1、1外文翻译LEGALREGIMES,AUDITQUALITYANDINVESTMENTMATERIALSOURCETHEACCOUNTINGREVIEWVOL72,NO3JULY1997PP385406AUTHORRACHELSCHWARTZIINTRODUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPAPERISTOEXPLORETHEIMPACTOFAUDITORSLEGALLIABILITYONAUDITQUALITYANDINVESTMENTTHEANALYSISEXTENDSTHECURRENTLITERATUREONAUDITORSLIABILITYUNDERFEDERALSECUR
2、ITIESLAWSBYSHOWINGHOWDAMAGEMEASURESCANDIRECTLYAFFECTLEVELSOFINVESTMENTSSPECIFICALLY,ISHOWTHATEVENTHOUGHAUDITORSLIABILITYCANIMPROVETHEAUDITQUALITYWHICHCOULDPROMOTESOCIALLYOPTIMALINVESTMENTS,ALIABILITYREGIMETHATINCLUDESANIMPROPERDAMAGEMEASURESUCHASTHETYPICALOUTOFPOCKETMEASURECURRENTLYUSEDINDUCESEXCESS
3、IVEINVESTMENTPREVIOUSLITERATUREONAUDITORSLIABILITYHASGENERALLYFOCUSEDONTHEIMPACTOFLIABILITYRULESONAUDITQUALITYEG,BALACHANDRANANDNAGARAJAN1987DYE1993MELUMADANDTHOMAN1990NARAYANAN1994NELSONETAL1988PALMROSE1994SCHWARTZ1997SMITHANDTIDRICK1997THEMODELSDESCRIBEANEQUILIBRIUMPHENOMENONFORAUDITINGEFFORTANIMP
4、LICITASSUMPTIONINTHESESTUDIESISTHATBECAUSEHIGHERAUDITQUALITYPROVIDESBETTERINFORMATIONTOINVESTORS,THELEGALREGIMETHATINDUCESTHEHIGHESTAUDITQUALITYALSOGENERATESTHEMOSTEFFICIENTINVESTMENTALTHOUGHBETTERINFORMATIONALLOWSINVESTORSTOMAKEMOREEFFICIENTINVESTMENTS,WECANNOTASSUMETHATTHEBETTERINFORMATIONINDUCEDB
5、YLEGALLIABILITYISALSOSUFFICIENTTOGUARANTEEASOCIALLYOPTIMALLEVELOFINVESTMENTLIABILITYPAYMENTSTHATMOTIVATEAUDITORSTOWORKHARDAREBASICALLYTRANSFERPAYMENTSFROMAUDITORSTOINVESTORSIFINVESTORSCANAFFECTTHEAMOUNTOFTHESEPAYMENTSBYALTERINGTHEIRINVESTMENTLEVELS,THENTHELEGALREGIMEMAYDISTORTTHEEFFICIENCYOFINVESTME
6、NTDECISIONSISHOWHERETHATWITHTHEOUTOFPOCKETMEASUREOFDAMAGESTHECURRENTBASISFORDETERMININGLIABILITYPAYMENTSOFAUDITORSTHEINVESTMENTLEVELEXCEEDSTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALLEVELOFINVESTMENTTHISKEYPOINTINDICATESTHATITISINAPPROPRIATETORANKLEGALREGIMESONLYINTERMSOFTHEAUDITQUALITYAMORECOMPLETEANALYSISSHOULDEXAMINETHEI
7、MPLICATIONSFORINVESTMENTDECISIONSANDTHERESULTINGSOCIALWELFARE,ANDINCLUDEATLEASTTHETWOCOMPONENTSOFLIABILITYRULESANDDAMAGEMEASURES2TWORECENTSTUDIESREFLECTTHEINTERACTIONBETWEENPENALTIES,AUDITQUALITYANDINVESTMENTSARESARATHANDWOLFSON1993ANDSHIBANO1995SARATHANDWOLFSON1993MODELTHEEFFECTOFAUDITINGONTHEVOLUM
