企业。COLE和WOLKEN（1995）提供了关于从NSSBF来的有效数据的详细信息。对于这项研究，我们把分析限制在小企业，从控股股权，管理方式，股东内部大小，外部股东的监控、规模和财务信息方面进行信息收集。我们致力于缩小公司独立的财务报表尤其是和个人与企业的资金联系在一起的相关的问题。我们将合作者和被S的公司提出掉，因为不同于C类公司，它们没有企业税收，这可能会导致企业所有者的激励方式更加以分散股权或发放红利的方式代替工资费用的形式，这是因为该公司在这种水平下无需双重课税。