8、EOFTRADE,ANDIMPOSEPENALTIESTOENSUREA“REASONABLELEVELOFAUDITEFFORT“THEYFINDTHATANINCREASEINTHEPENALTIESTYPICALLYLEADSTOAHIGHERQUALITYAUDITHOWEVER,AHIGHERQUALITYAUDITDOESNOTNECESSARILYINCREASETHEVALUEOFTRADESHIBANO1995INVESTIGATESTHEEFFECTOFINCREASINGAUDITORSLIABILITYONINVESTMENTSINAMODELWHERETHEAUDIT
9、ORSROLEISTOALLEVIATETHE“LEMONS“PROBLEMTHEAUDITORMAKESAREPORTINGDECISIONHIGH/LOWBUTCANNOTVARYTHELEVELOFAUDITEFFORTTHEINVESTMENTDECISIONISTOEITHERINVESTORNOTINVEST,BUTTHELEVELOFINVESTMENTDOESNOTVARYSHIBANO1995SHOWSTHATINSUCHAMODELHIGHERLIABILITYCAUSESTHEAUDITORTOBEMORECONSERVATIVEISSUEALOWREPORTMOREOF
10、TENCONSEQUENTLY,AHIGHERLIABILITYREDUCESTHEFREQUENCYOFINVESTMENTSMYANALYSISDIFFERSFROMTHESEPAPERSINTWOWAYSFIRST,MYMODELONAUDITQUALITYINCORPORATESALLTHEINVESTMENTLEVELASENDOGENOUSCHOICEVARIABLESSECOND,IEXPLICITLYMODELTHEINTERACTIONBETWEENDAMAGEMEASURESANDLIABILITYRULESISHOWTHATBOTHTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALIN
11、VESTMENTANDTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALAUDITEFFORTCANBEINDUCEDBYASTRICTLIABILITYRULEWITHADAMAGEMEASURETHATISINDEPENDENTOFTHEACTUALINVESTMENTTHESTRICTLIABILITYRULEINDUCESTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALEFFORT,ANDADAMAGEMEASUREINDEPENDENTOFINVESTMENTRESULTSINTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALINVESTMENTTHERESTOFTHEPAPERISORGANIZEDASFOLLOWSIN
12、SECTIONII,IPRESENTTHEMODELANDFINDASOCIALLYOPTIMALCOMBINATIONOFAUDITQUALITYANDINVESTMENTTHEANALYSISINTHISSECTIONCANNOTCAPTURETHEINCENTIVESOFAUDITORSANDINVESTORSRATHER,THISANALYSISISUSEDTOBENCHMARKAUDITEFFORTANDINVESTMENTUNDERALTERNATIVELEGALREGIMESWHICHDOCAPTUREAUDITORANDINVESTORINCENTIVESTHEAUDITQUA
13、LITYANDINVESTMENTLEVELSINDUCEDBYTHECURRENTLEGALREGIMETHATCONSISTSOFAVAGUENEGLIGENCELIABILITYRULEWITHANOUTOFPOCKETDAMAGEMEASUREAREDERIVEDINSECTIONIIIINSECTIONIV,IEXPLORESTRICTLIABILITYASANALTERNATIVELIABILITYRULEWITHTWODIFFERENTDAMAGEMEASURESTHATDEPENDUPONTHELEVELOFINVESTMENTNONEOFTHELEGALREGIMESINSE
14、CTIONSIIIANDIVOBTAINTHEOPTIMALLEVELSOFAUDITEFFORTANDINVESTMENTTHATWEREFOUNDINSECTIONIIIPRESENTTHEREGIMESTHATCANINDUCESOCIALOPTIMUMINSECTIONVASUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONSAREPROVIDEDINSECTIONVIINTHISPAPER,IPROVIDETWOCONTRIBUTIONSTOTHELITERATUREONAUDITORSLEGALLIABILITYFIRST,IINDICATETHATHIGHAUDITQUALITYISNOTS
15、UFFICIENTTOGUARANTEEALEVEL3OFSOCIALLYOPTIMALINVESTMENT,ARANKINGOFLIABILITYREGIMESONTHEBASISOFTHEAUDITQUALITYALONEMAYBEMISLEADINGSECOND,IIDENTIFYTHEDAMAGEMEASUREASAMAINSOURCEOFINVESTMENTINEFFICIENCY,THUSHIGHLIGHTINGITASANIMPORTANTCOMPONENTOFLEGALREGIMESDAMAGEMEASURESTHATVARYWITHTHEINVESTMENTLEVEL,SUC
16、HASTHEOUTOFPOCKETMEASUREUSEDINTHECURRENTAUDITORSLIABILITYREGIME,CREATEAFORMOFINSURANCEWHICHINDUCESEXCESSIVEINVESTMENTANILLUSTRATIVEEXAMPLETHATCOMPARESTHEFOURLEGALREGIMESTHATWEREDISCUSSEDINTHISPAPERISPROVIDEDINAPPENDIXAAUDITORSCURRENTLEGALREGIME,CONSISTINGOFVAGUENEGLIGENCEWITHANOUTOFPOCKETDAMAGEMEASU
17、RE,PREVENTSANEQUILIBRIUMPHENOMENONOFSOCIALLYOPTIMALLEVELSOFAUDITQUALITYANDINVESTMENTASUBOPTIMALAUDITQUALITYISCREATEDBYAVAGUEDEFINITIONOFDUECAREASUBOPTIMALINVESTMENTLEVELRESULTSFROMTHEOUTOFPOCKETDAMAGEMEASUREASOCIALOPTIMUMOFAUDITQUALITYANDINVESTMENTREQUIRESANALTERNATIVELEGALREGIMEPROVIDING2PROPOSITIO
18、NSTOINSIGHTINTOWHYAUDITORSLIABILITYISCURRENTLYDETERMINEDBYTHENEGLIGENCERULEWHILEPRODUCTLIABILITYISSUBJECTTOTHESTRICTLIABILITYRULEIFSTRICTLIABILITYISIMPOSEDWITHTHEOUTOFPOCKETDAMAGEMEASURE,INVESTORSARECOMPENSATEDFORTHEIRINITIALINVESTMENT,ANDWILLBEMOTIVATEDTOINVESTASIFTHEIRINVESTMENTHADNOPROBABILITYOFB
19、ADOUTCOMESASTRICTLIABILITYRULECANLEADTOTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALAUDIT,PROVIDEDDAMAGESARESETATTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALINVESTMENTLEVELINVESTMENTSWILLOCCURATTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALLEVELIFDAMAGESDONOTVARYWITHTHELEVELOFINVESTMENTHENCE,ALTERNATIVELEGALREGIMESTHATCONSISTOFDAMAGESTHATARESETINDEPENDENTOFTHEACTUALINVESTMENT,CA
20、NACHIEVESOCIALOPTIMUMUNDERASTRICTLIABILITYRULE,DAMAGESSHOULDBEMADEEQUALLYTOTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALINVESTMENT,INDEPENDENTOFTHEACTUALINVESTMENT,INORDERTOCAUSESOCIALOPTIMUMINDUCINGTHESOCIALLYOPTIMALAUDITEFFORTANDINVESTMENTUNDERTHEVAGUENEGLIGENCELIABILITYRULEREQUIRESIOIDAMAGESPAYMENTSTHATARESETTOBALANCETHECO
21、NFLICTINGEFFORTEFFECTSTHATAREELICITEDBYTHEVAGUENEGLIGENCELIABILITYRULESETTINGTHE“CORRECT“DAMAGEAMOUNTTHATWOULDINDUCETHESOCIALLYOPTIMALEFFORTUNDERTHEVAGUENEGLIGENCERULEAPPEARSTOIMPOSEMUCHGREATERINFORMATIONALREQUIREMENTSONTHECOURTSTHANISNEEDEDUNDERTHESTRICTLIABILITYRULETHUS,ALTHOUGHTHEVAGUENEGLIGENCER
22、ULECANELICITTHESOCIALOPTIMUM,THEEXCESSIVEINFORMATIONNECESSARYTOIMPLEMENTANAPPROPRIATEVAGUENEGLIGENCEREGIMEMAYMAKEITLESSDESIRABLETHANTHEREGIMEOFSTRICTLIABILITYWITHTHEIOIDAMAGEMEASUREADIFFERENTAPPROACHTOSOLVINGTHEINCENTIVESPROBLEMSOFPLAINTIFFSANDDEFENDANTS4ISSUGGESTEDBYPOLINSKYANDCHE1991INTHEFORMOFDEC
23、OUPLINGLIABILITYINADECOUPLEDLIABILITYSYSTEMTHEAWARDTOTHEPLAINTIFFDIFFERSFROMTHEPAYMENTMADEBYTHEDEFENDANTINTHEAUDITINGCONTEXTANIMPLEMENTATIONOFDECOUPLEDLIABILITYTHATWOULDRESULTINSOCIALLYOPTIMALCHOICESOFAUDITEFFORTANDINVESTMENTREQUIRESIMPOSINGOUTOFPOCKETDAMAGESONTHEAUDITOR,WHILEAWARDINGZERODAMAGESTOTH
24、EINVESTORSMYMODELINVESTIGATEDSETTINGSINWHICHTHEREAREONLYTWONATURESWHICHPROBABLYEXISTONEOFTHEIMPLICATIONSOFTHISSIMPLIFYINGASSUMPTIONISTHATTHEAUDITORSCHOICEREDUCESTOACHOICEOFEFFORTLEVEL,ANDTHEDOMINANTREPORTINGSTRATEGYISALWAYSTOREPORTTRUTHFULLYANINTERESTINGEXTENSIONOFTHISRESEARCHCOULDEXPLOREMORETHANTWO
25、POSSIBLESTATESOFNATUREINSUCHANEXTENSION,THEAUDITORWOULDMAKENONTRIVIALCHOICESOFEFFORTANDREPORTINGSTRATEGIES译文法律制度，审计质量和投资资料来源THEACCOUNTINGREVIEWVOL72,NO3JULY1997PP385406作者施瓦兹雷切尔I介绍本文的目的是探讨审计人员在审计质量和投资方面的法律责任影响力。这分析扩展了关于审计员的责任方面的相关文献,在联邦证券法下展示如何通过损害的方法可直接影响投资的水平。具体地说,我觉得即使审计师的责任可提高审计工作的质量,能够促进社会的最优投资，
26、但责任制度包括财产损失的措施（如目前使用的典型的实际测量）所引发的过度投资。关于审计人员过去的文献通常聚焦于审计质量责任规则的影响（比如，1987年BALACHANDRANANDNAGARAJAN；1993年DYE；1990年MELUMADANDTHOMAN；1994年NARAYANAN；1988年NELSONETAL；1994年PALMROSE；1997年SCHWARTZ；1997年SMITHANDTIDRICK）。该模型描述了一个为审计平衡而努力的现象。在这些研究中隐含的假设是因为更高的审计质量提供更好的信息给投资者,法律制度促进了最高的审计质量也产生最有效的投资。虽然更好的信息允许投资者
27、作出更高效的投资,但我们不能想当然地认为,通过法律责任来产生更好的信息也足以保证社会最优的投资水平。责任激发了审计人员努力工作的积极性，基本上是从审计人员转移支付给投资者。如果投资者可以通过这些补贴的金额来改变他们的投资水5平,那么法律制度可能会扭曲投资决策的效率。我在这里展示的实际测量是在破坏现有的基础上,确定审计责任支付的投资水平超过社会最优的投资水平。这个重点指出,只有在审计质量方面才是不适当地把法律制度分等。一个更为完整的分析应该检查投资决策的影响和所造成的社会福利,至少包括责任规则和损伤措施这两个组成部分。最近的两项研究反映了惩罚之间相互作用的力度,审计质量和投资是1993年SARA
28、TH和WOLFSON和1995年SHIBANO写的。1993年SARATHANDWOLFSON在贸易额上塑造审计的影响力,利用罚款以确保“审计努力的合理等级”。他们发现,增加处罚将代表性地趋向更高质量的审计。然而,更高质量的审计不一定增加贸易的价值。1995年SHIBANO进行了调查研究,在提高审计人员的责任上的投资将作为模范在审计师的角色中就是缓解“柠檬”问题。审计人员作报告的决心高/低,但不能改变审计努力的水平。投资决策是要么投资或不投资,但投资水平没有变化。1995年SHIBANO表明在这样一个模型中更高的责任会使审计师更保守发布的报告质量低经常性地；因此,一个更高的责任将降低投资的频率
29、。我的分析在两个方面不同于这些论文。首先,我的模型的审计质量,合并了所有的投资水平选择作为内生变量。其次,我明确了模型损害措施和责任规则之间的交互作用。我表明,严格责任规则的伤害措施所引起的两岸社会最优投资和社会最优审计努力的成果,它是独立的实际投资。接下来的文章组织如下。在第二部分,我将该模型找到一个社会最优相结合的审计工作的质量和投资。在第三部分分析不能捕捉审计师和投资者的动机，相反,这种分析用于基准审计投入金钱和精力,选择法律制度下捕捉审计师和投资者的奖励。在第四部分，目前的法律制度诱导审计工作的质量和投资水平,由一个模糊的过失责任规则和一个实际损害测量。第五部分，我严格探索责任作为替代
30、责任规则和那些依赖于投资水平的两种不同的伤害。所有的法律制度用于第III部分和第IV部分，我们在第II部分还包含获得最优水平的审计的努力和投资。我提出的政权会引起社会最适宜的情况在第VI部分。在第VI部分提供了概述和结论。本文中，我提供了两次审计师的法律责任的文学贡献。首先,我表明是因为高审计质量并不足够保障社会最优投资水平均责任制度,根据审计质量可能造成误导。其次,我损伤识别指标上的投资效率低下的主要来源,从而强调这是法律制度的重要组成部分。伤害措施随着投资水平的变化,如实际测量用现有的审计人员责任制度,创造一种保险导致过度投资的制度。以一个数值例子比较四法律制度,本文论述了提供说明文档在A
31、附录。审计师的当前的法律制度,由模糊的过失伤害措施来防止现金平衡社会上6的最佳水平来提高审计质量和投资。一个次优审计质量是创造一种模糊的定义得到应有的谨慎,投资水平结果从实际损伤的措施。一个社会最优的审计质量和投资需要另一种法律制度，提供了洞察为什么审计师的责任是目前取决于疏忽规则而产品责任是受严格责任规则。如果严格责任与实际损害征收补偿措施,投资者的初始投资,投资将会激发他们的投资没有概率的坏的结果。一个严格责任规则可以引导社会最优审计,但在损害社会最优投资水平。投资将发生在社会最优层次损害并不随以水平的投资。因此,其他的法律制度是由独立的损害的实际投资,可以实现社会的最佳状态。在严格责任规
32、则下的损害应该等于社会最优投资,它独立于实际的投资,以引起社会的最佳状态。促进社会最优审计投入金钱和精力,在模糊的过失责任规定要求IOI支付损害的冲突的努力来平衡结构的影响,由模糊的过失责任规则。设置“正确的”的伤害量下引导社会最优努力不明确的过失实施双头更大的信息需求比需要在法庭在严格责任规则。因此,虽然模糊的疏忽规则可以引发社会最优,过多的必要的信息,实现一个合适的模糊的疏忽体制可以使它不如的政权的严格责任IOI损伤的措施。一种不同的方法解决这一激励计划的问题就提示原告和被告POLINSKY和车婉婉1991的形式责任。在责任制度这个奖项不同原告由被诉人支付货款。在审计上下文一个完整的责任,将会导致社会最优选择的审计投入金钱和精力,损害于实际实施需要时,也会颁发审计人员零损害投资者。我的模型在只有两种可能状态的性质的研究的设置。我们的精简的假设是,审计师的选择减少努力水平的选择,占主要地位的报告策略报告一定是真实的。一个有趣的扩展这项研究能探测两个以上的可能状态的性质。在这样的扩张,审计师将非平凡努力的选择和报告策略。7
